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Party Images in East and West Germany: Salience, Similarities, and Diffe rences

In the following analysis we use this material to describe similarities and dissimilarities of the parties' images in East and West Germany8.

8 West German results are presented by Klingemann 1986; 1983.

Partisan Orientation in a 'New'Democracy 23

To this end we will first comment on the different saliency of political parties. Here we look at figures which show the proportion of East and West Germans which have answered the like/dislike questions.

Second, we present a systematic comparison of size of publics using major types of image elements and the positive or negative evaluation of the parties which results from its use9. This is of descriptive value. In addition, we try to relate the differences found to the three competing learning models. Large differences in usage of types of major image ele­

ments would be compatible with either a "direct-exposure long-term learning" or a "current events" explanation. While the first option is self-explanatory, the second alternative would apply when a current event is of much higher concern to the East Germans. Whether or not this is the case will be decided by informed speculation. Large differences, however, would hardly be in line with the "indirect-exposure long-term learning" model. Small dif­

ferences, in turn, could be explained by the latter model, and, as above, by the "current events" model. Again, the first option is obvious. The second applies when a current event hits both parts of the country and affects a party's image similarly.

To decide between the two possibilities, we thirdly have a quick look at changing sali­

ency of major image elements in West Germany between 1987 and 1990. If size of image element publics change drastically between the two points in time we consider this an indi­

cation of "current events".

Combining results from the second and third step we shall then come up with a rough classification of major types of image elements.

A comparison of the proportion of citizens who had nothing to say about the parties will provide an initial estimate the degree of differences we might expect between East and West Germans. These data are displayed in Table 3. In West Germany the like/dislikes questions were first asked in 1969. At that time about one out of five respondents had nothing to say - positive or negative - about the CDU/CSU or the SPD. The proportion was even higher for the FDP (28% when first asked in 1972). Since then, the percentage of West Germans which had nothing to say about the political parties has fallen steadily. In 1987 the proportion hovered around 5 percent for CDU/CSU, SPD, and the Greens. It was 12 per cent for the Liberals. Thus, although it took some time, at the end of the eighties

9 We have done some economizing in the presentation of the evaluation dimension. We need a simple in­

dicator for the direction of the evaluative component of a particular type of image element used by the respective public. To derive it we subtract the number of negative image elements from the number of positive image elements. In our analysis we only use the figure which gives the proportion of re­

spondents who on balance express a positive evaluation of the party. Thus, we neglect the feet that a low (high) positive value must not necessarily mean a high (low) negative value because of the third logical possibility that different respondents might evaluate the same type of image element differently. Our subtraction may not only yield a positive or negative sum but it may also indicate that there had been an equal number of positive and negative image elements. The logic of comparison and reasoning will be the same as laid out above.

virtually all West Germans had something to say about the major political parties (Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992:138-142). By 1990 the West German figures had not changed much. It seems as if, since 1983, a level has been reached which can hardly be expected to go down any further. If we take the West German finding as our point of refe­

rence, the proportion of East Germans who have nothing to say about the political parties is about twice the West German value for the SPD, FDP and the Greens. In case of the CDU the difference is smaller, but still 25 percent higher than in the West.

Table 3: The Comparative Salience of Political Parties. Proportion of the Electorate With Nothing to Say About the Political Parties.

East Germany

N 959 1476 1953 1197 1519 2076 1588 939

Thus, we do find a systematic difference between East and West Germans. More West Germans than East Germans have formed images about the major parties. This result sup­

ports the "long-term learning" model. But how do we rate the magnitude of the difference?

The difference is certainly not small. However, the East German figures of 1990 corre­

spond to West German figures of the seventies. One could say that the development of party images in East Germany is lagging about 12 to 20 years behind the current West German situation - but not longer. The proportion of West Germans who had nothing to say about the CDU or the SPD in 1969 was much larger than the proportion measured in 1990 for East Germans. This makes the lag look medium-sized and probably speaks for the effect of indirect exposure.

Next, we will compare similarities and differences of East and West Germans with respect to the familiarity of image elements and the image elements' evaluative direction.

Partisan Orientation in a 'New'Democracy 25

Thus, we ask how many citizens mention a particular characteristic of a party and how that party is evaluated by the argument encapsulated in the image element. To make the task manageable we concentrate on those image elements which are mentioned by at least 10 percent of the respondents10. This reduces the burden of description although it still leaves us with a complex task.

Which are the image elements in East and West Germany which meet the 10 percent criterion? Table 4 presents an overview of the major characteristics people associate with the four parties we can compare.

This initial comparison shows a great deal of similarity. East and West Germans are in complete agreement about the major image elements which characterize SPD and CDU.

There is less agreement with respect to FDP and the Greens. In case of the Greens

"economic policy" qualifies as a major image element in the East but not in the West, and it is the other way around for "categoric evaluation". The differences are largest for the FDP. East Germans associate a much greater number of major image elements with this party than West Germans. In general, however, the overall picture is one of similarity, not difference.

