PREVENTING CONFLICT AND SUPPORTING COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Global security will become more multipolar, interdependent and complex. The EU will be expected to make a much greater contribution to global security, including militarily, and by promoting interstate cooperation rather than competition. An increased political focus on preventing conflicts – particularly those with the potential for serious regional and global consequences – is likely. Not least because of the large number of fragile or failing states

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in its neighbourhood, in the next five years the EU could consider further strengthening its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in fragile states, in particular by developing stronger early-warning capacities, better employing development aid and other tools for promoting stability, and investing in mediation and peace negotiations. Supporting peace negotiations is effective in reducing violence and building peace. The EU could reinforce these processes by extending participation and connecting to a wider range of stakeholders in the field, including non-state actors.

Organised crime and the drugs trade will continue to expand into new regions and diversify into new commodities, necessitating an international rethink of current policies, which have largely failed. Indeed, some of these policies have caused unintended negative consequences across the supply chains. The EU could work in partnership with others in the Americas, West Africa and Central Asia to develop a more nuanced understanding of the global situation on drugs and organised crime. Exploring ways to mitigate and manage the global flow of drugs and to reassess drug policies in Europe could focus on the public health implications, including the violence and harm that drugs cause in communities.

The EU could also develop plurilateral security forums for negotiations on developing cooperative security regimes, such as conflict prevention and arms control agreements. As part of its effective multilateralism approach, in the next five years the EU could put more emphasis on evaluating the “effective” criterion and the efficacy of standing negotiating forums in the UN and other international organisations. New negotiation tracks that are not bound by vetoes might produce better results and in turn help to trigger progress in broader frameworks. In particular, the EU could substantially ratchet up efforts for Middle East regional security and a WMD Free Zone in parallel forums. Long-term EU planning for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and coherence across the EU on arms exports policies will be vital over the next five years. Building on the momentum and initiating a process for follow-on controls on conventional weaponry such as drones and automated robotics, and implementing existing constraints on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, could be fruitful new areas of cooperation.

As the US rebalances its military resources away from Europe towards the Asia-Pacific region, Europeans will have to take more responsibility for security in their strategic neighbourhood, and to work more closely with other partners such as Turkey, Russia and the African Union.

China, India and Brazil are increasingly active in Europe’s neighbourhood given their economic and energy interests. The role of Turkey will be a critical factor at the intersection of East and South. The EU already works with China and Russia on curbing Iran’s nuclear programme and cooperates with a range of powers on maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Options for the next five years may include creating mixed platforms to discuss shared challenges in Europe’s strategic neighbourhood, such as state fragility and the spread of illicit trafficking and radicalisation, with partner countries, regional organisations and relevant non-state actors.

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The EU has established platforms for dialogue on security affairs with China, India and Brazil and has an interest in deepening them and in fostering cooperation with other partners such as Japan and South Korea. The EU, in partnership with NATO, could also explore new approaches to security in the Euro-Atlantic region, engaging the US and Russia in new broad-framework dialogues to address emerging security threats and responses, as well as to build confidence.

A military role for the EU in the Asia-Pacific region will remain less significant (albeit some EU member states may take on certain military tasks), but this does not mean the EU has no security interest in that region. There are a number of areas where it could potentially play a useful role in Asian security in the coming years. These include working with South and East Asian countries on common cross-border challenges such as counter-piracy, cyber-security, maritime security, energy security, the impact of climate change and responding to natural disasters. Linked to this is continued EU support for developing ASEAN’s role in the governance of East Asian security.

Europeans will also need to wield the necessary capabilities to back their broad engagement in security, including with military action when necessary. NATO will almost certainly continue to underpin European territorial defence, but in the coming five years the EU could consider developing its role in three areas: the external aspects of internal security, such as organised crime and terrorism; protecting trade routes and access to resources; and responding to crises in Europe’s broad neighbourhood.

However, short of major progress on pooling and sharing military capabilities and targeting investment programmes to selected common needs, there is a clear risk that most individual EU countries will not be able to afford critical enablers for future external operations (whether conducted through the EU, NATO or the UN). EU governments could consider focusing their investments more on advanced technologies in the realm of cyber-security/defence, and technologies for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance such as satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles. More generally, by 2030 EU defence ministries will probably need to invest much more in naval and aerospace equipment and much less in (excessive) manpower.

In the 2014–19 period, the EU could also look to increase investment in research for developing upstream security strategies for new technologies – such as cyber-security in a quantum computing environment, non-state actor deployment of space-based assets, cyborg and neuroscience military applications and synthetic biology. That investment would be likely to yield manifold future rewards.

Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure will test the resilience of Europe and its societies. As the EU increases its cyber-security know-how, it could consider exporting this expertise globally, to the benefit of other regions that are still in the early stages of connecting their infrastructure sectors. Reducing the level of connectivity would be a way of mitigating the problem, but

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there are significant associated costs. In addition, the EU could exert more pressure on the international community for collective engagement on security issues such as cyber-security, outer-space weaponisation and nuclear disarmament.

5.5. BECOMING A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POWERHOUSE AND