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process. Though laudable, it would be important not to set unrealistic goals for a free-and-fair process in a country with an ongoing civil war, a culture of patronage, and some of the highest corruption rates in the world.21 There will almost certainly be corruption in the election; the challenge will be to minimize it.
A third option would involve U.S. diplomats encouraging the can-didates to recruit a team—and, for the eventual winner, ultimately appointing a cabinet—that reflects Afghanistan’s ethnic, religious, and other constituencies. This would involve White House, State Depart-ment, and Defense Department officials developing a communications strategy—complete with talking points—that reinforces the impor-tance of multiethnic coalitions in meetings with their Afghan coun-terparts. U.S. officials would need to communicate this message at several stages: during the campaign; while the votes are counted; after the announcements of preliminary and final results; and after the inau-guration of a new president. But there are risks with such a hands-on approach, since some Afghans might accuse the United States of for-eign meddling.
A fourth option would be to champion a specific candidate for president. U.S. officials could publicly support a candidate by making favorable statements, as well as by privately offering funding or other resources. But this option could fail to produce the desired outcome and would likely taint the legitimacy of the winner.
Peace Talk s
Peace negotiations will continue to be an important component of the political and security transitions in Afghanistan. In past insurgencies, the likelihood of a peace settlement has depended on the type and extent of external support that combatants received; the length, duration, and status of the war; and the existence and role of a third-party mediator to help with peace negotiations.22 Drawing on these lessons, U.S. policy-makers have three broad options as they weigh peace discussions.
One is for the United States—especially the White House and State Department—to play a leading role in negotiating a comprehensive peace settlement with the Taliban.23 The United States might take the lead in peace talks because the Taliban has thus far refused to negoti-ate directly with the Karzai government. Some proponents of U.S.-led
15 Policy Choices
peace discussions contend that negotiations are desirable even if they fail.24 They argue that insurgencies often end with a political settlement, not on the battlefield. But U.S.-led discussions face several challenges.
The United States would be serving as both a mediator and a combatant;
it would not be a neutral party. More important, although negotiations can be useful, many insurgencies end with a military victory by one side or the other, rather than a peace settlement. Since 1955, of the roughly fifty-five civil wars in which adversaries have fought for control of the central government, 75 percent ended with a clear victory.25 In addition, wars ended by military victory (rather than through peace settlements) are more likely to stay ended.26 This may well be true for Afghanistan.
Alternatively, the United States could play a supporting role in the negotiations, rather than a leading one, leaving leadership to the Afghan government and the Taliban.27 U.S. diplomats might refrain from par-ticipating in meetings between Taliban and Afghan government repre-sentatives until they reach a more advanced stage of discussions. Under one variant of this option, a third party, such as a senior diplomat from a Gulf state or a UN representative, might act as a mediator or facilita-tor.28 A third-party mediator could be useful with—or without—direct U.S. involvement in peace talks. The risk with a supporting U.S. role, however, is that the United States could lose some leverage in influenc-ing the negotiations.
A final option is to abandon peace negotiations, at least for the moment, and focus on other policy steps, such as improving ANSF capabilities, holding the 2014 presidential election, and supporting regional economic initiatives. But this approach undercuts the possibil-ity, however slim, of a peaceful end to three and a half decades of fight-ing. Many Afghans are tired of war, so peace talks may be worth a shot.
T he u.s. m i li Tary Presence
The size, composition, and duration of a continued U.S. military pres-ence in Afghanistan are the most frequently discussed components of the transition. As shown in Table 2, the financial costs of deploying U.S.
troops in Afghanistan have been high.
Budgetary pressures to reduce these costs have been an important factor in the current drawdown. As the United States reduces its pres-ence, there are four plausible military options for 2015 and beyond.29
TAblE 2: U.S. COSTS OF ThE AFGhANiSTAN WAR (iN billiONS OF DOllARS) Fy2012 Fy2004Fy2005Fy2006Fy2007Fy2008Fy2009Fy2010Fy2011 request War Funding14.620.019.039.243.459.593.8118.6113.7 State/USAID2.22.81.11.92.73.15.74.14.3 Source: Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011, p. 17.