We have choosen party images of West Germans as our point of reference. If we sum­

marize results of our earlier surveys which we have conducted since 1969 in West Ger­

many we can list a small number of relatively stable major image elements which are cha­

racteristic for these parties (Klingemann 1983; 1986).

On the image components related to policies and social groups, the SPD is seen as competent in "social policy", as representing the "lower class" and as not too fit for

"economic policy". In addition, the SPD is perceived to have a positive record in the area of the pre 1989 "Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik". For the CDU it is the other way around. Its turf is "economic policy" whereas its competence for "social policy" is rated low and its af­

finity to the "upper class" is not appreciated. In the long run, "Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik"

does not meet the 10 percent criterion (average size of public 8%; evaluation 46% posi­

tive). The FDP is seen as "liberal" and its record in "foreign policy" is regarded positive.

As for the CDU its close connection to the "upper class" is negatively evaluated.

"Environmental policy" is the positive trade mark of the Greens. Their "economic policy"

has received mixed evaluation.

10 This criterion is nothing but a pragmatic decision about a plausible cutting-point. A complete documen­

tation of all data can be obtained from the authors.

Table 4: Major Image-Element-Publics. Types of Image Elements Which Were Used by at Least 10 Percent of the Respondents, 1990

Type of Image Element SPD CDU FDP Greens

Policies and Social Groups

Liberal E

Economic policy E/W E/W E

Social policy E/W E/W

Environmental policy E/W

Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik E/W E/W

Foreign policy, other W

Lower class E/W

Middle class E

Upper class E/W W

Political Actors

Efficiency E/W E/W E/W E/W

Morality E/W E/W E/W E/W

Coalition behavior E/W

Party program E/W E E/W

Party organization E/W E/W E E/W

Politicians E/W E/W E/W

Categoric evaluation E/W E/W W W

Nonpolitical evaluation E/W

E = East Germany, W = West Germany

"Politicians" and "efficiency" are the major actor-related characteristics for SPD and CDU. Evaluations differ. While "efficiency" is more attributed to the CDU, SPD-politi- cians have on the average been perceived somewhat more positive than CDU-politicians.

Outstanding characteristics of the FDP are "coalition behavior", "morality" and

"politicians". This corresponds to political reality. In the past the FDP's coalition prefe­

rence has decided more than once which of the two big parties was able to govern. Most other voters don't like this situation where the tail waggles the dog. They react with a

mo-Partisan Orientation in a New'Democracy 27

ral undertone. Thus, if the FDP is evaluated in terms of "coalition behavior" or "morality"

the evaluation is largely negative. "Efficiency", "party program", "party organization" and

"morality" are major actor-related image elements of the Greens. The state of the party or­

ganization in particular has never been a source of positive evaluation. But what now are the differences between East and West Germany?

A detailed analysis for the four parties (tables not shown) finds that similarities in the display of types of image elements prevail. This is true, although less so, also for the eva­

luative dimension. Subsequently we point to types of image elements with large dif­

ferences to find out whether a "direct-exposure long-term learning" explanation or a

"current events" interpretation has more plausibility.

How many instances of "large" differences between East and West did we find11? The FDP's image is the most dissimilar among the four parties under consideration. 5 of 11 major types of image elements greatly differ in usage between East and West.

On the other hand we have encountered a great deal of similarity regarding the images of the remaining three parties. Table 5 shows the major types of image elements which display large differences according to our operational definition. Only 1 of 10 image ele­

ments meet the criterion for a large difference in case of the SPD. For the CDU the relation was 2 of 9; for the Greens 2 of 8. Thus, differences there are, but they are small most of the time. On the one hand the result is supportive of the "indirect-exposure long-term learning"

model. It may mean that East Germans have learned from friends and relatives or the mass media about the major characteristics of West German political parties. On the other hand, differences may be small but still compatible with a "current events" model. This would be the case if an event is perceived as equally relevant to a particular party's image in both parts of the country. To tell the two possible models apart we need an outside criterion.

Later on, we shall argue that image elements which show a large difference in saliency bet­

ween 1987 and 1990 in West Germany may be candidates for a "current events" interpre­

tation.

Is there a systematic pattern to dissimilarities? Table 5 lists all types of major image elements which qualify for the large difference category.

If there is a systematic pattern it is the greater concern of East Germans with party-rela­

ted characteristics. People are talking about the newly founded SPD's promising (or disap­

pointing) program and about the West German CDUs and FDP's potential problems and prospects related to these parties' decision to fuse with the old GDR block parties. In this

11 As a guideline to operationalize a "large difference, we decided to use an index by dividing the percen­

tage of the East German answers and the percentage of the West German answers in the respective cate­

gory and multiplying this ratio by 100. All differences below the 50 or above the 150 ratio mark are re­

garded as "large". The 50 x criterion, too, rests on a pragmatic decision and does not pretend to have any other quality.

case we tend to prefer the "current events" model for an explanation. After all, these issues were a direct consequence of the unification situation. One could also try to argue for the

"direct-exposure long-term learning" model. In this case we would have to stress the long­

term direct experience with the old block parties. We would not deny that this is an im­

portant ingredient. However, on balance we conclude that the issue could only arise in the unification situation. A similar argument may apply to the much higher use of "efficiency"

as a characteristic of the CDU. After all, a CDU-lead government had just demonstrated efficiency in bringing about unification.

