Methods for the social embeddedness of the political system and legal system system

system grew faster than shifts could happen in the political system.

We can arrive at two inferences. 1. as this appeared like a parallel line, this illustrates that the political system was changing more slowly than the economic system during this period. Or 2. If the development of the economic system was due to the control of the political system, or if the economic system was not controlled, that the economic indicators grew ten times in a short ten years means that the amount of social pressure or capacity was more than ten times. Any political system could not develop in such a short period of time.

Whether the first inference or the second is more correct, the political system was the supreme authority for leading the political evolution, and this suffered extreme challenges from economic growth. The political system sought to increase taxation plans and the national finances through economic planning, but in terms of overall economic growth, the political system should hand the scepter of control to the political system.

4.2. The bureaucratic system and unions in the midst of strategic groups As such, in examining this period of time with regards to the formation and assemblage of Taiwanese strategic groups, as well as the process of conflictive groups and their interaction, we can take the following as the points of departure for our investigation. First, the paths for political participation and mobilization;

second, behavior in terms of political participation on the basis of resources; and third, active factors in terms of this participation.

4.2.1. Methods for the social embeddedness of the political system and legal system

According to what was described previously, the Chinese KMT confronted both internal and external tensions after it came to Taiwan. Yet during this historical period, we can observe the following changes.

From the beginning of confronting the defeat of the KMT, the CCP decided to continue fighting the KMT, with many small skirmishes breaking out at seas between 1958 and 1979.²⁷⁹ The KMT was still under pressure after it fled to Taiwan by the KMT examining external political forces, resource allocation took priority based on proximity. Waisheng administrators, civil service workers, Taiwanese administrators, waisheng soldiers and their children, waisheng people, bensheng people, Taiwanese indigenous. The priority by which these people received resources became the basis for stratification in Taiwanese society, a categorization which cannot be avoided in research into Taiwanese society.

Later on, after the establishment of relations between the PRC and America in 1979, the ROC government lost its international position, with its number of diplomatic allies gradually decreasing. For those of subsequent generations raised in Taiwan, the dream of retaking China held by older members of the waisheng ethnic group was just a political dream, while more and more individuals reconnected with family members in China through underground channels. This meant that relations between Taiwan and China needed to become more normalized.

Second, intermarriage occurred between a portion off waishengren and Taiwanese benshengren, leading ethnic divisions to no longer be so clear on the basis of blood or origin. Third, although Taiwanese were indoctrinated with a new form of education and culture, and Chinese culture was the only social orthodoxy allowed, many of those educated under the Japanese were still alive, retaining to skepticism about the changes in the political system.

Confronted with such external factors, the government formed by the members of the KMT who had been twice “purified” continued to hold the historical perspective of the loss of China, and continued to fear farmers and workers —they were benshengren —as a potential threat because of communism. This was reflected in restricted channels for political participation for these groups. One can point to several consequences.

First, this led to the “gangsterization” of Chinese KMT members, with a lack of social and economic ties to the lower stratum of society.²⁸⁰ Second, in the Japanese localization which had taken place during the colonial period, Taiwanese society was still not yet mature in terms of political participation. And so, after the KMT came to Taiwan, through the institutionalization of political participation, political participation was reconstructed from the top-down. Third, with the waisheng ethnic group that came to Taiwan with the KMT, maintaining survival became an urgent issue for the government. For the KMT, the waisheng ethnic group constituted its arm, and with the large number of emigrants and passage of time with the elder generation passing away, the waisheng ethnic group that was

279 Between the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and the 619 Bombardment of 1960, although both sides announced a ceasefire, shelling continued until December 15, 1978, and that was only after America and the PRC declared the establishment of diplomatic relations on December 16, 1978.

280 Yu Ying-shih, "Zhongguo zhishi fenzi de bianyuan hua," Ershiyi shiji, no. 6 (August 1991): 15-25.

decreasing in numbers also needed to control ethnic groups in Taiwan domestically.

As such, we can observe quite clearly that during this period of time, social embeddedness in Taiwan revolved around, “”Stabilizing the economic position of the waisheng ethnic group”. The aim transitioned from plundering resources to a strategy for stabilizing social structure, to achieve the aim of stabilizing political power.

Whether in terms of plundering resources or stabilizing political structure, this was closely bound up with the people’s livelihood. These were the circumstances in which parasitism transitioned to symbiosis, as can be observed most clearly in industrial relationships. Concerning the social embeddedness of the political system, legal system, and economic system, the aim was not only to accumulate economic resources, or to maintain the structure of Taiwanese society, but also to maintain the legitimacy and rational basis of the ruling regime.

As such, although the aim of the political rulers was to maintain social stability, from the standpoint of social embeddedness, labor relations were only for the sake of maintaining labor resources as the rulers desired. This was the most important, but also most obscure, political aim of the KMT at the time.

