Statement of the Problem - The Role of International Law in Intrastate Oil and Gas Governance i

biodiversities and the wider environmental wellbeing, enforcing the high standards of the corporate responsibility and the compliance on the part of the investing companies to ensure that the anticipation of the wealth from Tanzania’s natural gas does not intensify the land insecurity, and other social conflicts.³⁰ To address the above issues require sound policies, legal and institutional frameworks that will ensure wide public participation and transparency in the decision-making.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The United Nations General Assembly played a decisive role during the debates on the evolution of the principle over natural resources sovereignty and governance. It created the platform through which states engaged in the debates regarding the equitable utilisation of natural resources. The adoption of the UNGA resolutions was a mile step towards the realisation of equitable interstate natural resource governance. However, the role of international law in the contemporary intrastate natural resource governance has received minimal attention.³¹ This is exacerbated by the fact that the oil and gas industry is one of the complex industries to govern due to the nature of contending interests involved and the amount of intensive financial investments required.³²

30 For instance, in the year 2013, there were series of riots, destruction of properties and some incident of death reported in some parts of Mtwara and Lindi where the oil and gas discoveries were made. The statements from the local government officials, law-enforcement agencies such as the judiciary and police, international and national civil society organisations (CSOs), the media, traditional institutions and religious leaders, were clear manifestation of the contention between resource owners and multinational national companies. see also The East African, Mtwara Protests Expose Gaps in Oil and Gas, Mineral Laws Management, 3rd February, 2013, The East African, Local Turn to Protests for a Larger Share of Mining Revenue, 5th January, 2013.

31 Schrijver N.J., Sovereignty over Natural Resources, (1997), p. 311. For critical discussion see Miranda Lilian Aponte, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource, (2012) p 803; Duruigbo Emeka, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural Resources in International, (2006).

32 The interests include the host states legitimate desire to generate revenue out of their endowed natural resources, multinational extractive companies, financial institutions desire to generate

The contemporary natural resources governance discourse is not concerned much about who owns the resources, but rather how the states endowed with natural resources can utilise them for their people's benefits. The effective natural resource governance depends on a concerted cooperation of all stakeholders involved. The envisaged cooperation is in two folds. Firstly, is the international and the transnational legal cooperation between the resource-rich states "host states" and the multinational extractive companies' states "home states".

Secondly which run from the first, is to address the host states domestic challenges on the policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks and take on board the international and transnational legislative measures to enhance intrastate natural resource governance.

As for the international and transnational legislative measures, the approaches taken by the home states transnational legislative measures on accounting and disclosure and the voluntary initiatives through transparency and accountability are narrow. This is because, their main focus is on the revenue inflow i.e., the disclosure of the payments made by the extractive companies to the host governments.³³ However, natural resource governance is not concerned only with the revenue inflow rather there are other important aspects along the resource value chain, in particular, the oil and gas industry which complete the natural resources governance jigsaw puzzle. These aspects include the allocation of a license permit for extraction, the award of contracts, fiscal regime, and environmental protection, among others.

In addition, the financial investment required in the oil and gas industry is intensive and therefore, cannot be catered for by the local financial institutions. It is rather catered for by the international financial institutions located in the home

profit from natural resources extraction, and home states of multinational extractive companies and financial institutions desire to generate income from taxation of their respective activities.

33 See the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act - USA); the Directive 2013/34/EU on Accounting and Disclosure; the Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act 2014 ESTMA - Canada); and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI).

states of the multinational extractive companies. Also, the multinational extractive companies are complex to manage due to their structural formation. They operate through subsidiaries incorporated in different jurisdictions and some are in the tax havens. The financial investments and the multi-jurisdictional operations call for the setting of the rules regulating and controlling the operations of their respective activities. This is, in particular, without the rules, some of the activities are schemed to stage and facilitate tax avoidance, tax evasion, aggressive tax planning, cross-border corrupt transactions, and money laundering, among others, which fall beyond the host states investigatory and prosecutorial jurisdictions.

At the domestic level, things are not at ease either; there are fragmented and competing intrastate policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks in the oil and gas industry without clear coordination and harmonisation. Firstly, the national development plans which are implemented through the policies are envisioned towards the National Development Vision-2025 which envisage to make Tanzania a middle-income country. However, the Long Term Perspective Plan, a special purpose vehicle, implementing the National Development Vision 2025 does not seem to be in harmony with the laws and the National Natural Gas Policy 2013 as a necessary driving force.

