1. Introduction
Tis chapter ofers an integrated theoretical framework of the role of religion in world politics. Tis framework builds upon, integrates, and expands existing theoretical perspectives that have addressed this topic. Te approaches that we fnd most useful and relevant to the subject at hand—
for example, primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism—do not focus exclusively (or even explicitly) on religion. However, they do high-light concepts and ideas that suggest relevant and compelling inferences about religion and world politics.
As we noted in the literature review, several theories link religion to vari-ous aspects of world politics. Some of these theories are complementary;
some are competitive; and some are contradictory. Moreover, some theories are more compelling than others, primarily on logical grounds. We focus on the central and persistent ideas linking religion to politics in general, and to international politics in particular. We examine these major approaches and evaluate their internal logic, pointing out the strength and weaknesses of their key arguments. We then ofer an integrated approach that builds on the salient arguments of each. We go on to present our own integrative theory of religion and world politics and explain the relationship between our theory and other leading theories on the subject. In order to facilitate a coherent discussion of and comparison among these theories, we focus on
several questions, which also guide the fundamental logic of our integrative framework:
1. What is the role of religion in the social and political life of a state?
2. Is there a diference between religiously heterogeneous and giously homogeneous societies in terms of the roles played by reli-gion in social and political life?
3. How does religion afect the rise, survival, and downfall of politi-cal elites?
4. Under what circumstances can political elites utilize religious beliefs in order to advance their goals?
5. Under what circumstances are religious groups willing to mobilize politically in support of, or in opposition to, government policies?
6. Under what conditions does religion afect perceptions of afn-ity or enmafn-ity between and among societies across national borders?
7. Is there a link between specifc religions and confict? Is there a link between specifc religion(s) and cooperation?
2. Primordialism
We discussed briefy the notion of religion as a communal institution in chapter 1. Te primordialist perspective of religion ofers a compelling explanation of the way in which religion has defned various communi-ties in both ancient and modern times. It is also a potentially compelling explanation for the alleged resurgence of religious-based politics in the post–Cold War era. According to this conception, religion is a defning marker of individual and group identity. It contains a set of directives for moral behavior at the individual and communal levels. Many religions also involve collective rituals, such as prayers, sacred holidays, and pil-grimages to holy sites. Religions involve worshiping and idolizing indi-viduals who are attributed with special—often superhuman—powers.
Many religions assign to some places—shrines, graves, and even cities—
a sacred status. Sacred sites attract pilgrims from distant places, but more importantly, they are controlled and managed by religious insti-tutions. More generally, religion is a collective belief system, one that
identifes virtuous behavior and distinguishes it from amoral behavior.
Such belief systems also identify communities of believers and sharply distinguish these communities from communities of “infdels,” “goyim,”
or “nonbelievers.”
Tis distinction between members of a religious community and non-members is sometimes based on biological foundations, for example, the Jewish principle that a Jewish person is one who was born to a Jewish mother1; sometimes on an article of faith, for example, the requirement in Islam that a Muslim is a person who has stated the shahada that “there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger”; and sometimes on a ritual, for example, the christening in Catholicism. In Buddhism, the criteria are to believe in the principles of Buddhism and to practice meditation. Te primordialist conception of religion is that of a funda-mental common denominator of a community based on shared beliefs.
Tese include belief in one or more deities and the principles, rules, and rituals associated with the dictates of this/these diety/ies. Tis distinc-tion between believers and nonbelievers is central to the primordialist approach.
Primordialism is often associated with superiority complexes. Believers—
those who know the “true mind of God” (Juergensmeyer 2003)—often try to impose their religious beliefs and way of life on nonbelievers. Tis superiority complex induces perceptions of power and righteousness, which are often accompanied by discrimination against and repression of reli-gious minorities in multicultural societies. In international contexts they are instrumental in processes of colonizing and subduing other peoples.
