Although armed groups do not generally use codes of conduct to regulate weap-ons use, storage, or transfers, they have five other types of internal regulatiweap-ons at their disposal to do so, namely standing orders and standing operating pro-cedures, military manuals, penal or disciplinary codes, internal organization documents, and operation orders.
Standing orders and standing operating procedures. Because they focus on specific issues or units, standing orders can provide details regarding the pro-curement, stockpiling, maintenance, distribution, storing, and use of weapons.
They may target specific layers of the leadership, partly to avoid burdening fighters with concerns over which they have little influence. Even a few rele-vant precautions may dramatically reduce the incidence of injuries or fatalities.
Examples include the following:
• The ANC ‘Rules and Regulations Covering the Handling of Weapons and Explosives of our Movement’ regulate the possession, distribution, handling, recording, and maintenance of weapons, as well as safety measures.101 They are the prime example of how armed groups can try to shape their mem-bers’ behaviour regarding all issues linked to weapons, and not only the use of force.
• The Naxalites’ ‘Standing Orders for Squads’ regulate the use of weapons in general.102
• The MILF’s ‘Internal Regulations on Use, Stockpiling, Production and Trans-fer of Anti-Personnel Mines’ is an example of how an armed group can regu-late the use of a specific weapons category.103
• Although armed groups have not adapted Geneva Call’s manual Implementing the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and Cooperation in Mine Action, they have responded positively to this endeavour (Geneva Call, n.d.). The manual uses the ten-rule format typical of an inter-nal order, which a group’s leadership might use if it were to issue an order on landmines. The rules include the prohibition of use (rule 1), production (rule 2), transfer (rule 3), and stockpiling (rule 4) of landmines.
Military manuals. In describing tactics and actions to be taken, military man-uals effectively prescribe standard actions regarding weapons. The unofficial Swiss manual for armed resistance against occupation is replete with such indi-cations. It describes ways to secure and store supplies of weapons, ammuni-tion, and explosives (von Dach, 1965, pp. 14–18, 104–05); the type of weapons to use in an ambush or in urban combat as well as methods for starting a fire (pp. 33, 150–54); what types of mines to use to block roads and dangers posed by uncontrolled mines (p. 29); and the use of explosives in sabotage (pp. 46–71).
Although this is not technically an armed group manual, it reflects requisite knowledge and thinking of armed group leaders. Moreover, it is has most probably landed in the hands of armed groups since its release more than 50 years ago.
Penal or disciplinary codes. Since they specify which behaviour the leader-ship is unwilling to tolerate among its fighters and link these rules to punish-ment, penal codes can act as complements to standing orders. Simply put, they allow the leadership to control what they have commanded. Unsurprisingly, in the SPLA and ANC codes, weapons are secondary to issues such as disobedi-ence to orders or desertion:
• The now-superseded SPLA Act of 1994 defines a number of offences linked specifically to firearms, such as theft and negligent loss (paras. 4(d), 4(f), 15).
In the 2003 SPLA Act, these rules have all but vanished, appearing only in a few vague references and one passage on an offence involving the aban-donment of weapons and ammunition before the enemy.
• The ANC ‘Military Code’ only addresses ‘negligence in handling, using or storing and loss of weapons’ (ANC, 1985, Military Code, General Regula-tions, 4d).
Internal organization documents. Given that they focus on internal proc-esses and decision-making, internal organization documents can address the issue of responsibilities for procuring, stockpiling, distributing, maintaining, and—to a lesser extent—using weapons. The Taliban layhas do not devote much space to these concerns, except when it comes to the sharing of weapons cap-tured from the enemy and to transferring weapons from one group to another (Clark, 2011b). This approach reveals that some weapons-related issues may need to be regulated together with the internal processes of armed groups.
Operation orders. In providing details on a given tactic, operation orders must specify the selection of weapons and the conditions of their use.104 For armed groups, they represent the best tool for balancing military needs against precautions designed to minimize collateral damage. They also allow an armed group commander to define behaviour regarding scattered weapons and ammu-nition after an operation, which can have a protective effect regarding unex-ploded ordnance.
To armed groups, standing and operation orders are the most appropriate tools for regulating any issue linked to weapons. Humanitarian organizations involved in related negotiations should note that, of the two, standing orders are the best tool for the provision of general regulations. Compared to codes of conduct, standing orders can be more detailed and are also easier to issue and change. Consequently, an armed group is more likely to discuss the issuing of such an order than the possibility of making changes to its code of conduct.
In discussions with representatives of armed groups, humanitarian actors should thus be particularly aware of the distinctions between orders and codes of conduct, in addition to understanding the specific characteristics of all inter-nal regulations.
For an order to be effective, however, the individuals who are to execute it must undergo weapons training. If the fighters are not trained, they will not respect a group’s regulations. Such was the case during the civil war in the Republic of the Congo; in 1997 in Brazzaville, both state forces and armed groups distributed AK-47s among villagers and urged them to join the fight-ing at the front lines (Biddle, Demetriou, and Muggah, 2002, pp. 4–5, 10).
Training can be especially effective with regard to the handling and combat use of weapons. While it is difficult to train fighters not to mistreat a prisoner or rape a civilian, it is possible—and even relatively easy—to train them to load, unload, secure, and fire a small arm with accuracy. It is also possible to train them to use firearms purposefully and to avoid wasting ammunition. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, fighters of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) were taught during their training ‘not to leave bullets in the firing chamber of their rifles or to leave the chamber open, particularly when no longer engaged in combat’ (Richards, 2011). Similarly, RCD–Goma fighters reported basic training of around six months. Indeed, a former sergeant major of the RCD reported that his movement had gone to considerable lengths to standardize the use of their weapons:
We had military regulations for the handling of the M16, SMG, revolvers, rockets, grenades, bombs, etc.105
Training can also yield results when it comes to stockpile management, particularly with respect to safety procedures designed to prevent accidents in storage. Such training was evident in the CNDP:
prior to distributing weapons, a record would be kept. The registration number of the weapon would be written down next to the name of the combatant receiving it. The number of cartridges handed out to this individual would also be noted.
When the combatant returned from his mission he would bring the weapon back to the depot (Richards, 2011, p. 6).