***
p!0.001;
**p!0.05;
*p ! 0.10;
+p ! 0.15
Information treatment: NoInfo Info NoInfo Info Diff. Returned††
Number of observations: n=793 n=854 n=632 n=683 n=936
Number of groups: 12 12 12 12 24
Intercept -3.994** 2.897** -4.238** 0.873 0.296
(1.769) (1.431) (1.700) (1.368) (0.579)
Amt. Sent by Same S 0.522*** 0.413*** 0.549*** 0.403***
(0.017) (0.031) (0.198) (0.030) Amt. Sent by Other S 0.034** -0.101*** 0.026 -0.117***
(0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022)
Difference Sent by S1 - S2 0.369***
(0.017)
Wald chi2 1014.38 198.94 884.97 348.20 1393.35
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
***99% significance, **95% significance, *90% significance.
†Censored lower limit= 0; upper limit = Amount Sent by Same S
††Censored Regression. Lower limit=0 - Amount Sent by S2; upper limit = Amount Sent by S1 Table 4: Triads 2S1R - Random-effects Tobit Regressions
Dependent Variable:
Amount Returned to Same S†
Table 5. Trust
Dyad
Treatment Amount Sent Tot. from S Avg. to Each R Tot. from S!&S" Avg. from Each S
Full Info 6.45 **
***8.43 ***
***4.22 ***
***14.55***+
***7.28***+
(3.44, 720) (2.96, 480) (3.04, 960) (5.08, 480) (3.46, 960)
Partial Info ***
***8.72 ***
***4.36 ***
***12.46***+ 6.23***+
(2.46, 480) (2.76, 960) (6.20, 480) (3.82, 960)
Overall 6.45 ***
***8.58 ***
***4.29 ***
***13.51 ***6.75 (3.44, 720) (2.72, 960) (2.90, 1920) (5.76, 960) (3.68, 1920) Notes: Standard deviations and number of observations are reported in parentheses
Superscripts *** report Mann-Whitney results. Subscripts *** report Panel results.
The **,*** at the left of the mean indicate signicant differences across network treatment with respect to the corresponding value for the dyad;
at the right of the mean they indicate signicant differences within network across information treatment.
Triad 2S1R Triad 1S2R
***p#0.01; **p#0.05; *p!0.10; +p!0.15
Table 6A. Trustworthiness - Absolute Amount Returned by Receiver
Treatment Returned Returned Tot. to S Tot. to S Avg. per R Avg. per R Tot. from R Tot. from R Avg. to each S Avg. to each S
(zeros incl.) (zeros incl.) (zeros incl.) (zeros incl.) (zeros incl.)
Full Info 8.98 8.06 *
(7.50, 646) (7.61, 720) (5.24, 318) (5.80, 480) (4.82, 774) (5.02, 960) (12.72, 379) (12.69, 480) (7.18, 854) (7.61, 960)
Partial Info ***9.82*** *
(4.87, 362) (5.43, 480) (4.67, 829) (4.75, 960) (13.35, 349) (13.81, 480) (7.34, 793) (7.62, 960)
Overall 8.98 8.06 * (7.50, 646) (7.61, 720) (5.09, 680) (5.62, 960) (4.75, 1603) (4.89, 1920) (13.04, 728) (13.38, 960) (7.29, 1647) (7.67, 1920) Table 6B. Trustworthiness - Percentage Amount Returned by Receiver (of Amount Received from Sender)
Dyad
Treatment % Returned % Tot. to S % Tot. to S % Avg. per R % Tot. from R % Tot. from R % Avg. to each S
(zeros incl.) (zeros incl.)
Full Info 39.43 40.46****** 40.51**** 39.55** ***44.69 ***45.52** ***44.74+ (27.35, 646) (17.08, 318) (17.45, 456) (23.22, 774) (23.36, 379) (24.72, 475) (25.45, 854)
Partial Info **35.47****** 36.86**** **35.38** ***42.68 39.40** **40.29+
(15.65, 362) (17.48, 467) (21.79, 829) (22.87, 349) (23.67, 444) (23.98, 793)
Overall 39.43 37.81 38.67 37.39 ***43.73 ***42.56 ***42.6
(27.35, 646) (16.51, 680) (17.56, 923) (22.58, 1603) (23.13, 728) (24.40, 919) (24.85, 1647) Notes: Standard deviations and number of observations are reported in parentheses
Superscripts *** report Mann-Whitney results. Subscripts *** report Panel results.
The **,*** at the left of the mean indicate signicant differences across network treatment with respect to the corresponding value for the dyad;
at the right of the mean they indicate signicant differences within network across information treatment.
***p!0.01; **p!0.05; *p!0.10; +p!0.15
(6.06, 720) (8.09, 720) (8.09, 720) (4.41, 480) (6.00, 960) (6.00, 960) (6.13, 960) (14.16, 480) (8.29, 960) Partial Info 11.05**+ ******18.19*** ******8.19*** **11.81* ******31.30*** *10.65***
(4.59, 480) (5.77, 960) (5.77, 960) (5.51, 960) (12.79, 480) (7.89, 960)
Overall 11.61 21.29 11.29 *11.49 ******17.83 ******7.83 ***12.19 ******32.64 11.32
(6.06, 720) (8.09, 720) (8.09, 720) (4.52, 960) (5.90, 1920) (5.90, 1920) (5.84, 1920) (13.55, 960) (8.12, 1920) Notes: Standard deviations and number of observations are reported in parentheses
Superscripts *** report Mann-Whitney results. Subscripts *** report Panel results.
The **,*** at the left of the mean indicate signicant differences across network treatment with respect to the corresponding value for the dyad;
at the right of the mean they indicate signicant differences within network across information treatment.
Triad 2S1R
***p!0.01; **p!0.05; *p!0.10; +p!0.15
Dyad Triad 1S2R
Table 8. Efficiency - Realized Percentage of Theoretical Maximum Gains
Dyad Triad 1S2R Triad 2S1R
Treatment
Full Info 82.24%
******
93.73% 84.43%
***+(17.22, 720) (11.85, 480) (14.52, 480)
Partial Info
******
94.87%
***78.47%
***+(9.83, 480) (17.71, 480)
Overall 82.24%
******
94.3%
*81.45%
(17.22, 720) (10.90, 960) (16.45, 960)
Notes: Standard deviations and number of observations are reported in parentheses Superscripts *** report Mann-Whitney results. Subscripts *** report Panel results.The * at the left of the mean indicate signicant differences across network treatment with respect to the corresponding value for the dyad; at the right of the mean they indicate signicant differences within network across information treatment.
***p!0.01; **p!0.05; *p!0.10; +p!0.15
Figure 1: !!! Info - - - - NoInfo
Figure 2: !!!! 1S1R !!!!!!! 1S2R Tot --- 1S2R Each !"!"!"!" 2S1R Each
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