Te forced conversion of pagan communities into Islam during the Islamic expansion era (Cleveland and Bunton 2012) is a clear example of these con-ceptions of the superiority of Islam over paganism. Taking up the “White Man’s Burden” was the rationalization for Christian Europe’s colonization of African, Asian, and Native American lands (Abernethy 2000; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915). At the same time, religion may afect perceptions of afnity and shared values among groups within a state, or between states, whose citizens share the same religion. Tis is evident in the role of the pope in moderating disputes among Catholics in Europe as well as the Americas. Te Crusades of 1096–1291 represent a period of transnational “religious wars” mobilizing “believers” in the faith against “infdels.”
Te general idea of religion as a force in international politics is closely linked to the notion of communal identity markers. Simply put, the poli-cies of states are afected by religion to the extent that religion becomes an important element in the defnition of national identity. Tus, exploring the extent to which religion helps defne national identity requires us to examine the circumstances under which a nation’s identity is linked to the religious afliation of its citizens. Te answer to this question lies in the intersection of two factors: the relationship between political and religious institutions and the religious homogeneity/heterogeneity of the society.
As we noted in our literature review, one of the more compelling foci of existing theories linking religion to politics concerns the relationship between religious and political institutions. Tis relationship has an impor-tant efect on the ways in which religious factors afect domestic and inter-national politics (Philpott 2007; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011; Fox and Sandler 2004; Gill 2007). Te primordialist perspective accepts this argu-ment. However, it interprets it in a diferent way than those discussed in the other theoretical perspectives.
In some societies, religious institutions and political institutions are one and the same. In other societies, they are closely linked. However, many modern societies separate religion from politics and from political institu-tions. In such states, religion—according to the primordialist perspective—
has little impact on politics. Separation between the religious sphere and the political one suggests that factors other than religion defne domestic or foreign policies. Such non-religious factors feature prominently in secu-lar political theory: interests, power, rationality, or other aspects of civic nationalism based on political, ethnic, or linguistic rather than religious identity.
On the other hand, when religious and political institutions are closely allied, primordialism suggests a close relationship between religion and politics. In such countries, religion becomes integral to the state’s political identity and of the national ethos, its history, and its vision of the future. It is a marker that defnes the self-portrayed character of the state as well as the character other peoples and nations attribute to that state. Tis character-ization afects the relations between the state and other actors in its external environment. It creates attachment to certain territories—holy places—or symbols that become a bone of contention between societies that belong to diferent religions.2
Religious homogeneity/heterogeneity refects the distribution of reli-gious beliefs and practices in a given society. Most societies lie somewhere on the religious homogeneity/heterogeneity continuum; only a few are fully homogeneous (all members practice the same religion) or fully het-erogeneous (members are evenly split among several religious groups). In homogeneous societies, religion is more likely to become a visible marker of national identity. Religious adherence may be viewed as a principal deter-minant of individual loyalty to the community. It afects individual will-ingness to contribute to the public good and risk one’s life in defense of, or for the purpose of spreading, the values of the dominant religion. In religiously heterogeneous societies, religion can be a powerful divisive force.
Religious diversity creates loyalties to subgroups. Tere is potential friction among groups when religious loyalty supersedes other loyalties—even to the state. Te prevalence of religious diversity makes these fssures particu-larly pronounced, threatening the cohesion of the larger community, that is, the state, as a whole. Leaders of religiously diverse states may fnd ways to overcome the primordial sources of tension among religious groups, for example, by separating the religious and political spheres and promoting religious freedom. However, where political and religious leaders in reli-giously diverse states are reluctant or otherwise unwilling to pursue policies that overcome such divisions, the likelihood of political and social strife increases substantially.
