The link between media and society has been studied over the years from diverse perspectives.
The various research approaches adopted reflect the evolution of paradigms in conceptualizing the role of media in society. Such paradigms can be studied within the ideological level of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences model. Christians et al (2009) argue that different societal formations bring about different kinds of media structures and functions.
They lay out four main traditions.
One is the corporatist tradition, which views the world as one body. In this tradition, the media are collaborative with the authorities because they operate from a shared set of values. Such societies tend to have a high degree of development mobilisation, with the media focused on national welfare and less critical of economic enterprise, religion and education. “Media elites are likely to be closely aligned to social, political, and cultural elites and dominated by a policy of national cultural unity” (Christians et al 2009, 22). In this case, the media does not play the role of the fourth estate that keeps the government accountable; rather, it is more of a development partner. This way of approaching media functions in society has been prevalent for instance in the Asian context.
Another world view is the libertarian tradition, also called the ‘liberal-individualist’ tradition.
This tradition “elevates the principle of freedom of expression to the highest point in the values hierarchy that the media are expected to uphold” (Christians et al 2009, 23). It draws from the late middle ages and renaissance in Europe as a response to the entrenched monarchies and religious institutions. This world view is prevalent in many western democracies, and is also reflected in media development projects in the Global South. Such projects are often funded by international NGOs or government agencies in the global north, and push for the freedom of expression as a core value in media practice. This specific value is further supported by being enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13
The next tradition that Christians et al propose is the social responsibility one, which “…retains freedom as the basic principle for organizing public communication, including the media, but views the public or community as also having some rights and legitimate expectations of
13 Article 19: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Available on http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
adequate service” (Christians et al 2009, 24). There are minimalist and maximalist versions of social responsibility. While a minimalist version expects the media to regulate themselves chiefly based on concern for professionalism and in response to requests from the public or the government, the maximalist version is more interventionist, with measures such as laws to ensure diversity or innovation, and creation of public service media tasked with serving the public good. It is under this tradition that public broadcasters such as the BBC are instituted.
Last is the citizen participation tradition, based on the idea that “…the media belong to the people, with an emancipatory, expressive, and critical purpose” (Christians et al 2009, 25). In this tradition, the media are instrumental in the struggle for collective rights. When these are achieved, the media in question may expire or “become institutionalized as the true voice of citizens, without being beholden to the market or government authority” (Christians et al 2009, 25). Local, small-scale and alternative media fit into this tradition. However, the authors see a challenge in applying this tradition’s thinking to more large scale and mainstream media such as national or international media. They instead advocate for mainstream media picking principles from these alternative media such as feedback and interactivity. In their summary and recommendations for this tradition, the authors conceptualise alternative media as ephemeral protest media which do not have a permanent place in the broader media scene;
rather, they exist to serve a certain goal and then eventually die out or get absorbed into the mainstream. The authors also seem to assume that ‘feedback and interactivity’ amount to
‘participation’, and overlook the power dynamics inherent in all media systems which necessitate alternative media in the first place. Indeed, alternative media exist because there are certain grassroots concerns that are not addressed by mainstream media, regardless of opportunities for feedback and interactivity.
Hints of some of these four traditions are apparent on the Kenyan media scene in different time epochs. Immediately following independence in 1963, the media were conceptualised as State partners who would play a key role in promoting development through the building of national unity (Ogola 2011; Ugangu 2016). At the time, the authoritarian or development tradition (Heath 1997) was prevalent. It can be equated to the corporatist tradition, where media function to promote the good of the nation, and what constitutes that ‘good’ is agreed upon by both the political class and the media. Since the liberalization of the media sector in the 1990s, the liberal-individualist tradition is apparent, especially in commercial media houses which operate under the rubric of freedom of expression and seek to hold the state to account. However,
freedom of expression is not always welcomed by the powers that be, and legislation has been used to curtail it. For instance, the country’s Official Secrets Act and the 1967 Preservation of Public Security Act limit information disclosure from the government to the media, and give the president power to censor any information deemed a danger to public security respectively.
