Policy effectiveness of regularisation programmes since 1996

In evaluating policy effectiveness in all EU countries, we are faced with an appalling lack of data, systematic follow-up or research. Only two countries (Spain¹⁰⁸ and France¹⁰⁹) seem to be able to produce an estimate of budgetary costs (for 2005 and 1997, respectively). Only one country (Spain) monitors the progress of legalised immigrants in the social security system; France had a follow-up survey for its 1997 programme, but nothing for its 2006 small-scale programme.¹¹⁰ Italy recently commissioned a large-scale survey¹¹¹ which is a sophisticated evaluation of the 2002 regularisation, while Belgium has commissioned an in-depth evalutation of labour market outcomes of persons regularised during the 2000 programme.¹¹² Greece and Portugal have no evaluations of policy outcomes.

3.3.1.1 Retention of legal status

The Italian mid-2005 survey estimated that regularised migrants represented 28% of the immigrant population, and that 98% retained their legal status. 88.5% renewed their permits with an employer, although loss of employment appears as a significant risk. For Spain, Arango and Finotelli¹¹³ report

108 Spanish government reply to ICMPD questionnaire.

109 Not included in the French government reply to ICMPD questionnaire: see REGINE country study for France, for details.

110 See REGINE country study for France.

111 Published (in English) as Cesareo, V. (2007): Immigrants Regularization Processes in Italy, Milan, Polimetrica.

112 Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid, Université d'Anvers, Groupe d'études sur l'ethnicité, le racisme, les migrations et l'exclusion, Université Libre de Bruxelle, 2008 : Before and After La situation sociale et économique des personnes ayant bénéficié de la procédure de régularisation en 2000 (Loi du 22 Décembre 1999), available at http://www.ulb.ac.be/socio/germe/documentsenligne/BAfr.pdf,

113 REGINE country study for Spain.

that a year after regularisation some 80% were still in the social security system and were able to renew their residence permits. In both Spain and Italy, expert reports conclude that regularisation has had a significant effect in reducing illegality. This is probably less true for the regularisations in Greece, although no reliable data or studies are available.¹¹⁴

For Spain, our report concludes that transition back into the informal sector was low for those migrants working in construction and restaurants, but very high (up to 90%) for agriculture and housekeeping. There is also an observable trend for a change of employment sector after regularisation – from agriculture to construction (males) and from domestic work to restaurants (females). For Italy, the study cited concludes that migrants’ actual employment often differed from that shown on the residence permit;¹¹⁵ on the other hand, it calculates that in the South of Italy

employment opportunities for legalised workers were roughly doubled in construction and agriculture.

Again, for Greece and Portugal there are no data.

We should note the European practice in regularisations of granting work visas, temporary cards (e.g.

6 months) or very short-term permits (1 or 2 years). This is in contrast to the amnesties of the USA and elsewhere, which grant long-term residence rights with a view to citizenship. The European policies are of two broad types: those that are predicated on immigrants as workers, and tend to recreate illegal statuses where labour market conditions are poor; and those that are predicated on humanitarian or social inclusion issues. In both cases, 6-month or 1-year permits are the norm, with onerous (and frequently different) conditions for their renewal or conversion to a normal residence permit. There are also some serious problems of a bureaucratic nature in implementing the transition from work visas, temporary cards or permits to normal residence permits. Thus, the award of longer-term statuses would seem to be an obvious route to improving retention rates; equally, setting different criteria for permit renewals is counterproductive and should be avoided.

3.3.1.2 Criteria for eligibility

Most of the regularisation programmes have similar criteria, although with different emphases on health status, ethnicity, family connections etc. The principal variable criterion of note is that of employment contract or employment record (as distinct from social insurance payments); a pattern is evident that requiring employers to actively participate in the regularisation process leads to a more successful outcome. When the programme is run in parallel with enforcement of labour laws by the Labour Ministry (i.e. a clampdown on the informal economy), and the dual Ministry approach also actively involves all the major social partners, the policy is more securely effective. The Spanish programme of 2005, as well as the Italian one of 2002, shows superior results over previous programmes (particularly compared with the Greek programmes) apparently for these reasons. The

114 For an explanation of why this is likely to be the case, see REGINE country study for Greece.

115 This is also shown by Reyneri’s study of earlier Italian regularisations, where falsified employment contracts and complex mixes of formal, informal and even fraudulent employment were common. See Reyneri, E. (1999):

"The mass legalization of migrants in Italy: permanent or temporary emergence from the underground economy?", in Baldwin-Edwards, M., Arango, J. (eds): Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern

conclusion would seem to be that regularisation programmes are suitable for irregular migrants in secure employment situations, whereas general or unfocused amnesties should be avoided.