Tose two factors—the degree of separation between religious and political afairs and the degree of religious homogeneity/heterogeneity—
help determine the kind of political processes that afect the domestic and international politics of a given society. Tis conception is captured in Table 3.1 below. Te top-left cell represents homogeneous societies that lack separation between religion and politics. For convenience, we label
Table 3.1 Social characteristics and primordial infuences
Religious structure of Separation between Religion and State
society No Yes states (Israel, Myanmar, Atheism in communist states)
Informal primordialism—Type II states (Brazil, Ecuador) Nationalism, rationalism—Type IV states (United States, United Kingdom, most Western European democracies)
those states as Type I states. Te Islamic Republic of Iran and the Wahhabi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are prime examples of this type. Religion plays a prominent role in the domestic and international politics of these societies.
It afects leader selection: political leaders need to be acceptable to religious institutions and religious leaders. Even if—as in the case of Iran over the last three-plus decades—there are competitive elections for the ofce of president, candidates are screened by the supreme (religious) leader, and those who are not considered acceptable are prohibited from competing.
Religious laws play a dominant role in the legal system. Loyalty to the state and loyalty to the prevailing religion are one and the same. Secularism is either disallowed or marginalized. Externally, international afnities and animosities—especially in security afairs, but also in other domains such as cultural and institutional interactions—are defned by religious similarity or diferences. Tis afects both cooperation and confict behavior.
Te defnition of religious homogeneity in these examples goes beyond the broad categories of religion and includes religious families within a given religion. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are Muslim states. Sha’ria law is the foundation of the legal system of both states. In both states, religious and political institutions are closely aligned. However, both consider each other a potential enemy because Saudi Arabia is predominantly Sunni, whereas Iran is predominantly Shi’ite. Tis afects, for example, their conficting interests in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen.
Examples of religiously homogeneous societies that have separated reli-gion from state (Type II states) include states such as Brazil or Ecuador.
Tese states practice a high separation between the Catholic Church (the dominant religion) and the state. Type II states tend to minimize the for-mal role of religion in politics via a constitution or a civil legal system.
However, religious beliefs and practices of candidates for political ofce often play a (typically informal) role in their election or selection. Attitudes toward religious minorities are often mixed, if not outright suspicious, even though legally these societies practice constitutional religious freedom.
Attitudes toward other states often correlate with religious similarity or dis-similarity. Religion is not formally invoked as a determinant of confict or cooperation, but seems to lurk beneath the surface. An example of this is the attitude of the European Union toward Turkey. Whereas the European Union (EU) has admitted many of the Eastern European states that had democratized only recently, it has continued to reject Turkey’s application.
Te formal reasons provided by the EU are just feeble excuses; it is Turkey’s Muslim identity that prevents its admittance to a predominantly Christian identifed community.
Religiously heterogeneous societies that do not separate religion from state (Type III states) often refect a situation wherein one religious group’s rules, principles, and legal values dominate those of other groups. Religious discrimination is often coupled with economic, social, and political dis-crimination. Tese discriminatory practices are guided by a narrow sense of religious identity wherein one religious group imposes its values on other groups. Religious freedom may be etched as a formal legal or constitutional principle. However, such states practice political, economic, and social discrimination against religious groups that do not represent the “state’s”
religion. Leaders are selected exclusively from the religious group that dominates the political system; members of “outside” religions are excluded from positions of infuence. Likewise, religious similarity between excluded religious groups and other states is often a source of both domestic and international tensions. Examples of this case include the imposition of athe-ism in communist societies, and the systematic discrimination against non-Jewish communities in Israel. In both cases, the formal legal system decreed freedom of religion. In practice, discriminatory policies are rampant and systematic.
Te last quadrant consists of religiously heterogeneous societies in which the separation between religion and state is embedded in the constitution or the legal system (Type IV states). In such societies, national identity is formed around non-religious symbols and afnities. Type IV states may still refect some tensions between diferent religious communities—as has been the case with respect to American attitudes toward Muslims in the United States since September 2001—but the role of religious factors in political discourses is minimal. Likewise, the degree of afnity or hostility such a state exhibits toward other actors in the international system is hardly infuenced by religious afnities or dissimilarities. Interests or shared values in terms of secular ideological similarities defne the foreign policies of such states. Most Western democracies ofer examples of such states.
