Ajaya Kumar Das
I
ndia’s pivot to Southeast Asia today attracts enormous inter-est in the context of systemic shifts in the global and regional structure of power. Its relatively efficacious interaction with Southeast Asian states in the last two decades under its “Look East Policy” (LEP) is based largely on the soft power of attraction rather than the hard power of coercion. Its growing military resources which engender its hard power have been utilised for soft power projection with relative success which in turn reinforces its hard power. The trajectory of the relationship has been discussed in great detail before.1 This paper makes a systematic examination of how India’s decision-makers have configured soft and hard power in their strategies towards these eastern neighbours in order to pursue India’s naturally evolving economic, political, military, and cultural interests and to what extent they have been successful in producing the desired outcomes. While analysing how military resources have1 See Amar Nath Ram (Ed.), Two decades of India’s Look East policy:
Partnership For Peace, Progress And Prosperity (New Delhi: Manohar, 2012); Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew’s Mission India(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009);
Isabelle Saint-Mézard, Eastward bound: India’s new positioning in Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005); Frederic Grare and Amitav Matoo (Eds.), India and ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001);
Kripa Sridharan, The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy(Aldershot:
Dartmouth, 1996); K. Kesavapany, A. Mani and P. Ramasamy (Eds.), Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Singapore, 2008); and Jaffrelot Christophe,
“India’s look east policy: An Asianist strategy in perspective”, India Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 2003), pp. 35–68.
been utilised for soft power behaviour, this article also addresses how all the four non-military soft power instruments—economy, culture, political values and foreign policy—have been utilised for soft power behaviour. Notwithstanding economy which is a core component of hard power, culture, political values and foreign policy can also generate hard power resources. Soft and hard power can mutually reinforce each other. Thus, how should India optimise its soft power in the region and thereby enhance its hard power? In addressing these questions, this paper makes an argument that soft power based on sufficient military and non-military resources will serve as the best basis to support India’s overall interests in the region including strong and beneficial defence and security relations.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first briefly defines the concept of soft and hard power, and concurrently analyses their components. In addition, it offers an analysis of the relation-ship between soft and hard power and addresses why soft power is important. Section two examines how India has utilised military and non-military resources vis-à-vis the Southeast Asian states for soft power behaviour. The third assesses the impact. The fourth section presents prescriptions for optimising India’s soft power in the region in order to pursue both security and prosperity, while the final sec-tion offers some concluding remarks.
What is Soft and Hard Power?
Why is soft power important? Besides its increasing use, which in itself signifies its relative value to hard power, “hard power exhibits a greater conflict of interests relative to soft power”.2 Moreover, contemporary factors in international affairs such as globalisation and interdependence, spread of nuclear weapons, the emergence of advanced technology, decline of “warrior ethics”, spread of democ-racy, and growth in regimes and international organisations have contributed to the elevation of soft power’s importance.3 As Gal-larotti writes, “The exclusive use of hard power is risky and often
2 Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Soft power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use”, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2011), p. 28.
3 Ibid., pp. 37–39.
self-defeating.”4 It can disempower a state. Other forms of power have in the past received less attention due to “preoccupation with military power”.5 Giving equal attention to other forms of power can also help assess the present and future utility of military force. Military force does not remain the only source of power in inter-state relations. As Joseph S. Nye says, “the world is no longer as unconstrained as in nineteenth-century Europe.”6 The “use of force is more costly today than was the case in the past”.7 As addressed below, soft power also reinforces hard power and vice versa.
Soft power, like hard power, is a form of power. Nye who coined and popularised the concept argues that it should be defined both in terms of resources and behaviour.8 In terms of resources, hard power of coercion is based on military and economic power resources. As discussed below, military and economic resources can contribute to soft power behaviour which is also based on attractive culture, politi-cal values and foreign policy.9 In behavioural terms, soft power is the ability to get the preferred results by power of attraction and hard power is the ability to wield influence by coercion (also by sanction and inducement). Any type of resource can contribute to soft power behaviour, but any kind of behaviour is not soft power behaviour.10 There is a clear distinction between coercion and attraction.
