Protocol in 2015 3
48
3.1
Guiding principle: Proceduralization of the 2 °C guard rail
The negotiations on a post-Kyoto climate agreement are in deadlock because the parties cannot agree on new, internationally binding reduction targets.
In the WBGU’s view, therefore, it is a good idea to place the emphasis in a new climate agreement in 2015 on making commitments that relate to climate-pro-tection targets and decarbonization roadmaps volun-tary and flexible for the parties. In order to persuade as many countries as possible to sign up to a new climate agreement in Paris, the states themselves should be responsible for defining the size and modalities of their individu al contributions to mitigation, adaptation and to dealing with loss and damage. Such a flexible and vol-untary approach based on self-commitments opens up creative scope for the parties. However, it will only con-tribute to climate protection if (1) the states are obliged to submit mitigation targets and decarbonization road-maps, and (2) these can be inspected, assessed and mon-itored not only by the United Nations, but also by glo-bal civil society.
This requires accompanying rules on procedure that guarantee the linking of assessments and decisions to current knowledge in climate science, and ensure trans-parency, participation and monitoring. To this extent, the WBGU pursues an approach that may be called the proceduralization of the 2 °C guard rail, since no compul-sory and material reduction targets are agreed.
Rather, the extent and form of the individual nations‘
contributions to decarbonization are decided voluntarily by the parties themselves – without further rules under international law. However, they do have an obliga-tion to develop climate-protecobliga-tion targets, e. g. up until 2030, and roadmaps for decarbonization up to 2070 at the latest. To this extent the WBGU’s proposal for the Paris Climate Protocol is a ‘hybrid approach’ with both compulsory and voluntary elements.
Unlike the negotiation process on new global
sus-tainable development goals (SDG process), for which the WBGU recommends the recognition of the 2 °C limit as an environment-related planetary guard rail to protect the Earth-system services (WBGU, 2014), the parties to the UNFCCC have already recognized the 2 °C guard rail on several occasions within the framework of the climate regime. Nevertheless, it is legally doubtful whether the guard rail is a target in the international climate regime that is recognized under customary international law and therefore marks the borderline of “dangerous anthropo-genic interference with the climate system” within the meaning of Article 2 of the UNFCCC. In order to over-come this legal uncertainty, the WBGU recommends enshrining the 2 °C guard rail in a legally binding Paris Climate Protocol (WBGU, 2011, 2014). The conditio sine qua non for compliance with the 2 °C limit is the scien-tifically derivable, long-term objective of reducing CO2 emissions from fossil fuels to zero worldwide in the sec-ond half of the century; the WBGU recommends striv-ing to achieve this by 2070 at the latest (Section 1.4, Chapter 2). This global long-term objective should also be enshrined in a legally binding Paris Climate Protocol.
In view of the global rise in temperatures to date, the Paris Climate Protocol cannot, however, restrict itself to climate-protection measures; rather it must also include rules on adapting to climate change and on how to deal with loss and damage caused by climate change. The three areas – mitigation, adaptation and dealing with loss and damage – should be designed as an instrumental cascade. As before, measures based on the precautionary principle primarily target mitigation, i. e. preventing and avoiding “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2 of the UNFCCC). At a sec-ond level, adaptation measures aim to alleviate and limit the effects of climate change that have already occurred or are expected, in order to reduce the hazards and risks.
At a third level, finally, there is a need for measures to deal with the loss and damage that has already been – and will in future be – caused by climate change.
In the WBGU’s view, the Paris Climate Protocol should have a ‘General Part’ containing legally bind-ing overarchbind-ing, procedural regulations for these three Box 3-1
The Durban-Mandate
The Durban Mandate (UNFCCC, 2011) does not clearly spe-cify what legal form, targets and instruments the new binding agreement should have. This has been the subject of intense discussions ever since. There is agreement that the Conference of the Parties (COP) should adopt the new treaty in 2015 in Paris, that it should apply to all UNFCCC parties from 2020, and that its level of ambition should be higher than in the past. In principle the Durban Mandate also offers the option of agreeing a completely new treaty that could replace the UNFCCC. Such an option is currently only being discussed on the fringes, since the states are continuing to search for solu-tions under the auspices of the UNFCCC. In the WBGU’s view, this is to be welcomed, because developing and agreeing an entirely new agreement would considerably delay effective
greenhouse gas reductions. The UNFCCC already has almost universal participation among the countries of the world (with 196 parties), which should certainly not be put at risk. An attempt to replace the UNFCCC would further exacerbate the already fragmented nature of international climate-protection law, and hinder and delay ambitious solutions.
