SPECIFIC SECTORAL CONDITIONS +

The i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e i n which the exchange between labor and c a p i t a l takes p l a c e may not be the same f o r a l l s e c t o r s of a n a t i o n a l eco-nomy. T h i s holds a l s o f o r the economic and s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i n f l u e n c i n g trade union behavior v i s - a i - v i s c a p i t a l as an employer o f l a b o r . While the

i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of j o i n t r e g u l a t i o n at s e c t o r a l l e v e l has a d i r e c t e f f e c t on BIA .organizational p r o p e r t i e s (with the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s introduced above) , the s o c i a l and economic s t r u c t u r e of the sector i n f l u e n c e s B i s i n d i

-r e c t l y th-rough i t s i n f l u e n c e on t-rade unions.

Operational i n d i c a t o r s f o r t h i s s e c t i o n are l i s t e d i n Appendix C.

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There are mainly f o u r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s e c t o r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of j o i n t r e g u l a t i o n which we expect to have a d i r e c t e f f e c t on the o r g a n i z a t i o n of business i n t e r e s t s :

(1) The R e l a t i v e Importance of Workplace and Company Bargaining as Compared t o Regional or N a t i o n a l M u l t i F i r m Bargaining... Employers a s s o c i a -t i o n s i n c r e a s e i n s i g n i f i c a n c e and gain i n o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l c a p a c i -t y -the g r e a t e r the extent to which the terms of. exchange a t the labor market are regulated by m u l t i - f i r m as opposed to workplace and company b a r g a i n i n g . The importance of m u l t i - f i r m bargaining i n an economic s e c t o r depends on

i t s area.of coverage and i t s impact on the a c t u a l wage l e v e l . The coverage of m u l t i f i r m bargaining i s measured by the percentage of workers i n a -given s e c t o r whose wages are covered by m u l t i - f i r m agreements. The impact of m u l t i - f i r m bargaining i s measured by. the difference'between workers' a c t u a l wages and the wage r a t e s s e t by the agreement (wage d r i f t ) ; the greater t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , the l e s s e f f e c t i v e i s the m u l t i - f i r m bargaining mechanism i n r e g u l a t i n g the labor market, and the lower (presumably) the c o n t r o l c a p a c i t y of employers a s s o c i a t i o n s (and trade unions) over t h e i r members...

(2) .Configuration of Trade Unions and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Arenas.

In a sector, with only one c e n t r a l i z e d trade union o r g a n i z i n g a l l groups of workers i n a l l regions and subsectors, there i s l i k e l y to be c o n s i d e r a b l e pressure upon employers to j o i n i n a s i m i l a r l y u n i f i e d and c e n t r a l i z e d employers a s s o c i a t i o n . T h i s should hold, perhaps t o a l e s s e r degree, even i f the s e c t o r has more than one bargaining arena, i . e . i f d i f f e r e n t agree-ments are negotiated by the same union f o r d i f f e r e n t regions, subsectors, or groups of. employees — the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r being the degree of union c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and the a b i l i t y of the union to coordinate i t s s t r a t e g i e s i n the d i f f e r e n t bargaining arenas. In any case, once a m u l t i - f i r m bar-gaining arena has been f i r m l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , employers w i l l f i n d i t

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u s e f u l to b u i l d up a coterminous i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n or, a t l e a s t , t o improve c o o r d i n a t i o n between e x i s t i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g employers i n the r e s p e c t i v e arena. T h i s should be true r e g a r d l e s s of the number of unions involved, on the. other s i d e of the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . In s e c t o r s i n which the number of unions and bargaining arenas i s high, the i n c e n t i v e s f o r employers to form comprehensive and complex a s s o c i a t i o n s or a s s o c i a -t i o n a l sys-tems are weak. G e n e r a l l y speaking, i f -the bargaining sys-tem i n a p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r i s fragmented i n a number of independent b a r g a i n i n g arenas —• which could be due to e i t h e r fragmentation o r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of trade u n i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n —• employers a s s o c i a t i o n s w i l l a l s o tend to be decentralized.and fragmented? i f on the other hand the number of b a r g a i n -i n g arenas -i s small and trade un-ion s t r a t e g -i e s -i n d -i f f e r e n t arenas are e f f e c t i v e l y coordinated, employers are f o r c e d t o b u i l d comprehensive and c e n t r a l i z e d a s s o c i a t i o n s with a high c a p a c i t y to i n t e g r a t e d i v e r s e i n t e r -e s t s and.to mak-e t h -e i r p o l i c i -e s binding on a l a r g -e and h-et-erog-en-eous con-s t i t u e n c y . The degree of fragmentation and c o o r d i n a t i o n of m u l t i - f i r m c o l l e c t i v e , bargaining arenas i n a s e c t o r i s i n d i c a t e d by the number of

(major) i n d u s t r i a l , agreements negotiated (fragmentation) and the number of (major) trade unions n e g o t i a t i n g i n d u s t r i a l agreements ( c o o r d i n a t i o n ) .

