nUclear energy
It was envisaged from the outset that the IAEA would promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and assist its member states in acquiring the necessary expertise, materials and technology to allow them to fully exploit it. The Agency’s mandate was to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.” This vision has not, however, materialized quite as expected.
The founding years of the IAEA were marked by breathless promotion of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The Agency had, after all, been launched after Eisenhower’s rousing 1953 “Atoms for Peace” address, which promised atomic miracles ranging from making deserts bloom to electricity that would be too cheap to meter. Yet in its first decade or so, the IAEA struggled to make its mark, as its anticipated functions either disappeared or were purloined by others. The Eisenhower idea of a “nuclear pool” or “fuel bank” managed by the IAEA quickly vanished.106 The early American and Russian offers of fissionable material had been received with
“apathy” (Hewlett and Holl, 1989: 371) by potential recipients, who preferred to deal bilaterally with other states. The IAEA never took possession of such material. There seemed to be little point in possessor states transferring it to the IAEA, either physically or virtually, for it to be then just transferred to recipients. Essentially, states did without the IAEA as middleman.
The role of clearinghouse for nuclear assistance and cooperation between member states also did not eventuate. Instead, the United States had begun providing training for foreign nuclear scientists,
106 The October 1954 second “Preliminary Outline” of the IAEA concept for review and comment by selected countries did not provide for a nuclear pool, since without the Russians it would have been pointless; even with the Russians back in the picture, the United Kingdom and Canada still did not favour the pool idea. In any event, the National Security Council had determined that the United States would “earmark” reasonable quantities of fissionable materials rather than physically handing them over (Hewlett and Holl, 1989: 230).
engineers and technicians, donating or subsidizing research reactors (and fuel) and concluding bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements intended, at least in part, to pave the way for nuclear power reactor sales. The Soviets soon followed with their own programs. The IAEA simply did not have the capacity or expertise, nor the inclination, to manage such interactions.
As for the fanciful notion that somehow the Agency would help provide nuclear power plants to states, this perception also quickly faded. Within a few years of Eisenhower’s speech, the Americans realized the barriers to realizing this vision. Nuclear power stations would not be cheap, but expensive, the safety of early models could not be guaranteed and spreading peaceful nuclear technology might help increase nuclear weapons capabilities, not least because all nuclear power plants produce plutonium, a bomb material. States seeking to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, through uranium enrichment to reprocessing of plutonium, would essentially acquire the crucial precursors for nuclear weapons. All these factors caused the early promise of nuclear electricity to sour, and the Agency’s planned role as the handmaiden of nuclear power generation receded rapidly.
The idea of an international fund for financing nuclear plants died for lack of contributors (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2012: 85). For their part, states genuinely wanting nuclear power reactors preferred to work directly with vendor states.
There was a renewal of enthusiasm for nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s, as the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Russia and other European countries began deploying large numbers of reactors. Seeing a possible role for itself in extending nuclear energy to developing countries, the Agency at times became overwrought in its excitement. As Pringle and Spigelman put it, “There are few more ridiculous documents in the history of nuclear overstatement”
than the IAEA’s 1974 Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, which projected a potential demand from such countries for 140 nuclear power plants (1981: 389). Only a handful of these plants were ever built and, again, the IAEA’s role was marginal.
According to a plan launched at the first GC session in 1958, the Agency did, however, begin technical assistance for such low-level activities as agriculture and medicine, but it failed to match the extravagant promises of Atoms for Peace. The advanced nuclear countries (at this stage, these were only Canada, France, the United States, the United Kingdom plus the Soviet Union) envisaged that they would mostly be providing technical advice and training through the Agency, with minimal financial commitments and certainly not large-scale transfers of sophisticated technology for nuclear reactors or activities such as reprocessing and enrichment, especially in the absence of safeguards. The developing countries, led by India and Egypt, with the support of the Latin Americans and Soviet bloc, fought hard to expand assistance programs to encompass technology transfers and equipment, and keep onerous controls to a minimum. As Bill Barton notes, here too “Arguments were lengthy and acrimonious” (1997: 43).