Pursuing the liberal-individualist tradition is made even more complex due to media ownership patterns in Kenya. Research shows that a majority of leading commercial media houses have ties to politicians, and editorial decisions catering to politicians’ whims are made.14 Indeed, even with expanded media freedom, media houses opt to practice a degree of self-censorship rather than antagonise their political ties. Meanwhile, the state broadcaster continues with the corporatist tradition and adheres to government development priorities. Christian et al’s (2009) citizen participation tradition has not characterised the Kenyan media context as such, but there is room for it in community broadcasting legislation, as will be outlined in the fourth chapter.
As such, Kenyan media exist under hybrid traditions which have grown out of an evolving political context.
2.2.1 Global Trends and Media Policy
Global trends also impact on the paradigms under which media are envisioned. As MacLean (2014) points out, “Beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, an economic paradigm that emphasized privatization, liberalization, competition, and globalization of carriage and content began to displace the public service paradigm that traditionally guided media and communication policy” (Maclean 2014, 40). Kenya was not exempt from this global wave of economic and political change, similar to most African countries (Nassanga 2009).
As global viewpoints changed over time regarding the role of development communication and the role of the state as a key player in communication evolved, changes to accommodate this shift also took place in the Kenyan media policy.
However, even with the move to a more liberalized media sector, and, presumably, less of a top-down, development-oriented approach, voice is not assured for the everyday citizen.
Munene (2009), drawing on examples from the Kenyan media industry, argues that African media, in promoting neoliberal values such as ‘freedom of the press’ are actually promoting
‘freedom for those who own the press’, most of whom are foreign owners. As such, African
14 See for example Freedom House 2015 report about Kenya’s media freedom on https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/kenya
media are involved in ‘postmodern colonialism’ which has had the net effect of suppressing home grown knowledge. Speaking from a global perspective, Manyozo (2011) points out that the diffusion approach to communication policy making has resulted in indigenous knowledge communication systems being ignored. The yardsticks to measure progress in communication are determined by international development organisations, which is a form of cultural imperialism.
Alhassan and Chakravartty make a related argument, pointing out that media policy in the Global South should be looked at in view of postcolonial considerations. They assert that “the postcolonial state in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America successfully has legitimated itself, not as an outcome of a negotiated product of civil society and capital….but as an institution that founds it primary purpose of existence upon the discourse of national development planning and modernization” (Alhassan & Chakravartty 2011, 367). Similar to Manyozo’s views, they argue that in postcolonial nations, “communication resources of the nation are often discussed, not as resources for democracy but as those for ‘development’ in the technical sense of diffusion studies” (Alhassan & Chakravartty 2011, 371). They argue that “in the postcolonial milieu, development (and, by extension, development communication theory and practice) was as instrumental as political technologies in governmentalizing the Global South in international relations” (Alhassan & Chakravartty 2011, 378).
As a result of these historical factors, they argue, in the postcolonial setting, “the boundaries of state, civil society, and capital are often collapsed into a hegemonic relationship in which domestic policy outcomes often are borne under the shadow of the imperial requirements of capital” (Alhassan & Chakravartty 2011, 378). They propose that “a postcolonial information, media, and communication policy framework should consider how international capital goes through a process of localization within countries of the Global South and acquires domestic political instrumentality” (Alhassan & Chakravartty 2011, 378). They recommend using
“public access, equity, and democratization” as benchmarks to evaluate policy, as opposed to invoking the idea of “development to justify information, media, and communication policy”
(Alhassan & Chakravartty 2011, 379). However, much as they critique the rhetoric of
‘development’ as a way for the state to legitimize its paternalistic status, in proposing ‘public access, equity and democratization’ as more appropriate benchmarks, Alhassan and Chakravartty still draw on indicators originating in the global North as a way to evaluate information, media and communication policy in the Global South, as criticized by Manyozo.
