policy formulations into the intersubjective frameworks of the regimes can be tracked by looking into the elements constituting those formulations and changes in the intersubjective and normative frameworks of the regimes.
transformation of the world order. To support this argument, the dissertation concentrates only in the changes in the normative content of the GATT regime during the Uruguay Round. It demonstrates that the legal scope of the trade regime was redesigned, and its content was re-defined in this process in a way that is reflective of the new neoliberal ideological context thereby creating a constitutional framework towards disciplining the states. This dissertation puts the creation of the GATS in the spotlight since this framework was instrumental in redefining fundamental norms of the GATT, i.e. non-discrimination and liberalisation to regulate trade in services.
Through such redefinition, this transformation altered the intersubjective meanings intrinsic to the trade regime including the notions of trade, trader (i.e. exporter and/or importer), protectionism and barriers to trade. It changed the meaning of trade which has for centuries meant a cross-border exchange of commodities. Today trade encapsulates both exports and imports of goods and services. The hegemonic transformation has also redefined the authority of the states and market actors vis-à-vis each other by de-legitimizing certain domestic regulations which turned to be defined as non-tariff barriers, and by according new rights to foreign service producers who got the status of traders.
On the other hand, the emergence of and changes to international regimes take place in the context of hegemonic formation, which determines the limits to the regime
transformation. In this regard, it is further argued that the transformation of the trade regime has been constrained by the challenges faced by the neoliberal hegemony in the form of counter ideas leveraged by social forces contesting neoliberalism. This argument is supported with evidence drawn from the analysis of the second case, i.e.
investment. The business case for a multilateral investment framework under the WTO intended to generate further disciplines upon member states through provisions on investment protection especially against various forms of expropriation, investment liberalisation and settlement of disputes between investors and governments. The proposed framework would further transform the normative content of the regime by according new obligations to the states and extending the legal rights of investors vis-à-vis governments. Depending on the standard that would be adopted during potential WTO negotiations, the normative content of the regime would expand the scope of the norms of non-discrimination, liberalisation as well as transparency to ensure a larger space for the operations and cross-border mobility of capital. Hence, the intersubjective meanings of the regime could even further be amended by redefining trade towards encompassing cross-border movements of selected forms of capital as well as the meanings of barriers and protectionism accordingly.
Secondly, this dissertation aims to bring an answer to the question of “what are the roles played by TNCs in the normative transformation of the trade regime?” Based on its theoretical framework, the dissertation suggests that TNCs have been the major social forces to take part in the construction of the neoliberal world order and the transformation of the trade regime. The focus here is the involvement of TNCs in setting the trade regime’s agenda. It is argued that TNCs engaged in the redefinition of the fundamental norms of the trade regime through pursuing particular agenda-setting strategies, including both coercive and consensual dimensions. Agenda-agenda-setting is defined in Chapter 2 broadly to include state and non-state activities before and during intergovernmental negotiations. Both state and non-state actors engage in agenda-setting by building cases and coalitions. TNC activities may take the form of a
“war of position” by developing and disseminating their case as a policy formula addressing the needs and preferences of a broad set of actors. Any changes to the trade regime require the agreement of governments including weaker states since the GATT/WTO operates on consensus. Thus, TNCs need to influence the positions of the negotiating agents through leveraging available instruments that would include both educative tools to get the consent of subordinate actors and available coercive tools in the form of trade sanctions. It is argued that TNCs utilised different strategies in the cases of services and investment because their preferences and strategies were shaped within different contexts of hegemonic formation.
From the late 1970s, the case of services was built and promoted by U.S. based TNCs which engaged in a war of position with the aim of convincing initially the American government and later other actors in the tradability of services and the necessity of a GATT framework to eliminate the regulatory barriers inhibiting international delivery of services. This case was developed as a policy formula addressing the interests and needs of negotiating states. It was projected through coalition-building within and beyond the United States and included education activities to change the established mindset of “trade in goods.” They succeeded in getting the U.S. government on board followed by other OECD countries and finally developing countries (which were initially resistant to the expansion of the GATT agenda). Their campaign succeeded in putting services on the GATT agenda and in changing its intersubjective meanings.
Parallel to the embracement of their case by European and developing country governments, they were also obliged to provide concessions along the road. Thus, the GATS was constructed as a flexible instrument that would achieve significant market opening only in the longer term.
On the other hand, the investment case seems to prove the emergence of certain limits to the structural power of TNCs given that their preferences and strategies to set the WTO agenda were constrained by the challenges raised in the civil society in the
context of contested neoliberal hegemony. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a group of social actors who were critical of the neoliberal trade agenda, policies and institutions emerged and mobilized within and across the borders against a new round of talks under the WTO. This dissertation argues that these forces became influential in setting domestic and multilateral trade agenda through activating policy-makers as well as other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). European TNCs who were pushing for a WTO investment constitution failed to build a strong transatlantic business coalition for an ambitious agenda in the WTO. They remained low-profile in their agenda-setting campaign which entailed mainly the utilisation of their power by directly lobbying the European Commission. Growing concerns and moral attacks on TNC operations were culminated with the formation of an NGO coalition which set a counter war of position through a cross-border campaign aiming to prevent the launch of the talks in the WTO. This coalition became influential in the entrenchment and broadening of the block of countries by educating African governments about the potential negative impacts of a WTO investment treaty and facilitating their mobilisation. The failure of the Cancun Conference was a consequence of a clear repositioning on the side of least developed countries and consolidation of the anti-investment coalition against the actors demanding the initiation of anti-investment talks.
The remainder of the dissertation is structured in three parts. The first part develops a conceptual framework to understand the shift in the ideological framework from the U.S. to neoliberal hegemony (Chapter 2) and associated normative transformation in the trade regime (Chapter 3). The second part is devoted to the case of services.
Chapter 4 analyses the emergence of the TNC coalition in the United States beginning in the late 1970s and business activities to build consensus in the U.S. and Europe.
Chapter 5 explores the Uruguay Round negotiations in services and the role of TNCs in the construction of the GATS and its fundamental norms. The third part examines the case of investment. Chapter 6 outlines the pre-Doha Round deliberations, the architecture of international investment rules, and divergent transatlantic business preferences in the context of the OECD MAI negotiations. Chapter 7 studies the transatlantic business deliberations and European TNC campaigns for a WTO accord in the context of Doha negotiations, and the resistance and counter campaign of NGOs. Chapter 8 recapitulates the arguments and summarizes the findings of the dissertation.