2-1 Support for Local Governments
(1) Overview of Support
The national government and local governments from across Japan deployed official to assist affected local governments in dealing with the aftermath. The national government deployed a Team to Support the Daily Lives of Disaster Victims, consisting of 68 information and communications official (hereinafter “Information Liaison Officers”) from various ministries and agencies, along with a total of 8,388 support official. As well as ascertaining the extent of the damage in affected municipalities, the Information Liaison Officers’ role involved liaison and coordination between the national government and affected municipalities. Specifically, they sought to gain an understanding of each municipality’s requests and issues, and, in particular, to ascertain needs at evacuation centers, providing regular reports on their findings to the on-site disaster management headquarters and explaining government policies, where necessary.
In addition, local governments across Japan deployed official to Kumamoto Prefecture and Kumamoto City to assist affected local governments under a variety of schemes, including national and regional block agreements concluded by members of the National Governors’ Association, assistance organized by the Japan Association of City Mayors, and assistance based on agreements between individual municipalities (Figs. 2-1-1 and 2-1-2).
National government official engaged in support activities at Mashiki municipal office
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(2) Agreements between Local Governments and Agreements between Local Governments and Private Sector Companies
To ensure the smooth procurement and supply of goods in the event of a disaster, it is important that local governments not only stockpile items, but also conclude support agreements with other local governments and private sector companies before disaster strikes.
In Kumamoto Prefecture, most local governments had concluded goods procurement and supply agreements Fig. 2-1-1 Deployment of Official to Kumamoto Prefecture Based on Agreements with the Kyushu–
Yamaguchi Nine Prefectures Framework, the Union of Kansai Governments, the National Governors’ Association, and Shizuoka Prefecture, etc. (April 21 – May 30, 2016)
Duties: Ascertaining extent of damage
Source: From materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake
1,800
Fig. 2-1-2 Deployment of Official to Kumamoto City Based on Agreements with Major Cities and the Mayors Association of Designated Cities, etc. (April 21 – May 30, 2016)
Medical/health care
Disaster waste
Residential land &
building risk assessment Water supply
Educational support Other
Source: From materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake
Managing
before the earthquake, with 40 of the 46 local governments, etc. (including Kumamoto Prefectural Office) within the prefecture (approximately 90%) having concluded support agreements (Fig. 2-1-3). Of these 40 local governments, 33 (approximately 80%) had concluded agreements with local governments outside the prefecture (Fig. 2-1-4).
Should a major disaster occur, neighboring local governments are also likely to be affected, so it is necessary to conclude agreements with local governments in more distant areas as well.
Agreements must be concluded not only with other local governments, but also with private sector companies. In Kumamoto Prefecture, 29 of the 40 local governments (approximately 70%) had concluded agreements with both local governments and private sector companies (Fig. 2-1-5).
Thus, most of Kumamoto Prefecture’s local governments had concluded goods procurement and supply agreements and this was one reason for their ability to secure assistance from so many local governments promptly in the aftermath of the Kumamoto Earthquake. On the other hand, many local governments and private sector companies were affected by the disaster, so it was difficult to adequately fulfill the commitments made in these agreements in some cases. This challenge is not specific to Kumamoto Prefecture, but rather is one common to local governments nationwide. Accordingly, local governments need to conclude multiple agreements to diversify their disaster risk, so that they are prepared for a major disaster of the kind expected to occur in due course, such as Nankai Trough Earthquake.
Fig. 2-1-3 Goods Procurement and Supply Support Agreements Concluded by Local Governments within Kumamoto Prefecture
No agreement concluded 6 local governments
Agreement(s) concluded 40 local governments
Fig. 2-1-4 Agreements Concluded with Local Governments Outside Kumamoto Prefecture
Concluded with local governments both within and outside the
prefecture
Fig. 2-1-5 Agreements Concluded with Private Sector Companies
Source: From materials distributed at the Fifth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake
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(3) Development of Support Mechanisms
Mechanisms for personnel deployment and securing various other forms of support from an array of national and local government bodies had been put in place before the earthquake occurred and were utilized in Kumamoto (Figs. 2-1-6 and 2-1-7).
