In August 2004 UNHCR finalized a verification exercise in Guinea’s six refugee camps and one transit camp, and reported that there were 78,318 UNHCR-assisted refugees in Guinea.
Source: UNOCHA (2004b)
THE MILITARIZATION AND DEMILITARIZATION OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GUINEA CHAPTER5
Table 5.2 UNHCR-assisted refugee population in Guinea, August 200426
Préfecture Camp/transit centre Refugees
Kissidougou Boreah 4,063
Kuntaya 9,908
Telikoro 6,185
N’Zérékoré Kola 6,177
Lainé 25,046
Nonah (transit centre) 3,979
Macenta Kouankan 22,960
TOTAL 78,318
SAS ECOWAS PART 1 DEF 26.4.2005 12:49 Page 163
This total of 78,318 represents a significant reduction in the refugee popula-tion from the 103,063 reported in April 2004 (UNOCHA, 2004b). While many refugees agreed that the statistics had been previously inflated, thereby allowing a greater number of people to benefit from UNHCR assistance, they also felt the revised statistics were too low. In Kouankan, for example, the refugee committee believed that, while the pre-verification statistic of 32,000 was inflated, the true camp population was between 27,000 and 28,000, as opposed to the 22,960 claimed by UNHCR.27As well, the BCR estimated the camp’s population to be closer to 25,000.28Even if the statistics from the veri-fication were taken to be a true representation of the camp-based population, the exact number of refugees in Guinea would remain unclear. The govern-ment estimates that tens of thousands of refugees remain unassisted outside refugee camps, while UNHCR includes in its statistics only the total number of assisted refugees.29For example, the Préfet of N’Zérékoré states that there are 44,000 refugees living in N’Zérékoré,30none of whom are reflected in UNHCR’s numbers.
While the exact numbers are contentious, it is possible to generally describe the conditions of the various refugee populations in Guinea. The official repatriation programme for Sierra Leonean refugees ended in July 2004. Under the programme over 92,000 Sierra Leoneans were repatriated from Guinea with UNHCR assistance between the emergency returns in late 2000 and the end of the organized repatriation programme. A programme is now being developed for the 1,814 remaining UNHCR-assisted Sierra Leonean refugees, who are currently in the camps near Kissidougou, prima-rily in Boreah Camp. Hundreds if not thousands of Sierra Leoneans remain in Conakry and in other large urban areas.31 The majority of the Sierra Leoneans in Conakry who identify themselves as refugees claim that they cannot return to Sierra Leone, have no prospects in Guinea, and consequently seek resettlement in a third country. Guinean officials generally tolerate the continued presence of these Sierra Leoneans who emphasize that, as ECOWAS citizens, Sierra Leoneans benefit from the right to move and work freely in any ECOWAS country.32
Given the change in the situation in Liberia since the departure of Charles Taylor in August 2003, the apparent durability of the ceasefire signed in Accra
shortly after Taylor’s departure, and the stability of Gyude Bryant’s transi-tional government, the facilitated repatriation of Liberian refugees began in November 2004. Until then Liberian refugees remained in one of Guinea’s camps, primarily around N’Zérékoré and Macenta. Interestingly, many of the Liberian refugees said that they preferred their situation in late 2004 to the pre-2000 settlements. All 12 members of the refugee committee in Lainé camp said that they would rather live in the camp than in the neighbouring communi-ties.33In fact, conditions in the camps, especially Lainé, are significantly bet-ter than in the surrounding villages, and refugees enjoy the freedom of movement necessary to allow them to pursue economic activity outside the camps.
Ivorian refugees in Guinea live in very different conditions. The 3,979 Ivorian refugees recognized in Guinea remain in the Nonah transit camp, more than a year after their arrival in Guinea. Unlike the camps where land is allocated and refugees are supported to build semi-permanent dwellings, the Ivorians in Nonah live in large tents housing up to 50 refugees. As a result there are greater health concerns in Nonah, with a greater number of reported skin infections and respiratory diseases than in the other camps.34There are also fewer activities in Nonah, which, coupled with uncertainties related to their status, leads to greater psychological problems among the refugees.
Secured camps?