(3) Presence and C o n f i g u r a t i o n of T r i p a r t i t e and B i p a r t i t e P u b l i c or Quasi-Public Bodies, Agencies, A u t h o r i t i e s . Dealing with Sector-Spec-i f Sector-Spec-i c Labor Problems. Most o f what has been s a Sector-Spec-i d above (III.3.1.2.) on the i n f l u e n c e on BIAs o f state-sponsored c o n s u l t a t i v e or d e c i s i o n a l bodies of f u n c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s o holds f o r bodies composed of both unions and employers (and sometimes i n c l u d i n g s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) . Regardless of how such bodies have come i n t o existence — whether by s t a t e imposition or by agreement between the s o c i a l partners — f o r the

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employers under t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n they u s u a l l y create strong i n c e n t i v e s to coordinate t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and/or the a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i r

asso-c i a t i o n s . In t h i s respeasso-ct, b i - or t r i p a r t i t e bodies have about the same impact on BIAS as i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d bargaining arenas (see above). M u l t i -party s e c t o r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s with a p u b l i c or q u a s i - p u b l i c s t a t u s a l s o tend to i n c r e a s e the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and.sometimes i n f a c t the orga-n i z a t i o orga-n a l resources, of both uorga-nioorga-ns aorga-nd BIAs. As a coorga-nsequeorga-nce, the goverorga-n- govern-ing c a p a c i t i e s of business a s s o c i a t i o n s are enhanced. A f u r t h e r impact of m u l t i p a r t i t e i n s t i t u t i o n s on BIA p r o p e r t i e s may be through t h e i r e f f e c t on trade unions. By improving the., s t a b i l i t y of comprehensive and c e n t r a l i z e d trade union organizations,, such i n s t i t u t i o n s put a d d i t i o n a l pressure on BIAs a l s o to develop t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s .

(4) Status of S e c t o r - i n N a t i o n a l Trade Union P o l i c y . N a t i o n a l trade union, movements may concentrate t h e i r e f f o r t s on a p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r (or

region) to achieve a "break-through agreement" which can be l a t e r extended to the r e s t of the economy (country). Break-through s e c t o r s are s e l e c t e d on the b a s i s of t h e i r market and production s t r u c t u r e and of the s t r e n g t h of t h e i r trade union o r g a n i z a t i o n . Since these f a c t o r s remain f a i r l y s t a b l e over time, union e f f o r t s to gain model agreements u s u a l l y concentrate on a small number of s e c t o r s . . Employers i n such s e c t o r s w i l l have to f a c e indus-t r i a l a c indus-t i o n more o f indus-t e n indus-than oindus-ther employers, and indus-they w i l l indus-t h e r e f o r e be more i n c l i n e d to form strong, a s s o c i a t i o n s . Furthermore, s i n c e the outcome of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, i n break-through s e c t o r s concerns not only the employers immediately a f f e c t e d but a l l employers i n the country, s e c t o r a l employers a s s o c i a t i o n s are l i k e l y to r e c e i v e outside o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a s s i s -tance if. needed. They are a l s o l i k e l y to p l a y an important r o l e i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l employers peak.associations.

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In a d d i t i o n to the e f f e c t s of s e c t o r a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s , s e c t o r a l business a s s o c i a t i o n s are i n f l u e n c e d by a number of s o c i a l and economic f a c t o r s whose e f f e c t on them i s more i n d i r e c t . In p a r t i c u l a r , we expect three such c o n d i t i o n s t o be o f importance:

(1) Labor I n t e n s i t y and P o s i t i o n i n N a t i o n a l Wage S t r u c t u r e . The g r e a t e r the labor i n t e n s i t y of production, the more, everything e l s e be-i n g equal, be-i s at stake f o r employers be-i n the determbe-inatbe-ion of the p r be-i c e of labor."¹" As a consequence, employers i n labor i n t e n s i v e s e c t o r s are p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to d e t e c t common i n t e r e s t s and act' c o l l e c t i v e l y on l a b o r - r e l a t e d matters. In c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s , on the other hand, employers a s s o c i a t i o n s can be expected to have considerable d i f f i c u l -t i e s c o o r d i n a -t i n g and c o n -t r o l l i n g -the labor-marke-t behavior e s p e c i a l l y of the l a r g e r andmore p r o f i t a b l e among t h e i r member f i r m s . The more c a p i t a l -i n t e n s -i v e an -i n d u s t r y -i s , the more -i t s l e a d -i n g f -i r m s w -i l l be prepared to pay t h e i r workers wages i n excess of industry-wide agreements —• not only

to buy i n d u s t r i a l peace but a l s o to keep o v e r a l l trade union i n f l u e n c e among t h e i r workforce i n check — and the l e s s w i l l i n g such f i r m s w i l l - b e to co-operate as buyers-of-laborswith other f i r m s and to subject themselves to c o l l e c t i v e labor-market d i s c i p l i n e . Likewise, i n s e c t o r s where wages grow f a s t e r than i n the economy as a whole, employers may f i n d i t necessary-to strengthen t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n s i n order to make t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e against union demands more e f f e c t i v e . In s e c t o r s with wages f a l l i n g r e l a t i v e t o the n a t i o n a l average, the i n c e n t i v e s f o r employers to organize are weak.