In looking at labor-capital relations from the standpoint of social structure at this time, if this is only read from a purely liberal point of view, we could analyze how ethnic groups formed the basis of workers’ relations with capitalists. But to advance this line of thought in terms of social development, in trying to address the question as to which specific groups were willing to become workers or capitalists, this becomes a question of why one would aspire to try and control a system or agree to facilitate its operation. In considering this line of thought, integrated labor-capital relations were formed from the social structure of Taiwanese society during this time, or at least served as the reason for the assemblage of strategic groups.

1. Withdrawing to Taiwan as a purification strategy of the KMT

As described before, in the process of the KMT government coming to Taiwan, some may have not come to Taiwan because of personal reasons, unwillingness, or their political position, or that they were been unable to obtain the Chinese KMT’s resources and so did not come to Taiwan. This led to the “purification” of the party, leading the KMT to become the political party in Taiwan which held the most resources, as well as the sole ruling party.

After this purification, it would appear as if the KMT made decisions on the basis of internal decision-making. But in reality this was a feudal, military clique system.

For example, in 1949, the KMT’s central committee decided to give Chiang Kai-shek “resumption of power,”²⁸¹ and only until 1954 did the KMT central

281 “Resumption of power” refers to that after the KMT’s defeat by the CCP and the KMT was forced to retreat to Taiwan and left office, but Chiang was named as president again by the Central standing Committee of the KMT.

Zhongguo guomindang zhong changhui, "Zhongguo guomindang zhong changhui linshi huiyi," (Academia Historica, December 3, 1949).

committee formally vote him into power through a vote by the majority of the National Assembly, Chiang having 1507 votes in support and only 48 votes against.

In the process, legislators, Control Yuan members, and National Assembly members worried that their personal interests would be harmed if they did not advocate resumption of power by Chiang, and so they pushed for Chiang’s authority to be enshrined in the Constitution.²⁸²

This shows that there was much doubt in society at the time, otherwise Judicial Yuan head Wang Ch’unghui and Lin Bin would not have to sign off on this.

Moreover, with the declaration of martial law in 1949, news rarely reported on this. Central elections were frozen until 1969, when there was by-elections for the National Assembly, for legislative yuan members, and for Control Yuan members.

But representatives for the KMT after they came to Taiwan generally served until death, thus becoming known as the “National Assembly of Ten Thousand Years.”²⁸³ Chen Cheng also obtained the seat of vice president during this period.

In examining historical facts, we see that central legislative representatives included members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan, could continue to serve with high salaries while doing little for thirty years.

Those who held such positions came to enjoy social benefits and, overall, this led to a set of relations in which political rulers were close to business. At the same time, there was a clustering of business and political interests, making it clear that law was a means of social control. Consequently, for each social element, to enter the strategic group not only required certain conditions, but also was determinant in what way strategic groups oriented towards the centers of power in society.

2. The intimate relationship between Taiwan’s future destiny and the KMT

The KMT’s defeat and withdrawal to Taiwan took place after fifty years of Japanese colonization. However, Taiwan’s perspective on the international world and politics was reshaped after the Japanese colonial period, influencing the subsequent implementation of government. The KMT still feared the imagined enemy, the CCP, which had led it to implement martial law in Taiwan. On the other hand, Cold War thinking as promoted by America led to the imaginary enemy of international Communism, not just the Chinese Communist Party. As such, this is a way in which international outlook cannot only be said to have been the product of the KMT’s worldview.

In reality, before the meeting, Pai Chongxi, Chen Cheng, and others had discussed their arrangement of duties with Chiang Kai-shek. See Pai Chongxi, "Pai Chongxi dian jiang zhongzheng qing fu zongtong zhi zhenzuo junxin wanhui jie yun," (Academia Historica, Novembeer 27, 1949), Chiang Kai-Shek, "Chiang Chung-cheng dian Bai chongxi chenggao huannanyugong fendoudaodi juexin zhishenganwei." (Academia Historica, November 28, 1949), Chen Cheng, "Chen Cheng dian Huang Shao-ku jin Li Zongren qizhi binan xieze weiguo zhiyou wang Chiang Chung-cheng zongtong fuzhi," Academia Historica, December 1, 1949).

The following documents were only made publicly available after 2016.

282 Central Daily News, "Sifa yuan wang yuanzhang shuoming: Zongtong fu xing shi shi you xianfa genju," March 3, 1950, Central Daily News, "Da faguan linbin: You mingque jieshi ren jiang zongtong fu xing shi shi zai falu shang hao wu wenti,' March 3, 1950.

283 Please see footnote 65.

But as with George Orwell’s 1984, Taiwan’s martial law period not only led to Taiwan being closed off from the international world. And if people questioned this state of affairs, they would be deemed Communist bandits according to the dictates of martial law. With a closed off geographic terrain, this led Taiwan to lack ways to widen channels for exposure to the international world. Because Taiwanese could only come in contact with the KMT’s vision of Taiwan’s future, there was a lack of space to consider any third option. As described earlier, part of the economic basis by which the political rulers held power was U.S. AID, and these factors have made Taiwanese society generally adopt the government's policy principles and arguments as the only creed without question. When I conducted interviews in 2012, many interviewees expressed the following points of view:

At the time of the Second Taiwan Straits crisis, I wrote a final testament in a tunnel in Kinmen, preparing for an intense battle underground...of course, I was frightened to die, but I thought of Taiwan only retaining the Pacific Ocean, and there was no way I could retreat...now looking back on why we were prepared to die fighting them, we’re prepared to embrace them now, saying that blood is thicker than water and that they’re not the enemy. It was them who said that the CCP was the enemy. Those that decided the CCP is not the enemy were also them.²⁸⁴

The one expressing this was a member of the strategic group in Taiwanese society, but it is regularly unquestioned that one must rely on the ruling party’s claims.