However, the support systems were not necessarily adequate, so further strengthening of functions enabling physical support and emergency response assistance to be provided to affected local governments is required.
A key challenge in facilitating the provision of support in the event of disaster is ensuring that tasks such as the creation of mechanisms for coordination among the various assisting organizations, the standardization of disaster response work, and the matching of organizations/personnel with duties are carried out in an integrated manner. Following deliberations by the Study Group on Securing Municipal Administrative Functions in a Major Disaster between January and March 2017, the national government (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) decided to establish a new scheme based on a simple checklist that would enable the status of three key elements in affected municipalities to be ascertained without delay: senior management;
manpower; and government buildings and other aspects of the physical environment. In March 2017, the Seminar on the Deployment of Support Official to Assist Affected Residents in Rebuilding their Lives after a Major Disaster began to consider the development of effective manpower deployment mechanisms and support for the management of affected local governments.
Fig. 2-1-6 Illustration of the Deployment of Support Official to Major Municipalities Following a Major Disaster
Source: From materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake
Fig. 2-1-7 Major Local Government Support Initiatives by each Ministry and Agency equipment for use in disaster management
・Free public wireless LAN at evacuation centers
Ministry of Defense
・Disaster relief deployment of Self-Defense Forces
(search and rescue, emergency repairs, medical support, support for the supply of water and food, bathing support, transport of supplies)
National Police
Agency ・Police disaster response units
Ministry of
・Emergency fuel supply based on the Disaster Oil Supply
・Support for sewerage system repairs
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries
・Farming and Rural Disaster Relief Unit (Midori Disaster Relief Squad)
Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare
・Disaster medical assistance team (DMAT)
・Disaster psychiatric assistance team (DPAT)
・Deployment of public health nurses, etc.
・Matching the needs of social welfare facilities with welfare personnel
・Deployment of investigative and technical official to address damage to the water supply
・Support for the reopening of schools
・Enhanced psychological care
・Deployment of senior cultural properties specialists
・Deployment of emergency risk assessors
Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake
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2-2 Living Conditions of Evacuees and Self-help/Mutual Support Initiatives
(1) Evacuation Centers
On April 17, 2016, the Cabinet Office published and circulated the Evacuation Center Management Guidelines, the Guidelines for Securing and Managing Toilets at Evacuation Centers, and the Guidelines for Managing and Operating Welfare Evacuation Centers, to facilitate the appropriate operation of evacuation centers by affected local governments. However, examples of evacuation center management that was not necessarily appropriate were also pointed out.
Accordingly, the Cabinet Office decided to put together an anthology of examples as a complement the Evacuation Center Management Guidelines, etc., to contribute to smoother evacuation center management.
As such, it conducted a questionnaire-based survey of relevant local governments and affected citizens in January and February 2017 (Fig. 2-2-1). In addition, the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake proposed that a system of advisors be established to support evacuation center management.
Fig. 2-2-1Major Comments Expressed in the Questionnaire (Excerpt)
Source: Cabinet Office
Reality of support for those affected by the disaster and associated issues
・Some mentioned the fact that PTA executives, other relevant individuals, and local junior and senior high school students had set up self-management bodies, which took on the bulk of the work involved in managing evacuation centers, thereby enabling the staff of affected local governments to dedicate their time to liaison and coordination with the city. Others mentioned that elementary, junior and senior high school students had assisted in serving meals and chatting to elderly people, and senior high school students had cleaned the toilets.
Self-management initiatives
・While the staff members conducting consultations to check on the health of evacuees were not always the same individuals, they visited at the same time, without fail, and left handover notes regarding the matters discussed, facilitating a smooth response without the need to repeatedly ask the same questions.
Maintenance of a hygienic environment
・People find it easier to speak up if they are told, “Please speak to us if you have a longstanding medical condition or a mental or physical disorder and you need anything,”
rather than, “Please tell us if you need assistance.”
Responses to those requiring special consideration
・Many respondents mentioned that the number of evacuees who were served meals at evacuation centers equipped with emergency field kitchens fluctuated considerably. To ensure that they did not run short of food, they dealt with this by preparing meals that could more readily accommodate fluctuations in the number of people to be served, such as soup, rather than individually packaged meals.
