Power as networks: concepts

Having surveyed the various theoretical influences that underpin this study’s con-ception of power as network, I shall now summarise the different concepts and sketch out the method adopted here, though the discussion of power will not be reiterated. As a matter of principle, occurrences of these conceptual terms in the following chapters signal that the discussion is operating at a meta-level to be conceived of in the manner outlined here.

2.4.1 Identity

Conventionally, ‘identity’ denotes an individual’s more or less reflected awareness of alignment to a group – i.e. its identity with/equivalence to other members of said group.¹²⁶ This conventional concept is refined here, because it is committed to the illusion of static stability: ‘I am X, you are Y’.¹²⁷ In my view, a study of historical interaction networks requires a more flexible concept capable of ques-tioning such illusions of stable normative order. It stands to reason that the smallest unit of power interaction is in fact expectation, i.e. an actor’s conception of what is normal in a specific interaction with specific alteri, which derives from experience and is encoded in memory. Here, such expectations shall be called identities. It follows that the concept of identity employed here is not only plural, but also relational and situational. Identities in the plural are understood as sets of

125 Luhmann himself considered organisations the most powerful elements of society (Luhmann 1988², 98-115; cf. Anter 2012, 128-131). For the Hellenistic period, adopt-ing this focus would, however, lead back to an old formula, the routinization of charismatic rule via the incorporation of traditional and bureaucratic elements (see Gehrke 1982, 267-271), as it would lead one to study empires and institutions.

126 On this concept of identity see e.g. Erikson, Erik H. Identität und Lebenszyklus. Frankfurt a.M. 1973. Cf. Assmann 1992, 130f.; 144.

127 The illusion of stability is revealed already by its situational, discursive character and the plurality of its relational layers, as Ronald Cohen has demonstrated in the case of ethnicity as a category of identity (idem. “Ethnicity. Problem and Focus in Anthropol-ogy”, in: Annual Review of Anthropology 7 (1978), 379-403, esp. 387-389). On the illusion of causality in action cf. Luhmann 2000, 23f.

expectations, encoded in memory, and both generated and adapted through interaction. Identi-ties in this sense reduce perceived contingency and thereby configure agency. At the same time, they are created and adapted by action, establishing identity as a dynamic both between individuals and between individual and collective. In the singular, identity designates the reflexively abstracted sets of relational expec-tations relevant to the given situation and thus comes close to the term’s conven-tional usage. In order to avoid confusion, ‘sub-identity’ or ‘expectation’ will also be used where this is not meant.

2.4.2 Actor

Following White, actors appear as networks¹²⁸ of such identities. As identities are generated and made relevant by action, actors can be defined as all entities that produce changes in the relational configuration of entities to one another: actors influence identity.¹²⁹ These changes are generally reactions to other changes in this configuration, which allows us to conceive of all action as reaction in a pre-exist-ing, infinitely complex social web that can be conceptualised and studied as a network. This conception does not express a deterministic worldview, but is always the result of retrospection: In fact, the infinite network complexity of any actor prohibits determination as all interactions are subject to double contin-gency.¹³⁰

128 ‘Network’ still designates a set of elements that can be distinguished from the relations that exist between these elements (Holzer 2010², 34; see also above p. 45). Note again that networks are produced by applying a heuristic perspective, a specific way of se-lecting, seeing, and interpreting that is certainly not without alternative. This study attempts to identify networks at multiple levels of interaction, ranging from the indi-vidual to the inter-collective. To an extent, doing so will allow these networks to be compared, revealing structural patterns.

Power networks specifically are here defined as narrative configurations that have recourse to a generalised code of power but in practice continuously reconfigure its boundaries and applicability by ‘playing’ with the boundaries between social codes and by crafting translations.

129 White 2008², 154; Callon 1991, 140. This argument is circular to an extent, since identity is only relevant where action occurs. The origins of action, outlined above, are not strictly relevant to this study, but see Luhmann 1984, 160f., who locates them in the experience of the difference between psychic system and environment.

130 See Luhmann 1984, 414: “Erwartungserwartungen (i.e. the expectation that alter ex-pects certain behaviour; my parenthesis) veranlassen alle Teilnehmer, sich wechsel-seitig zeitübergreifende und in diesem Sinne strukturelle Orientierungen zu unter-stellen. Damit wird verhindert, daß soziale Systeme in der Art bloßer Reaktionsketten gebildet werden, in denen ein Ereignis mehr oder minder voraussehbar das nächste

