Any new approach by the EU to foster trilateral cooperation with China and Africa on addressing climate change should build on insights and lessons learnt from the EU’s previous attempt on trilateral development cooperation in 2008, as discussed in Section 2.
First and foremost, trilateral cooperation must be guided by Africa’s policy priorities, as analysed in Section 4. Although adaptation is, and will remain, the top priority for African countries as far as climate action is concerned, it is recommended to start trilateral cooperation in another priority area identified in Section 4, namely renewable energy.
From the seven identified priority areas, renewable energy seems to be one of the most suitable areas for initiating trilateral cooperation, given that it represents a low-hanging fruit and can quickly lead to tangible benefits for African countries, such as facilitated access to affordable electricity through the proliferation of renewable energy technologies.
This would help build trust and a spirit of partnership, which were not present during the EU’s first attempt at trilateral cooperation. Once the atmosphere becomes more conducive for trilateral cooperation via the demonstration of a new inclusive and transparent approach and immediate tangible benefits, more complex projects on adaptation could be launched.
Furthermore, renewable energy is an area in which each partner of the EU-China-Africa triangle has extensive previous experience regarding cooperation with the other two.
Already in 2008, the EU identified renewable energy as an area in which trilateral cooperation could “enhance local capacity” to “maximize sustainable investment and development outcomes” and proposed to initiate
joint work with the African Union Commission (AUC) and China, for capacity building purposes, on climate change and renewable energy, possibly including technology transfer and increased capacity for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) investment, also under a post-2012 global climate change agreement. (EC, 2008, p. 6)
The EU invited its member states as well as African and Chinese partners to “consider and support” this proposal and to “enter into specific agreements between agencies, institutions and associations to facilitate results-oriented joint initiatives” (EC, 2008, p. 8).
In addition, at the AU level, African countries’ have emphasised renewable energy as an important area for the continent’s development in the African Unions’ Agenda 2063 (AUC [Africa Union Commission], 2015a, p. 16) and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023) (AUC, 2015b, pp. 57, 63, 67) as well as through the AU’s recent endorsement of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI).20 African, Chinese and
20 AREI is significant, as it is the first continent-wide “Africa-owned and Africa-led inclusive effort to accelerate and scale up the harnessing of the continent’s huge renewable energy potential”. AREI aims to coordinate existing renewable energy initiatives, achieve at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020 and 300 GW by 2030, and establish a pan-African renewable energy institution for research and training.
European experts interviewed in the context of the preparation of this paper all highlighted renewable energy as a suitable starting point for an EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation (Interview CRES, 2016; Interview Ethiopia, 2016; Interview Finland, 2016; Interview Ghana, 2016; Interview Mali, 2016; Interview NCSC, 2016; Interview United Kingdom, 2016). Furthermore, a number of other recent developments would support a trilateral initiative in this area.
The EU and China have established various strategic energy cooperation mechanisms, which include cooperation on renewable energy. Currently, the EU-China Energy Dialogue, the EU-China High-Level Energy Meeting and the Partnership on Urbanization constitute the three main institutional mechanisms around which the cooperation is articulated (EC2 [Europe-China Clean Energy Centre], 2015, p. 2). The EU-China Energy Dialogue was established in 1994, constituting one of the oldest sector dialogues between the EU and China. The dialogue is carried out via two mechanisms: the EU-China Energy Conference and the EU-China High-Level Working Group on Energy. In 2009, the European Commission (EC) and China established the China-EU Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy to provide postgraduate education and vocational training in the fields of solar, wind, bio and geothermal energy and to facilitate the development and applications of renewable energy technologies.21 In 2010, the two sides established the Europe-China Clean Energy Centre (EC2) with the objectives to promote the increased use of renewable energy sources in China and to support China’s efforts to shape a more sustainable, environmentally friendly and efficient energy sector through technology cooperation, institutional advisory services, capacity-building and information dissemination (Europe-China Clean Energy Centre, 2015, pp. 13-14). Furthermore, the EU and China agreed on the EU-China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation in June 2016, which, inter alia, aims at strengthening cooperation on promoting the use of renewable energy (EC, 2016c, pp. 2, 7-8).