Tis framework illuminates how primordialism conceives the impact of religion on the domestic politics of states. It also suggests some general ideas about the international implications of a state’s religious structure for its for-eign policy orientations and possible behaviors. We interpret the principal
operative factors in the primordialist perspective diferently from the more traditional theories of religion and politics we have discussed in the previ-ous chapter. We accept that the relationship between religiprevi-ous and political institutions is a key variable in determining the extent and manner in which religion afects politics. We argue, however, that the notion of “political theology,” while important, is not an independent condition. Rather, it is a function of state-religion relations, and is typically determined by the ability and willingness of political institutions to allow religious beliefs to infuence major political practices. A political theology, if one exists, can shape national politics only if it can unify society around it, and only if the political leadership is willing or capable to employ it as a unifying symbol.
What are the factors that defne relations among states according to the primordialist perspective? As noted, the notion of religion as an identity marker shapes not only the perception of leaders and followers about who they are but also their perceptions of other political actors outside their borders. Tis applies in particular to the attitudes that leaders and followers develop toward neighbors or other actors that are relevant to the state’s secu-rity and well-being. Much of the interaction in international relations—
especially of the confictual variety—takes place among contiguous states.
Primordialism suggests that the religious similarity between a state and its neighbors has a powerful efect on the nature of this interaction. Here too, we can use the above scheme to explain how domestic structure and inter-national politics afect each other.
Religiously similar states that border each other are likely to share val-ues and identities. Te political boundaries that separate one state from another may be formal and legally binding, but the people in these societ-ies feel a strong afnity for each other. Consequently, ceteris paribus, the primordialist perspective expects little confict between such states. Te international relations of such states should be marked by various forms of cooperative interactions. Shared religious values serve as important trust-inducing mechanisms; they can cement contracts that form the foundation of international cooperation and international institutions.
On the other hand, religious diferences between contiguous states may be a source of friction, both due to ideational divergence and potential religious confict, and to competing claims for holy shrines, or the afnity of one state with a persecuted religious minority in another state. Religious diferences imply diferences in basic values, vocabulary, and priorities.
Tey are a source of miscommunication and misunderstandings, thereby impeding cooperative arrangements (Cohen 1997). Consequently, primor-dialism suggests that the degree of cooperation across cultures should be much lower than within cultures.
According to the primordialist perspective, religiously homogeneous states are less likely to experience internal strife. Tis is so because religion makes for a strong social bond. Tis is especially true in Type I states, because the leadership is seen as legitimated by God and supported by religious institutions. In Type II and Type IV states, the primordialist approach also expects relatively little internal strife. Whether or not the society is homogeneous—religious beliefs can be freely expressed, and religious practices are separate from political ones. Civil confict, to the extent that it exists, may well be on issues that are more related to eco-nomic or social conditions than to religious freedoms. On the other hand, Type III states are expected to be highly prone to civil strife. Te cohabi-tation of political and religious institutions tends to favor one religious group over others. Tis favoritism often causes grievances due to religious oppression. Such grievances often translate to violent opposition to the regime.
We are less likely to observe outside intervention in domestic politics of religiously homogeneous societies. Such societies build ideational walls to defend themselves against outside infuence—ideological, economic, or political. By contrast, religiously diverse states are more prone to internal instability, often due to tensions among religious subgroups jockeying for position or patronage within the society. Afnity between religious minori-ties and neighbors of such states tends to increase the likelihood of external
We are less likely to observe outside intervention in domestic politics of religiously homogeneous societies. Such societies build ideational walls to defend themselves against outside infuence—ideological, economic, or political. By contrast, religiously diverse states are more prone to internal instability, often due to tensions among religious subgroups jockeying for position or patronage within the society. Afnity between religious minori-ties and neighbors of such states tends to increase the likelihood of external