The process of political and constitutional reform in Vietnam

entrepreneurs, is a great change in modern society of Vietnam. However, in a recent study on the political change and the middle class in Vietnam, Gainsbrough (2002) claims that although the emergence of entrepreneurs is a new phenomenon in the business life of Vietnam, but it is not new in the political life. This is because many of entrepreneurs are former government officials or relatives of the leadership. According to Gainsbrough, there is little evidence showing that entrepreneurs pressurize government into political change. It is evident that the middle class also requires institutional reforms, especially those concerning the improvement of the business environment, the transparency of the legal system and legal institutions, etc. Yet their requirements cannot be regarded as opposition to the government.

Certainly, the leaders of Vietnam are inclined to avoid negative consequences resulting from changes of social structure, i.e. the establishment of the opposition in the future. In addition, they also need the support of the middle class for the current economic renovation.

Therefore, from my point of view, it is not necessary to regard the opposition against the state leaders as a prerequisite for the constitutional change in the transition of Vietnam. This means that the existence of new strong interests groups that are independent from the government, e.g. entrepreneurs, may not be seen as a precondition for the constitutional reform in Vietnam.

Although the existence of the opposition has not been found in Vietnam, the increasing pressure of the opposition in the future could force the leaders to propose political and constitutional change. The next section will analyse the role of actors concerned in the process of constitutional reform in Vietnam. The question here is who will propose the draft of new constitution in Vietnam and who will ratify it, and what are their interests and references.

Analysing the process of constitutional making in the United States, McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1986, 1989, cited in Salzberger & Voigt 2002) examined the individual interests of delegates present at the Philadelphia Convention (whether debtors or creditors of the government, slave owners, Western landowners, potential exporters, or otherwise) in order to explain their voting and ratifying behavior. Salzberger & Voigt (2002, p. 216) have tried to explain the processes of constitutional reform in Israel and Central and Eastern Europe by examining the organizational or party interests. They assume that constitutional conventions made up of members of a parliament still stemming from a socialist regime will have different preferences from conventions comprised of newly-elected parliamentarians. In their view, the interests of members of ruling parties will differ from those of members of newly emerging parties. The constitutional changes in Israel and CEE thus resulted from the bargaining process between the members of ruling parties with members of newly emerging parties.

The process of political and constitutional reform in Vietnam is quite different from those in the West because Vietnam has only one party, namely the CPV. There are also many other political and social organizations such as the fatherland front, the trade union, the union of women, the union of youth, the association of peasants etc. None of them are in opposition against the state and the CPV, but are leaded by the CPV. The political and constitutional changes in Vietnam thus have been initiated by the leaders of the CPV.

In Vietnam, the leaders of the CPV and the state propose political and constitutional reforms.

The proposals for political reform will be prepared by the Central Committee and the Politburo. Then policy proposals (e.g., the policy reports to the National Party Congress) will be discussed and approved by the National Party Congress, which takes place every five years and lasts one or two weeks. In the period between the National Party Congress sessions, the Central Committee is responsible for the policies of the CPV. With respect to constitutional reform, a group of experts in politics and law is commissioned to make a proposal of a new constitution or an amendment to the Constitution. The proposal will be publicized through mass media in order to get broad public views and comments. The party organizations, state organs and other political and social organizations can also help to collect citizens’ opinions on the proposed constitution or the amendment to the constitution. The proposal then will be reviewed and passed at the National Assembly by at least two-thirds of its total membership.

From analysing the process of political and constitutional reform, it can be affirmed that the CPV plays a decisive role for political and constitutional change in Vietnam. Other political

at large can give their opinions and comments on the proposal of political and constitutional reform. Thus, political and constitutional change in Vietnam cannot be regarded as the process of negotiating or bargaining powers between opposite parties or interest groups in society on the one hand and the leaders of the CPV and government on the other hand. In other words, there is no bargain between the state leaders and the rest of society.

However, there is an internal bargaining process among the leaders of the CPV and the government organs. The reason is that in the process of political and constitutional reform, there is an increasing opposition of some party leaders and governmental officers at both central and local levels, who want to preserve the status quo and therefore challenge any political and constitutional reform. Olson (1982) regards the reaction of agents of existing institutions as the main impediment to institutional change. For Olson (1982), the capacity of organized groups for adjusting themselves to the existing institutions results in the persistence of inefficient policies. This is because such a capacity gives special interest groups a strong status-quo bias. Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) claim that economic and institutional improvements may be blocked by political leaders fearing to lose influence. In their view, political institutions themselves are the causes of the absence of economic and political reforms as they grant decision-making power to those who have incentives to preserve the status quo.

According to Boudreaux and Pritchard (1993), the force and the development of the opposition against the proposed constitutional change play a very important role in the reform process. They point out that constitutional change is easier to take place in the case that today’s opposition is weak but expected to be stronger in the future. The opposition of some CPV members and governmental officers to the proposed political and constitutional reform in Vietnam is increasingly strong. The reason is that they have lost many interests and powers due to the political reform and constitutional change.

In Vietnam, the political reform is a bargaining process between two competing factions within the party leaders and governmental officials, namely the reform group and the conservative group. The reform group has proposed political or constitutional reforms. Yet they have to bargain with the conservative group so that their proposed reforms can be passed and implemented in reality. This explains why over 20 years, the political reform and constitutional change in Vietnam could not be radical, but gradual. Furthermore, due to the resistance of the conservative group, many political and institutional reforms which are concretised in the constitution and laws have not been implemented seriously in reality. As

Mr Nguyen Dinh Loc, a NA representative, complains, “it seems to be that, after laws were drafted and passed, we (the National Assembly of Vietnam) lose them as they are not implemented in reality”⁴⁷. The judiciary reform of Vietnam in recent years is a typical example for this situation. Although the leaders of the CPV and the government have proposed judicial reform promoting JI, this policy has not been implemented properly. I will explain this problem in more detail in the following section.