The EU has also extensive experience in cooperating with African countries in the area of renewable energy. In 2007, the EU and the AU jointly launched the Africa-EU Energy Partnership,22 which, inter alia, aims to expand the use of renewable energy in Africa. In 2015, 35 African and European ministers and commissioners launched the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) to catalyse the development of African renewable energy markets. RECP is comprised of four action areas: policy advisory, private-sector cooperation, access to finance and innovation, and skills development (Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme, 2016). The EC has also set up the Electrification Financing Initiative23 as a financing mechanism to support market development and private-sector initiatives in the area of renewable energy technologies in African countries. Furthermore, the EC and EU member states have already pledged support for AREI, and the EC recently announced its intention to sign a joint declaration with AREI on renewable energy in Africa as well as specific declarations to cooperate with Mozambique and Zambia on the implementation of AREI (EC, 2016b).
The draft EU-AREI joint declaration states that the EU “will mobilise support to facilitate investments that will increase the generation capacity of at least 5 GW” by 2020 (Council of the European Union, 2016b, p. 5).
21 See http://icare.hust.edu.cn/EN
22 See http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en 23 See http://www.electrifi.org
As we have seen in Section 3, China has considerable experience in working with African countries on the proliferation of renewable energy technologies as a means to addressing climate change. Under the “FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)”, China pledged to support African countries to implement renewable energy projects and to encourage and support the participation of Chinese businesses in the investment, construction and operation of power projects in Africa through expanded cooperation on solar energy, wind power, bioenergy, power transmission and transformation, and grid construction and maintenance. China and African countries agreed to “establish a training programme for the capacitation of African energy practitioners through research and development exchanges” (FOCAC, 2015b). Furthermore, China committed to advance cooperation on the development and utilisation of renewable energy sources with African countries under the Belt and Road Initiative (NDRC, 2015a) and the G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialization in Africa and Least Developed Countries. The China Renewable Energy Society, which is affiliated with China’s State Council, is preparing to sign a cooperation agreement with AREI at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Interview CRES, 2016).
Hence, a timely and concrete action to start trilateral cooperation on addressing climate change could be for the EU to support the implementation of AREI jointly with China.
Such a cooperation could take place at the regional or national level and offer direct support for increasing installed renewable energy capacity and/or contribute to the establishment of the Africa Renewable Energy Institute planned under AREI (2016, p. 18).
A potential modality of trilateral cooperation on the implementation of AREI is used here as an example and should be seen as one of many possible starting points for cooperation.
At the regional level, a trilateral cooperation pilot project could involve the EU through RECP, China through the NDRC’s Department of Climate Change, and African countries through AREI’s newly established Independent Delivery Unit. However, given the institutional constraints of RECP as a multi-donor programme, it may be more practical to explore possibilities for a trilateral cooperation pilot project from the EU side through one of its member states. Germany may be an ideal candidate for such a project, given its recognition of trilateral cooperation as an important instrument for development cooperation, its strong commitment to AREI,24 its extensive experience supporting climate action in China and in African countries in the area of renewable energy – for example through the German-Chinese Energy Partnership25 and the South African-German Energy Programme (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, s.a.) – and its global leadership in renewable energy policy and technologies. In addition, Germany could utilise its unique position as a founding member of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED),26 a high-level
24 Under the German G7 Presidency in 2015, the G7 pledged to “accelerate access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries, including through alignment with the proposed Africa Renewable Energy Initiative”. The G7, Sweden and the Netherlands further pledged USD 10 billion in grants and loans to support AREI, of which Germany pledged the largest contribution of USD 3 billion until 2020 (Federal Government of Germany, 2016, pp. 33, 36).