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The first, often referred to as the “zero option,” is to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan.30 This option assumes that the United States has no major strategic interests left in Afghanistan or that a mili-tary presence would not achieve U.S. objectives at an acceptable cost.31 It could also occur with a failure by U.S. and Afghan officials to con-clude a bilateral security agreement. According to this view, al-Qaeda’s leadership has already been severely weakened because of the relentless U.S. counterterrorism campaign and hence U.S. forces are no longer needed in Afghanistan to combat a diminished threat.32
The second option involves reducing the U.S. military footprint to between one thousand and three thousand personnel in Afghanistan, configured solely for counterterrorism operations.33 The U.S. military would work with the CIA, other U.S. intelligence agencies, and Afghan units to kill or capture terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda and associ-ated groups to prevent their resurgence in Afghanistan. There are sev-eral possible U.S. force packages for this mission. One might include a squadron of “Tier 1” or other special operations task force units, drawn from units attached to Joint Special Operations Command. These forces would operate with a small number of NATO special operations forces and work closely with Afghan special operations units, such as the Ktah Khas, to conduct operations. This option would also include limited “enablers,” such as unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
The zero and counterterrorism options would significantly reduce (or eliminate, in the former case) the financial burden on the United States of supporting U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and minimize (or eliminate) American combat deaths. But both options pose substan-tial risks. U.S. forces would have little or no mandate and limited or no capabilities after 2015 to assist the Afghan government if the Taliban threatened to overrun a major city or even topple the government. It would also increase the probability that Afghanistan would be used as a beachhead for al-Qaeda and other militant groups.34 Iraq after the U.S.
withdrawal is illustrative: al-Qaeda in Iraq has regrouped since 2011. It conducts attacks at a high tempo and was instrumental in establishing an affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, in Syria.
Third is a light foreign internal defense option, which would include between four thousand and six thousand U.S. forces, plus additional NATO forces. It would expand the U.S. mission from counterterrorism to foreign internal defense.35 A small number of U.S. special operations
18
forces would train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Local Police.36 U.S. forces might also be required to help Afghan forces provide security for the 2014 election and backup protection for U.S. diplomats. This option would involve keep-ing more U.S. forces in Afghanistan than the counterterrorism option, along with a small contingent of NATO forces, to ensure the Afghan government is not overthrown and to help Afghan forces degrade the insurgency. The foreign internal defense mission would rely on U.S. spe-cial operations and other forces to help the Afghans conduct counterter-rorism and counterinsurgency operations, as U.S. Army Green Berets have done in the Philippines, Colombia, and other campaigns.
Fourth is a larger foreign internal defense option that would consist of between eight thousand and twelve thousand U.S. forces. This option would include a larger force package of U.S. Army Special Forces, unmanned aerial vehicles, a conventional security force assistance team, attack aircraft, and other enablers. A larger force package would allow the United States to deploy more trainers and advisers to a greater number of areas, facilitating Afghan counterinsurgency operations.
The light and heavy foreign internal defense options would involve higher financial costs than the first and second options, albeit still at much lower levels than today. They also risk a higher number of U.S.
casualties, though U.S. forces would concentrate primarily on training Afghans, not fighting. At the same time, both options allow the United States to continue to improve the combat capability of Afghanistan’s national and local security forces, as well as respond in extremis to situ-ations such as a Taliban advance on a major city or the potential over-throw of the Afghan government. The United States could reduce its force numbers as Afghan capabilities improve. Table 3 summarizes the four options and their likely budgetary costs.
econom ic growT h
There are several policy options for fostering economic growth during the transition. The United States and other donors could concen-trate assistance efforts on supporting rural assistance programs. Sub-stantial gains in agricultural output are possible if irrigation systems are expanded, incentives and systems to ensure efficient use of water and maintenance of irrigation systems are improved, and further
TAblE 3: OvERviEW OF MiliTARy OPERATiONS37 annual cost (in billions Troop strengthof 2012 option Primary mission(u.s. forces)u.s. dollars) Zero Option No military mission, but could include civilian, diplomatic, and 0 $0 intelligence missions CounterterrorismConduct counterterrorism strikes against al-Qaeda and associated1,000–3,000$0.6–$1.8 groups with Afghan partners Light Foreign Internal DefenseConduct counterterrorism strikes; limited train, advise, and assist to 4,000–6,000$2.4–$3.5 Afghan units Heavy Foreign Internal DefenseConduct counterterrorism strikes; more robust train, advise, and assist8,000–12,000$4.7–$7.1 to Afghan units Source: Author calculations based on average cost per service member from Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011, p. 23.
20 Afghanistan After the Drawdown
investments are made to expand and maintain roads and market access for agricultural inputs and products.
