By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, if you receive a total of 11 monetary points from the other group members? ________

When you are ready, please click on OK.

140

First Task

Please note: Do not open the attached envelope before you are asked to do so!

At the beginning of the first task, you will be arbitrarily assigned to a group of four and your group will be marked by a specific color. Your group has the possibility to choose its group color between two colors. Each group member will be provided with two colors to vote for. The color chosen by the majority of group members will be your group color. In case of standoff a random mechanism will determine the group color.

In this task only those solutions, which are entered correctly by ALL FOUR group members will be considered as correct. Please take into account that every solution must be approved by clicking on the “Eingabe speichern” (“Save input”) button.

During this task the group members are allowed to communicate with each other. For this, a chat box is positioned on the left hand side of the computer screen. Your conversation will be recorded.

You have 8 minutes to solve the task. Only in this time you may communicate with your group members. Please note that you are not allowed to chat about the second stage of the experiment.

Violations of this rule will cause to lose your earnings and to be excluded from further experiments.

Please note that each group member has to enter the correct answers and approve them by pressing the “Eingabe speichern” (“Save input”) botton. You have to click on “Seite verlassen”

(“Leave page”) before the 8 minutes have run out. Otherwise the results will not be saved. The time left will be shown to you in the upper right hand corner of your screen.

All participants will be shown a picture and a list of objects. The task is to find the hidden objects in the picture. The inscriptions on the left and the upper side give the numbers of the rows (Reihe) and columns (Spalte), respectively. You are asked to insert this information in the boxes of the screen, which will be shown on the right hand side of the screen. The first box refers to the row (Reihe), the second to the column (Spalte). An example for this exercise is given below.

141

Picture Computerscreen

Eingabe speichern

Seite verlassen

The group, which finds most of the objects in the 8 minutes time is the winner group. At the end of the experiment you will be informed how many objects each group of the experiment have found and whether you are belonging to winner group of this task. In this case, you will receive a congratulation message.

Please click on OK when you are ready.

142

References

Akerlof, George A. (1980): A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence. In The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 (4), p. 749.

Barron, John M.; Gjerde, Kathy Paulson (1997): Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship. In Journal of Labor Economics 15 (2), pp. 234–254.

Ben-Shakhar, Gershon; Bornstein, Gary; Hopfensitz, Astrid; van Winden, Frans (2007): Reciprocity and emotions in bargaining using physiological and self-report measures. In Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (3), pp. 314–323.

Bicskei, Marianna; Lankau, Matthias; Bizer, Kilian (2013a): Negative Reciprocity and Anger-Like Emotions in Homogenous and Heterogeneous Groups. Working Paper. University of Göttingen.

Bicskei, Marianna; Lankau, Matthias; Bizer, Kilian (2013b): How Peer-Punishment affects the Cooperativeness in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups – A Public Goods Experiment with Social Identity. Working Paper. University of Göttingen.

Bochet, Olivier; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis (2006): Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments. In Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60 (1), pp. 11–26.

Bosman, Ronald; Sutter, Matthias; van Winden, Frans (2005): The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game. In Journal of Economic Psychology 26 (3), pp. 407–429.

Bosman, Ronald; van Winden, Frans (2002): Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment. In Economic Journal 112 (476), pp. 147–169.

Chen, Yan; Li, Sherry Xin (2009): Group Identity and Social Preferences. In The American Economic Review 99 (1), pp. 431–457.

Currarini, Sergio; Mengel, Friederike (2012): Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias. FEEM Working Paper No. 37.2012. Available online at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2088744, checked on 17/08/2012.

Dugar, Subhasish (2013): Non-monetary Incentives and Opportunistic Behavior: Evidence from a Laboratory Public Good Game. In Economic Inquiry 51 (2), pp. 1374–1388.

Eaton, B. Curtis; Eswaran, Mukesh; Oxoby, Robert J. (2011): Us and Them: the origin of identity, and its economic implications. In Canadian Journal of Economics 44 (3), pp. 719–748.

Elster, John (1989): Social Norms and Economic Theory. In The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4), pp. 99–117.

Elster, Jon (1998): Emotions and Economic Theory. In Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1), pp. 47–

74.

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs (2004): Social norms and human cooperation. In Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4), pp. 185–190.

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon (2000): Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. In The American Economic Review 90 (4), pp. 980–994.

Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon (2002): Altruistic punishment in humans. In Nature 415 (6868), pp. 137–

140.

Fischbacher, U.; Gächter, S. (2010): Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments. In The American Economic Review 100 (1), pp. 541–556.

Fischbacher, Urs (2007): z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. In Experimental Economics 10 (2), pp. 171–178.

143

Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst (1999): Collective action as a social exchange. In Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39 (4), pp. 341–369.

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto (2009): The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment. In The Economic Journal 119 (540), pp. 1534–1559.

Ibañez, D. M., & Schaffland, E. R. (2012). Group identity and leadership: An experimental analysis:

Unpublished Manuscript. University of Göttingen.

Kandel, Eugene; Lazear, Edward P. (1992): Peer Pressure and Partnerships. In Journal of Political Economy 100 (4), pp. 801–817.

Keser, Claudia; van Winden, Frans (2000): Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods. In Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102 (1), p. 23.

Lankau, Matthias; Bicskei, Marianna; Bizer, Kilian (2012): Cooperation Preferences in the Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Social Identity. cege Discussion Papers, 148.

University of Göttingen. Available online at http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/sh/60864.html.

Lankau, Matthias; Bicskei, Marianna; Bizer, Kilian (2013): The role of expectations in the provision of public goods under the influence of social identity. Working Paper. University of Göttingen.

Lindbeck, A.; Nyberg, S.; Weibull, J. W. (1999): Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State. In The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1), pp. 1–35.

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven; Villeval, Marie-Claire (2003): Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. In American Economic Review 93 (1), pp. 366–380.

Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven (2005): Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote cooperation. In Economic Inquiry 43 (3), pp. 649–660.

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James; Gardner, Roy (1992): Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible. In The American Political Science Review 86 (2), pp. 404–417.

Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans (2008): Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect. In Journal of Public Economics 92 (1-2), pp. 34–53.

Solow, J. L.; Kirkwood, N. (2002): Group identity and gender in public goods experiments. In Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 48 (4), pp. 403–412.

Tajfel, Henri; Turner, John (1979): An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In Stephen Worchel, William Austin (Eds.): The Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey: CA: Brooks/Cole, pp. 33–47.

Vyrastekova, Jana; Funaki, Yukihiko; Takeuchi, Ai (2011): Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment. In The Journal of Socio-Economics 40 (6), pp. 919–928.

Wit, Arjaan P.; Wilke, Henk A.M (1992): The effect of social categorization on cooperation in three types of social dilemmas. In Journal of Economic Psychology 13 (1), pp. 135–151.

Zeelenberg, Marcel; van Dijk, Wilco W.; Manstead, Antony S.R; van der Pligt, Joop (1998): The Experience of Regret and Disappointment. In Cognition & Emotion 12 (2), pp. 221–230.

144