In contrast to Alhassan and Chakravartty’s (2011) proposal, Manyozo (2011) argues that
“governments and civil society organizations in Africa and, indeed, the whole of the Global South should develop their own communication for development policies organically”
(Manyozo 2011, 332), and that “To remove concerns about cultural imperialism, the ideologies of modernization, especially the concept of free information, should not serve as a universalized benchmark for communication for development policy-making” (Manyozo 2011, 333). Manyozo also calls for research into the political economy of media, communication and development policy, and a focus on the voices of the Global South in the ongoing debates.
In a similar argument, Willems (2014) critiques development communication approaches for implicitly overlooking the agency of the communities and individuals in which such projects are located. She argues that they tend to focus on communication interventions typically funded by a Northern non-governmental organization, usually to assess impact or to anticipate potential effects of such interventions. This approach ends up highlighting the agency of the Global North in the media landscapes of the Global South, instead of focusing on “actually existing roles of media and communication in processes of development and social change that are taking place outside the context of Western development interventions”(italics by author) (Willems 2014, 15). Looking at the Kenyan media industry, one traces both the ideas of media as development tools and those of media for democratization and free speech. This suggests a media industry straddling the middle ground, as aptly captured by Ugangu (2016).
2.2.2 Media for Development as a Kenyan State Policy
Following independence from colonial rule in the 1960s, the media system in Kenya was designed to support the government to achieve developmental goals (King’ara 2011; Ogenga 2010; Ogola 2011; Odhiambo 1991). In the 50 years since then, while the media system has expanded to incorporate commercial, non-government-affiliated media, the idea of the media as having a nation-building responsibility persists across the board (Ugangu 2016). This is not unique to Kenya. There is an assumed developmental role for the media held by many African governments ever since independence, with, for instance media in East Africa characterized by their ‘nation-building’ function (Ramaprasad 2001; Ogola 2011). The participation of the press in national development may genuinely aid the government’s development efforts; however, it is also a way for authoritarian governments to ensure that only positive aspects of the leaders
and of the government’s development efforts are emphasized, thus legitimating and extending such leaders’ stay in power (Ramaprasad and Kelly 2003). This paternalistic approach ignores the dynamic nature of media and audiences, takes media audiences to be culturally homogenous, and defines these audiences in opposition to western culture (Tomaselli 2009).
Tomaselli argues that this brings a disconnect between policy and reality:
The dilemma for Africa is that post-Fordist methods of production, marketing and consequent consumption practices tend to be in opposition to nation-building and culturally universalizing discourses. These are cemented in the modernist notion of the uniformity and integrity (economic, political, cultural, linguistic and cosmological) of the ‘nation-state’, national versus global citizens and cultures bounded by geographical considerations. (Tomaselli 2009, 11)
Thus, while the government conceptualizes media in a one-dimensional way and makes policies that reflect that conceptualization, the media growth and use on the ground reflects different realities. Nyamnjoh (2005) explores this discrepancy between universalising media discourses and actual realities on the ground. He argues that in Africa, individuals and communities take up the dual roles of ‘citizens’ who exist under the principles of democracy, and ‘subjects’ who opt to collaborate with the powers that be, whether at the community level or at the state level, for various reasons such as accessing resources. Consequently, conceptualising the media audience exclusively as either subjects or citizens fails to capture the complexity of the ways in which people interact with media and with the state. By the same token, Nyamnjoh argues, media practitioners carry out their work from both the citizen and subject perspectives outlined above, and one needs to keep this in mind in order to fully grasp the values under which media in Africa function.
For instance, while both commercial and state media provide information that supports the working of other societal institutions, specifically commercial media align themselves with the tenets of civic democracy, albeit in a limited way, given that most commercial media outlets are owned by the political class. Commercial media have acted as a voice of criticism to a certain extent in the Kenyan context, especially through investigative reporting. However, such exposés have led to journalists’ lives being threatened and media houses being faced with high
fines15 based on libel charges.16 From these developments, one notes that in the Kenyan context, the State limits how much of a radical role the media can play, through instituting and enforcing legislation. Though the media have relative freedom in comparison to the pre-liberalization era, the State still uses legislation to delineate the bounds of media practice.