Employing such a flexible definition of the actor is essential, as this concept must be capable of covering all forms of political action, the evaluation of which derives from the actors’ view of their own world order as it is presented in textual reflection and/or artefact. The central importance of divine action and of acting objects in the ancient world, for instance, immediately forces one to acknowledge that the category of ‘actor’ cannot be restricted to human beings. The reified lan-guage of texts and inscriptions, as well as other monumental and non-monu-mental, inanimate objects play a crucial part in these processes due to their large communicative surface and their near infinite potential for re-reading and action that far exceeds that of the original human authors.¹³¹ The principles of ANT sketched above have provided an extensive theoretical foundation for the inclu-sion of non-human entities in networks of power by considering them part of compound actors created through translation, and for treating them as actors, simply because objects qualify and even substitute human action.¹³² A publicly exhibited inscription, for example, can be seen as standing in for a human speech act, encoded in petrified text, but finitely perpetuated under the conditions of limited double contingency.¹³³ The formal structure and syntax of Greek honor-ary inscriptions, decrees, and letters clearly betray their proximity to the spoken

nach sich zieht. […] Die Reflexivität des Erwartens ermöglicht dagegen ein Korrigieren (und auch ein Kämpfen um Korrekturen) auf der Ebene des Erwartens selbst. Das ist ein kaum zu überschätzender Vorteil, denn Erwartungen geben den Strukturen einen revidierbaren Inhalt.”

131 To a degree, inscriptions can thus be considered plural texts in the sense of Roland Barthes (idem. S/Z. Translated by Jürgen Hoch. Frankfurt a.M. 1994², 7-26, esp. 18).

On the concept of the political public in which these interactive texts participate see Habermas, Jürgen. Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a.M. 1990, as well as the conceptual modifications by Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. Öffentliche Meinung. Die Entdeckung der Schweigespirale.

Frankfurt/Berlin 1989. For an application of the concept in Ancient History cf. Kuhn, Christina. “Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt:

Einleitende Bemerkungen”, in: eadem (ed.). Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt. Stuttgart 2012, 11-30, esp. 14f. In my ‘network-perspective’, the public is conceived as a discourse network of actors with interactions considered generally valid.

132 Latour 2007, 122-124: “[…] dann ist jedes Ding, das eine gegebene Situation verändert, indem es einen Unterschied macht, ein Akteur […]”; (quote from p. 123, original italics). Latour lists a whole range of qualifications that serve to nuance non-human agency: “Außer zu »determinieren« und als bloßer »Hintergrund für menschliches Handeln« zu dienen, könnten Dinge vielleicht ermächtigen, ermöglichen, anbieten, ermutigen, erlauben, nahelegen, beeinflussen, verhindern, autorisieren, ausschließen und so fort” (p. 124).

133 On performative speech-acts see still Austin, John L. How to do Things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. Oxford 1980.

word.¹³⁴ Taken with a grain of salt, the stone thus stands in for a human actor constantly repeating its wording, since it remains capable of affecting the mesh of semantic negotiations within others. By contrast with the ANT position, however, I hold that objects generate identity only within human actors, causing their net-works of identity to be purely external and contingent upon context. Their phy-sical form is an expression of culture and thus of identities, causing their agency to be generated by the networks they are part of. The crucial theoretical difference between object and human actors is that objects are not fully subject to double contingency, since they are incapable of reflecting on the actions of alteri. These limitations have consequences for networks of political action as they allow actors to create less complex actors for the purpose of generating and adapting semantic order.

2.4.3 Interaction

The events that alter the relationships between actors and the configurations of networks are their interactions.¹³⁵ This study focuses on interactions relating to power, here understood as the control of insecurity (i.e. contingency) by altering actors through the dynamic of translation. It is here assumed that all relevant interaction is directed within a network, i.e. that it originates from one actor and is reactively perceived by others, creating a mesh of interaction between actors and an interface between physical and cognitive space. Interactions are not limited to individual actors, but can also aim at constructed collectives, or even take place

134 On performance in epigraphy and monumental constellations of text and image see Ma 2013b, 59. Inscriptions being read in public is mentioned for instance by Dem.

20.63f. (at a trial), and IC III iii 4 (=Chaniotis, Angelos. Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit. Stuttgart 1996, no. 28), l. 40-47 (annual, festive re-performance). See recently Chaniotis, Angelos. “Listening to Stones: Orality and Emotions in Ancient Inscriptions”, in: John Davies and John J. Wilkes (eds.). Epigraphy and the Historical Sciences. Oxford 2012, 299-328. Rhetorical structures in honorary decrees are visible in their structures of resumption, which can be analysed with linguistic methods and establish coherence that guides reader and listener through the sometimes extensive argument. Examples are provided by the ἔν τε τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ... καὶ νῦν formula, employed for instance in IG XII 4, 1, 30:2-5 or FD III 4, 414:7f.-12, or by the structuring use of τε particles, e.g. IG XII,4 1, 99: 6-21. On the linguistic analysis of textual structure see Brinker, Klaus, Cölfen, Hermann, and Pappert, Steffen. Linguistische Textanalyse. Eine Einführung in Grundbegriffe und Methoden.

Berlin 2014⁸, esp. 29-57. I am grateful to Florian R. Forster (Munich) for the τε ex-ample.

135 This is equivalent to the acts of translation identified by M. Callon (1991, 140).

between such collectives via intermediaries. On a functional level, interactions are treated using the categories devised by Callon in his sociology of translation.

When using these categories in analysing interactions reflected in historical sources, the central questions must then be whether and for whom these functioned as problématisation, intéressement, enrolment or mobilisation, as well as whether and how these steps were successful and how they affected the socio-political network they took place in. The complexity and interactive nature of the source tradition itself are respected in that the analysis aims to reconstruct dis-cursive rather than factual reality.