Another option is to channel assistance toward developing mining or the oil and gas industries in hopes of generating substantial revenues that can be tapped by the Afghan government. Afghanistan has poten-tially commercially exploitable deposits of iron ore, copper, natural gas, and other metals and minerals.38 However, the World Bank notes the need for substantial investment—between $6 billion and $15 bil-lion—to open these mines. Extracting these metals or oil and gas will be expensive and challenging. Because of infrastructure costs, insti-tutional weaknesses, and the poor investment climate in Afghanistan, mining or oil and gas extraction are unlikely to make major contribu-tions to the Afghan economy in the near to medium term.
Finally, the United States and other donors could invest in improving transnational transportation networks across Afghanistan. Increased cross-border transit, especially between India and Afghanistan, could strengthen economic ties among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, potentially resulting in a decline in tensions between Pakistan and the other two countries. Increasing transit to Central Asia is less promis-ing. Volumes of trade among Central Asia, Pakistan, and India are low and likely to remain so. Afghanistan’s rough terrain, the poor state of its highways, levels of insecurity, and bribes demanded from transit com-panies are not conducive to transit traffic between these two areas. Until security improves and costs fall, Afghanistan is unlikely to become a major international corridor.
regional Dynam ics
There are several U.S. policy options for dealing with Afghanistan’s complex regional environment, especially with Pakistan and India. The first is to more aggressively encourage Pakistan and India to pursue détente, especially economic détente. “We will pick up the threads from where we left in 1999,” Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif said after his 2013 election victory, referring to his previous stint as prime minister. “That is the roadmap that I have for improvement of relations between Pakistan and India.”39 As prime minister in the late 1990s, Sharif signed a number of agreements with his Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, including the Lahore Declaration. Under the Lahore
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Declaration, both sides agreed to intensify their efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute and reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. But India has been reluctant to support a more active U.S. role in helping negotiate détente with Pakistan. Assuming Sharif is serious about détente, there is still opposition among some Pakistan military officials to closer relations with India.
A second option is for U.S. policymakers to develop a more aggres-sive policy toward Pakistan to root out militant groups. Examples might include tying U.S. military assistance to Pakistan’s progress in counter-ing military groups or continucounter-ing to shift U.S. supply routes from Paki-stan to the northern route through Central Asia. On the latter issue, insurgents extort payments from trucking companies, especially those hauling cargo for NATO forces. Rerouting supply routes, even at an additional cost, would cut into revenues insurgents have relied upon to prosecute the war.
The challenge for U.S. policymakers is that Pakistan’s military, through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, continues to provide some support to the Taliban and other insurgents. It does so to counterbalance India in Afghanistan and in the hopes of encouraging an Afghan government allied with Pakistan. In the past, those insurgen-cies that have received support from external states triumphed more than 50 percent of the time, while those with no support won only 17 percent of the time. Sanctuary is almost as important. Insurgents have been successful approximately 43 percent of the time when they enjoyed sanctuary.40 Consequently, depriving the Taliban of external support or sanctuary would decrease its odds of overthrowing the Afghan govern-ment. If the Taliban is to be deprived of sanctuary, the Pakistani military would have to change policy. To date, the military leadership and ISI have shown little willingness to withdraw support, and Pakistan’s secu-rity agencies have been unwilling to apprehend most Afghan Taliban operatives residing in Baluchistan and Karachi. Repeated efforts by the Bush and Obama administrations employing a mix of sticks and carrots have failed to change Pakistan’s behavior.
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Although the American public has grown disillusioned with the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, the United States retains impor-tant interests in targeting terrorist groups that threaten the United States and helping the Afghan government provide for its own secu-rity. Much as some would like to disengage as quickly as possible, it is important that the United States continue to help Afghanistan over-come the challenges it faces so that it does not pose a threat to U.S.
national interests. Accordingly, the United States should pursue the following recommendations.
PromoTe mulT i eT hn ic coali T ions For T he 201 4 elecT ion
U.S. policy should focus on encouraging the formation of multiethnic presidential campaigns—and appointing a representative cabinet for the eventual winner—rather than on backing specific candidates. Pros-pects for security will improve if the next president and his team receive support, however grudging, from the broad range of political and ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
In practical terms, the White House, State Department, and Defense Department should develop a communications strategy—including synchronizing talking points—that encourages Afghans to achieve political consensus among their most important constituencies. Several Pashtun presidential candidates have already courted ethnic minority running mates to demonstrate inclusivity and secure the support of minority constituencies, but candidates can change their running mates until the election. U.S. officials should reinforce with their Afghan counterparts—in both public comments and private meetings—that