2.2.3 The Place of Culture in Media Roles
When it comes to community radio, an additional media role is the creation and maintenance of culture, expressed through the practices in and around such media. Indeed, it is not only the media content that determines the media role, but also the practices around the media institution in a community.
Carey’s ritual view of communication asserts that the purpose of communication is not so much to transmit information as it is to create and maintain culture, that is, certain understandings of the world. According to him, “A ritual view of communication is directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs” (Carey 2002, 5). In attending to media for example, people do not necessarily learn something new but rather, engage as observers in a ritual in which their specific view of the world is portrayed and confirmed.
Meadows et al (2009) see ‘culture’ as a useful term when examining the impact of community media processes. They assert that culture is “expressed, represented, reproduced and maintained through the media” (Meadows, et al. 2009, 151), although not exclusively so. They define culture as “our everyday frameworks for understanding and communicating our experience of the world and importantly our place within it” (Meadows, et al. 2009, 151).
Therefore, community broadcasting is appropriately placed to perform the function of communicating culture. Especially due to the fact that community media broadcast in local languages, they play “a critical performative and mediating role” (Meadows, et al. 2009, 154).
15 In 2013, new media laws were passed which allowed for the possibility of heavily fining journalists and media houses for breach of a government-dictated code of conduct. See for example article “Kenya parliament passes draconian media laws” on the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) website:
https://cpj.org/2013/12/kenya-parliament-passes-draconian-media-laws.php
16 Section 194 of the Kenyan Penal Code states that “Any person who, by print, writing, painting or effigy, or by any means otherwise than solely by gestures, spoken words or other sounds, unlawfully publishes any
defamatory matter concerning another person, with intent to defame that other person, is guilty of the
misdemeanour termed libel.” This section of the law was declared unconstitutional by the Kenya High Court in February 2017. It was found to be contradictory to freedom of expression.
Since the media in general are central in the production and maintenance of cultures “through the broadcast of music, news, and information, representations of community and generally, a community’s ‘whole way of life’ – the participation by community members in media processes is recognised as a site of empowerment” (Meadows, et al. 2009, 156).
The authors argue that the power relations between audience members and media producers is
“at the very least disturbed by the production and reception of community media” (Meadows, et al. 2009, 154), therefore solely studying the content of community media runs the risk of missing out the ways in which community media facilitate ‘community organisation’ (quoting Tomaselli and Prinsloo 1990, p. 156), and the cultural relationships between media workers and the communities from which they emerge (Meadows, et al. 2009, 154). It is thus important to study the ‘transformative processes’ that community media bring about in individuals and communities and to view community development not only as community empowerment enabled through media, but also the changes that take place in the community due to the ownership and management of a broadcasting station, such as training volunteers, creating networks with other organisations and so on. In this case, the communication process itself reflects and reproduces culture.
Still referring to culture and communication as intertwined, Faniran (2014) argues that myths and rituals add to the communalistic understanding of communication, with myths referring to
“truths about society that are taken for granted and woven through everyday discourse”, and rituals being the “deeper emotional media of dramatic performance” (Faniran 2014, 153). In view of this proposal about the cultural specificity of communication ideals, it is of interest to evaluate how similar or dissimilar the narratives and practices in community radio in the three researched contexts is. In other words, can one trace the same myths and ritual styles across the three stations, or do they differ? What community cultures and values could one infer from
“truths about society that are taken for granted and woven through everyday discourse”, and rituals being the “deeper emotional media of dramatic performance” (Faniran 2014, 153). In view of this proposal about the cultural specificity of communication ideals, it is of interest to evaluate how similar or dissimilar the narratives and practices in community radio in the three researched contexts is. In other words, can one trace the same myths and ritual styles across the three stations, or do they differ? What community cultures and values could one infer from