7 cooPeratIon PolIcy 7 cooPeratIon PolIcy
with the best scientists in other parts of the world ‘in order to access complementary skills and knowledge, with a view of stimulating new ideas’. 120 Based on their research of scientific networks, Wagner and Ley-desdorff 121 also stress the importance of the individual and argue that international research collaboration is more due to ‘the dynamics at the subfield level created by individual scientists linking together for enhanced recognition and rewards than to other structural or pol-icy-related factors’. They emphasize factors internal to science — more precisely, internal to the intellectual and social organization of science — which offer incentives for individual scientists to cooperate within their own countries as well as across countries. For Suttmeier 122 the disciplinary differentiation of science on the one hand and the field-specific characteristics of mega-science on the other are factors that require closer cooperation between specialized scientists at the international level.
Based on this discussion and the analysis by Edler 123 and Bukvova 124 of various motivations that scientists have to pursue research collaboration, the following list of drivers for international research collaboration can be compiled:
• Access to expertise, leading edge and complemen-tary know-how
• Access to funding from foreign institutions / pro-grammes
• Access to natural or social phenomena, which are limited geographically
• Sharing of costs and risks in projects that require large infrastructure equipment
• Increase of academic prestige
• Capacity building; learning of new skills
In the collaboration between developed and develop-ing countries there is the challenge of how to best re-duce the negative effects of an asymmetry of partners with distinct and complementary strengths. Moreover, scientists in developing countries entering international research collaboration may not only expect an increase in their scientific skills, but also care about the impact of the collaborative research on local development and whether scientific and non-scientific capacity
improve-120 The Royal Society (2011), p. 57
121 Wagner, Caroline S. / Leydesdorff, Loet (2004): Network Structure, Self-Organization and the Growth of International Collaboration in Science. Am-sterdam School of Communication Research, University of AmAm-sterdam, p. 21 122 Suttmeier, Richard P. (2008): State, Self-Organization, and Identity in the Building of Sino-U.S. Cooperation in Science and Technology, in: Asian Perspective, 32(1), pp. 8 f analysis/j.edler_-_the_role_of_international_collaboration_in_the_frame-work_programme.pdf, most recent access date: 13 September 2011, p. 3 124 Bukvova, Helena (2010): Study Research Collaboration: A Literature Re-view. Working Papers on Information Systems, Technische Universität Dres-den, Germany, online at: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/10-3, most recent access date: 13 September 2011, pp. 3–6
ment contribute to future research. 125 Here, the indi-vidual motivation of scientists overlaps with the expec-tations of policy-makers that S&T collaboration serves economic and social development.
In sum, various push and pull factors exist that ex-plain why scientists are interested in international re-search collaboration (see table 14). The structural push factors relate to the conditions scientists are faced with in their home countries — including academic recognition, access to research infrastructure, and communication technologies that allow them to enter into international academic exchange. The structural pull factors refer to the conditions outside of the scientists’ home countries, and include the quality of research equipment, educa-tion and training and leading edge researchers - as well as the opportunities to study geographically limited so-cial and natural phenomena.
Table 14: Scientists’ motives for international collaboration
Push factors Pull factors Structural factors – Academic recognition
Besides structural factors there are policy-related factors that provide incentives for scholars to cooperate on an international level. Depending on the financial support for international research collaboration through mobil-ity programmes or regional and international coopera-tion agreements, scientists are encouraged to enter into an international R&D exchange. The system of rewards for internationally-recognized scientists with regards to career opportunities has also an impact on the individ-ual motives for international collaboration. The extent to which scholarships, other means of research funding and capacity building are available for scientists abroad also influences their individual decisions.
Policy support for cross-border research collabora-tion is based on the expectacollabora-tion that internacollabora-tional S&T cooperation will have a positive impact on national
eco-125 OECD (2011a): Opportunities, Challenges and Good Practices in Interna-tional Research Cooperation between Developed and Developing Countries, Paris: OECD, online at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/16/47737209.pdf, most recent access date: 13 September 2011, pp. 4 f
nomic development. 126 Edler 127 distinguishes between a narrow understanding of S&T cooperation support policy by governments and large funding and research organizations that foster scientists (and firms) in their in-ternational activities and a broader understanding. The latter include non-science policy objectives such as for-eign policy and development aid policy. In her study on drivers of international research collaboration, Boekholt et al. 128 underline that intrinsic science policy objectives interact with non-science ones; namely, 1) collaboration to improve national competitiveness, 2) the support of developing countries’ S&T capabilities, 3) the need to cope with global challenges, and 4) the improvement of diplomatic relationships and, indirectly, international security. The analysis of the later policy motivation can be related to historical and political relationships of countries and geographical proximity. 129
Summarizing the policy motivations (see table 15) that drive international research collaboration the push factors include the expected positive impact on local and national economic development, the increase of national S&T capabilities, the awareness of global chal-lenges that need joint approaches and the support for national diplomacy and security policy goals.