The survey above has shown that interaction between actors establishes pre-cedents in the form of expectations for future interaction, here termed identities.

A constant stream of concurrent interactions tends to weaken such identities over time, especially those that codify unlikely choices, so that the effect of interactions declines.¹³⁶ If the contingent world order generated by earlier interactions is to be preserved, interactions need to be reproduced and interaction modes ‘main-tained’. This dynamic is particularly relevant in the context of power interactions because reproducing identities that codify unlikely selections are particularly liable to resistance. Only their successfully repeated performance can stabilise order.¹³⁷

2.4.4 Contingency and trust

In White’s social theory, actors interact to control the experience of contingency, i.e.

the openness of social complexity, and thereby generate security, since action establishes relational identity for the future.¹³⁸ Contingency thus exists whenever action is to take place, so constantly. The perception of contingency is specific to

136 On the superimposing dynamic of forgetting see Eco, Umberto. “An Ars Oblivionalis?

Forget It!”, in: PMLA 103:3 (1988), 254-261, esp. 259f. (translated by Marilyn Migiel):

“One forgets not by cancellation but by superimposition, not by producing absence but by multiplying presence.” Cf. further Lachmann, Renate. “Die Unlöschbarkeit der Zeichen: Das semiotische Unglück des Mnemonisten”, in: Renate Lachmann and Anselm Haverkamp (eds.). Gedächtniskunst. Raum – Bild – Schrift. Studien zur Mnemo-technik. Frankfurt a.M. 1991, 111-141, esp. 116f., and Ricoeur, Paul. Gedächtnis, Gesch-ichte, Vergessen. Munich 2004, 679-690, who discusses the complexities and layers of memory in relation to forgetting. I thank Verena Schulz (Munich) for discussing me-mory dynamics with me.

137 Luhmann 1988², 12: “Die Funktion der Macht liegt in der Regulierung von Kontin-genz.”; 31: “Die Leistung ist die Übertragung reduzierter Komplexität […].”

138 Luhmann 1988², 19; White 2008², 1-4. Luhmann (1984, 63) further emphasises that control is never unilateral, but always contributes to general order, meaning that those in power are compelled to adhere to their own order.

each individual actor and its network configuration.¹³⁹ It becomes particularly per-ceptible, however, when configurations change and the actors’ expectations no longer conform to the web of action that constitutes their environment. Even when this happens, the vast majority of these shifts is minimal and can be easily absorbed by reproducing existing expectations, without requiring extensive action or fundamental adaptation.¹⁴⁰ This ability to handle contingency is based on an acquired trust in expectable action, i.e. the projection of past experience into the future, whereby alteri acted in accordance with ego’s expectations despite contin-gency.¹⁴¹ Trust thereby generates agency, normality and relative tranquillity.¹⁴² In the context of power, this means that the creation and maintenance of trust in order, i.e. that others act in alignment with translated expectation, offers the safest path towards a stable network of power. A nuanced mixture of power interaction (i.e. change) and expected interaction therefore aids in preventing the order from appearing contingent. This contingency can also be obfuscated, for instance by constructing and controlling other sources of contingency through interaction.

2.4.5 A note on legitimacy

Given the theory applied here, the question of whether the interactions studied here were legitimate in a legal or sociological sense, either ancient or modern, is of only secondary importance.¹⁴³ The reason is that this study is concerned with subtle, systemic aspects of power rather than with coercive threats or violence:

societal power operates in categories other than overt authority and its study is therefore not concerned with individual relations of command and obedience.

Although the question of legitimacy is often central to studies of Hellenistic rule, this study thus takes a simply phenomenological approach to the question of an action’s legitimacy: if an action is successful, it is also legitimate.

139 Luhmann 1984, 159f.

140 Luhmann 2014⁵, 27-31.

141 Luhmann 1984, 179-187. See in extenso Luhmann, Niklas. Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus zur Reduktion sozialer Komplexität. Stuttgart 2014⁵, 1-9; 29. For Harrison White trust is not a central concept, but rather a ‘style’, i.e. a ‘quality’ of social interaction (2008², 112f.; 161).

142 Luhmann 2014⁵, 29.

143 On legality as a secondary encoding see Luhmann 1988², 42f., 45f. On legitimacy and (situationally performative) value consensus as a necessary ingredient of rule see ibid.

149f.; 174f. On legitimacy cf. Weber 1972⁵ [1922], 122-124.

This means that the locus of legitimacy is the de facto network of interaction.¹⁴⁴ Factors such as participation in a shared normative and legal discourse, as well as in other collectivised narratives, can of course affect the configuration of this net-work and blend together in informing the concrete reactions power interactions elicit.¹⁴⁵ These reactions can be understood as being located on a gradient: Once a certain critical point on this gradient is reached, reactions stop being neutral and turn negative. How easily this point is reached, however, obviously depends on the nature of the interaction and its network environment. Legitimacy thus emer-ges as a secondary discourse about power interaction that modulates but does not determine its efficacy and is thus not central to this study.