Fifty-five years later, the IAEA has emerged with a technically well-regarded, wide-ranging peaceful uses program that is significant to its mainly developing country recipients, but still relatively modest in terms of the overall IAEA program of activities. The Agency has two key support roles in the peaceful uses field: one deals with nuclear power generation; and the second with other peaceful applications of nuclear technology. It has three departments concerned with such issues: the Nuclear Energy Department, the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications, and the Department of Technical Cooperation, which administers the TC program. The regular budget for 2012 for the three departments is:
• Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Science:
€33.7 million;
• Nuclear Techniques for Development and Environmental Protection: €38.6 million; and
• Management of Technical Cooperation for Development:
€20.3 million.
The latter figure does not include the TC Fund, which finances projects outside of the regular budget and is reliant on voluntary assessed contributions. By comparison, the Agency’s budget for policy, management and administration is €75 million, while that for Nuclear Verification is €128.7 million.
The role of the Nuclear Energy Department is to foster “the efficient and safe use of nuclear power by supporting existing and new nuclear programmes around the world, catalyzing innovation and building indigenous capability in energy planning, analysis, and nuclear information and knowledge.” This is known as IAEA’s Major Programme 1, on Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Science. As in other areas of its work, the Agency provides services and advice to member states on nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle for:
• continued reliable and safe lifetime operation of present reactor systems and fuel cycle facilities;
• expanded use of nuclear power, particularly for countries currently without nuclear power, or with only small nuclear power programs;
• development of advanced reactor systems and their fuel cycles for the long term;
• capacity building for energy analysis and planning;
• objective consideration of the role of nuclear power for sustainable development; and
• development of nuclear knowledge management, information and communication.
The Nuclear Energy Department is also responsible for technological aspects of radioactive waste and decommissioning as part of the Agency’s Major Programme 3, on Nuclear Safety and Security. Since about 2000, with the growth in interest in civilian nuclear energy worldwide, the IAEA resumed its role as a key adviser
to its member states on whether or not they should launch a nuclear power program.
The Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications, meanwhile, is responsible for the implementation of the IAEA’s Major Programme 2, on Nuclear Techniques for Development and Environmental Protection. Key areas identified by the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) drive the program: water, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity, known as the WEHAB topics. The Johannesburg summit reaffirmed the Agenda 21 Action Plan and the priorities identified in the Millennium Declaration. Major Programme 2 focuses on the use of nuclear and isotope techniques — on their own or integrated with other technologies — to assist member states in providing unique solutions to help achieve relevant WEHAB goals. Addressing agricultural productivity and food security, improvement of human health, increased availability of water resources, assessment and management of the marine and terrestrial environments, and industrial applications using radioisotopes and radiation technology, these techniques enhance the contribution of nuclear sciences and applications to sustainable development objectives by strengthening national research and development capacities.
Promotion of nUclear energy
Compared to other aspects of the Agency’s work, its nuclear energy program is relatively uncontroversial. According to former US Ambassador to the IAEA Greg Schulte, three anti-nuclear energy states — Austria, Ireland and New Zealand — have had a hand in circumscribing the IAEA’s peaceful applications role (2010: 5).
Given the lack of influence these states have at the Agency, this seems unlikely, except at the margins. Schulte asserts, nonetheless, that “Friends of Nuclear Energy” (China, France, India, Russia and the United States) were “able to put the agency back into the business of helping countries interested in nuclear power.” In any event, the budget for this aspect of the Agency’s work is a relatively modest
€33.7 million in 2012. After rising slightly in the early 2000s as the
“nuclear renaissance” was increasingly heralded, the budget has since plateaued.
Compared to the OECD’s NEA or the industry-based World Nuclear Association (WNA), the IAEA is constrained in promoting nuclear energy too enthusiastically by its dual mandate, which enjoins it to both advocate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and help ensure that this occurs safely, securely and in a non-proliferant fashion.