Table 5: Major Differences Between East and West Germany Regarding Type of Image Elements

Type of Image Element SPD CDU FDP Greens

Image Elements Related to

Cell entries are image elements which differed by 50 percent or more between East and West Germany. In­

dex values in parentheses.

Major differences in policies/social groups image elements only occur in the FDP's and the Green party's image. These differences are harder to explain than actor-related differences.

The FDP is a challenge. For the Greens we have no convincing explanation.

The FDP is associated with "upper class" in West Germany and "middle class" in East Germany. "Upper class" is coded when entrepreneurs, the rich, those with money etc. are

Partisan Orientation in a New'Democracy 29

mentioned. This species was relatively absent in the former GDR. Here "upper class" was much more defined in terms of the ruling class, the nomenclatura. Thus, the term "middle class", which refers to artisans, shopkeepers, small independent farmers and related groups, may serve as a functional equivalent for "upper class" in the East German context to describe a group of higher economic status. Economically defined class relations as they exist in West German society have not been part of the direct experience of East Germans.

Thus, we are prepared to explain the difference in terms of the "direct-exposure long-term learning" model. The more pronounced position of "foreign policy" in the FDP's image in West Germany may be due to the fact that East Germans associate foreign policy decisions more with the party of the chancellor and not with the FDP. West Germans, however, have experienced that the Free Democrats virtually "owned" the foreign policy domain since 1969. This would speak for the "direct experience long-term learning" model. If it comes to the Greens we have no convincing explanation why "economic policy" is of greater im- portance in East than in West Germany. In both parts of the country Greens normally try to discuss economic policies in terms of environmentalism. We speculate that the East Ger­

man experience of economic policies which did take into account considerations of envi­

ronmental protection much less than in West Germany may have caused this difference. If this has some plausibility we would classify the deviation as a hybrid caused by "direct" as well as by "indirect" long-term learning. Because we think that direct exposure is the more important criterion, we classify the instance accordingly. Last not least, categoric evalua­

tion is much more frequent in West Germany. Here, too, we need bold speculation to ex­

plain the difference. Considering the fact that in East Germany what we call the Greens (Alliance 90/The Greens) are broadly associated with the political forces which brought down the old communist regime it may be that categoric evaluations were that much more positive. Here, too, we have a borderline case between the "direct-exposure long-term le­

arning" model and the "current events" model. In this instance our scale tips in favor of the

"direct-exposure long-term learning" model.

Summarizing major differences of the evaluative aspect of image elements between East and West Germany we find a situation which is much less similar (Table 6). For CDU, FDP, and the Greens about half of their major image elements are evaluated differently by East and West Germans. Only for the SPD there are no large differences between East and West Germans at all. They agree on the evaluation of the SPD's image elements.

There is a common pattern to this finding. In all cases are the large differences due to the fact that East Germans, relative to West Germans, had a more positive view of these image elements. This is in line with the general support pattern of the parties in East and West Germany in the 1990 election. There are plausible reasons to assume that the evaluation of image elements may be more different than their distribution. One explanation could be

that while types of image elements are the same in East and West Germany they are eva­

luated differently because of differences of interests in the two parts of the country.

Table 6: Major Differences Between East and West Germany Regarding Evaluation of Image Elements

Type of Image Element SPD CDU FDP Greens

Image Elements Related to

Cell entries are image elements which differed by 50 percent or more between East and West Germany. In­

dex values in parentheses.

For the record, we now summarize our "best" judgement regarding "large" differences in types of image elements with special emphasis on East Germany. The preferred model is given in paranthesis.

SPD: "party program" (current events).

CDU: "party organization", "efficiency" (current events).

FDP: "party organization", "party program" (current events), "foreign policy",

"upper class", "middle class" (direct-exposure long-term learning).

Greens: "economic policy", "categoric evaluation" (direct-exposure long-term le­

arning).

Partisan Orientation in a 'New'Democracy 31

Arguments for this classification seem plausible to us. For all other image elements with large differences we need additional information to make classification possible and mea­

ningful.

We shall try to provide this information by considering stability and change of the major types of image elements in West Germany between 1987 and 1990. If the difference is large we argue for a "current events" explanation.

7. "Current Events". The Changing Saliency of Image Elements in West Ger­

many, 1987-1990

Similarity between party images of East and West Germans can be explained by the

"current events" model or the "long-term learning" model, be it direct or indirect. A com­

parison of the 1987 and 1990 West German figures should help us to sort out image ele­

ments which have undergone rapid change and become more prominent in 1990. Such image elements are our candidates for a "current events" explanation. In operational terms we will stick to our definition of "large" difference. Thus, we select image elements when

ments which have undergone rapid change and become more prominent in 1990. Such image elements are our candidates for a "current events" explanation. In operational terms we will stick to our definition of "large" difference. Thus, we select image elements when