Pathways of the EU Influence

My purpose in this part is to explain how and under what conditions the EU exercises influence, and show variations in the EU influence. This purpose is pursued by two analytical steps. First, it is crucial to demonstrate how the EU influence occurs. To understand the EU influence, I construct a framework and analyze different types of impacts on civil society development and show the interplay between the EU and domestic-level factors. Secondly, I will show that there is variation in the EU impact by using this analytical classification. This classification is at the center of the puzzle and requires thinking about differentiation and why such differentiation occurs.

Europeanization literature establishes several mechanisms of EU influence that reflect two logics of domestic change. In most of the studies, conditionality and socialization are the two key mechanisms of EU influence (Kubicek 2003; Kelley 2004; Schimelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). As Schimelfenning (2012: 9) puts it “all other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of these two fundamental logics- varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than conditionality and socialization”. Since these approaches identify different casual factors for institutional change, they are regarded as alternative but not necessarily exclusive models of EU influence.

To explain the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I used a pathway model that has been employed to examine the EU impact on border conflicts (Diez et al.

2006; 2008). In this study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Diez et al.

conceptualize four pathways of EU impact by using the work of Barnett and Duvall (2005) on different categories of power in international politics. They differentiate pathways along two dimensions and construct a two-by-two table. On the one hand, they distinguish pathways according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an effect on integration process that are not directly influenced by EU actors” (Diez et al. 2006: 571). On the other hand, the EU impact can be on policies or social dimensions. The first pathway is a “compulsory impact”- direct impact, based on carrots and sticks policies. The second pathway is an “enabling impact” a

form of indirect impact when actors in conflict empower their positions by linking their agendas and positions to the EU. The third pathway, connective impact, is another form of direct impact and established through mainly financial and concrete measures establishing and supporting contact among conflict parties. The final pathway is the “constructive impact” that results in reconstruction of identities (Diez et al. 2006: 572-574).

The model through the categories of pathways distinctly shows multiple but interconnected types of EU influence and allows me to capture the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU involvement. I applied this model to civil society and used analytical categories of compulsory, enabling and connective pathways to explore the EU impact on civil society. However, I will not use the category of the constructive pathway for the analysis of the EU impact on civil society development.

When applied to civil society, the constructive impact is the most powerful, but also a long-term transformation of civil society, which depends on a deep change in identity constructions, and (re-) construction of identities (Diez et al. 2006). Transformation of civil society in terms of constructions of identities is a long-term process and indicators of change take considerable time to become visible, thus problematic to trace. Nevertheless, it is an incremental structural change that occurs in civil society, but difficult to observe during the course of my research. I have also borrowed labels for different forms of impact from Diez et al. (2006; 2008) since it provides a good fit with the main research question that I am examining. The added value of the proposed model is twofold. First, interaction between different mechanisms of EU impact on civil society development is rarely explored in the literature. In the Europeanization of civil society literature, most of the analyses of the EU impact have focused on compulsory and enabling pathways. Nevertheless, it has become clear during my research that the connective pathway has a particular importance although it has been overlooked by most of the literature. In addition to other pathways, the connective pathway of EU influence is innovative both in terms of understanding the interactions between actors and the differential impact of the EU across sectors of civil society.

Second, the model shares considerable overlap in the conceptualization of EU impact with most of the literature in the Europeanization field that contrasts logic of actions- logic of consequentialism and logic of appropriateness.

The compulsory pathway is based on a rationalist bargaining model. As emphasized by rationalist institutionalism, it follows a “logic of consequentialism” in

which actors engage in rational strategic action based on the costs and benefits analysis calculations and choose the action that maximizes their utility and minimizes their costs, thus, calculating the consequences of their actions. Here, a pattern of action is explained by reference to goal-seeking behavior. In this case, the EU sets the rules as conditions that civil society actors have to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the EU.⁶ In this context, Europeanization is perceived as an “emerging political opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals” (Börzel and Risse 2003: 63). Accession conditionality is the principle mechanism in which the EU exerts influence on applicant countries on the basis of the implementation of the acquis in order to gain access to the EU’s opportunities (Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier 2005). From this perspective, the EU has provided a political opportunity structure to civil society actors through accession conditionality and changed legal environment and financial resources (Börzel and Buzogány 2010b: 161). On the one hand, in the enlargement process, accession conditionality and implementation of EU policies offered opportunities to civil society to strengthen their positions and participate in policy making. On the other hand, financial assistance programs provided access to additional resources for civil society actors.

The enabling pathway emanates when specific civil society actors link their political agendas to the EU and justify and legitimize their actions and decisions with reference to the EU. The EU has functioned as a “legitimization device”,

“legitimizing usage” (Jacquot and Woll 2003) and becomes a reference point in domestic political debates to justify policies, decisions and actions. For instance, Risse et al. (1999) have shown that human rights groups are often marginalized and treated as traitors. In such cases, civil society actors can use a normative EU framework to substantiate their positions and arguments. As Jacquot and Woll explain, in this way legitimization is used “to increase and renew the public acceptance of a policy decision at the national level” (2003: 7). In this framework, civil society actors justify their decisions through European symbolism and with reference to EU norms. For instance, Ian Manners (2002:242) argues that there are five main norms of the EU: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.

Civil society actors can refer to these norms and promote them as legitimate behaviors

6 The external incentive model is mainly promoted by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir (2005) and shows that the EU has the potential to empower non-state actors during the enlargement process.

at the domestic level, which in turn enable civil society actors to advance and legitimize their political agendas. Therefore, identification with Europe generates support and legitimization. However, the enabling pathway of the EU impact depends on the political commitment of the government to fulfill EU conditionality and the prominence of issues on the EU-Turkey agenda (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015: 139).