Representatives from the government of Guinea, UN agencies, NGOs, health practitioners, civil society, and refugees themselves agreed that refugee camp militarization was no longer an issue in Guinea. The research team asked the same question of each informant it interviewed during September and October 2004: ‘Do you feel that the presence of small arms or armed elements in the refugee camps in Southern Guinea is a cause for concern today?’ In all 50 interviews the answer was ‘no’. The BCR35and security officials36denied any incidents related to small arms in any of the refugee camps in the 12 months preceding September 2004. This was supported by health officials in Laine and Kouankan camps as well as in Nonah transit camp, where no case of small arms-related injuries has been recorded since the opening of the camps.37Members of Refugee Committees denied the use of small arms in
THE MILITARIZATION AND DEMILITARIZATION OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GUINEA CHAPTER5
SAS ECOWAS PART 1 DEF 26.4.2005 12:49 Page 165
reported cases of intimidation, sexual violence or abductions in and around the camps.38
Source: BCR, N’Zérékoré, October 2004
There has been a noticeable shift in security concerns among the refugee com-mittees in Lainé and Kouankan camps. In 2001 many refugees expressed con-cerns about physical and sexual abuse, forced recruitment, and theft of limited humanitarian assistance by armed elements. In September and October 2004 refugees attributed their insecurity to their uncertain legal sta-tus, their inability to return to their country of origin, and their desire to be resettled abroad. While statistics provided by the BMS indicate that a number of crimes are still being committed in the camps (Table 5.3), the level of crime does not appear to be disproportionate to the size of the population and is not a significant concern among refugee camp inhabitants.
There was, however, also agreement that, while the refugee camps were free of small arms and armed elements, the Forest region in which the camps are located was not. It was generally held that the Forest region of southern Guinea, stretching from Kissidougou to N’Zérékoré and containing all of Guinea’s refugee camps, had a problem with small arms and light weapons stemming from the events of 2000–01. Concerns were also voiced regarding the remaining Young Volunteers who have yet to be demobilized. As such, it is important to emphasize that, while refugee camp militarization does not appear to be a cause for concern in Guinea, the militarization of the
refugee-Table 5.3 Reported incidents in Lainé, Kounkan, Kola, and Nonah refugee camps, 1 January – 31 August 2004 Camp
Lainé 17 3 28 5 0 4 22 0 2 2 0
Kouankan 11 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Kola 16 5 23 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nonah 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 44 12 59 5 3 5 22 0 2 2 1
Theft Rape Fist-fights Incitement Extortion Child abandonment Petty theft Murder Narcotics possession Hunting accidents Assault causing bodily harm
populated area—the towns and villages surrounding refugee camps—is a significant problem.39
Informants also drew attention to the prevalence of hunting shotguns out-side the camps, citing a recent case where a refugee from Kouankan camp sustained a non-fatal gunshot injury caused by a local. Government officials, UN representatives, humanitarian agencies, civil society, and refugees them-selves, however, agree that there is no link between the prolonged presence of refugees in Guinea and the proliferation, or use, of small arms. This lack of refugee identification with the small arms trade in Guinea is also evident in the absence of reported use of small arms in refugee camps and surrounding communities.
The continued presence of armed elements Young Volunteers
Government officials openly state that Guinea was able to withstand the incursions of 2000–01 because of the masses of Young Volunteers that came forward following President Conté’s 9 September 2000 appeal. More recently, however, they have accepted that the continued presence of the Young Volunteers and the failure of efforts to demobilize them are among the great-est causes of insecurity in the Forgreat-est region.40
The recruitment of Young Volunteers was highly decentralized.
Government officials believe that each Sous-Préfecture recruited a minimum of 150 volunteers.41Given that each of Guinea’s 11 Préfectures comprises ten Sous-Préfectures, it is likely that a minimum of 16,500 Young Volunteers were recruited and armed. To this estimate, however, should be added the addi-tional recruitment that took place in urban centres along the border and the massive recruitment that took place in Conakry. In N’Zérékoré town alone, for example, 4,500 Young Volunteers were recruited.42It is on this basis that estimates on the number of Young Volunteers recruited are as high as 30,000.43 Young Volunteers were promised future integration into the Guinean army as a reward for their service.44In a country with massive unemployment and few economic opportunities for young people, this was likely a strong motivating factor for volunteering. After March 2001, however, it became clear that not all Young Volunteers could be incorporated into the army, as the
THE MILITARIZATION AND DEMILITARIZATION OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GUINEA CHAPTER5
SAS ECOWAS PART 1 DEF 26.4.2005 12:49 Page 167
armed forces could not afford such an increase in its numbers and not all Young Volunteers were fit for regular military service. As an alternative to full military service, the Guinean army formed marching bands—fanfare—in N’Zérékoré, Yomou, Lola, Macenta, Guékédou, Kissidougou, and Faranah, and filled the ranks of these bands with Young Volunteers, regardless of their musical ability.