Having learned its lesson in over-optimistically forecasting the growth of nuclear energy in the 1980s, the IAEA is today usually more sober in its projections than the industry or some of its member states.
DG ElBaradei claimed: “In fact, I never preach on behalf of nuclear energy. The IAEA says it’s a sovereign decision, and we provide all the information a country needs” (BAS, 2009: 9). More pointedly, in regard to the current enthusiasm for nuclear energy, he told the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in an interview in September 2009 that: “In recent years, a lot of people have talked about a nuclear
renaissance, but I’ve never used that term. Sure, about 50 countries were telling us they wanted nuclear power. But how many of them really would develop a nuclear power program? Countries such as Turkey, Indonesia and Vietnam have been talking about building nuclear power plants for 20 years. So it’s one thing to talk about nuclear power: it’s another thing to actually move forward with a program” (BAS, 2009: 7).
Even under ElBaradei, however, the Nuclear Energy Departmentoccasionally became overly enthusiastic about nuclear energy, for example, the claim on its website in July 2009 that “A total of 60 countries are now considering nuclear power as part of their future energy mix” (IAEA, 2009b), a figure apparently derived from a list of countries that had at any time and at any level, approached the agency for information on civilian nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Futures Project in 2010 identified half of that number with serious intentions of acquiring nuclear energy (Findlay, 2010b: 72–
84). Since Fukushima, that number has shrunk even further to less than a dozen countries. Israel, Italy, Nigeria, Senegal and Venezuela are among those that have given up, while Bangladesh, Egypt and Indonesia are still struggling to fulfill their decades-long ambitions.
At this stage, Jordan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam are the most likely to succeed (Findlay, 2011).
DG Amano is now in the unfortunate position of being obliged to continue to promote nuclear energy even while his own country, Japan, is undergoing a fundamental reconsideration of its nuclear energy program, and where the Fukushima accident has convinced several other states to abandon it altogether or end their plans for pursuing it. There will, therefore, no doubt be a drop in the number of states seeking the Agency’s advice on whether or not to pursue nuclear energy. In July 2009, IAEA DDG of Nuclear Energy Yury Sokolov estimated that over the next two years the Agency was expected to assist 38 national and six regional nuclear programs, a
“three-fold increase from the previous reported period.”107 The Agency was gearing up for even higher demand, but these calculations now need to be reassessed.
Nonetheless, even if the revival is confined to current users and the few successful newcomers, safeguards will likely need to be applied to increasing numbers of civilian nuclear power plants in NNWS. In addition, safety and security expectations, based on IAEA principles, guides and recommendations, are rising — both for existing and new nuclear reactors. The Agency is also likely to continue to play a vital role for states that persist with their investigation of the nuclear energy option, however unrealistic, by urging these newcomers to carefully consider all the requirements for successfully acquiring nuclear energy, notably through studying and adhering to the Agency’s exhaustive Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power (IAEA, 2007c). The IAEA should continue to leverage interest in nuclear energy to promote safety,
107 “Finding a role for nuclear: IAEA helps developing countries assess readiness for nuclear power,” IAEA staff report, July 21, 2009. Available at: www.iaea.org/newscenter/News/2009/
nuclearrole.html.
security and non-proliferation norms, goals and legally binding obligations, not just for newcomers, but for states considering expanding their existing programs. Fukushima provides a golden opportunity for the Agency in this respect.
One challenge facing the Agency in advising states concerning their ambitions for nuclear energy is that it is not mandated or technically competent to advise them on alternatives, especially
“green” alternatives with low carbon emissions, much less a holistic national energy strategy. It can refer states to the International Energy Agency, but that is an arm of the OECD and is therefore only obliged to assist its member states — the developed countries. The World Bank may assist in planning and funding developing country energy projects, but there is no truly multilateral energy agency. This is a lacuna in global governance that is beyond the IAEA’s ability to fill.