Secondly, the enactment of the Petroleum Act 2015, the Tanzania Extractive Industry (Transparency and Accountability) Act 2015, and the Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act 2015 for the purpose, supposedly, of updating and consolidating the existing legislation in the oil and gas industry is not in harmony with pre-existed oil and gas legal and regulatory frameworks. For instance, prior to the enactment of these laws, the government had already entered into 28 Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with 18 companies over prime oil and gas blocks. Each individual PSA creates its separate legal and regulatory framework of the oil and gas industry along the resource value chain. Therefore, there are parallel and, at times, the possibilities of overlapping applicable legal

and regulatory frameworks, i.e., the enacted legislation and the individual production sharing agreement governing oil and gas industry.³⁴

Thirdly, in a wake of the completion of the legal, institutional, and regulatory paradoxes, the National Assembly enacted two legislations, namely the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017.³⁵ The former Act empowers the National Assembly to review all agreements (oil and gas), arrangements for the exploitation, extraction, and the use of natural resources entered by the government ³⁶ while the latter empowers the National Assembly, through resolution, to direct the government to review and re-negotiate the terms of all agreements or arrangements considered by the National Assembly unconscionable.³⁷ In addition, the Act provides the dichotomous provision to the effect that once the government commence re-negotiation of the terms of the agreement with a party in compliance with the resolution of the National Assembly, whether or not the agreement is reached

34 Section 261 (3) of the Petroleum Act 2015 provides that all agreement entered into by using the repealed Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1980 shall be deemed to have been entered into by using the newly enacted law and shall continue to be in force until lawfully determined. The effect of this law is that there is likelihood of contradictions between the terms contained in the individual Production Sharing Agreements and the provisions of the Petroleum Act in so far as the interpretation and enforcement are concerned. This is, in particular, where the terms contained in Production Sharing Agreements do not comply with the legal requirements provided for under the Petroleum Act. In addition, section 27 of the Tanzania Extractive Industry (Transparency and Accountability) Act 2015 provides that all mineral agreements, production sharing agreements or any other agreements signed prior to coming into operation of the Act, shall be subjected to disclosure required under the Act, except where the information is confidential as may be determined by the Tanzania Extractive Industry Transparency Committee established under the Act. However, the Act does not define information deemed confidential, thus, leaving it to discretionary powers of the committee.

35 Acts no 5 and 6 of 2017 respectively, It is argued and rightly so, imposition of another regulatory framework over existing one makes investment environment volatile, more so, when the new regulatory regime entrench strict provisions which render the implementation of the regulatory frameworks in the Production Sharing Agreements a nugatory.

36 See section 12 of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, No. 5 of 2017.

37 See sections 4 (1), 5 (1) - (3) and 6 (1) of the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, No. 6 of 2017.

between parties, such terms shall cease to have effect and shall be treated as having been expunged from the impugned contract.³⁸

Fourthly, the oil and gas are exhaustible resources and deplete with time. Their proper extraction should be a determinant factor for the economic development of the resources-rich states, without which there is a risk that the future generations will not have an opportunity to benefit. Therefore, proceeds generated from the extraction should be invested in other dynamic sectors like the construction of infrastructures, agriculture, and manufacturing industries, among others. Such diversification creates a synergy between the extraction of natural resources for the sustainable development and the intergenerational responsibilities.³⁹ Equally, oil and gas extraction have impacts on the environment. The environmental damages do not only affect the states in whose territory they occur, but also the world as a whole. Therefore, states have the duty to refrain from using their natural resources in a way which can damage their neighbours and the world environment in general.⁴⁰

38 See section 7 (1) of the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, No. 6 of 2017. From the wording of the provision, one wonders if there is re-negotiation or review by parties if one of the parties has power than the other and that before the beginning of the review the final result is already pre-determined.

39 Johnson-Calari Jennifer, Rieltveld Malan, Sovereign wealth management; Central Banking publications, (2008), p. 180.

40 Tarlock Dan, A., Sustainable Development in Latin American Rainforests and the Role of Law:

Article: Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management; Texas International Law Journal; (1997); p.

43; Maggio Gregory, F., Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applications under International Law for Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources, Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, (1997), p. 204.

17 1.3 Objectives and Significance of the Study 1.3.1 Main Objective

The main objective of this study is to examine how the principle of international laws complement the intrastate policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks on the natural resource governance, in the oil and gas industry.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

1. To assess the legal and contractual frameworks between the multinational extractive companies and the government of the United Republic of Tanzania in order to see the extent to which their respective interests adversely affect the performance of natural resources sector contribution to the economy of the state.

2. To examine the Tanzanian policy, legal and institutional frameworks on natural resource governance and identify their respective strengths and weaknesses which have direct impacts on natural resource governance and to propose general and specific legal reforms aimed at enhancing oil and gas industry governance.

3. To explore how best the natural resources can be exploited in an economical and environmentally friendly manner that benefits the people as a whole and in particular the local communities where the natural resources are located and guarantee the sustainable development of the present and the future generations.

1.3.3 Significance of the Study

1. The study widens up the debate and the discourse on the role of international law on natural resource governance and addresses the emerging contemporary issues on intrastate natural resource governance.

2. The study harmonises the legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks by taking on board the international, transnational legal initiatives and domestic frameworks to enhancing intrastate natural resource governance through a wider participation of the public in terms of ownership and realisation of the benefits from the oil and gas resources.

3. The study adds to the existing literature on the natural resource governance, in particular, the narrowed scope of looking at natural resource governance from a revenue inflow perspective to a widened scope along the oil and gas resource value chain.

