“clericalization” of retreat practice
IV.6. Religion and identity in Tibet
Robert Bellah suggests that in many traditional cultures, religion set an important foundation for the formation of social relationships; contrary to secular ideologies, which focus on progress, the primal concern of religion is identity. Through offering answers to the fundamental questions about existence, the nature of self and of the world, and by codifying morality, religion offers a sense of stability and consistency, sustained by recurring rituals.325
In pre-modern Tibetan societies, the relationship between religion and identity has been very close. As many scholars have pointed out, the merging of Buddhism with literally every sphere of public and personal life became the main way, in which collective and individual identities were formed.326 This is why today’s religious revival, as much as it needs to be perceived in light of suppression of religion by the Chinese state and its assimilationist politics that threaten the core of Tibetan identity, is furthermore an active attempt to reconstruct traditional identities.
As the anthropologist Catherine Bell noted, by placing a group in a shared ritual setting, the authority of tradition is invoked in order to reaffirm the sense of continuity. Here, tradition is understood as a particular number of references, rooted in the past; one specific collective is also distinct from another.327 Perhaps this is why authors like Mona Schrempf have analyzed the current Tibetan revival as “ethno-religious,” which is concurrent with my own approach.328
Religious theory and practice are dynamic factors that define a self, society and its relationship with the world, both in times of prosperity and misfortune. Bell suggests that relying on spirituals symbols is a proven means to cope with grand social crises, like war or a political transition:
Perhaps the central function of a religion is to act as a cultural gyroscope, to provide a stable set of definitions of the world, and correlatively, of the self, so that both transience and the crises and life can be faced with some equanimity, by the society or the person in question. It is this stability, continuity and coherence
324 Terrone 2009: 81-84.
325 Bellah 1965: 223, 173.
326 For instance Schrempf 2002: 11.
327 Epstein & Wenbin 1998: 122.
328 Schrempf 2001.
provided by commitment to a set of religious symbols […] that give religion such a prominent place in defining the identity of a group or person.329
In Khams, the great and renewed popularity of Buddhism today is also a reaction, resolving the individual and collective predicaments that have appeared in the wake of destruction, colonization as well as an abrupt and forceful modernization. The manifestations of perplexity and frustration, often understated, have often been compared to an “identity crisis” that spread throughout all Tibetan-speaking communities of the PRC.330
As mentioned above, the “civilizing projects” of the CCP, which dealt with China’s minorities (minzu) as inferior groups in urgent need of a cultural upgrade through assimilation with the Han majority, were designed specifically to eradicate the Tibetan sense of self-worth as an ethnic collective.331 Marxist theory and Maoist practice in Tibet was to ensure that the general class identity would become the necessary replacement for ethnic, religious and local individuality, evaluated as backward and inferior.332 Although this venture failed, it left a tremendous, collective sense of low self-esteem, fueled by the persistent Han chauvinism. The post-Mao reforms have yet augmented the dilemmas and challenges facing Tibetans today, e.g. a widening generation gap, increasing socioeconomic inequalities, growing consumerism in urban areas of the PRC paired with acute poverty in the rural regions and the radical reevaluation of traditional patterns of gender identity.333
As religion becomes the main antidote for the “identity crisis” and a factor in instigating social reform, frustration can be skillfully channeled in ways which remain within the field of officially tolerated discourse. This helps avoid ostensible political protests, which result in an interminable spiral of increased governmental control, repression and continued reactions on the side of the oppressed.
With religious tolerance, both sides reap the benefit of maintaining accord. It was a popular strategy in ancient empires that kept the various groups of the empire together, while at the same time, nationalistic tendencies were suppressed. Therefore, lenience on the side of the Chinese authorities makes it possible for Buddhist practice to flourish and ironically, reinforces both ethnic and autonomist tendencies.
329 Bellah 1965: 173.
330 For the use of this term compare Samten Karmay 1994, Kapstein 1998, Havnevik 1994: 262-263 and Bellah 1965: 2.
331 Harrel 1996.
332 The ethno-religious revival in Tibet can also be placed among the post-modern discussions on ethnicity, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. See Gupta & Ferguson 1992 and Radhakrishnan 1987.
333 Makley 2007: 130, Epstein & Wenbin 1998: 136. For consumerism as dangerous for tradition see King 1996:
411.
For many Tibetans today, Buddhism represents the value of their civilization and it recreates a sense of a shared culture, absent in their post-Maoist, secularized environment.
This is one of the reasons why the choice of life as a monastic is increasingly popular among Khams pas. Havnevik believes that this phenomenon might represent a radical answer to the problem of identity. In her analysis, she borrows a concept of “role-blockage,” coined by ethnologist Ingrid Rudie, who uses this notion to describe a decision of taking up a lifestyle that entirely excludes other social roles. In the case of Tibetan monastics, “role-blockage”
advocates the choice of an explicitly Tibetan way of life which can function as a possible solution to the “identity crisis.”334
IV.6.1. The revival as response to modernity
Encroaching modernity only fuels the “identity crisis.” Modernization, understood here as not merely progress in technology, but most of all, an abrupt and systemic “revolution in knowledge,” forms an entirely new context for social and cultural organization, compelling religious traditions to accommodate to the new environment.335
Industry, exploitation of natural resources, tourism, the secularized education model as well as new technologies arrived in the traditional society that was unprepared to face such changes. A sudden rupture of social conventions and values ensued. What is more, modernization brought about issues, which the pre-modern societies of Tibet could not successfully counteract. The drastic changes in the rural economy resulted in relocation or forceful sedentarization of nomads; consumerism and commercialism are currently on the rise, especially among urban communities throughout China; family ties are destabilized due to economically caused separation; redundancy amid Tibetans is increasing as a result of the great influx of Han migrants to the urban centers across the plateau.336
As for the new opportunities and commodities associated with modernity, they often remain unavailable to Tibetans. This is due to poverty, lack of education and inequality on the job markets, where Han Chinese are generally preferred over indigenous applicants. Even if the prospects of modernity were freely accessible to Tibetans, they are inevitably bound to the control of the system which had brought about these changes in the first place. The Chinese
334 Havnevik 1994: 263, emphasis mine. The concept of “role-blockage” is elaborated within the context of the case study in Chapter Ten in the sections discussing the phenomenon of renunciation.