Table 15: Motivations for policy makers to support international S&T col-laboration
Push factors Pull factors
– Impact on sustained economic growth
– Increase of national S&T capabili-ties
– Tackling of global challenges – Support of national diplomacy /
security policy goals
– Funding programmes for scien-tists and S&T administrators – Access to leading-edge
technol-ogy
– Access to education and training – Regional policy agreements on
S&T collaboration
Source: Authors’ own compilation
Although international S&T collaboration is regarded by most countries as crucial for innovation-driven econom-ic growth, the extent to wheconom-ich collaboration is actually supported by governments varies widely. Different poli-cies can be related to national S&T development strat-egies, which either stress independent endogenous technological competence or emphasize rapid techno-logical sophistication through technology transfer via the absorption of foreign direct investments. The term technonationalism is applied to strategies which focus on the nation as the driver for innovation, and which al-locates R&D budgets and diffuses technology. 130
Tech-126 Suttmeier (2008), pp. 8 f 127 Edler (2008), pp. 4–5
128 Boekholt, Patries / Edler, Jakob / Cunningham, Paul / Flanagan, Kieron (eds.) (2009): Drivers of International Collaboration in Research. Final Re-port for the European Commission. EUR 24195 EN, Bruxelles, pp. 8 f 129 Ibid.
130 Edgerton, David E.H. (2007): The Contradiction of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Perspective, in: New Global Studies, 1(1), p. 5
nonationalism is seen as combination of ‘a strong belief that the technological capabilities of a nation’s firms are a key source of their competitive process, with a belief that these capabilities are in a sense national, and can be built by national action’. 131 In the literature on inno-vation policies, Japan was traditionally considered to pursue a technonationalist policy, stressing the impor-tance of technological autonomy for national security and benefiting from the absorption of foreign technol-ogy without contributing much to new knowledge. 132 Today, China is often cited as an example of a country that adapted a technonationalist approach. In contrast to technonationalism, countries that follow a strategy of technoglobalism do not emphasize the nationality of firms that create new technologies, but aim to benefit from free technology trade and foreign direct invest-ments. This concept is based on the notion that the glo-balization of new technologies, particularly in the fields of transport and communications equipment, reduces the role of national governments in innovation. Two countries that have strongly applied such an approach are Hong Kong and Singapore. 133
Technoglobalism is closely related to the term of technoliberalism applied by some scholars to S&T strat-egies that rely mainly on minimal state intervention, economic liberalization and deregulation. The degree of state intervention in the economy is regarded as the dividing line between those countries following a strategy of technonationalism and others that pursue a strategy of technoliberalism. 134 When transferring this concept to Southeast Asian countries in the late 1990s, Posadas 135 classified Vietnam as following a strategy of technonationalism, in contrast to Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, which applied a technoliberalist strategy with strong incentives for inward foreign direct investments. Indonesia and Malaysia pursued an in-between strategy, leaning towards technonationalism by trying to become independent in some technolo-gies, but inviting multinational companies for ambitious projects such as the Multimedia Super Corridor in the case of Malaysia.
The discussion of the various national S&T strategies is closely related to the question of how actively coun-tries are involved in international research collaboration.
While some countries in Asia followed a technonation-alist strategy, motivated by ‘the desire of Asian states to free themselves from dependence on Western
technol-131 Nelson, R. / Rosenberg, N. (1993): Technical Innovation and National Systems, in: Nelson, R. (ed.), National Innovation Systems, A Comparative Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 3
132 Corning, Gregory P. (2004): Japan and the Politics of Tech-Globalism.
Armonik, New York, and Lynn 2005: pp. 188–189) 133 Lynn (2005), p. 188; Edgerton (2007), p. 1
134 Posadas, Roger (1999): The Development of Science and Technology in South-East Asia: Status and Prospects, in: Science Technology & Society 4(1), p. 128
135 Posadas, Roger (1999): The Development of Science and Technology in South-East Asia: Status and Prospects, in: Science Technology & Society 4(1), pp. 127 f
7 cooPeratIon PolIcy 7 cooPeratIon PolIcy
ogies’ 136, the dramatic increase in globalization in the last decade forced them to modify their approaches.
The surge in S&T globalization was particular visible in the international diffusion of technology at an earlier stage than in the past, the integration of technologi-cal complementarities through strategic alliances, and the international mobility of S&T professionals and stu-dents. 137
Before studying the international S&T collaboration of each ASEAN member states, we will have a look at the ASEAN as a regional grouping and its intraregional and extraregional S&T policies.
