Metastatements concerning comparability of specific comparata in particular

As has been stated in the previous paragraphs, the metastatements concerning comparisons in general can be unspecific: Referring to all comparisons in the world as atypeof activity is enough, insofar as an average recipient of such a compara-tive message knows what the word “comparison” means.⁹⁴In a world bent on effi-ciency of information transmission, one universal metastatement “all comparisons are good” (1.2.1) would turn evaluation of any specific comparata or classes thereof on the scale “good”/“bad” into a waste of time. However, in discussions of social practices, it is common, if not essential, to see how general principles function un-der specific circumstances, and this functioning leaves ample room for deductive reasoning moving from (1.2.1) to (1.2.2). Whenever this movement occurs outside of well-trodden paths of logical reasoning, it often stalls or gets stuck in between, thereby complicating the relation between premises and conclusions and some-times obliterating their difference.

93 Cf. Schenk/Krause, Vergleich, 676; Stefan Willer, Die Allgemeinheit des Vergleichs. Ein kom-paratistisches Problem und seine Entstehung um 1800, in: Michael Eggers (ed.),Von Ähn-lichkeiten und Unterschieden. Vergleich, Analogie und Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Literatur, Heidelberg 2011, 155; Mauz/Sass,Hermeneutik des Vergleichs,10–11. The correspondences be-tween comparison and similarity pop up at nearly every level of comparative activities—from terms (similitudo) to social practices (the consensus-building procedure known in German as

“Vergleichung,” see: Marsh H. McCall,Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison, Cam-bridge 1969, IX; Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 84, 106). Overalll, cross-evaluation of obviously dif-ferent things is discouraged: Whereas Latin poetry contains standard apologies for compar-ing “big” thcompar-ings with “small” ones (Vergil,Georgica, IV, 170–178; Vergil,Bucolica, I, 19-25; Ovid, TristiaI, 3.25, 6.28), European political writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries obsessively warn against juxtaposing “top” and “bottom” of the social ladder (cf. Steinmetz,

‘Vergleich’, 112; Steinmetz, Above/below). For the things that are even more disparate—such as God and humankind—the outright prohibition of comparisons was put in place (see be-low,III, 8.2).

94 Cf. Bertrand Russell, Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types, in:American Journal of Mathematics, 30 (3/1908), 222-262, see 236.

In the history of comparative discourse, deduction often presents itself as a slightly duplicitous totum pro parte. A general—usually pejorative—evaluation of comparisons (1.2.1) loudly fronts for hidden specific metastatements (1.2.2), feed-ing the suspicion that the narrator’s only goal is to borrow some authority for an otherwise petty claim. In this way, the two opposed kinds of metastatements melt together: Whereas the universal metastatements lose their generality, their partic-ular counterparts tacitly uphold some mid-level generalization without bringing it to the narrative surface.

The case in point is the popular saying “All comparisons are odious,” easily found on the pages of proverbial wisdom manuals in many languages.⁹⁵Instead of end-ing all discussion of comparative practices, this general metastatement often in-troduces pointed bans on particularly explosive comparata (e.g., female beauty).

So, in Fernando de Rojas’ macabre comedyCelestina(1499), the prostitute Elicia re-fuses to share a table with a servant named Sempronio, because the latter has just showered the young Melibea with compliments. Sempronio, in turn, reminds fu-rious Elicia that he has never looked at Elicia and Melibea from the comparative standpoint, and it was her, not him, who was “guilty” of “having compared”:

ELIC[IA]. […]? Hauía yo de comer con esse maluado, que en mi cara me ha porfiado que es más gentil su andrajo de Melibea, que yo?

SEMP[RONIO]. Calla, mi vida, que tú la comparaste. Toda comparación es odiosa: tú tienes la culpa y no yo.⁹⁶

The same pseudological following from the general maxima (“toda comparación es odiosa”) to its only relevant specific application—refraining from comparing mis-tresses of varioushidalgos—is a recurrent topic in another milestone of pre-mod-ern Spanish fiction.⁹⁷And the gap between premises and conclusions appears to be even more glaring in John Fortescue’sCommendation of the Laws of England(1499), in which the success of a comparative enterprise proving—surprise!—the supremacy of English laws is crowned by the phrase (“comparaciones odiosas esse”) put in the mouths of both the auctorial narrator and his conversation partner (modeled upon Prince Edward, the only son of exiled Henry VI).⁹⁸All in all, the chief purpose of deliberate paralogical mixing between general and specific metacomparative state-ments appears to be a case of isolating and ring fencing some unspoken

incom-95 Cf. Pedro Vallés,Libro de refranes y sentencias[1549], Madrid 2003, 66; Gonzalo Correas, Vocab-ulario de refranes y frases proverbiales[1627], Madrid 2000, 336; Giacomo du Bois de Gomicourt, Sentenze, e proverbij italiani cavati da diversi famosi autori antichi, e moderni [...], Lyon 1683, 153.