・Meticulous care was taken in displaying warnings concerning food allergies and the packages for the foods used in preparing the meals were displayed alongside them, enabling those with food allergies to check the ingredients.
Management of food and supplies
・Both evacuees and those running evacuation centers stated that they felt that temporary toilets in which the waste was sealed off in single-use bags after each use were particularly outstanding from the perspectives of both hygiene and center
management. At the same time, some expressed the view that temporary toilets in which each toilet was equipped with a plastic tank were not appropriate from a center management perspective, because it took too long to replenish the water. Others expressed anxiety about the hygiene implications of temporary toilets not equipped with water, because, while requiring little management, there was a tendency for feces to pile up.
Provision and management of toilets
・There were complaints about the fact that the areas of evacuation centers designated for single men and single women were placed next to each other, but cardboard and other materials were used as partitions to divide up the areas for men, women, and families.
・Families with infants and young children had difficulty in expressing their views and even those running the centers found it hard to speak to male staff in some cases, so suggestion boxes were put in place to ensure that support was not biased in favor of those with the loudest voices.
・In evacuation centers with women-only rooms, the only staff on duty were men, leading to difficulty in cleaning the rooms and the toilets.
Availability of separate areas for men and women; consideration for children
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Evacuees take center in the first-floor lobby of Kumamoto City Office (April 29, 2016)
Evacuees take center in the lobby of Mashiki Health and Welfare Center (April 29, 2016)
A corridor and room at Mashiki Health and Welfare Center (April 29, 2016)
(2) Activities by Individual Volunteers and NPOs
Several cases were observed where it was difficult to respond to the Kumamoto Earthquake only by interventions of government bodies and citizens. This is believed to have stemmed from the sheer scale of the disaster: evacuees exceeded 180,000 at one stage and the number of evacuation centers operated peaked at 855. Another reason is thought to have been the fact that local government officials and local citizens were not necessarily proficient in responding to a disaster that caused such a huge amount of damage. As such, the support provided by individual volunteers (described below) and NPOs, among others, was of great assistance to affected areas and citizens.
In Kumamoto, the support offered by NPOs led by the Hinokuni Conference for Kumamoto Earthquake Support (described below) is particularly noteworthy. An organization that works with government bodies and NPOs, the Hinokuni Conference is an initiative unprecedented in Japan, in terms of both the speed with which it was set up (having been established on April 19, 2016) and the scale of the support that it provided while coordinating duties between NPOs, in partnership with government bodies.
This section provides a broad overview of the activities of individual volunteers and NPOs, and examines future approaches to such activities.
(i) Individual volunteers
Individuals who go to affected areas at their own initiative to provide those affected by the disaster with support, without being affiliated to an organization of some kind are referred to here as individual volunteers.
In most cases, the task of receiving these individual volunteers and allocating duties to them is carried out by the disaster volunteer centers (hereinafter “disaster VCs”) established by social welfare councils in disaster-afflicted areas. The social welfare councils of 17 affected municipalities began setting up disaster VCs on April 19, 2016 to receive individual volunteers.
In general, surveys to ascertain the needs of those affected by a disaster cannot be carried out in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, because those people have evacuated their homes. Immediately after the earthquake in Kumamoto, some disaster VCs took the step of restricting the volunteers sought on the basis of where prospective volunteers lived (for example, accepting only those who lived in Kumamoto Prefecture or in Kyushu), due to the impact of aftershocks, the need to prioritize efforts to rebuild the lives of local citizens and ensure the safety of volunteers, and concerns about dealing with prospective volunteers who were surplus to requirements. From the latter half of April through May, the needs of those affected by the disaster gradually became clearer and efforts by volunteers to tidy up homes and clear away rubble got underway in earnest.
However, given concerns about road congestion during the consecutive national holidays in early May, the prefectural government put out a call on its website for people to take into account the need to alleviate such congestion.
At the same time, while some disaster VCs attracted more prospective volunteers than they could actually process, others struggled with a shortage of candidates. Accordingly, surplus volunteers were referred to disaster VCs without enough volunteers. After the consecutive national holidays in early May, the on-site disaster management headquarters put out a call via bodies such as the Kyushu Economic Federation, asking companies to participate in volunteer activities, while the Cabinet Office and various other bodies used their websites, Twitter, and other means to encourage people to volunteer.