7.3 The ASEAN’s intraregional and extraregional S&T policies
Integration in the ASEAN region has not been left only to the market but has been guided by the idea of the benefits of a stronger institutional framework since the Asian financial crises in 1997. Due to the central role of S&T in economic development, closer technological co-operation has been supported in ASEAN through the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (ASEAN COST). This Committee aims to guide the formulation of the region’s S&T policies and the establishment of programmes. Based on policy decisions made at the ASEAN summits and meetings of ASEAN Ministers for S&T, the COST designed a number of special programmes and actions. The action plan on S&T for the period 2007 to 2011 (‘ASEAN Plan of Action on Science and Technology: 2007–2011’, (APAST)) incor-porated previous action plans (see figure 75) and com-bined them with national directives and S&T plans.
APAST contains not only policy objectives directed at the region itself, but also guidelines for stronger interna-tional cooperation on the part of ASEAN with countries and regions others than the so-called dialogue partners.
In detail, APAST lists the following objectives: 1) creating intra-ASEAN S&T cooperation that has extensive syner-gies and is self-sustaining, with strong participation by the private sector; 2) establishing an S&T network sup-portive of public- and private-sector human resource development; 3) supporting technology transfer be-tween institutions and industry; 4) increasing awareness of the crucial role S&T plays in economic development in ASEAN; and, 5) expanding S&T cooperation with the international community. This last objective shows that COST is also pursuing an outward-looking S&T strategy.
136 Kang, David / Segal, Adam (2006): The Siren Song of Technonational-ism, in: Far Eastern Economic Review, March 2006 Issue
137 Posadas (1999): p. 128, and Schüller, Margot / Gruber, Florian / Trienes, Rudie / Shim, David (2008): International Science and Technology Coopera-tion Policies of Southeast Asian Countries, ConsultaCoopera-tion Paper, SEA-EU-NET, Hamburg, Vienna and Amsterdam, November 2008, pp. 5–6
Figure 75: Framework of the ASEAN Plan of Action on S&T (APAST):
2007–2011
Source: ASEAN secretariat
In terms of actions, APAST explicitly requires support for closer cooperation with ‘dialogue partners and other relevant organisations on regional projects’ as one of its strategic thrusts. In order to achieve this objective, the following actions were proposed:
• development of new strategies for partnership with dialogue partners;
• facilitation of access to the resources of dialogue partners for regional projects, with a focus on the newer member countries of ASEAN; and,
• support for closer relationships with relevant ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea, China) S&T agen-cies for mutually beneficial development in East Asia.
There are eleven S&T dialogue partners listed in the ASEAN action plan on S&T, including China, India, Ja-pan, South Korea, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, the EU, the USA, Canada and Russia. Most of the dialogue partners have a specific S&T dialogue forum with the ASEAN to jointly discuss activities, which often takes the form of a joint working group. Japan, South Korea and China are cooperating with the ASEAN through the ASEAN COST+3.
The bilateral fields of S&T cooperation listed in the APAST 2007–2011 are very similar, reflecting the ASEAN’s priority programme areas for S&T cooperation in 2007:
1) food S&T, 2) biotechnology, 3) meteorology and geo-physics, 4) marine S&T, 5) non-conventional energy re-search, 6) microelectronics and information technology, 7) material S&T, 8) space technology and applications,
and, 9) S&T infrastructure and resource development. 138 At the 6th Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology (IAMMST–6) held in Krabi, Thai-land, in December 2010, the S&T ministers decided to extend the implementation of the APAST until 2015. The ongoing APAST (2007–2011) will be enhanced by in-cluding macro-initiatives, while the preparation for the next APAST (2016–2020) is underway. This new policy programme should take into account the recommenda-tions presented at the IAMMST–6. 139 The so-called Krabi Initiative 2010 adopted the motto ‘Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for a Competitive, Sustainable and Inclusive ASEAN’, and identified eight thematic tracks as key areas to be implemented: (1) ASEAN Innovation for Global Market; (2) Digital Economy, New Media and Social Networking: (3) Green Technology, (4) Food Se-curity; (5) Energy Security, (6) Water Management; (7) Biodiversity for Health and Wealth and (8) Science and Innovation for Life.