Just as having military resources does not always guarantee suc-cess, a state’s possession of soft power resources also does not guar-antee the desired political outcome. Thus the relational approach to
4 Giulio M. Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations:
A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5.
5 David a. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, http://www.princeton.
edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20(2012)%20Power%20 and%20International%20Relations.pdf.
6 Joseph S. Nye, “Power and foreign policy”, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, No. 1(2011), p. 10.
7 Colin S. Gray, “Hard Power and Soft power: The utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st century”, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, April 2011, p. 21.
8 Joseph S. Nye, “Power and foreign policy”, pp. 12–13.
9 For detailed discussion, see Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York:
Public Affairs, 2011), pp. 3–109.
10 Ibid., p. 20.
power suggests understanding power of an actor in relation to one or many subjects. It is necessary to identify the context and causation.11 For policy relevance, it is necessary to identify “who gets what, how, where and when” while approaching power analysis.12
There are three aspects of behavioural or relational power which include both soft and hard aspects.13 A state can “change” the “exist-ing preference” of another actor through attraction or persuasion and also by coercion. The former behaviour constitutes soft power and the latter is hard power.14 A state can also set the agenda to be followed by a subject by both attraction and coercion. And through the third face of power, an actor can “shape” another actor’s “ini-tial preference” both by attraction and coercion. As Nye defines,
“Fully defined, soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”15 Persua-sion is also associated with attraction.16 Underlying attraction of any actor, there are three soft power currencies—“beauty”, “brilliance”
and “benignity”. Beauty is “about the resonance that draws actors closer to each other through shared ideals, values, causes, or visions
… shared values and causes provide a push toward the perception that the other regime is beautiful, which in turn will encourage confi-dence, friendship, and cooperation”.17 Brilliance is about competence or “high performance” in actions of an agent.18 Benignity originates from “a wide spectrum of behaviours, ranging from doing no harm
11 For the discussion on the importance of ‘contexts’ in understanding power, see David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies”, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), pp.
161–194.
12 See Harold Dwight Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and society: A framework for political inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).
13 See Nye, The Future of Power, p. 91.
14 For the three faces of power behaviour, see Nye, The Future of Power, p. 91.
15 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
16 Ibid., p. 93.
17 Alexandr Vuving, “How Soft Power Works”, Paper presented at the panel
“Soft Power and Smart Power”, American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, 3 September 2009, p. 11.
18 Ibid., p. 8.
to others to actively protecting and supporting others”.19 Thus an actor through these soft power currencies creates attraction and favourable outcomes based on all the five pillars of soft power.20
The mode and substance of a country’s foreign policy can elicit beauty, brilliance and benignity by showing diplomatic skills in negotiation, “playing by rules”, respecting commitments, defining interests broadly, embracing multilateralism, etc. Similarly, cultural excellence and similarity through the currencies of brilliance and beauty can lead to soft power of an agent. Beauty and brilliance can also be generated by pursuing universal political values or values that are beneficial to others. Although economic resources contribute to hard power, a country’s economic success can indicate its brilliance leading to attraction and influence.21 Founded on that success, a con-trary’s human capital, technological prowess, and knowledge society can create attractive power. In an age of globalisation, economic lib-eralism is viewed as a universal value. Thus the economy of a country which is open to trade with other liberal economies will certainly generate its beauty and benignity and boost its attraction. Similarly, military power resources through the currencies of beauty, benignity and brilliance (or competence) can create soft power influence.22 By providing protection and assistance, a state can create attrac-tive power. Credibility or trust also plays an important role in this process. The modalities of assistance in the form of joint exercises, training and education, and humanitarian assistance can enhance familiarity, trust, benignity and brilliance.23 Fighting for an ally or a friend and providing protection through extended deterrence which is credible can contribute to soft power. Again, competence, trust and familiarity are closely related to benignity, beauty and brilliance.
Military-to-military relations through the mechanisms of dialogues, exchanges, staff talks, etc., can also contribute to attraction and soft
19 Ibid., p. 9.
20 For discussion on these currencies, see Alexandr Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.” See also Nye, The Future of Power, p. 92.