By the end of November 2016, all evacuation centers had been closed and considerable progress had been made in moving those whose homes had been half or completely destroyed by the disaster into emergency temporary housing or provisional temporary housing. Accordingly, activities by large numbers of volunteers aimed at supporting the recovery of people’s daily lives were coming to an end. Consequently, the disaster VCs
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switched to recruiting volunteers for activities on weekends only or were reorganized into “Daily Life Reconstruction Support VCs.” Since the end of 2016, virtually no volunteer activities aimed at responding to the disaster have taken place.
Fig. 2-2-2 Establishment of Disaster VCs Following the Kumamoto Earthquake
The main activities undertaken by individual volunteers include surveys of the needs of those affected by the disaster, tidying up homes, clearing and shifting rubble, support for the management of evacuation centers, and sorting of relief supplies. The status of the various disaster VCs is shown below.
Municipality
Situation as of November 13, 2016
Recruitment Area Specified by Disaster VC Kikuchi City April 19 777 Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Support VC on May 22
Uto City April 19 3,166
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction Support VC (including clearance of sludge due to flooding, from June 25) on June 6 Uki City April 19 4,119 Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Support VC on June 1 Minamiaso
Village April 20 6,768
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction Support VC on July 1 Reorganized into a VC to deal with all fields, not only the disaster (ordinary VC) on September 1
Yamato Town April 21 275 Reorganized into an ordinary VC on September 1
Mashiki Town April 21 34,268 Carried out activities on Fridays and
Saturdays Nationwide
Kumamoto City April 22 38,267 Carried out activities on weekends Nationwide Ozu Town April 22 3,178 Mainly carried out activities on Saturdays Kyushu Koshi City April 22 802 Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Support VC on May 15
Kikuyo Town April 22 1,832 Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction Support VC on May 21
Misato Town April 22 194 Ordinary VC Nishihara
Village April 24 14,357
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction Support VC on July 29.
Carried out activities on weekends
Nationwide
Kosa Town April 25 732 Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction Support VC on June 21
Aso City April 26 729 Reorganized into an ordinary VC on May 4 Kashima Town April 26 2,238 Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Support VC on June 1
Mifune Town April 29 4,895 Including clearance of sludge due to flooding, from June 25.
Source: Data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (as of November 13, 2016)
Kumamoto City Disaster Volunteer Center
(ii) Initiatives drawing on the know-how and expertise of NPOs and other support groups
At least 300 NPOs and other support groups from Kumamoto and outside it carried out a variety of activities in the aftermath of the Kumamoto Earthquake, including running evacuation centers and making improvements to the living environment that government bodies would have found difficult to carry out unaided, as well as preparing meals for evacuees; conducting surveys of evacuees centering in their own damaged homes or in cars and providing them with support; managing, transporting, and distributing donated goods; and supporting the management of Disaster VCs.
Fig. 2-2-3 Examples of NPO Activities
・Conducting surveys of the living environment at 118 evacuation centers in Kumamoto Prefecture
・Improving toilets, beds, meals, and the sanitation environment
・Devising evacuation center layouts, setting them up, and arranging spaces with consideration for evacuees
・Supporting the layout, setup, and management of welfare evacuation centers
・Managing and delivering donated supplies
・Arranging cardboard beds and nursing care supplies
・Coordinating meal provision for evacuation centers
・Delivering programs aimed at preventing “inactive lifestyle syndrome,” including conversation groups and footbaths
・Supporting local citizens in transitioning to self-management
・Supporting consolidation into hub evacuation centers and efforts to close all evacuation centers etc.
<Evacuation center assessments>
Following the Kumamoto Earthquake, the large number of evacuation centers meant that a lack of understanding of the situation at the centers was an issue. Accordingly, NPOs worked with the on-site disaster
Following the Kumamoto Earthquake, the large number of evacuation centers meant that a lack of understanding of the situation at the centers was an issue. Accordingly, NPOs worked with the on-site disaster