Our improved understanding of the native importance of the valley at and east of Lincoln (p. 23–8 above) means that we can longer perceive the Roman military occupation of the Lincoln gap purely in terms of the strategic value of its geographical situation. The invading army will have been made aware of the ritual significance of the site, and this may help to explain why it may have based itself initially on the south scarp of the gap, not encroaching upon the sacred waters so dear to the Corieltauvi (see chapter 5 above).
Whatever the view of the tribe towards the Roman’s arrival, it may have taken a period of negotiation – long enough to require a cemetery – and quite possibly subsequent coercion, before the army moved forward to impose itself as a more permanent presence domi-nating the site by building a causeway across the marsh and a new fortress on top of the north scarp.
The waterways were now the essential supply routes, and at least part of the waterfront was taken over for
military supply and other purposes, while it appears that the multivallate earthworks to the north and east of the city were slighted as part of the same symbolic imposition of control.
With regard to the detailed topography of the military installations, research since 1970 has added considerably to our understanding of the general layout of the hilltop fortress and associated military occupation, but there are still considerable gaps in our knowledge. We now have clear evidence that the fortress faced east, we know the positions of the gates and the principia and we can reconstruct the latter’s plan in outline. Information on the defences them-selves is quite extensive, but this is not the case with the gates. Yet, although the site of the baths has been presumed (perhaps wrongly, and they could well have been located nearer to the river), none of the other principal buildings has been identified, nor has any of the accommodation been investigated on sufficient a scale to contribute greatly towards the research debate on 1st-century fortresses. Since the disposition of garrisons was at this period still fluid, we cannot
be sure on present evidence whether the whole legion was present at Lincoln, or only part, perhaps even with some auxiliaries.
The extent of associated extra-mural occupation was considerable, especially to the south, beyond the river, where the principal cemeteries were located.
There were evidently other foci outside the fortress also; towards the west, perhaps, and along the river, east of the causeway bridgehead. As yet, however, little detail has been forthcoming to allow us to distinguish exact functions at these various sites and we remain largely ignorant of activity in the rest of the area around the fortress controlled by the army.
It seems clear that the hilltop fortress was not built and occupied before the Neronian period – the pottery quantities peak at c.AD 60, and there is no exclusively Claudian glass – but the unresolved discrepancy between the epigraphic, numismatic and ceramic dating means that we remain uncertain about its precise construction date. The need for investigation of some well-dated and stratified deposits is quite clear, and another important priority will be to confirm the presence or absence of an earlier base on the valley floor: the arguments for there having been such an early base are quite compelling. Although we now have more background information on the topo-graphy of the site, and in particular the locations of early river channels, we still need some systematic environmental sampling of legionary-period deposits to capitalise on these new understandings.
Within the hilltop fortress two phases of construction were clearly discernible at some structures, including the defences, and dating evidence from the demolition deposits associated with the dismantling of the legion-ary buildings at certain sites makes it clear that both belong to the military occupation, rather than the second phase representing the earliest structures of the colonia. A partial reorganisation, at least, might be expected with the arrival of a different legion; infor-mation from other fortresses occupied previously and subsequently by these legions might help resolve this question, even if no more precise dating material is found. Some structures also showed signs of repair, including the rampart front at East Bight (EB 66) and the ‘second’ phase building nearby (EB 80).
Detailed analysis has established that native potters
were used by the legion for some of its requirements.
The remainder of the ceramic assemblage is what might be expected for legionary occupation, but too few groups have been recovered from non-residual contexts to allow more detailed analysis of material from particular structures. Other artefacts from the con-struction of the fortress have not yet been subjected to the same level of analysis, but there is much scope here for determining the scale of the undertaking. The amounts of various materials required for the work, and the time required to complete it, could be calculated whilst the supply sources, the spending power of the army and its economic and environmental impact on the surrounding area should be reviewed.
The fortifications were deliberately left in position when the 2nd Adiutrix departed, possibly to delimit the site, but presumably also to minimise potential damage from hostile natives, like that which had overtaken Colchester in AD 60–1. Other structures seem to have been demolished, and in certain cases the timbers were burned on site. How and when this was achieved is uncertain. The traditional view is that a caretaker garrison was left behind to oversee the task and to control local activity. But there would inevitably have been a fall in economic activity with such a substantial reduction in spending-power.
Quantitative analysis of the pottery from the city indicates a substantial fall-off (Darling and Precious forthcoming), and this cannot have been wholly due to the ‘economic cycles’ which may have affected the province (Going 1992).
The presence of the army had created, over a period of twenty years or so, a major market and an associated settlement. It had also necessitated the construction of a communications infrastructure. As at Gloucester and Colchester, it made political sense to capitalise on this investment by handing over the whole establishment to a veteran settlement. Ob-viously, some of the traders departed with the legion, but others may have remained. How long this deci-sion took from the army’s withdrawal in c. AD 78 to a date in Domitian’s reign (AD 81–96) is uncertain.
Traditionally, it has been considered that the army was too fully engaged in the conquest of Scotland for a colony to be founded before c. AD 86, but there is no certainty on this point.
crossing, had a great ritual significance to the peoples who lived in the area. Indeed the significance of the pools for earlier peoples, rather than any other aspect of the topography, is preserved in the Roman place name Lindon, which derives from the Celtic llyn – ‘a pool’ (Cameron 1985, 1-3). To the Romans the pools were the most notable feature of the location, al-though the equation of -don with the word -dun (meaning a hill) is no longer thought valid (Ibid.).