The connective pathway promotes contact between civil society actors chiefly through common activities. It is expected that support and contact through the context of common projects may lead to “broader societal effect in the form of social networks” (Diez et al. 2008:28) across civil society actors in the long term. In the case of civil society, it is possible to observe connective impact at three levels both through the accession process and civil society programs. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, the EU’s civil society policy promotes interaction between actors through the partnership principle. First, the EU pre-accession process facilitates interaction between the state and civil society. In line its understanding, civil society is seen as partners rather than rivals in decision-making processes. The cooperation between the state and society is also pre-requisites in EU-funded projects. Second, both the EU process and EU programs support interaction between civil society actors. Strong civil society is seen as an essential component of the enlargement process. Third, the EU encourages transnational relations with the European counterparts to trigger learning in civil society. Participation in Euro-umbrella networks and partnership are two key instruments of the connective impact.

Although these categories of the EU pathways have been adapted to civil society and provide a good fit, at the same time adaptation involves some problems.

At the theoretical level, there are different analytical categories of the EU impact. Yet, at the empirical level, pathways and outcomes of the EU impact could lead to ambiguous outcomes.

In the original framework, Barnett and Duvall have described compulsory power as “the direct control of one actor of the conditions and actions of another”

(2005: 51). Therefore, compulsion exists through direct control, domination and force. In the case of civil society, there is no such force. The EU cannot directly force and control conditions and actions of civil society. For that reason, compulsory impact is never complete because civil society can reject EU conditions and actions.

So, how does compulsion work in civil society? The compulsory impact has occurred through the acquis communautaire and the financial incentives. The compulsion takes

place in the accession process by pressuring the state to comply with EU legislation.

The EU, in this way, has pointed out constitutional, legal reforms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Of course, this does not have a direct impact on civil society but by pressuring the Turkish state, the EU has indirectly shaped the functioning of civil society in Turkey. This has created an opportunity for these organizations, and enables them to follow and prioritize their agendas. Therefore, civil society actors were not forced directly by the EU, but the EU empowers and enables these actors by forcing the Turkish government. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will show how this is the case in different issue areas by focusing on concrete examples from the different fields.

Another way that the EU performs compulsory impact is through funding. At the empirical level, the relationship between funding and categories of the EU impact is extremely complicated, and compulsory impact could lead to interrelated but different outcomes. In a way, funding itself is compulsory where it is established through concrete conditions. Nevertheless, the outcome of funding could belong to other categories of the EU impact- compulsory, enabling and connective. For example, one illustration of the compulsory impact is the calls for proposals in the EU projects. In these projects, the EU explicitly spells out conditions for funding for civil society actors. The EU prioritizes certain issue areas according to its policy fields.

However, the provision of funding is only compulsory when the EU forces civil society actors to undertake projects according to its priority area rather than their original expertise. This is compulsion because civil society actors are forced to adapt their issue areas according to EU priorities, and there is a strategic move as a logic of behavior to get funding. In other cases, some civil society actors use the “window of opportunity” that the EU provides. In this case, their expertise or agenda fits perfectly with the EU priorities, and they just use this opportunity to promote their agendas and policies, demonstrating the enabling impact. Finally, the EU also provides civil society actors incentives to follow EU rules. For instance, in the EU projects the provision of funding involves a transnational incentive. Thus, the outcome of the funding is connective.

Although rationalist and sociological institutionalism is central to comprehend the pathways of the EU impact and how the EU influences civil society, both approaches neglect the importance of history in understanding Europeanization outcomes. Disregarding history in the analysis presents problems. The rational choice orientation stresses the significance of political opportunities provided by the EU. EU

channels funds to civil society to build and develop the capacities of these organizations. As discussed in section 2.1.2. in detail, several studies show that despite the opportunities provided by the EU, civil society in CEE has lacked capacities; Europeanization has chiefly empowered organizations with sufficient capacities, including the governance capacities. Yet, if the EU does not take into account historical factors and traditions in a country, EU funds by itself do not necessarily empower civil society organizations. For example, transferring funds to Turkish civil society is an important resource for Turkish civil society, but has not created the intended objectives. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, traditionally receiving funding from international institutions and foreign countries has been seen as “interference into internal affairs” and “betrayal to one’s country”. For instance, Chapter 7 further shows that, for a long time, EU demands on human rights have not been seen from the human rights perspective and human rights organizations have been regarded as “traitors”. Therefore, the EU influence does not occur independent from the historical context.

Sociological institutionalists emphasize the construction and diffusion of ideas and socialization brought by the EU processes. Learning is a key instrument of sociological institutionalism. Several EU programs have made cooperation between civil society actors a condition for civil society funding. Moreover, the EU has introduced various mechanisms in these programs to trigger learning between actors.

One example is the cooperation between domestic civil societies and activities that support cooperation. However, if there is no tradition of cooperation between civil society actors, learning and socialization is limited. Civil society actors learn in light of their former experiences. In Chapter 4, I show that an inherited characteristic of Turkish civil society is lack of cooperation and division between civil society actors.

Empirical Chapters-Chapters 5, 6, and 7- show that cooperation between civil society actors varies depending on the issue area. Civil society actors, which have a stronger tradition of cooperation, are more likely to cooperate. The following section will situate the historical dimension into the broader literature.