3.3.1.3 Possible encouragement of illegal migration flows to or from the territory

The existing research, including government answers to the ICMPD questionnaire, does not support the claim that legalised migrants subsequently move to other EU countries. Indeed, it is counter-intuitive to suppose that migrants with a recently-acquired legal status in one country would choose to re-migrate and lose that status.

On the other hand, there is evidence that irregular migrants make their way through northern

European states to those in the South, and also vice versa.¹¹⁶ This is the consequence of the Schengen system, and has no relation to regularisation opportunities, but rather to those in national labour markets. Such a consideration is outside the remit of this project.

Insofar as encouragement of future migration flows is concerned, on the basis of available evidence it is impossible to quantify to what extent large-scale regularisations might play a role; in the case of the USA, there seems to be a very limited effect.¹¹⁷ As mentioned elsewhere, irregular migration is in many countries a substitute for legal, organised labour migration flows: again, it is employment opportunities and information networks related to those which are pertinent. One particular type of flow has been empirically related to regularisation (specifically to that of Spain in 2005): this is the stimulation of former illegal residents actually outside of the country at the time of the regularisation programme.¹¹⁸ This effect is the result of regularisation criteria focused on past residence, rather than continuous and current residence: reformulation of criteria may well be appropriate in the light of this new evidence.

3.3.1.4 Bureaucratic management of programmes

The management of large-scale programmes has been a significant problem for almost all countries, with unexpectedly large numbers of applicants, insufficient machinery to receive and process applications, staff shortages and various unpredicted difficulties. The consequence, in almost every country, has been long queues of applicants, massive delays, and (in many cases) continuous

extension of deadlines and postponement of decisions.¹¹⁹ Variable interpretations of the regularisation legislation across regions or prefectures appear as a significant problem resulting in highly unequal

116 This is specifically noted in the case of East Europeans migrating to Spain via Germany – see REGINE country study for Spain.

117 Orrenius, P., and Zavodny, M. (2001): ‘Do amnesty programs encourage illegal immigration? Evidence from IRCA’, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Paper 0103.

118 Elrick, T. and Ciobanu, O.: ‘Evaluating the Impact of Migration Policy Changes on Migration Strategies:

Insights from Romanian-Spanish migrations’, Global Networks (forthcoming).

119 The Greek programme of 1998 (Green Card) was particularly notable for its delays and deadline extensions, with very slow processing of applications. See REGINE country study for Greece.

treatment according to nationality, or region of application. This latter problem is perhaps worst in the case of regularisations in France.¹²⁰

One issue that has scarcely been addressed is the procedure through which applications are made.

Several factors emerge as both crucial and variable in the way they are implemented across countries (and sometimes, as in the case of France, even within a country). These are:

ƒ The importance of involving civil society and migrant associations in the process, from the planning stage and throughout the implementation phase

ƒ The need to guarantee protection from expulsion to applicants during the process

ƒ The mechanism(s) by which the applications are evaluated – i.e. through documents and other checks or requiring personal interview

In the last case, the scant evidence suggests that personal interview alters regularisation programmes such that they start to resemble mechanisms: thus, a lack of strict evaluation criteria tends to

emphasise subjective (more personal) judgements about applicants. Equally, the administrative burden associated with personal interview (and any appeal rights) adds considerably to the costs of such a programme. Thus, the personal interview approach – at least on the face of it – would seem to promote uncertainty, inequality of treatment, and delayed implementation of the programme.¹²¹ Of all programmes examined in any detail, best practices are most easily identified in the Spanish programme of 2005. The organisational aspects of the programme, even when encountering

unexpected problems, are exemplary: they consisted of 742 information points, recruitment of 1,700 temporary staff, support from trade unions and migrant associations, and strong management techniques. These latter included a clear administrative division between social security offices for collecting applications and the Interior Ministry for processing them. In addition, the Labour and Interior Ministries established electronic systems for information exchange between ministries and for automatic renewal of residence permits.¹²²

3.3.1.5 General summary

The overall impact of regularisation programmes is positive, with apparently small but permanent reductions in illegal residence and/or employment, and little evidence to support the claims of increased illegal migration flows in any direction. What is clearly missing, however, is systematic evaluation of policies and appropriate corrective responses. Even the most basic data, such as total number of applications, total number regularised, and subsequent renewals, are missing from the great majority of MS programmes. This data deficit should be a priority issue, since without even basic data, policy analysis is at best speculative and, at worst, futile.

Related proposal(s):Options 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

120 See REGINE country study for France.

121 This last point seems to be one of the main factors in the poorly-managed 1998 Green Card programme in Greece. See REGINE country study for Greece, for details.