25 See https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/32698.html
26 Since its establishment in 1992, CCICED has been receiving support from the German government. The EU has also supported CCICED since 2008. Germany’s Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, Barbara Hendricks, currently holds the position of CCICED Vice Chairperson.
advisory body to the Chinese government, to initiate a dialogue on trilateral cooperation under CCICED’s recently launched Task Force of South-South Cooperation (China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 2016) together with African partners. Furthermore, such trilateral cooperation would be an opportunity for Germany to demonstrate jointly with China – as the incoming and outgoing G20 Presidencies – the G20’s commitment to promoting the use of renewable energy in Africa made at the G20 Summit in 2016 (G20 Research Group, 2016).
If a pilot project is to focus on supporting AREI’s objective of achieving at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020, an AU member state should be identified for partnering on such a project. Zambia may be interested in exploring such cooperation, given its intention to sign a declaration with the EU on working together on AREI’s implementation. Furthermore, Zambia can offer valuable experience on trilateral cooperation on renewable energy technology transfer gained through the ongoing project with China and UNDP, described in Section 3.2.2. Through this project, Zambia has also established effective working-level relations with China, which would be an additional advantage for a swift set-up of a pilot project. For the success of such a project, it would be key to ensure that the three partners jointly go through all stages of project development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and build on their respective comparative advantages. Trilateral cooperation can only be successful if all three partners reached a common understanding of cooperation that creates a basis for joint action despite potential differences in their concepts of development (Langendorf et al., 2012, p. 28).
Alternatively, a pilot project could focus on supporting AREI on enhancing domestic renewable energy technology manufacturing, assembly, deployment and operations capacity (AREI, 2016, p. 17), or on establishing the Africa Renewable Energy Institute, which is to serve as AREI’s backbone for research and training (AREI, 2016, p. 18). For the latter, the EU and China could build on the experiences from the establishment and operation of the China-EU Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy in China and engage the institute and its network.
7 Recommendations
A report on the aggregate effect of INDCs published by the UNFCCC Secretariat in May 2016 finds that although the implementation of INDCs will deliver sizeable emission reductions, global aggregate emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the implementation of the INDCs will not fall within the scope of 2°C scenarios27 and therefore fail to achieve the objective of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016). It is therefore necessary to urgently identify ways that enable greater ambition of all countries and to prepare for the climatic consequences of potentially not reaching this objective.
27 Under the Paris Agreement, countries have agreed to make contributions to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. These temperature levels were determined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which provides the scientific basis for the UNFCCC process, as meeting the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective of stabilising GHG concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Trilateral cooperation may be a valuable additional means that can complement existing cooperation between developed and developing as well as among developing countries in this context. To achieve this through an EU-China-Africa trilateralism, the following recommendations are offered.
7.1 Build on insights from the EU’s previous initiative on trilateral cooperation with China and Africa
Ensure that all partners are equally engaged from the outset: The EU’s expression of interest towards China to cooperate with China in Africa on addressing climate change should be followed by a similar proposal to the AU to consider the establishment of trilateral cooperation with China in this area.
Develop a trilateral cooperation pilot project based on the priorities of African countries: Although African countries’ (I)NDCs are a useful starting point for selecting a thematic area for cooperation, the AU should be engaged in this discussion to learn from their perspectives about which areas a trilateral approach may be most useful and could best build on the respective comparative advantages of the EU and China as development partners.
7.2 Establish a pilot project in support of the AU’s Africa Renewable Energy Initiative
Support the initiative’s goal of achieving at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020: Build on existing cooperation mechanisms, institutions and experiences between the EU, EU member states, China, the AU and AU member states in the area of renewable energy to identify suitable project partners from each side of the trilateral partnership. Make use of the recent commitments to support the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative by the EU and its member states as well as by China. Develop a trilateral cooperation pilot project at the national level between the initiative, an EU member state and China to ease administrative burdens. Consider a German-China-Zambia pilot project, given the conducive preconditions for such a cooperation outlined in Section 5.
Support the establishment of the Africa Renewable Energy Institute: Establish a partnership between the China-EU Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy and AREI’s Independent Delivery Unit to share experiences and lessons learnt from the establishment and operation of the joint China-EU institute.
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