21 For further analysis of the relationship between economic resources and soft power, see Nye, The Future of Power, pp. 51–109.
22 Ibid., pp. 25–50.
23 Ibid., pp. 47–48.
power through the three soft power currencies.
While making a distinction between hard and soft power, it is very important to identify not only what the agent does but also how the subject perceives. As the adage goes, beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. If the subject is the beneficiary of hard power of coercion, then it becomes susceptible to the agent’s attraction and soft power.
India’s rising hard power resources or their coercive use may not be attractive to China. But for Vietnam these hard power resources are benign and attractive due to the enmity between China and Vietnam.
In the future, if India-Vietnam relations turn into military alliance, that can enhance India’s hard power. A state can enhance its hard power resources if it can convert its soft power influence—based on both military and non-military resources—to access military bases, to increase trade and investment, to engage in joint research and production of weapons, to hold regular military exercises, to form military alliances, etc. Therefore soft power can also reinforce hard power and vice versa.24 For greater effectiveness, each resource needs the other. In mutually reinforcing relationships, they can increase a state’s influence. The next section traces how India has used both military and non-military assets for soft power influence.
Utilising Soft and Hard Power Resources Military
The discussion below describes how India’s rising military resources, which augment its hard power, have been used for generating soft power by creating a militarily strong, credible and positive image, engaging in military assistance and diplomacy, and providing public goods.
Creating a strong, credible and positive image
India required military resources not only for its own survival but also to play a larger role commensurate with its history, size, and geo-graphical location. Its nuclear ambiguity and the subsequent nuclear tests in 1998 were demonstrations of both. Its decision-makers linked
24 See, for more discussion, Giulio M. Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations, pp. 32–38 and Chapter 4 and 6.
its tests to India’s greater role in Asian geopolitics. At the July 1998 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, India declared itself as a nuclear weapon power.25 “A more powerful India will help balance and connect the oil-rich Gulf region and the rapidly industrialising countries of Southeast Asia,”
wrote Jaswant Singh, then Senior Adviser on Defence and Foreign Affairs to the Indian Prime Minister.26 Following the tests, India concurrently showed its readiness to enter into an agreement on
“no-first use” bilaterally or multilaterally, and voluntarily commit-ted to follow a “no-first-use posture” and policy of non-use against a non-nuclear weapon state.27 While engaging ASEAN, India main-tained that it did not aim to engage in any arms race while pursuing a “minimum credible deterrence”.28 India also maintained military restraint as a responsible nuclear power during the Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999.
India has sustained its military modernisation since its nuclear tests, and has emerged as the world’s third-largest armed force today.29 It has launched inter-continental ballistic missiles and indig-enously built nuclear submarine to boost its nuclear deterrence. With the purchase of airborne tankers, it can project air power outside the subcontinent. Similarly, it can deploy naval forces outside the Indian Ocean region (IOR). However only after consolidating first in the IOR, India may aim to match its public pronouncements about its maritime and strategic interests beyond the IOR by attaining the required force levels for sustained operations.30 It has a “Maritime Capability Perspective Plan for 2012–2027”. As the former Chief of
25 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s gains from the ARF meet”, The Hindu, 29 July 1998.
26 Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5 (September/October 1998), p. 48.
27 “Paper laid on the table of the House on Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy”, http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/mayjune1598.pdf; “Opening Remarks by National Security Adviser Mr Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, 17 August 1999.
28 Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs, “India and ASEAN: Security Paradigm for AD 2000”, IDSS, Singapore, 2 June 2000.
29 “Country Comparisons – force levels and economics”, The Military Balance, Vol. 112, Issue 1(2012), pp. 467–474.
30 “Terror threats factored into Navy’s preparations”, The Hindu, 8 August 2012.