There is an intense discussion on whether the COP in Paris should simply take one or several ‘COP decisions’, which are not legally binding under international law (soft law). Although soft law is an important supplement to legally binding law in the context of international environmental conventions (see French and Rajamani, 2013, on the role of soft law in interna-tional environmental law), a restriction to soft law would not be in line with the Durban Mandate, which aims at a result with legal force. Total renunciation of a legally binding set of rules should therefore be rejected.
Guiding principle: Proceduralization of the 2 °C guard rail 3.1
PROCEDURES, PROCESSES
STATES GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
& CLUBS P A R I S C L I M A T E P R O T O C O L
(WBGU Proposal)
Basic principles Precautionary
principle Polluter pays
principle Equality principle GOALS
PARTICIPATION
Decarbonization roadmaps up to 2070
Targets up to 2030 Codify 2°C guard rail Zero CO2 emissions by 2070 at the latest
Dealing with loss & damage
Adaptation Technology transfer Financing
Flexible mechanisms Review & MRV PLEDGE & REVIEW
PROCESS – binding, MRV – Parties to the
UNFCCC
Everyone
(NGOs, civil society, citizen movements, individuals) Science (IPCC)
Climate procurators, environmental associations Are given access to
climate information
Are given access to justice
Pioneer clubs, networks
State clubs could be an integral part
City networks (...) Monitoring through
legal protection Transparency through
information Transparency & monitoring
through participation Take scientific
findings into account
compulsory review by UN institution
promises / access
Are given pre-ferential access commit to
submit pledges commit to
Take on pioneer function Take on moni-toring function
Are given right to make statements Findings must be taken into account
Provides current scientific knowledge
General Part Proceduralization of the 2°C guard railSpecial Part
Figure 3-1
The WBGU's proposal for a Paris Climate Protocol. The principles are the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and the equality principle. The parties to the UNFCCC commit to two compulsory parts of the Paris Protocol. The General Part of the Paris Protocol would oblige the parties to consider scientific expertise in all decision making and to guarantee participation rights, thus promoting transparency and monitoring by global civil society. These stipulations would apply to all areas and mechanisms of the Special Part. In the Special Part of the Protocol, the 2 °C guard rail and, as its concretization, the goal of zero CO2 emissions by 2070 at the latest, would be enshrined as a compulsory, integral part of the treaty. The WBGU recommends a pledge-and-review process to ensure compliance with these obligations. The pledges would be (1) voluntary self-commitments in the form of a specific emissions-reduction targets up to 2030, and (2) decarbonization roadmaps up to the year 2070. The pledges would be subject to a binding review. Compliance with the fixed targets would be monitored by regular measurement, reporting and validation (MRV). The Special Part of the Protocol should contain rules on technology transfer, financing, flexible mechanisms, adaptation and dealing with loss and damage. Pioneer clubs and networks that are particularly engaged in the field of climate protection could be given preferential access to funding and technology transfer.
Source: WBGU
50 Table 3-1 Assessments of proposals on the planned Paris Climate Agreement. See Box 3-2 for information on sources. Source: WBGU, 2014 MitigationMeasurement, repor- ting and verification (MRV)
AdaptationLoss and damageFinancing, capa-
capa-city building and technolog
y transfer
Market mechanismsLegal form Haites et al. (2013) >Pledge-and-review process >Phase-out of GHGs by 2050 >Ambition level rises auto- matically every 4 years >States not split into groups in the sense of the annex system >New way of registering measures by non-state actors
>
Annual lists and semi- annual r
eports for all parties >Review by experts
>More financial and institutional resources required >UN panel should dev
elop proposals for 2015
>More financial and institutional resources required >UN panel should dev
elop proposals for 2015
>Financing according to the UN 'scale of assessment' >Technology transfer: use existing UNFCCC bodies; simplify and promote dissemination >Capacity building: no new rules r
equired
>New body for market mecha-nisms which also tak
es on CDM and JI functions
>Content-related rules initially decisive; it could be a mixture of different instru- ments Kreft and Bals (2013) >Pledge-and-review process >Range of commitments >Commitments dependent on development status
>Uniform standards and verifiable procedure >Further develop International Consul- tations & Analysis (ICA) & International Assessment & Review (IAR) >Continuation of the 'adaptation frame- work' developed in Cancún >States could set them- selves an adaptation target >International 'insur- ance solution' similar to the African Risk
Capacity on drought risks >Compensation
mechanism under the UNF
CCC
