Neutrality and Finlandisation

Finnish security thinking cannot be separated from the presence of its big neighbour Russia, since the two countries share a border of more than 1300km. Even though some roots in this relationship can be traced back to the era of the Russian Empire, the contemporary security dynamics are most meaningful when departing from the aftermath of the Second World War. As known from history, Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union, and after a loss in the Continuation War, it lost over 10% of its territory, it had to agree with the Soviet naval base in Porkkala and was forced to carry a heavy burden in war indemnities (Tiilikainen, 2006, p. 76). In addition, Finland was later on in a

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position where it was forced to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA¹) with the Soviet Union in 1948 (Forsberg, 2018, p. 3).

This treaty asserted Finland’s commitment to neutrality, assured to deter any attempt to use Finnish soil to attach the Soviet Union by foreign states, and included the possibility to ask military aid from the Soviet Union if needed to fulfil the treaty (Forsberg, 2018, p.

3). Even though the treaty can be regarded as vague in its wording and it did not enforce any major commitments to its parties, this treaty is seen as a symbolic indication of the Finnish will to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union in exchange for keeping its sovereignty (Rusi, 2016, pp. 33-35). Hence, good relations with the Soviet Union were something that the political elite needed to reckon with. The leaders and the nation absorbed these principles, and this Finnish political practice has been labelled as Finlandisation.

Finlandisation, also known as the Kekkonen-Paasikivi line², describes the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, where the latter made Finland to abide by its preferred foreign policy track, while enabling Finland to stick to formal sovereignty. In order to please Moscow, Finland had to conduct its foreign and security politics in a way which would, first of all, be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and secondly, would not leave any suspicion that the Finnish soil could be used in attacking the Soviet Union (Forsberg

& Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 85). Hence, the Kekkonen-Paasikivi line was based on the assumption that Finland should avoid substantial integration with the West, and even more firmly preclude itself from the West’s military alliances such as NATO.

In addition, thanks to the arrangements with the Soviet Union, Finland did not criticise the Soviet Union, even during the events in Hungary (1956) and Prague (1968) (Forsberg, 2018, p. 4). However, the same policy worked the other way around too, meaning that Finland refrained from condemning the United States (US) for its invasion in Vietnam, thereby attempting to truly hold a balance on its neutrality policy (Forsberg &

Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 70). Taken together, Finlandisation meant that Finland was firmly attached to the concept of neutrality which was absorbed into the Finnish security thinking. The core of the Finlandisation implied that Finland was not free in its decisions,

1 In Finnish widely as known the YYA treaty.

2 Named after the presidents who were firm followers of certain principles labelled as Finlandisation.

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and self-censorship had to be adopted to adjust to the geopolitical circumstances of Cold War Europe.

When it comes to the impact of Finlandisation on Finnish politics, Rusi (2016) claims that Kekkonen-Paasikivi doctrine has had a serious effect on the Finnish foreign and security politics throughout the second half of the 20th century, and its traces are still visible in the Finnish politics (Rusi, 2016. pp. 89-90). Rusi argues that Finlandisation is sometimes seen in an unjustified positive light by some political actors in Finland,

“Finlandisation has been turned into a success story, which can be used to preserve and protect the national self-esteem, but it cannot be made without embellishing the truth or even distorting it.”³ (Rusi, 2016, p. 14). Rusi believes that because Finlandisation is portrayed as a success, especially by the Finnish left, the constructed reality of the past distorts the reality of today (Rusi, 2016, p. 14).

The advocates of the Kekkonen-Paasikivi doctrine, on the other hand, stress that Finland managed to hold distance from the Soviet Union thanks to neutrality and thereby maintained its independence (Tiilikainen, 2006, p. 76). More interestingly, it can be said that Finlandisation as such was accepted among the Finns even on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1988, 80% of the population supported the FCMA Treaty, suggesting that good relations the Soviet Union were important to the Finnish people (Forsberg, 2018, p. 4). This indicates that historical facts are not always the decisive factors. Rather, it is how constructed historical lessons determine the past and are thereby absorbed into the people's collective memory (Forsberg, 2018). For this reason, many Finns might see the policy of neutrality as something positive.

Simultaneously, by the process of Finlandisation, neutrality became part of the Finnish identity and was seen as a guarantee of Finnish sovereignty.

Strong self-defence capabilities are yet another part of the Finnish security-related identity. In this regard, the main task is to protect the neutrality and the national borders of Finland by building up credible self-defence structures (Pajunen, 1968, p. 85). The centrality of this argument stems from the experience of the Second World War. Even

3 “Suomettuminen on käännetty menestystarinaksi, jolla voidaan hoitaa kansallista itsetuntoa, mutta se ei onnistu ilman totuuden kaunistelua tai jopa vääristelyä.” (Rusi, 2016. p. 14). Translated from Finnish by the author.

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though Finland did not receive any significant support from the West, Finland was the only country that lost the war but was not occupied by other state(s), which is today attributed to the preparedness and strong will of the Finnish military (Pajunen, 1968, p.

85). Therefore, the ability to protect its soil is central to the Finnish identity, and the country has had a conscription throughout the Cold War and even today (Pajunen, 1968, p. 86).

Also, in contrast to Sweden, Finland maintained its military capabilities even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when it was widely believed that peace and an end to the political division have arrived to stay in Europe. Strong will to be prepared to defend the country even today is reflected by the fact that more than 70% of the population supports the current conscription arrangements, and 80% of the population are ready to defend the country in a conflict (Järvenpää, 2016, p. 6) Thus, there is a consensus in the Finnish society that the country must be prepared to defend itself on its own in a crisis.