335 Bond 1992: 11-12. Mary Douglas (1982) cited by Bond (1992: 4) presents religious cosmology of traditional culture as a structure which changes abruptly with the advent of modernity; also see Bellah 1965: 196.
336 Horlemann 2002: 240- 267.
and modernity are the two new opponents, which merge into one, as Tibetans perceive them as “extrinsic others.”337
All of these transformations are factors that augment the existential crisis mentioned above.
Since the issue of identity is central in the religious quest, modernization becomes an ethical and religious concern.338 After 1978, Tibetans were seeking a way to revive their identity/identities in response to the Maoist project that had not only instrumentalized, but most of all, failed them. The ethno-religious revival is an effort of an alleviation of pressure as described by Wallace; therefore, I would postulate that the renewed Tibetan interest in Buddhism is a response to modernity.339
According the Bellah, there are four types of reaction a religion can develop towards modernization.340 Given that the contemporary Tibetan Buddhist revival addresses collective emotions by applying traditional symbols, but also for the presence of nationalist and ethnic agendas, it would fit Bellah’s description of a neotraditionalist movement.341 As Germano has noted, the renewed interest in gTer today accounts for a reemphasis of importance of past symbols and as such, acts as the indigenous response to modernity.342
However, I will argue that the central manifestation of Tibetan neotraditionalism is the current revival of hermitism. Since, as Gavin Flood has remarked, the essence of asceticism lies in “the internalization of tradition,” the case study presented in the subsequent chapters illustrates the great role that renunciates play in the current revitalization of the Tibetan religious heritage and ethnic identity. 343
Returning to the scale proposed by Bellah – as it was briefly discussed above, the Tibetan revival, in addition to its neotraditionalist character, also seems to possess certain reformist traits. For instance, the urgency to put forward a successful response to modernity has caused the reinterpretation of certain aspects of Tibetan religion such as the role of women or the primacy of certain schools or lineages over others.344
For Tibetans, modernization and colonialism are frequently perceived as one. In this case, neotraditionalism becomes a tool for a restatement of ethnic identity and of opposition against
337 Germano 1998: 90.
338 Bellah (1991: 64) quoted in Bond (1992: 1); also see Bellah 1965: 194-203.
339 One aspect of reception to modernity in Eastern Tibet is discussed in Hartley 2002.
340 They are conversion to Christianity, traditionalism, reformism and neotraditionalism (Bellah 1965: 168-225).
341 Compare Bellah 1965: 213-215.
342 Germano 1998: 90.
343 Flood 2004: ix.
344 King (1996: 401-436), who seems to be using the same scale invented by Bellah, even argues for the dominance of the reformist element in the modern Tibetan revival, but her examples concern the nationalistic and socially engaged language of Buddhism in the TAR and in exile. Also see Bond 1992:13.
the contemporary Chinese nationalism with its model of one state and fifty-six ethnic groups.
Such affirmation of identity has been observed in the examples of early 20th-century India and Sri Lanka, where the value of traditional religious ideology and indigenous world-view became the central concern in the Buddhist revival. Although different from the context of today’s Khams in their development of political and social engagement, their reaffirmative activities were likewise carried out vis-à-vis the challenge posed by colonialism.345
Looking at the Sri Lankan instance of Buddhist reinvigoration, its initiator Anagarika Dhammapala (1864 – 1933) saw Buddhism as a “main instrument for a new Sri Lanka” and thus, he turned it into a tool for reaffirmation of the Sinhalese identity; however, with the acceptance of the role played by modern science and technologies. His agenda was similar to the cases of Tibetan leaders, which involved drawing on nativist and national mythology, pointing to the Buddhist origins of the Sinhalese.346 The second phase of the Sri Lankan revival was a surge of neotraditionalism (ca.1956) similar to the phenomenon observed in the Tibetan territories of the PRC today. Exit from community life and the return to the ideal of the recluse, advocated by the Theravāda elite, was an indigenous counter-initiative to both modernity and the values of the colonists, since both were considered immoral.347
The late 19th and the first half of the 20th century marked the period of a Buddhist renaissance across Asia, whereby most of the movements were dedicated to reforming the religious, but also the social and political spheres. Although India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Korea, Japan or Vietnam are often examples of public engagement, and not withdrawal from worldly affairs, they all present instances of opposition to colonialism, consumerism and social conflict. 348 These instances are analogous to the Tibetan revival, which can be understood as a reaction to the Chinese dominance and colonial practice, the imposed Marxist ideology, modernization and its derivatives like commercialization and consumerism.