Given our new understanding of the symbolic im-portance of the Lincoln gap to the Corieltauvi, we should probably now suppose that motives other than tact were dominant in the Roman decision to establish a military base here. The pre-existing ritual signifi-cance of the site must affect our view of the impact of new military installations at Lincoln for their contemporaries. As the military details of the in-vasion and the Roman army are already studied so extensively at sites across the Roman Empire, it may be this interaction, between conquerors and con-quered, to which the Lincoln case can contribute most effectively.
Within this Era, the District Council area has been divided into 27 distinct RAZs which attempt to address both the military agenda and the relationship between the Romans and their new imperial subjects.
The RAZ accounts, along with their mapped extent, can be accessed on the CD-Rom.
Our research agenda for the Roman Military Era contains, first, a group of eight RAZs defined in order to address questions relating to the initial choice of site for the Roman fortress or fortresses. All of these RAZs ask what the choice of location for the new fortress might be able to tell us about the relationship between conqueror and conquered. Should the in-stallation of a new fortress alongside the ritual pools, and the construction of a causeway across them, be seen as a sensitive gesture by a political ally; or alternatively, is it more likely to represent a deliber-ately aggressive act of desecration or humiliation?
6.1 The early fort
6.2 The Wigford causeway
6.3 Buildings on the sand islands in the Brayford
B. The Roman Military Era – The archaeological agenda.
An introduction to the Research Agenda Zone entries (on CD-Rom)
David Stocker
At the time of the Conquest, it is clear that Lincoln was selected as one of a handful of locations for major Roman investment within the territory of the Coriel-tauvi (along with Leicester and, perhaps, Longthorpe).
We need to ask why. Until recently, arguments based on the superiority of the Roman military engineers’
appreciation of the defensive capacity of the place was offered as the principal, if not the only, explanation.
Such arguments, rooted in military engineering and strategy, remain valid, but this Assessment has shown that, in AD 43, the site was already valued for other reasons. We have seen in Chapter 5 that, although there may have been no settlement at Lincoln in the late Iron Age, this did not mean that the place was unimportant to the peoples of the countryside round about. Indeed the little evidence we have suggests that it was a site of considerable symbolic importance to the Corieltauvi, and, we could argue, that importance may have been confirmed by the site’s selection for major Roman installations.
But iron-age Lincoln was not the Corieltauvi’s main political centre; that was probably at Old Sleaford and this centre was moved by the Romans, not to Lincoln, but to Ratae Corieltauvorum – Leicester. So, if we are correct to measure Lincoln’s importance in the 1st century AD by characterising the Roman establish-ment here, we should be contrasting the legionary headquarters with the tribal capital and political centre. This reasoning should lead us to draw a clear distinction between the foundation of Lindum and Ratae Corieltauvorum. Lindum is clearly not the main political centre. Indeed, like Glevum, it seems to be a foundation of a distinctive military type, a long way (over 50 miles) from the centre of the political territory in which it sits.
In making the same observation, Martin Millett (1999, 193) thought that this indicated that distinctive
‘tactical’ factors resulted in the foundation of both Lindum and Glevum. Millett proposed that such military bases were located in ‘quiet’ areas deliber-ately, to keep the army away from the centres of tribal power. However, our preliminary understanding of the layout of the Witham gap in the late Iron Age, described in Chapter 5, suggests that the area of pools and meres west of the Stamp End causeway, or river
6.4 Stamp End causeway
6.5 Route way to the Stamp End causeway 6.6 Early cemetery in the Wigford area 6.7 Valley floor deposits
6.8 An early hilltop enclosure?
A second group of research questions within this Era are focused on issues related to organisation and planning within the Roman military base, or bases.
First-century military organisation is a well-populated research area and future work in Lincoln can make a substantial contribution to the debate. Three RAZs have been identified which should help explore such matters:
6.9 The Neronian Fortress 6.9.1 Fortifications 6.9.2 Principia 6.9.3 Barracks
A third group of RAZs have been identified which approach the difficult topic of how archaeological discoveries might tell us about the impact of the new Roman fortress on its immediate surroundings and on native populations. Because existing information is so scarce, these questions are poorly formulated at
the moment. Nevertheless we can make preliminary proposals, based on our limited understanding of the topography of the Lincoln gap. The RAZs so far identified that cast light on these issues are as follows:
6.10 Waterside installations 6.11 Potential western quaysides 6.12 Road up the northern hillside
6.13 Northern hill slope area with springs and possible secular occupation 6.14 Training and recreational complex
out-side fortress east gate 6.15 Cemetery east of fortress
6.16 Canabae outside east, north and west gates
6.17 ‘Farm’ at Bishop Grosseteste College 6.18 Legionary prata and territorium 6.19 Iron-age ditch system
6.20 Fosse Way crossing of Witham 6.21 Roads beyond the Canabae
6.22 Northern and southern hill slopes 6.23 Birchwood area and Boultham Moor 6.24 Upper Witham valley
6.25 Lower Witham Valley
7. The Colonia Era
A. Archaeological account
Michael J Jones
have no information on the number of veterans settled at Lincoln, it is likely to have been several hundred, if not more, and there may not have been enough soldiers due for retirement in such a short period.