Worship and Religiously Motivated Discrimination
Appendix 4. Subject pool and ethnic differences in pro-social behavior
Socio-economic descriptive statistics based on the pre-experiment survey show that participants in Jimma were about three years younger than in Addis Ababa with 23.8 years compared to 26.4 years of age (insignificant; see Table 2). There were 28% female participants in Addis Ababa and 25% in Jimma. Education levels ranged on average between high school and college for both cities, which can be considered as quite high compared to the national level, at which only 15.7%
attend secondary education (UNICEF, 2013). The high education level of our subjects may be due to the fact that the study was carried out in urban centers. Monthly incomes were typically in the range of 0–1,000 Birr or 1,000–3,000 Birr and were slightly higher on average than the national mean yearly per capita income of 550 USD / 11,571 Birr (The World Bank, 2015).
Comparing means of the two different study groups (before and after church) within cities, no significant differences can be found, attesting, thus, that the randomization did not cause any biases.
Since Ethiopia is a highly diverse country not only regarding religion but also ethnicities, a deeper look into the ethnic composition of the sample population can contribute to the interpretation of results. The data shows that our sample from Jimma has a considerably higher diversity of ethnicities compared to Addis Ababa, with 21.85 % not being part of one of the four major ethnic groups Amhara, Oromo, Tigray or Gurage. In Addis only 2.84% do not belong to one of these major ethnic groups. Interpreted together with the previously described statistics regarding the contact to and opinions about other religions, the higher ethnic diversity could also be an indicator of the higher tolerance levels displayed by individuals in Jimma.
Regarding mean transfer levels in the dictator game, Oromo transfer significantly less in Jimma compared to Addis Ababa (significant at the 5% level). Tigray, Gurage and other ethnic groups in Jimma transfer more compared to Addis Ababa, however, not at statistically significant levels.
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Table A5. Ethnic composition of the sample and mean transfers in the dictator game, disaggregated by ethnicity
Addis Jimma
sample share (in
%)
mean transfer in dictator game
sample share (in
%)
mean transfer in dictator game
National Share (census 2007, in
%)
Amhara 53.9 27.36 41.72 25.07 26.89
Oromo 15.60 30.45 26.49 24 * 34.49
Tigray 16.31 23.91 6.62 34 6.0
Gurage 11.35 27.95 3.31 34 2.53
Others 2.84 15 21.85 24.84 30.09
* denotes a 5% significant difference between Addis Ababa and Jimma, Mann-Whitney U tests.
148 Appendix 5. Behavior in the trust game
After the end of the dictator game, subjects in our experiment also played a one-shot version of the trust game. We randomly allocated our subjects to the role of sender or receiver. In the trust game we applied the strategy method for receivers and randomized the role of the sender and the receiver within each session. Sender and receiver were endowed with 80 Birr each. Senders were asked to decide how much of their endowment they would like to transfer to a receiver outside of the session (in steps of 10 from 0 to 80). The amount was doubled by the experimenter for the receiver. Receivers were asked to decide how much they would like to transfer back for each of the 9 possible amounts (0 to 160 in steps of 20) that they may have received from a sender outside of the session. This game is commonly used to measure trusting and trustworthy behavior (measured by the amount transferred by the sender and by the receiver, respectively).
Descriptive statistics of the senders’ transfer decisions in the trust game in Addis Ababa reveal a similar pattern as described in the case of the dictator game. However, differences in means are not statistically significant, which may be due to the different roles (sender and receiver in the trust game) assumed by participants in our between-subjects design, largely reducing the sample size. While in the before-church setting the mean transfer to Orthodox Christian individuals is 39.5 Birr, the mean transfer to Muslim individuals is only 32.37 Birr (p=0.34, Mann-Whitney U test; N=58). In the after-church setting transfers to Muslim individuals increase and transfers show a balanced pattern across in-group and out-group (32.5 Birr to Christian names and 32.3 Birr to Muslim names; p=0.96, Mann-Whitney U test; N=58). These findings are corroborated in the regressions of Table A6.
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Figure A2: Trust Game: Mean transfers Player A
In the city of Jimma, no significant differences in mean transfers can be found in either of the two samples (before and after church), hence we cannot detect a discrimination reducing effect of worship since discrimination is not present to begin with. The same is true of the decisions of individuals allocated to the role of the receiver, which form our measure of trustworthiness (see the regressions in Table A7).
020406080
Mean Transfer
Before After
Christian Muslim
Addis Ababa
020406080
Mean Transfer
Before After
Christian Muslim
Jimma
150
Table A6. Transfers in the trust game
Addis Ababa Jimma
(1) (2)
Expectation 0.459*** 0.326***
(0.074) (0.056)
Muslim recipient -14.462 5.201
(10.124) (5.519)
After church -4.303 -0.304
(10.196) (6.825)
Muslim recipient x After church 7.144 -11.123
(12.086) (8.780)
Constant 28.002*** 20.107***
(3.204) (2.033)
No. of observations 116 100
No. of censored observations (left/right) 23/18 11/9
F-test on the restriction:
Muslim recipient + Muslim recipient x
After church =0 p= 0.332 p= 0.387
Notes. Tobit regressions with church fixed effects. Dependent variable is the first mover’s transfer in the trust game, left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 80. Expectation refers to the stated expectation of the first mover in the trust game about the backtransfer by the second mover. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1
151
Table A7. Backtransfers in the trust game (average trustworthiness following strategy method)
Addis Ababa Jimma
(1) (2)
Expectation 0.119 0.235
(0.133) (0.156)
Muslim recipient 5.264 -7.998
(9.750) (11.536)
After church 2.892 -12.965
(9.828) (11.159)
Muslim recipient x After church 2.839 16.437
(15.192) (15.305)
Constant 40.528*** 55.912***
(15.000) (15.125)
No. of observations 89 77
F-test on the restriction:
Muslim recipient + Muslim recipient x After church =0
p= 0.508 p= 0.407
Notes. Linear regressions including church fixed effects. Expectation refers to the stated expectation of the second mover in the trust game about the actual transfer received by the first mover. *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1.
152 Appendix 6. Aditional information on recruitment
The most important information from our recruitment flyer was:
“The research activity in your community will be on: ____________________________
Beginning time: ….. [or …….]
Note: We will schedule the activities in a way that you will be able to attend church before or after the activity.
Place: ________________________________
As a reminder of our appointment, we would like to call you or send you a text message one day before the workshop. In this message we will also tell you if you are invited to Group A [time] or Group B [time] on [Date]. Can you please give us your phone number.”
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