One issue that is occasionally raised is that of statutory schizophrenia:
the Agency is both a promoter and regulator of nuclear energy. This has obliged successive IAEA DGs to be axiomatically enthusiastic about the global spread of nuclear energy to any country that desires it (even if the DG and the Secretariat harboured doubts about the wisdom of this), while also being a harbinger of nuclear catastrophe if safety, security and safeguards are not continually strengthened.108 One potential result, which fortunately has not eventuated, is a conflict of interest within the Secretariat between promoting and regulating nuclear energy. As David Fischer has noted, “Those who know the IAEA well know that these doubts are misplaced. The staff of the IAEA have not tempered their approach to nuclear safety or safeguards because of concern for the interests of the nuclear industry or because they feared that rigorous safeguards or safety measures would push up the cost of nuclear power” (1997: 417). In general, the Agency has judiciously balanced its promotional and regulatory roles. Ironically, this may be due in part to the Agency’s much maligned organizational stovepiping, with separate departments for promoting nuclear energy, safety and security, and safeguards. This is usually regarded as deleterious for efficiency, but may have helped avoid the Agency’s regulatory functions being subordinated to its promotional functions.
The waxing and waning fortunes of nuclear energy over the years may also be responsible. While the Agency was swept up in the general enthusiasm for spreading nuclear energy worldwide in the 1970s, notably to developing countries, it has since adopted a more sober approach. For instance, it now hedges its bets by issuing high and low estimates of future deployment of nuclear reactors. Since the so-called nuclear renaissance emerged about 2000, the IAEA has, far from colluding with industry, on balance probably helped dampen its wilder expectations. By setting out in lengthy technical documents the arduous requirements that states must fulfill before even considering the adoption of nuclear energy, the Agency has undoubtedly deterred some states altogether, and caused others to
108 See, for example, Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear power and the global challenges of energy security,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, September 6, 2007.
Available at: www.wna.org.
look more sagely at the enormous human, resource and financial investments required.
Another factor that has prevented the Agency from being “captured”
by the nuclear industry is that it is an organization of governments, rather than nuclear vendors or operators. Diplomats dominate the Agency’s governance, and nuclear scientists and technologists do not predominate in the upper levels of the Secretariat. Being an organization of states, the views of the industry, for good or ill, is largely mediated through diplomatic representatives to the Agency. It therefore naturally errs on the side of expanding multilateral nuclear governance (through international law and norm building), rather than spreading the technology itself. In fact, unlike national atomic energy agencies, the IAEA does not have the close relationship to the nuclear industry that might be expected from its mandate (regrettably so when it comes to issues such as nuclear safety and security).
More problematic than an intra-agency conflict of interest, is that the Agency’s dual statutory roles attract support from different, and sometimes opposing, constituencies within the IAEA membership.
Developing states, most of which have had no desire to acquire nuclear weapons and have regarded nuclear proliferation, safety and, lately, security, as largely Western preoccupations, have, as already noted, from the outset seen the Agency’s prime value as a provider of technical assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.109 The United States also originally saw the Agency as a vehicle for promoting peaceful uses, notably sales of US nuclear reactors and other peaceful nuclear technology. Over time, though, the United States has increasingly stressed the Agency’s role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring the safety and security of peaceful nuclear activities. Other Western states eventually fell in line with the goals of the United States. The split in the IAEA membership on this issue has only grown as membership from the
“third world” increased and the NAM began to pay more attention to the Agency. These differences have manifested themselves in political and budgetary battles, most notably in regard to TC.
technical cooPeration
Although there is no mention in the Statute of what would become the TC program, it has come to be viewed by the developing countries as a major reason for joining and staying in the Agency, and for lending their support to other Agency activities that they see as only of marginal interest or benefit to them. Since TC is not mentioned in
Although there is no mention in the Statute of what would become the TC program, it has come to be viewed by the developing countries as a major reason for joining and staying in the Agency, and for lending their support to other Agency activities that they see as only of marginal interest or benefit to them. Since TC is not mentioned in