PROSPECTS OF ENGAGING INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS. REVIEW OF THE

CONFERENCE AT IMEMO

Dmitry CHIZHOV

On October 18, 2012 the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS) hosted an international conference ‘Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations’ which was a part of the ‘Russia and the Deep Nuclear Disarmament’

program jointly implemented by IMEMO RAS and the ‘Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc’.

Academician Alexander Dynkin, Director of IMEMO RAS, in his introduction emphasized that after the two decades of bilateral US-Russian deep nuclear arms reductions the time came to raise the issue of engaging other nuclear weapons states (NWSs) in the process.

Leading Russian and Indian experts presented their views at the conference. It was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, as well as various diplomatic missions in Moscow.

As the conference was held under the Chatham House Rule, the following summary does not specify the identity of the speakers.

The analysis showed that the nine existing nuclear armed states were engaged in different military and strategic relations.

The Soviet/Russian-American nuclear deterrence with comparable strategic potentials of the two parties became the basis for both mutual deterrence and nuclear arms limitations and reductions. However, such a model is rather an exception in the current balance of power relationships.

The relations between Pakistan and India are similar to the USSR–USA relations at the beginning of the Cold War. The tense relations generate considerable political obstacles for a dialogue on nuclear weapons reduction and limitation. Another important issue is the presence of the Chinese factor in the Indian-Pakistani strategic relations.

The conference focused on the essential elements of strategic relations between India and Pakistan, including prospects for arms control, confidence-building measures, and impact of the third parties.

A prominent Indian expert outlined his view on the current state of strategic relations between India and Pakistan. The speaker examined differences in nuclear policies of two countries, and indicated internal and external factors that contributed to persistence of bilateral tensions and created a risk of a nuclear conflict.

Pakistan has no official nuclear doctrine and its willingness to use nuclear weapons first, if India crossed a ‘red line’ (i.e.

undertook some political, military, or economic actions unacceptable for Pakistan) greatly disturbs New Delhi.

A high level of terrorist threat, risk of attack against nuclear weapons storage sites and overall low level of political control over nuclear weapons in Pakistan also affect the bilateral relations.

It was underlined that Pakistan’s nuclear policy and severe internal instability hinder the bilateral arms reduction and disarmament negotiations.

Negotiations between India and Pakistan on nuclear arms reduction seem to be meaningless without accounting for the role of the Chinese factor. (Pakistan and China maintain a high level of military-technical cooperation.) However, the divergence of geopolitical interests within this ‘strategic triangle’ complicates transition to the trilateral negotiations.

The arms control aspect is not conspicuous in the Indian-Pakistani strategic relationship since India is ready to discuss nuclear disarmament issues only in a multilateral format within the UN framework and with the participation of all NWS.

India supports the proposal to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. India, like Pakistan, continues to observe a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

Russian experts examined the strategic relations between India and Pakistan, the nature of the ‘minimum nuclear deterrence’

concept, and political role of nuclear weapons in both countries.

They drew attention to the contradictions in the concept of

‘minimum deterrence’ practiced by these states.

Some participants argued that for India its nuclear status meant being a power with not only regional but also global interests, i.e. a status that promoted the upholding of these interests in bilateral and multilateral forums, especially in the UN, and in effect brought India to the level of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

It was noted that the military significance of India’s nuclear status was related to deterrence of its key strategic opponent, which, according to the prevalent expert opinion, was China. All major Indian political parties have developed national consensus concerning the nuclear status of the country.

For Pakistan, its nuclear status means leadership and authority both in the Muslim world and in a broader scale, as Pakistan is the only Islamic state possessing nuclear weapons.

Pakistan seeks the role of political counterbalance to India in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Pakistan has also developed strong domestic consensus of various political forces on the nuclear status as a means of strengthening national security and deterring neighbouring India.

Russian experts proposed a number of measures to enhance nuclear security in South Asia. India and Pakistan should provide greater transparency of their nuclear forces (in relation to their structure and deployment). They could develop the dialogue on confidence-building measures extending to nuclear and conventional weapons. To enhance the overall stability both states could accept the no-first-use principle. Among possible confidence-building measures the speakers mentioned an obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the disputed areas or near the Indo-Pakistani border, to maintain medium- and long-range nuclear missiles at reduced alert, as well as to exchange the relevant information.

The need to develop common approaches not only to security but to resolution of major political and economic issues was emphasized. The role of the third parties in promoting the

nuclear arms reduction process in the South Asian region was also highlighted.

The experts raised a number of essential issues that affect the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan and the prospects for their participation in nuclear weapons reduction and nuclear disarmament.

Some of them considered it premature to involve India and Pakistan in disarmament process as these countries were building up their nuclear arsenals and were not ready for this step.

The conference referred to the chance of bringing India into the nuclear arms reduction process lost by the USA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (At the time when India could have agreed to substantially increase transparency of its nuclear weapons program and even to limit it.)

The conference paid particular attention to the ways of improving mutual trust, exchanging and verifying information between the countries.

Some participants expressed concerns that in the process of data exchange on the India’s nuclear infrastructure and strategic nuclear forces there might be a possibility of information leaking to China or a terrorist group.

Russian experts suggested that detailed information should not be provided for such exchange in order to prevent a terrorist attack on nuclear weapons storage sites.

Most experts expressed their confidence in the sufficiency of the security level of the Indian nuclear infrastructure, while pointing out that in the future, terrorist attacks against such targets might pose a real danger in case terrorist organizations underwent qualitative transformation.

Information exchange on medium- and short-range delivery systems was proposed as one of the areas to enhance transparency in the Indian–Pakistan relations.

The 1987 INF Treaty between the USSR and USA was mentioned as a model agreement. The limitations could apply to ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5500 km which constitute a majority of the Indian and Pakistani arsenals.

The conference focused on various destabilizing factors in the strategic relations between India and Pakistan.

Domestic instability in Pakistan is one of such factors. The change of political leadership has affected dramatically the political situation in the country. The Pakistani military continue to play the leading role in the nuclear weapons development and to restrain political control over the nuclear arsenal.

The experts also expressed concerns that in 5 to 10 years the change of generation could lead to ideological alteration within the Pakistani military. If extremist ideas take root in the military it may increase the risk of strategic information on nuclear infrastructure or even nuclear materials being handed over to terrorists.

According to the experts, if terrorists gain access to nuclear weapons or nuclear materials, an act of nuclear terrorism may take place within or beyond the South Asian region.

Thus, terrorism has a major effect on the strategic relation between India and Pakistan. It was generally agreed that terrorist activity (primarily in Pakistan) exerted negative influence on the regional strategic stability.

An Indian expert argued that terrorism played the key role in the ‘erosion’ of nuclear deterrence in the region.

Overall, the conference revealed significant differences between the parties when it came to the approaches or problem assessment of nuclear weapons reduction. The clear example was the discussion of the framework of possible negotiations. Experts demonstrated a large gap of opinions on the timetable and terms of India and Pakistan engagement in the nuclear disarmament process.

The conference has come to the conclusion that the current difficult strategic relations between India and Pakistan seriously impede the involvement of these countries in the international nuclear arms reduction process.

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