96 Fernando de Rojas,La Celestina, ó, Comedia de Calisto y Melibea[1499], Barcelona 1841, 176. See also: Mauz/Sass, Vergleiche verstehen,1.

97 Cf. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra,Don Quijote de la Mancha[1615], Madrid 1999, 350, 386.

98 Cf. John Fortescue,De laudibus legum Angliae[1499], Cincinnati, OH 1874, 225–238.

parables—be they the object of romantic love or a subject of imperial rule (see in more detail belowIII, 8.1/8.2).⁹⁹

1.1.1 Equations vs. 1.1.2 Differentiations

Above, it has been shown how the directionality of discourse, reflecting time asym-metry, produced the difference between “left” and “right” of the written line, or “be-fore and after” of the spoken line. Indeed, the same signifier (“I”), referring to the same signified (the narrator), can have different meanings in the subject and the predicate parts of the statement, because the production of speech is accompanied by a steady influx of information that alters the overall semantics of the utterance while it is being produced(II, 2.1). Mapped onto the lexical level of the sentence, this change (namely, the alleged spiritual growth of the narrator’s identity), cancels out logical reflexivity, turning the standard equation (*I = I,1.1.1.) into a relative grad-ing comparison (“I am more than I,”1.1.2 + 1.1.2.2.1): The latter statement sounds like an odd paradox until one tries it out onanysaying involving comparata separated only by the time of their reference (see, e.g., below:III, 3.1/3.2).

If initial sameness of comparata can be turned into contrast in the process of message production, the neutralization of their difference appears equally possible:

In any case, thecoincidentia oppositorumhas been one of the cornerstones of philo-sophical dialectics,¹⁰⁰and many empirical observations of likeness and unlikeness of certain objects leave matters unsettled. Thus, departing from the a priori as-sumed difference in the feeling capacity between flora and fauna, Buffon inverts the habitual scheme of deductive reasoning, conditionally accepting the difference first, contesting its universality later, and refusing to make any judgment on the matter at the end:

“Une différence plus essentielle pourroit se tirer de la faculté de sentir, qu'on ne peut guère refuser aux animaux, et don’t il semble que les végétaux soient privés. […] Cette différence entre les animaux et les végétaux non-seule ment n'est pas générale, mais même n'est pas bien décidée.“¹⁰¹

99 To be sure, there are exceptions: A handful of authors take the notion of “odious comparisons”

seriously. See: Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 114–115 (on the entry “Comparison” in theDictionary of the [French] Academy(1694)); William Hazlitt,Table Talk. Essays on Men and Manners[1821], Lon-don 1903, 141.

100 The most basic expression of this tradition is Heracleitus’ insistence on “being” and “nonbe-ing” at the same time: εἶμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν (Heracleitus,Alleg.Hom. 24).

101 Georges-Louis Leclerc (Comte de Buffon),Œuvres completes. Tome VIII. Histore des animaux [1749], Paris 1833, 7. On Buffon’s comparisons, see: Thierry Hoquet, Logique de la comparaison et physique de la génération chez Buffon, in:La Découverte39 (1/2007), 595–612.

In a single, albeit extensive, comparative utterance, the relation between the com-parata “animals and “plants” is presented in three ways: (1) a possible difference (1.1.2 + 13.2); (2) a mixture of difference and indifference (some animals and plants are similar in their ability to feel [1.1.1] and others are not [1.1.2]); and, finally, (3) no relation at all (2). Proceeding from surety to uncertainty, Buffon’s statement has a negative informational value in relation to his subject. However, the zoologist’s unvarnished report of his squabbling with the thorny subject more than makes up for this loss.

1.1.2.2.1 Relative grading comparisons vs. 1.1.2.2.2 Absolute grading comparisons

Superficially, the boundary between relative and absolute grading comparisons should be watertight, because the opposition seems to be directly and effortlessly translatable into the grammatical distinction between comparative (better) and su-perlative (best) adjectives. However, a second glance at the passage from Strind-berg’sCrimes and Crimes(see above,II, 7.2) documents the fairly easy neutraliza-tion of both opposineutraliza-tions at once. In the quote, as we remember, Adolphe clearly compares two kinds of crimes, and deems one category (moral wrongdoings) to be worse than the other (criminal transgressions). Notwithstanding the relativ-ity of comparison, he uses for the first category the superlative adjective “värsta,”

conflating a relative grading comparison (*moral wrongdoings are worse than criminal transgressions[1.1.2.2.1]) with an absolute one (*nothing is worse than moral wrongdo-ings[1.1.2.2.2]). Understandably, such conflations are particularly plentiful in finite sets consisting of two elements (1.1.2.2 + 10.1) in which it is impossible to drive a wedge between “X is better/worse/… than N” and “X is the best/worst/… in the set (X, N).”