In contrast to the current emphasis on S&T ac-tivities confined mostly to the academic domains, the Krabi Initiative requests a paradigm shift in order to focus more on the benefits of science to the ASEAN’s citizens. The paradigm shift is represented by a number of goals, including ‘STI Enculturation’, which stands for the need to mainstream STI into peoples’ lives and to support citizens with outstanding STI achievements as role-models. Another goal refers to the ‘Bottom-of-the-Pyramid Focus’ and focuses on the larger part of the population and their basic needs for food, housing, health and access to information and knowledge. The
‘Youth-Focused Innovation’ takes into account the large share of the young population and creates incentives to increase their STI potentials and entrepreneurship. As climate change is a hot topic for all of the ASEAN mem-ber states, the ‘STI for Green Society’ goal relates to the introduction of appropriate low carbon technologies.
The ‘Public–Private Partnership Platform’ aims to support the linkages within the innovation system in order to in-crease the role of the private sector in S&T. 140
There are six flagship programmes by the ASEAN, focusing on: 1) Early Warning System for Disaster Risk Reduction; 2) Biofuels; 3) Application and Develop-ment of Open Software (OSS); 4) Functional Food; 5) Climate Change; and, 6) Health. For these flagship pro-grammes the implementation plans have been finalized as of May 2011. In order to support these programmes, the S&T ministries decided to establish a complemen-tary R&D human resource exchange programme.
An-138 The list of the ASEAN’s S&T cooperation programmes with dialogues partners is included in the original 2008 consultation paper (Schüller, Gru-ber, Trienes and Shim 2008: 7–8).
139 ASEAN (2011): Annual Report 2010–2011, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, p.
39
140 ASEAN (2010): Report of the ASEAN COST. Retreat on the “Future of Science, Technology, and Innovation: 2015 and Beyond”, Krabi, Thailand, 11–12 December 2010, online at: http://www.aseansti.net/images/stories/
report%20of%20the%20asean%20cost%20retreat%20on%20sti-final.pdf, most recent access date: 13 September 2011
other region-wide initiative is the ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2015, which was launched in January 2011 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The ASEAN’s cooperation in ICT with its dialogue partners has also been continued, focusing on joint programmes under the ASEAN+3 with China, Japan and South Korea as well as ICT cooperation with the EU. 141
Despite the growing importance of the ASEAN COST as a dialogue forum for the coordination of the region’s S&T programmes, the institutional and funding capacity of this committee is still rather limited. This holds true for the ASEAN Secretariat altogether, which has to cope with a heavy administrative burden resulting from the increasing pace and extent of regional cooperation and integration. With regard to the financing of S&T coop-eration, most of the funding comes from dialogue part-ners, while the ASEAN Science Fund (ASF) has only a low annual budget. 142 During the IAMMST–6 meeting in December 2010, the S&T ministries requested an aug-mentation of this fund in order to support the flagship programmes and the implementation of the Krabi Ini-tiative. 143
Unlike the EU, which is a supranational institution, the ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization and thus has no decision-making power of its own. 144 The ASEAN’s international S&T policy is therefore strongly influenced by the interests of individual member coun-tries. The fact that some of the ASEAN–5, the founding members of this regional grouping, have almost similar economic development levels explains, according to some scholars, the fact that they tend to compete in S&T rather than cooperate. Stronger regional cooperation is mostly concentrated in those countries which joined ASEAN last, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet-nam. The ASEAN-help-ASEAN programme (2001–2004 Action Plan) has been especially designed to support these member countries’ S&T development. 145 However, the Krabi Initiative demonstrates that the ASEAN COST strives for closer intraregional cooperation among S&T policies alongside the ambitious aim to also establish an ASEAN Community by 2015.
141 ASEAN (2011), pp. 39 ff
142 Konstadakopulos (2003): The evolution, substance and priorities of EU and ASEAN cooperation in science and technology, in: Asia Europe Journal, 1(4), p. 563
143 ASEAN (2010): Chairman’s Statement of the 6th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology (IAMMST), Krabi, Thailand, 17 Decem-ber 2010, online at: http://www.aseansec.org/25723.htm, most recent access date: 13 September 2011
144 Moeller, Joergen Oerstroem (2007): ASEAN’s Relations with the Euro-pean Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29 (3), p. 480
145 Konstadakopulos (2003), pp. 562 f
7 cooPeratIon PolIcy 7 cooPeratIon PolIcy
Table 16: Selected economic and social indicators of ASEAN member states
* VHHD refers to very high human development; HHD refers to high human development; MHD refers to medium human development; LHD refers low human development.
** refers to the inequality-adjusted index
Sources: World Bank, Word Development Indicators 2010 and ‘country at a glance’ statistics; UNDP, Human Development Report 2010; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2010; Asian Development Bank, Key
Sources: World Bank, Word Development Indicators 2010 and ‘country at a glance’ statistics; UNDP, Human Development Report 2010; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2010; Asian Development Bank, Key