A large number of Young Volunteers, however, were never integrated into either the army or the marching bands. A number remain in the Forest region and are still armed. The recent steep increase of the price of rice, the staple food in Guinea,45has led some former Volunteers to pick up their guns and turn to crime. In the words of one humanitarian worker in Conakry, ‘they are suffering, they have a gun, and they are willing to use it’.46
Research carried out by the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network identified 7,118 former Young Volunteers, many of whom have not been inte-grated notwithstanding the army’s most recent efforts to disarm them in July 2004.47 Based on information collected on the 1,728 Young Volunteers who registered in the Network’s N’Zérékoré office in 2004,48it appears that 94 per cent (1,630) of the Volunteers were male, 53 per cent (990) had been integrated into the army or the fanfare, and 7 per cent were under 18 during the events of 2000—the youngest being eight.
LURD
Estimated to comprise between 3,000 (Brabazon, 2003, p. 7) and 8,000 (IISS, 2004, p. 375) combatants, LURD played a significant role in the fall of Charles Taylor in 2003. Despite Liberia’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabili-tation and Reintegration programme (see Chapter 4 on Liberia), the continued presence of LURD fighters has had a significant impact on security in the Forest region of Guinea. Given the inactivity of LURD and the loss of a com-mon objective for its fighters, many LURD fighters have reportedly been drifting back across the border either to benefit from humanitarian assistance49 or to engage in criminal activity (IRIN, 2004b).
LURD elements were reportedly involved in the June 2004 outbreak of vio-lence between the Mandingo community of N’Zérékore and the Toma and Gherze residents of the surrounding villages, which lasted for two days and
involved the use of small arms and light weapons (IRIN, 2004a). The Commandant of BAC, whose vehicle was hit by machine-gun fire during the incident, believes that LURD gunmen played a role in escalating what was initially a localized inter-group dispute.50 The Préfet of N’Zérékoré reported that more than 20 AK-47s were seized in the aftermath of the violence, but that the marking of the weapons had been tampered with so as to make it impossible to determine the origin of the weapons.
Pro-Taylor and anti-Conté groups
Rumours abound in the Forest region about the formation of other armed groups, either pro-Taylor militias or anti-Conté factions. IRIN reported in September 2004 that pro-Taylor loyalists were recruiting former combatants in Liberia to travel to Guinea and train in the area around Mount Nimba (IRIN, 2004c). Rumour has it that the ex-combatants were each being paid USD 200 to join armed opposition to Conté.
Associated with this opposition is the little-known Movement of the Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG), a group reportedly led by army officers involved in a failed 1996 coup attempt against Conté (Szajkowski, 2004, pp.
147, 298) and estimated to be 1,800 strong (IISS, 2004, p. 375). RFDG elements reportedly fought beside the RUF and Liberia forces in the attacks on Guinea in 2000–01 (Szajkowski, 2004, p. 298). According to IISS (2004), RFDG has now disbanded, but so little is known about the group that this is difficult, if not impossible, to confirm. Government officials in Conakry, however, frequently mention the threat posed by exiled Guinean dissidents, and use this threat to justify limiting domestic political participation and protest. It is also possible that the RFDG existed in name only.
Small arms proliferation and trafficking
While there was general agreement that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons was a significant problem in the Forest region of Guinea, it was not possible to find any reliable statistics on the scale. Nevertheless, confiden-tial meetings with senior government officials provided a useful overview of the various sources of illegal small arms in Guinea. Most importantly, all gov-ernment officials interviewed stated that there were no links in their minds
THE MILITARIZATION AND DEMILITARIZATION OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GUINEA CHAPTER5
SAS ECOWAS PART 1 DEF 26.4.2005 12:49 Page 169
between the continued presence of refugees in Guinea and the traffic in small arms. A wide range of humanitarian and civil society representatives con-firmed this view. While there is a common perception within the government that refugees played a role in the incursions of 2000–01—either by providing shelter to rebels or by acting as guides during the attacks—it is now widely held that the problem of small arms in the Forest region is not linked to the presence of refugees. Rather, the following appear to be the main sources of small arms circulating today in Guinea:
The looting of a Conakry armoury
In March 2001, 6 people died and 41 were wounded when an ammunitions warehouse exploded at the Alpha Yaya Camp in Conakry (IRIN, 2001). The cause of the explosion was never reported, but it is now generally believed that the armoury was looted shortly after the blast. Arms looted from the armoury have been recovered in seizures throughout Guinea. It is generally believed, however, that some arms have remained within the country and are being used by criminal gangs. While many officials see this as the most sig-nificant source of small arms no details on the number and or types of looted weapons are available.