(Relative d e c l i n e o f s e c t o r a l wages may a l s o be due to s u c c e s s f u l a s s o c i a -t i v e a c -t i o n by employers.)

Leaving aside sectors l i k e the p u b l i c s e r v i c e where increased labor costs can e a s i l y be passed on to the consumer — or could u n t i l the emergence of taxpayer r e v o l t s .

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(2) Union Density. The higher the percentage of the workforce i n a s e c t o r who are. u n i o n i z e d (density r a t i o ) , the g r e a t e r i s the need f o r em-p l o y e r s to organize i n em-powerful emem-ployers a s s o c i a t i o n s . C e t e r i s em-p a r i b u s ,

t h i s i s true even i f the number, of unions and b a r g a i n i n g arenas i n the:, sect o r i s h i g h . In s e c sect o r s wisecth a fragmensected b a r g a i n i n g gyssectem and d e c e n sect r a l -i z e d trade un-ion o r g a n -i z a t -i o n , h-igh d e n s -i t y makes -i t l -i k e l y t h a t ga-ins made by one union, or by workers i n a "break-through" b a r g a i n i n g arena, w i l l soon be made a l s o by other unions or i n other b a r g a i n i n g arenas ("leap-frogging") . The more probable t h i s i s , the higher the i n c e n t i v e s f o r em-p l o y e r s t o coordinate t h e i r bargaining s t r a t e g i e s a t the s e c t o r a l l e v e l . Density r a t i o s may d i f f e r widely by subsectors and by sub-groups of the

s e c t o r a l workforce; the greater these d i f f e r e n c e s , the more d i f f i c u l t i t i s to p r e d i c t the e f f e c t o f the o v e r a l l d e n s i t y r a t i o on s e c t o r a l BIA proper-ties... A s e c t o r ' s aggregate d e n s i t y r a t i o r e f l e c t s t h e - s t r u c t u r e o f the

workforce i n the s e c t o r and c o v a r i e s with v a r i a b l e s l i k e the r e l a t i v e number of manual as opposed to non-manual, s k i l l e d as opposed t o u n s k i l l e d , and male as opposed to female workers. Since these and s i m i l a r v a r i a b l e s a f -f e c t BIA o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s through t h e i r e -f -f e c t .on union d e n s i t y , they are discussed in- t h i s context r a t h e r than s e p a r a t e l y . The union density o f a s e c t o r i s given by the r a t i o o f union members (excluding pen-sioners) .over the t o t a l number o f workers (excluding the unemployed). •

(3) S t r i k e P a t t e r n . The s t r u c t u r e of business a s s o c i a t i o n s i n a given sector i s c o n d i t i o n e d by the frequency and p r e v a i l i n g p a t t e r n of

s e c t o r a l s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . In a s e c t o r which i s r e l a t i v e l y s t r i k e - p r o n e i n comparison to the economy as a whole, employers should be more l i k e l y to b u i l d up strong and encompassing employers a s s o c i a t i o n s than i n a sector with low s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . I f s t r i k e s are predominantly l o c a l ,

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u n o f f i c i a l and short, employers a s s o c i a t i o n s tend to be l i m i t e d i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n s to the p r o v i s i o n o f advice and l e g a l services,. The more s t r i k e s become r e g i o n a l or n a t i o n a l i n scope, the more the f u n c t i o n s of employers a s s o c i a t i o n s w i l l tend to i n c l u d e the p r o v i s i o n o f s t r i k e insurance or the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f lockouts. With i n c r e a s i n g r e l a t i v e frequency o f o f f i c i a l as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from u n o f f i c i a l s t r i k e s , the r o l e o f the employers a s s o c i a t i o n as the o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of i t s members

v i s - a - v i s the union grows i n importance. I f s t r i k e s normally l a s t long, employers may f e e l a need f o r s t r i k e insurance, and t h i s again i s l i k e l y to add to the f u n c t i o n s of employers a s s o c i a t i o n s .

