This context relates to associated fields like translation, (risk) communication and public understanding of science (Rudiak-Gould 2012). One of the shortcomings in past research on science communication has been identified as the expert/lay dichotomy that distinguishes between two groups believed to be homogeneous, i.e., “scientists”, as the discourse producers, and “the public”, as the discourse recipients (Thompson and Rayner 1998). The underlying assumption of this dichotomy, “that it is possible to separate what the risks really are from what the public erroneously believe them to be” (Thompson and Rayner 1998: 165), not only simplifies the complex discourse and ignores the heterogeneity of those that constitute it. It has also led to incorrect conclusions in social scientific research, public information campaigns, and policy-making. With reference to the pioneering work of Kempton et al. (1995), who showed among other things how fundamentally
US-Americans’ perceptions of climate change are based on different pre-existing cultural models that are widely shared, Thompson and Rayner conclude that “the accuracy of the detailed information that members of the public are receiving from media discussion or public awareness campaigns is largely irrelevant” (Thompson and Rayner 1998,: 148).
Thus, they conclude that more precise science communication does not necessarily lead to a more accurate public understanding of the problem. For example, a number of studies have shown a widespread phenomenon, which I also encountered on Palawan (described in more detail below), that lay people usually confuse climate change with ozone depletion (Löfstedt 1991; Kempton 1991; Bostrom et al. 1994; Kempton, Boster, and Hartley 1995; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Smith and Joffe 2013; Friedrich 2017). A popular “solution” for such phenomena would be to correct this misconception by better communicating scientific knowledge, also known as the (information) deficit model. By providing targeted education about the actual causal interconnections, it is assumed that the public will eventually see the world the way scientists do. This unidirectional sender/receiver structure of communication has been criticized as psychologically and sociologically naïve (Stern 1992; Kearney 1994; Wynne 1995; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Blake 1999; Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau 2000; Jasanoff 2007; Hulme 2009;
Jasanoff 2010; Rudiak-Gould 2013b). Indeed, the deficit model ignores the fact that the acquisition of new knowledge is a selective process, and that receiving new information does not necessarily lead to the understanding intended. In order to integrate it into pre-existing systems of knowledge and meaning, there must be a certain amount of coherence and plausibility, since “a series of isolated facts or details do not create meaning” (Kearney 1994: 430). Creating meaning, however, is a creative and thus active process that does not fit into a unidirectional structure of communication. Instead of trying to correct “wrong” concepts with more detailed scientific information, these concepts should be taken into serious consideration. Another limitation of the deficit model is what environmental psychology labels the knowledge-behavior or value-action gap. This refers to the problem that people apparently do not act as desired, for example by changing their consumption patterns, even though they seem to know enough about their individual and collective
impact on the environment, and hold high environmental values (Blake 1999).
In comparison, the sociocultural model explains the relationship between knowledge and behavior much better; it is less knowledge-based and considers norms, values and social actors. Because, as Jasanoff has stated, “without human actors […] even scientific claims have no power to move others” (Jasanoff 2004a: 36). Among others, she has pointed out that science alone cannot provide a moral basis for action (Milton 1996, p. 124; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Jasanoff 2007).
Instead of a unidirectional transfer of climate change knowledge, the sociocultural model assumes a more dialogical communication along
“cultural circuits” (Hulme 2009), like science, politics, media, and the public that represent distinct domains in which “[m]essages about climate change have no starting point and no ending point; they travel around this circuitry, changing frame, form and meaning as they go”
(Hulme 2009: 221).
A third model that more strongly emphasizes the meaning of discourses and their role in the selectivity of knowledge acquisition can be called the discourse model. Discourses provide an epistemological and normative structure to determine what particular information is relevant, and what can be ignored or rejected. By considering the national and local translation regimes—i.e., social agents, institutions, communicational patterns, narratives, and discourses that mediate and translate the global discourse on climate change—the manifold local manifestations of this discourse eventually become explainable.
Translation regimes show us how, where, and by whom relevant knowledge is actively shared, verbally or non-verbally. Identifying and analyzing such regimes is indispensable to delineate how the scientific discourse is being received and reproduced on a local scale.
Language is another significant factor that permeates all the models described. The anthropologist Rudiak-Gould emphasized that the communication of scientific climate change knowledge is not only an issue in terms of translating ideas, concepts and cultural models; it is also a linguistic problem:
Climate change communication is ultimately an issue of translation: the cultural translation from scholarly communities to citizens; the cultural translation from Western and other elite developers of climate science to
indigenous people and other non-Westerners; the linguistic translation from specialized climatological jargon to the colloquial language of citizens; and the linguistic translation from English, and other languages in which the notion of anthropogenic global warming has been formulated and studied, to the languages of those who are called upon to prevent or prepare for it. (Rudiak-Gould 2012: 46)
During his fieldwork on the Marshall Islands, Rudiak-Gould found that the local term that is used to translate climate change into Marshallese language already holds various meanings, and thus influences how climate change as a concept is understood. He assumes that this kind of mistranslation (deficit model) or reinterpretation (sociocultural and discourse model) occurs in many other societies and languages as well. Instead of dismissing those local concepts as a result of failed communication, however, he suggests that they may provide the opportunity for real dialogue (Rudiak-Gould 2012, 2014b). In this context, anthropologists, linguists and other social scientists familiar with local patterns of meaning can make a decisive contribution to improving climate communication.
In the Philippines, the English term climate change is predominately used in public discourse, since English is the country’s second lingua franca. For instance, in national television broadcasts, where “Taglish”
is predominately spoken (a common mix of the first lingua franca, Tagalog or Filipino, and English), the term climate change is clearly preferred to its Tagalog translation pagbabago ng klima. However, even if the same term is used as in global scientific discourse, this does not mean that its meaning has not changed or will not change further along the chain of communication. The question of translation does not disappear just because there is no linguistic translation. What remains is cultural translation. The Philippine example therefore demonstrates why a distinction must be made in climate change communication between knowledge and meaning as much as between local and global discourses.