This attitude also exists in terms of worker-capital relations. Firstly, seeing as Taiwan’s existence was, in government policy, for the aim of the KMT retaking mainland China, the militarization of administration led to this also becoming standard in the management and running of businesses. Second, in certain government-run or party-run industries, there were no other companies in the same industry. Privately-run industries could only cooperate at a low level with government-run or party-run industries. Third, as the majority of these government-run or party-run businesses were controlled by the waisheng ethnic group that had come to Taiwan with the KMT government, this led to different places of residence for Taiwanese benshengren, as well as paths to employment, with the waisheng ethnic group filling the vacancies left by the Japanese who had left Taiwan. Fourth, even if many Taiwan businesses have immigrated to China or to Southeast Asian countries, militarization of industries was a characteristic of how they conduct business. One can quickly find videos of this so-called

“militaristic’ style of business online in less than ten minutes, as a way by which taishang promote their effectiveness in running businesses, entirely without the belief that economic production needs should address workers’ or human needs.

3. Institutionalization as a strategy

As described in section 6 of chapter 3, many of the Nationalist government’s labor regulations were formulated in a specific era. During this period of time, labor related laws appeared and were frozen without being reprised subsequently.

284 2012 interview

Examining the Labor Union Act, after its implementation in 1929, in 1943, 1947 and 1949, the text of the existing law was thrown out and replaced with a new law, without any line-by-line amendment. During the war with the Chinese Communist Party, the KMT further expanded the scope of regulations on labor to regulate unions and public gatherings. Namely, during the national revolutionary period, the KMT government had to establish the pretenses of ethnic racial, class, and occupational equality, and also wished to prevent infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party among the working class. This is why the text of the existing law would be thrown out and new text drafted.

After coming to Taiwan, industries originally present in China had to confront the new environment and social circumstances present in Taiwan and make necessary adjustments. The KMT government declared martial law in order to achieve their aims, only amending elements of labor law as late as 1975. Outside of labor law, other laws were not amended. But relatively speaking, laws not related to labor were not changed too much by martial law, though some saw new lines added or some amendments.

This points to how, at the time, the main axis of labor law was actually the National Mobilization Law, which took higher priority as a way to resolve labor-capital disputes during this period. In examining this law carefully, line fourteen of the law states that the government must resolve labor disputes, and forbids labor actions such as blockading factories, striking, or going slow. Line 5 of the Outline for Mobilization, Suppressing Chaos, and Implementing the Constitution states that labor and capital should cooperate and that if there are disputes, this should be arbitrated by law, and that going slow, going on strike, to cease trading, shutting down a factory, or other means of blocking productivity and disrupting social order, will be punished according to the law. Under martial law, labor agitation could be punished with death. The various administrative orders promulgated after the implementation of the martial law also limit the realization of basic labor rights, i.e. forbidding illegal gatherings, forming organizations, demonstrating, petitioning, striking, and stopping work.

We can see that during this period, with the implementation of such restrictions during the martial law period, labor disputes were seen as something that could negatively influence economic development and disrupt social order. As such, the Labor Standards Act, which originally set out to protect workers’’ rights, became instead the means for ensuring hierarchy and control of labor and workers.

According to the rules of the labor market, both labor and capital had no way of establishing relations with the other side individually. Both sides were aware that they were not the main actors in the labor market, and that it was the government bureaucracy which controlled what took place. Consequently, for workers constituting a strategic group, this led to a dependency on bureaucracy and legal institutions. As such, there was no avoiding the influence of the government and bureaucratic system, despite attempts to rely on the legal system as a form of mediation.

This sort of reliance on the law and the bureaucratic system led the government to become the supreme authority in resolving disputes between labor and capital.

And in practice, with the priority on economic growth, capital was favored.

On the other hand, through various historical periods in Taiwanese history, whenever labor and capital have a dispute and are unable to come to an agreement, or attempt to enter into dialogue, there is the irregular model of both sides always relying on the government to mediate. The reason why this is irregular is because labor and capital lacked channels for participating in the political system, with the government providing for this space for dialogue serving as one of the few means of direct political participation available for interactions for both sides. The most visible proof of this was how both labor and capital put funds into retirement pensions which should be autonomously managed, but instead the government used this as a means of stabilizing the stock market.²⁸⁵

4. Economic splits between members of the waisheng ethnic group and the

4. Economic splits between members of the waisheng ethnic group and the