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I I I . 4 . ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES III.4.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim o f t h i s p r o j e c t i s t o determine under what c o n d i t i o n s and f o r what purposes business i n t e r e s t s a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y through formal a s s o c i a -t i o n s ; wha-t forms such a s s o c i a -t i o n s , o r sys-tems o f a s s o c i a -t i o n s , -take i n d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l environments; and what tasks such formal a s s o c i a t i o n s perform. F o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s makes i t unnecessary f o r us t o take sides i n the o l d and ongoing debate on whether o r g a n i z a t i o n s can or cannot be "understood" through t h e i r formal p r o p e r t i e s , and t o what

degree formal s t r u c t u r e s r e v e a l or determine what i s " r e a l l y going on" i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The purpose o f our research i s not p r i m a r i l y t o

"under-stand o r g a n i z a t i o n s " but r a t h e r to e x p l a i n the r e s o r t to formal o r g a n i z a t i o n , as opposed to informal c o l l u s i o n , as a mode o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by a p a r t i -c u l a r s o -c i a l -c l a s s . Here, we have o f f e r e d the hypothesis that the emer-gence and the s t r u c t u r e o f f o r m a l l y organized (systems of) i n t e r e s t asso-c i a t i o n s o f business vary s y s t e m a t i asso-c a l l y with two asso-c l u s t e r s o f determinants:

the kind and s t r u c t u r e o f the u n d e r l y i n g membership i n t e r e s t s , and the c o n d i t i o n s and processes o f p o l i t i c a l influence.. The present s e c t i o n o f t h i s paper i s devoted t o d e f i n i n g a set o f v a r i a b l e s and o p e r a t i o n a l i n d i c a t o r s measuring the extent and the way in. which the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r -ests of business i n s p e c i f i c c o u n t r i e s and economic sectors are organized i n , and intermediated by, formal a s s o c i a t i o n s .

To j u s t i f y the concentration o f the research on formal o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s , i t may be u s e f u l t o consider b r i e f l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p between

formal o r g a n i z a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . F o r m a l i z a t i o n o f systems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n e n t a i l s an e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n o f common o b j e c t i v e s

("functional s p e c i f i c i t y " ) and the establishment o f c r i t e r i a o f e l i g i b i l i t y for membership. Since r u l e s of i n c l u s i o n are a t the same time r u l e s o f

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e l i m i n a t i o n , the f o r m a l i z e d boundaries of i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s f u n c t i o n as i n s t i t u t i o n a l f i l t e r s separating members and i n t e r e s t s t h a t are admitted i n t o the a s s o c i a t i o n , from others t h a t are excluded and have to f i n d t h e i r own o r g a n i z a t i o n a l forms. I n t e r n a l l y , i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s c o n t a i n i n g heterogeneous i n t e r e s t s among t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c y may set up.^fdrmalized sub-d i v i s i o n s allowing subsets of i n t e r e s t s to express themselves insub-depensub-dently and to be o f f i c i a l l y represented i n the a s s o c i a t i o n ' s p o l i t i c a l process.

Other p a r t i a l i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n a' BIA which are not i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n t h i s way are excluded from open and.legitimate a r t i c u l a t i o n . Furthermore, to the extent t h a t the i n t e r e s t s represented by a p a r t i c u l a r a s s o c i a t i o n a f f e c t , and are a f f e c t e d by, other i n t e r e s t s , a s s o c i a t i o n s may enter i n t o more or l e s s formalized r e l a t i o n s h i p s c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and combining t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n t o more general '.interest, aggregates. By selecting,- excluding, emphasizing, suppressing and combining i n t e r e s t s , the formal s t r u c t u r e s o f i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s process the complex v a r i e t y of motives and goals e x i s t i n g i n the s o c i a l group- they represent, and transform them i n t o a more or l e s s coherent s e t o f p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s and a c t i o n s . I f the form o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l channels p r o c e s s i n g a group's "raw i n t e r e s t s " i s a l t e r e d , the i n t e r e s t s s e l e c t e d f o r representat i o n w i l l change, and representathe "processed i n representat e r e s representat s " are l i k e l y representat o be d i f f e r e n representat -l y weighted and aggregated. In t h i s sense, the forma-l o r g a n i z a t i o n a -l p r o p e r t i e s of (systems of) i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s can be conceived of as an objectivé, b e h a v i o r a l expression of how the r e s p e c t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s per-c e i v e and i n t e r p r e t the per-c o l l e per-c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r per-c o n s t i t u e n t s .

T h i s i s not to say, of course, t h a t every s i n g l e aspect o f the behav i o r of i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s , or o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n general, i s d e t e r -mined and explained by formal o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s . There i s no doubt

123 or to observe which members t a l k to which over the telephone i n

prepara-t i o n of an imporprepara-tanprepara-t d e c i s i o n . Formal o r g a n i z a prepara-t i o n a l p r o p e r prepara-t i e s can

124 scope and purpose (the more "external e f f e c t s " and interdependencies they

" i n t e r n a l i z e " ) ; the more s p e c i a l i z e d and coordinated they are i n t e r