4. The study highlights, in the course of discussions, the setbacks and mistakes made in the mining sectors in Tanzania so that the same will be avoided in the future when framing the policy and laws governing the extraction of natural resources in the country.

1.4 Literature Review

Charles Riziki Majinge⁴¹ traces the historical development of the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources from the time when the United General Assembly passed and adopted the resolutions 523 and 626 in January and December 1952 respectively. The two resolutions recognise the importance of natural resources in the developing countries. The developing countries inspired by the Havana Charter,⁴² reaffirmed the protection and promotion of foreign investments premise on the terms and conditions determined by the host countries, seeking greater power to control their resources. Further, the need for the optimum utilisation of natural resources, and the quest for the economic sovereignty of the newly independent countries to determine their economic

41 Majinge Riziki Majinge, The Doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law and its Application in Developing Countries, (2010), pp. 235 – 268.

42 See the Final Act of the Havana Charter on International Trade Organization of 1948.

progress crystallised the debate on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources.⁴³ The author argues that the principle of PSNR was re-echoed in subsequent declarations and other human rights instruments.⁴⁴

The author adds that the challenge of the developing countries like Tanzania is how they can best exercise the right over sovereignty of their endowed abundant resources with the interests of the people at the centre of the equation. There are contending set of rights and obligations in relation to asserting recognition and respect of their inherent right over their natural resources, on the one hand and the incapacity of African mode of production, which, by and large, rely on the foreign expertise to exploit these resources, the quantity to be exploited and fixing prices for the exploited resources are all outside their control, on the other hand.⁴⁵

It is the author’s contention that the liberalisation policies that were put in place by the government of Tanzania to encourage the foreign and domestic investors in the mining sector were onerous. The author underscores that most of these policies were advocated by the World Bank to the African countries by repealing some of the stringent performance-related legislative measures in the mining

43 Majinge Riziki Charles, The Doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law and its Application in Developing Countries, (2010), p. 236.

44 Some of the General Assembly resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources include: Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 25 November 1966, 2386 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968, 3016 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, 3171 (XXVII) of 17 December 1973, 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 and 2692 (XXV) of 11 November 1970. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force on 23 March 1976 and International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force on 3rd January 1976; See also World Bank, Strategy for African Mining, Technical Paper No. 181, Washington DC, (1992).

45 For critical discussion see Alao Abiodum, The Tragedy of Endowment: Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa, (2007), pp. 120-145. See also, Cohen, N., The Curse of Black Gold: Oil is Bad News for a Country; Far from Bringing Prosperity, It is the Harbinger of Poverty, Malnutrition and oppressive Government, New States-Man, 2 June (2003).

industry which were deemed unfriendly to the investors.⁴⁶ Subsequently, there were major reforms/overhauls of legislation and policies governing the mining sector in Tanzania, supposedly, to heed to the World Bank advise. The policies and laws which were enacted encouraged tax holidays, low corporate taxation, exemption from customs and sales duties and reduced royalty. The results from these panaceas saw the mining sector contributing insignificantly to the national economy.⁴⁷

The author further cites corrupt practices by the highest government officials as a setback towards the contribution of the mining sector to the economic well-being and sustainable development of the people of Tanzania as a whole. He concludes by calling upon the developing countries to consider acquiring a significant stake in the administration and management of local subsidiaries of the foreign companies. The author argues that Members of Parliament should be involved in the negotiation of these multimillion contracts as the legitimate representative of the people.

The article highlights the application of the principle of PSNR in governing the mining sector in Tanzania. It also highlights the challenges encountered in balancing the interests of the resources endowed countries vis a vis foreign extractive investment companies. However, its scope is limited to mineral resources only and excludes the oil and gas resources which are subject of the study. It also does not give the solution on how the principle of international laws can be applied to enhance the intrastate resource governance in the oil and gas industry.

46 Majinge Riziki Charles, The Doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law and its Application in Developing Countries, (2010), p. 246.

47 Majinge Riziki Charles, The Doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in International Law and its Application in Developing Countries, (2010), p. 249. For further discussion of Tanzania investment in mining industry, see Peter, C.M., Miles Apart but Walking the Same Path: Control of Wealth and Natural Resources – Lessons from Nigeria and Tanzania, (2007).

Adelardus Lubango Kilangi⁴⁸ examines the application of the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in regulating the mining sector in Tanzania. The author expounds the principle by stating that it was developed following the complaint by the resource-rich developing countries regarding inequitable arrangements of the exploitation of their resources against the resource seeking developed countries. The author elaborates the principle by addressing the concerns of the resource-rich countries, thus, the rights to assert ownership of their resources, the right to exploit their resources, the right to manage and control the exploitation of the resources.

The author contends further that Tanzania is endowed with the abundant mineral resources which, if exploited equitably, could lead in the sustainable economic development of the people by improving the essential services in all walks of life.

The author argues that the resources-liberal approach that Tanzania has adopted contributes immensely to the poor performance of the mineral sector and thus the application of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources becomes a paradox. The author concludes that if Tanzania wants to

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