Young Volunteers and retired military
The second most significant source of small arms, estimated to account for roughly 5,000 small arms illegally circulating in Guinea, are those arms that were officially issued by the Guinean military but never returned at the end of service. This includes arms issued to the Young Volunteers during the 2000–01 attacks. Yet not all Young Volunteers were armed: according to a government report only 70 per cent of 2,380 Volunteers surveyed in Guékédou handled weapons and participated in combat (Republic of Guinea, 2001, p. 6). Several officials also explained that retiring police or army officers were not always required to return their service weapon upon retire-ment. These weapons therefore routinely leaked to criminal elements.
Local production
There is a significant local craft industry for the production of arms, mostly
shotguns. This is confirmed by the BAC seizure of 52 12-gauge craft shotguns between 2001 and 2003 (Republic of Guinea, 2001–2003). Hunting is an important source of income in the Forest region, and shotguns are a regular sight on the main roadways. There are no estimates of the scale of annual pro-duction in Guinea, and it is generally believed that these weapons are not widely used for criminal purposes.
Traffic from Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire through Guinea
The most significant seizures of small arms in 2004 occurred on the border with Mali. From February to September 2004 small shipments of small arms—typically 6 to 12 AK-47s—have been seized en route to Bamako, the capital of Mali. More prolific, however, is the traffic of weapons from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire, fuelled by differing DDR programmes in the two countries.
Current DDR programmes in Liberia offer an initial payment of USD 150 for the surrender of a weapon and a further USD 150 when the participant reports for reintegration support in his or her home area. The programme in northern Côte d’Ivoire is expected to offer two payments of USD 450. This has created a traffic of arms and combatants from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire through southern Guinea (especially N’Zérékoré), as ex-combatants in Liberia believe that they are able to collect an additional USD 150 for surren-dering a weapon without having to ever participate in the reintegration ele-ments of the programme. This traffic has had a significant impact on the security environment in N’Zérékoré, as ex-combatants often engage in crim-inal activity during their journey.
Conclusion
Guinea’s refugee population, which totalled 450,000 in the late 1990s, was severely affected by the 2000–01 cross-border attacks and the Liberian civil war. Not only did both sides target refugees during the fighting, but the infil-tration of armed groups into the refugee camps caused suspicion and led to further harassment and displacement of refugees.
The full impact of militarization on refugee protection in Guinea, however, can be understood only in the context of broader refugee populated areas. A
THE MILITARIZATION AND DEMILITARIZATION OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GUINEA CHAPTER5
SAS ECOWAS PART 1 DEF 26.4.2005 12:49 Page 171
large proportion of Guinea’s refugee population does not live in camps but in nearby villages. Continued small arms proliferation and the presence of thou-sands of armed and idle ex-combatants in the Forest region demonstrate that, while refugee camps have been relatively secured, significant concerns remain for the protection of refugees living elsewhere and for civilians in gen-eral. Furthermore, as the boundaries of refugee camps are not enforced, inse-curity and small arms proliferation outside the refugee camps can have a direct impact on refugees inside the camps.
While the responses developed by national and international actors in the camps have achieved meaningful results despite very limited resources, sig-nificant threats to Guinea’s stability require urgent attention. The failure to mobilize sufficient funds to disarm and reintegrate remaining Young Volunteers has the potential to threaten the country’s internal security for years to come, especially given the uncertainty surrounding President Conté’s succession (ICG, 2003). Guinea’s stability also remains vulnerable to spillover effects from the conflict in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, including regional small arms trafficking and the movement of armed elements. In this difficult context increased border control and regional military cooperation stand out as prerequisites to avoid the suffering of the past.
List of abbreviations
ACT Action for Churches Together BAC Brigade Anti-Criminalité
BCR Bureau pour la Coordination des Réfugiés (regional branches of BNCR)
BMS Brigade Mixte (police and gendarmerie)
BNCR Bureau National pour la Coordination des Réfugiés
BNCR Bureau National pour la Coordination des Réfugiés