Naval Staff, Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma has noted, “The Indian Navy has adopted a capability-based, rather than a threat based approach for future growth.”31
The Indian Navy is also increasing its force levels in India’s eastern seaboard.32 According to the Budget Estimates 2012–13, the Indian Navy accounts for 19.29 % of the total defence budget, up from about 12 % in 1991.33 The Indian Air Force accounts for 24.93
% of the total defence budget in 2012–2013. Despite India’s military spending on the rise, it maintains restraint and is transparent unlike China. Nevertheless the current trajectory and the future planning of its naval and air power with expeditionary ambition strongly sup-port India’s greater role in the Indo-Pacific if not the entire world.34 Unless public expressions of geopolitical role are backed by develop-ment of military resources, they lack credibility and potential soft power utility. Similarly, other modalities of military-based soft power which are discussed in the following pages also originate from these actual and potential military resources and modalities. Therefore underlying the accretion of military hard power resources there is a purpose to structure expectations of ASEAN states through attrac-tion and persuasion. As the 2009 Indian Maritime Doctrine notes,
“The success of strategic deterrence and the projection of a strong
31 Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma, “Metamorphosis of Matters Maritime: An Indian Perspective”, IISS, 25 June 2012, http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/metamorphosis-of-matters-maritime-an-indian-perspective/
32 Sudha Ramachandran, “Indian navy pumps up eastern muscle”, Asia Times, 20 August 2011.
33 “Demands For Grants (2012–2013)”, Fifteenth Report Standing Committee on Defence, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, April 2012, http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/FINAL%20DFG%20%20 REPORT%20-2012-13.pdf.
34 “Demands For Grants (2012–2013)”; Farewell Press Conference of Admiral Nirmal Verma, 7 August 2012; Interview with Admiral Nirmal Verma, “Indian Navy: Towards Blue Water Capability”, India Strategic, December 2011, http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1309_Indian_
Navy_towards_blue_water.htm; Nitin Gokhale, “How Indian Navy is expanding and modernising”, NDTV, 25 June 2012, http://www.ndtv.com/
article/india/how-indian-navy-is-expanding-and-modernising-235746;
Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings”, 24 September 2012, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.
aspx?id=275#footnote11.
national image both require a robust, credible defence posture and capability. Much of this is attained in peace time diplomacy, in the image portrayed by the armed forces to domestic and international audience.”35 Similarly, as a leading Indian defence analyst puts it,
“people might look at the Indian navy and say, now, why do we want to tie up with these guys? They haven’t got enough force. And if we need someone to hold our hand, let’s chose someone who really car-ries a big stick … the Indian sticks aren’t big enough … That’s what the Southeast Asians say. They are frightened of China but we don’t give them enough comfort.”36 India became more strategic in its LEP in the aftermath of Pokhran II by focusing more on defence relations with ASEAN countries.37 As a democracy, India has a solid record on civilian control over its military. Yet India’s military development, especially its naval build-up in the 1980s and the use of force at the same time in its immediate neighbourhood created some suspicion and negative reaction in some ASEAN states.38 In order to check this, India, besides public diplomacy, began engaging in military assistance and diplomacy.39
Military assistance and diplomacy
Providing military assistance, deploying forces overseas, showing flags, hosting friendly navies, providing training, conducting joint exercises, engaging in evacuations, employing in peace keeping, peace-making, peace building and peace enforcement, and engage-ment through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) constitute the Indian Navy’s diplomatic and benign role.40 One of the objectives of the benign role is to project India’s soft power.41
For soft power utility, India has extended military assistance in
vari-35 Integrated headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), India’s Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8, 2009, p. 107.
36 Raja Menon, “The Indian Ocean 2020: The Indian View”, Atlantic Council, 25 June 2010, http://www.acus.org/event/indian-ocean-2020-indian-view/
transcript.
37 Isabelle Saint-Mézard, Eastward Bound, pp. 412–420.
38 Ibid., 280–286.
39 Ibid., pp. 292–295.
40 Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009, p. 105–122.
41 Ibid., p. 120.
ous forms to ASEAN countries to augment their hard power capabilities.
India’s support, however, varies from one country to another. Among all, India has substantive defence engagements with Singapore. Under the Army and Air Force Bilateral agreements, India has for the first time
India’s support, however, varies from one country to another. Among all, India has substantive defence engagements with Singapore. Under the Army and Air Force Bilateral agreements, India has for the first time