>The existing funds must be replenished >The Standing Commit- tee on Finance should review the financing mechanism ev
ery four years
>Market mechanism
in which only states that commit to comply with the 2 °C target are allowed to take part
>Legally binding part is short and concise >Supplemented by COP decisions EU Submis-
Submis-sion to the ADP (2013)
>Pledge-and-review process: regular assessment includ- ing ambition raising >Reduction commitments for all, taking 'common but differentiated responsibili- ties' into account >Compliance with the 2 °C target >System for monitor- ing commitments required >Experience from Kyoto: ICA & IAR >Support for ongoing adaptation efforts >Mitigation and adap- tation are linked >Initiate work programme >Mobilization of further financial resources required >EU wants to pay a fair share of the promised $100 billion per year up to 2020 >Market mecha- nisms important instruments for promoting cost- effectiveness
>Legally binding
and ambitious commitments f
or all states in the form of a Protocol Edenhofer et al. (2013) >Pledge-and-review process with scientific review & incentives to raise ambition >Gradual, continuous increase in ambition must be possible
>Transparent MRV system required >Further research and analysis required >Role of private invest- invest-ment should be look
ed at
>Innovations and trans- fer of mitigation tech- tech-nologies must be financ
ed
>Allow, interlink, and possibly coor- dinate bottom-up market mecha- nisms in the con- text of the UNFCCC >Hybrid legal form with legally
binding and non- binding elements >Flexibility of the agreement >Agreement with flexible Sterk et al. design(2013a, b) >Various forms of commit- ment >Regular review of ambition level (at intervals of max. five years) >Development of ZEDS (zero- emissions development strategies) in all states
>Uniform system simi- lar to rules of the Kyoto Protocol >
Financing must also focus on adapt
ation >
Financing must also focus on loss and dama
ge >The Paris agreement should contain financ- ing commitments that are based on scientific estimates of develop- ing countries' needs >Ideally the climate regime should finance itself by 'emissions pricing'
>Criticism of emis-
emis-sions trading and Kyoto Protocol ('basket approach') >No emissions trading b
y govern- ments
Guiding principle: Proceduralization of the 2 °C guard rail 3.1
Morgan et al. (2013) >Ambitious reduction targets to be reached by 2015 >Presentation of very specific options with different ambi- tion levels
>Description of four
possibilities with diff
erent ambition levels WWF (2013)Two options: 1. Developed countries raise reduction and financing targets; trusting in this, developing countries increase targets 2. All states determine new ambitious targets jointly or individually >Development of zero-carbon action plans (ZCAPs) and low-carbon action plans (LCAPs)
>System on MRV developed in Durban, e.g. continue using ICA and IAR >Further action should relate to the IPCC report >Financial funds must be increased >Development of principles, functions and institutional components of an International Mecha- nism on Loss and Damage >Developing countries need confidence cre- ated by the developed
countries' financial pled ges >Reveal concrete steps to increase ambition >Carbon pricing of bunker oil as an
additional possibil- ity (with a disc
ount system for devel- oping countries) Vieweg et al. (2013) >Pledge-and-review process >Periodic review every 2 years >Targets of the EU 20-20-20 kind >Differentiated commitments >Clubs within and outside UNF
CCC as an interim step towards broader, more ambitious participation
>Proposal relates mainly to mitigation commitments >Proposal relates mainly to mitigation commitments >Market mechanisms with supporting func- tion for capacity build- ing and technology transfer >Despite several criticisms, market mechanisms offer flexibility with respect to reach- ing reduction tar- gets
Zhang and Shi (2013)
>Larger global emissions budget than if 2 °C is complied with >Pledges by the individual states (binding: low ambition) and green growth clubs (voluntary: high ambition) >'Emissions account' in the sense of an income and expenditure system Ngwadla et al. (2013) >Criticism of pledge-and- review: failure to increase the ambition level using the Copenhagen Accords >Clear commitments for Annex-I and developed states
>
Clear financing commitments f
or developed countries >
Clear financing commitments f
or developed countries >Analysis results: Protocol is recommended by many
52
areas on incorporating scientific expertise, on the trans-parency of assessment, decision-making and monitor-ing procedures, and on participation and opportunities for access to justice (Section 3.2). The ‘ Special Part’ of the Paris Climate Protocol should include legally binding special instruments on the three areas: mitigation (2 °C guard rail, global long-term goal, pledge-and-review process), adaptation (development of existing mech-anisms), and dealing with loss and damage ( Warsaw Mechanism; Section 3.3.3). The Special Part should also contain regulations on the instruments of the flexible mechanisms, technology transfer and financing.
As already mentioned, the Paris Protocol should be characterized by a hybrid approach that is based on a combination of compulsory and voluntary elements (Edenhofer et al., 2013). Since internationally binding commitments on emission reductions for all countries in the sense of a ‘top-down approach’ negotiated under the UNFCCC are still widely regarded as politically unrealistic, it should be possible – in the context of a pledge-and-review process (Section 3.3.1.3) – for the parties to freely choose targets in a ‘bottom-up approach’ that are consist-ent with national policy (pledges). One important compul-sory element would be a commitment by the countries to set themselves national climate-protection targets, sub-mit them in the context of the UNFCCC, and implement them nationally by e. g. 2030. Emissions-reduction targets are particularly relevant in this context. All the relevant framework conditions relating to the targets should be
specified to make each target internationally comparable;
this would make it possible to conduct a scientific review to determine whether the globally aggregated targets are in line with the 2 °C guard rail. The targets should be sub-mitted in the context of national strategic decarboniza-tion roadmaps which explain how the global, long-term goal of avoiding all CO2 emissions by 2070 at the latest is to be achieved in the respective national context (WBGU, 2009, 2014). The submission of the decarbonization road-maps should also be a binding obligation.
The target should be followed up by a review by a body of the United Nations to determine, inter alia, whether the submitted national targets, taken together, are sufficient to move towards a global emissions path-way that allows compliance with the 2 °C guard rail. This review should also be part of the binding Protocol, as should agreements on the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of all agreed measures, which should be repeated regularly.
Initially this approach primarily aims at offering a compromise that is acceptable to all countries. The ambi-tions should be gradually raised in the repeated pledge-and-review process, interacting with the national climate policies of the parties.
Figure 3-1 shows the WBGU’s proposal for a Paris Climate Protocol. It demonstrates how the procedurali-zation of the 2 °C guard rail in the Paris Climate Protocol can forge a link between state multilateralism and other actors such as environmental organizations.
Box 3-2
Selected proposals on the planned Paris climate agreement – Sources
> Edenhofer, O., Flachsland, C., Stavins, R. and Stowe, R. C.
(2013): Identifying Options for a New International Climate Regime Arising from the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. Policy Brief. Cambridge, MA: The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, The Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change.
> EU Submission to the ADP (2013): Submission by Lithuania and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, 16. September 2013. New York: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
> Haites, E., Yamin, F. and Höhne, N. (2013): Possible Elements of a 2015 Legal Agreement on Climate Change. Working Paper 16. Paris: Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI).
> Kreft, S. and Bals, C. (2013): Warschau, Lima, Paris – Im Dreisprung zum Klimaabkommen. Ausblick auf den Kli-magipfel COP 19 in Warschau. Hintergrundpapier. Bonn:
Germanwatch.
> Morgan, J., Tirpak, D., Levin, K. and Dagnet, Y. (2013): A Pathway to a Climate Change Agreement in 2015: Options for Setting and Reviewing GHG Emission Reduction Offers.
Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute (WRI).
> Ngwadla, X., Abeysinghe, A. C. and Freitas, A. (2013): The 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from the Bali Road Map.
Oxford: European Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI).
> Sterk, W., Beuermann, C., Luhmann, H., Mersmann, F., Thomas, S. and Wehnert, T. (2013a): Input to the European Commission Stakeholder Consultation on the 2015 Interna-tional Climate Change Agreement: Shaping internaInterna-tional cli-mate policy beyond 2020. Website: http://epub.wupper-inst.org/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4927 (viewed 30.
June 2014). Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute.
> Sterk, W., Beuermann, C., Dienst, C., Hillebrandt, K., Hermwille, L., Lechtenböhmer, S., Luhmann, H., Mersmann, F., Samadi, S., Thomas, S. and Wehnert, T. (2013b): Submis-sion to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Workstream 1: The 2015 Agreement.
Website: http://wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wupperinst/
ADP-WS1-Submission-Wuppertal-Institute.pdf (viewed 30.
June 2014). Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institute.
> Vieweg, M., Sterk, W., Hagemann, M., Fekete, H., Duscha, V., Cames, M., Höhne, N., Hare, B., Rocha, M. and Schmole, H. (2013): Squaring the Circle of Mitigation Adequacy and Equity: Options and Perspectives. Draft for Public Comment.
Köln, Wuppertal, Berlin, Karlsruhe: Ecofys, Wuppertal Institute, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, Climate Analytics, Institute for Applied Ecology.
> WWF (2013): Consultation Submission. The 2015 International Climate Change Agreement: Shaping Inter-national Climate Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels: WWF European Policy Office.
> WWF (2013): Consultation Submission. The 2015 International Climate Change Agreement: Shaping Inter-national Climate Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels: WWF European Policy Office.