Recent protests by college and professional athletes against unnatural black deaths have received a lot of attention in mainstream media, on social media platforms, and in scholarly publications but often for all the wrong reasons. Much of the attention is focused on whether sporting events are appropriate venues for addressing social justice issues, whether some forms of protest are perceived by the public as more or less deviant than other forms, and whether protestors should receive sanctions from their respec-tive leagues and/or teams.1 Absent from many of the discussions is a focus, fi rst and foremost, on the black deaths that led to the protest. Also missing are in-depth thoughtful analyses on responses to the protests. Specifi cally, critical analyses of responses to the protests—from “Main Street” to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue—are needed to understand the linkages between three important concepts: “American civil religion,” perceived black prog-ress by white workers, and what I call “white religious shock,” or the dis-orientation white workers experience when they encounter challenges to the white social order, manifested in what is best described as white fervor.
I argue that nowhere are the linkages between white laborers, religion, and perceived black progress more salient than in the responses to protests by players in the National Football League by President Donald Trump and the league’s (and Trump’s) largely white-worker fan base. I begin with a review of how American civil religion is defi ned and how it functions. I explore how American civil religion and the state are co-constitutive and how football functions in the service of American civil religion to bind together seemingly disparate groups of white people at the top of a racial-ized social system, while simultaneously seeking to bind people of color, black people in particular, at the system’s lowest level. Lastly, I introduce a
typology based on the intensity of racial consciousness and the intensity of belief in American civil religion.
American (Un)Civil Religion Defi ned
For many centuries black and white people have contemplated what it means to be an American, who and what America values, and whether the American dream exists for all, or just for some. Responses to these all-important questions vary by race given the centrality of race in the history, present, and undoubtedly future of the nation. Conversations about race and movement forward around issues of race stall before they start for a number of reasons, not the least of which is a relatively understudied con-cept that was popular in the sociology of religion in the late 1960s through the mid-1970s. American civil religion was popularized by sociologist Robert Bellah, and openly criticized by many others, including acclaimed religious scholar Charles Long.
Bellah defi nes American civil religion as “the subordination of the nation to ethical principles that transcend it in terms which it should be judged.”2 Bellah argues that American civil religion is deserving of the same level of rigorous scholarly engagement as any other religion.3 He makes the case that American civil religion includes the same elements of religious viewpoints shared by a majority of Americans. Rituals, beliefs, and symbols are the ways the public religion is expressed, argues Bellah. The inauguration of a new or returning U.S. president is one example, perhaps the most important ceremony in American civil religion, says Bellah. During the ceremony, the president makes a promise not only to the people of the nation but also to God. The president relays that while he must answer to the people, ulti-mately he is responsible to a much higher authority, Bellah writes. American civil religion not only holds the president responsible to the people and to God, but it also obligates Americans to work together and individually to carry out God’s will. American civil religion grammar is careful not to defi ne narrowly, if at all, the God to which it refers. There’s “no mention of Jesus, for example, but [it is] very specifi c on the topic of America.”4 American civil religion is what Bellah calls a “genuine vehicle of national religious self-understanding.”5
Bellah describes the relationship between American civil religion and America’s concept of itself. Evidence may be found in the founding docu-ments, including the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Indepen-dence.6 Bellah asserts, “The words and acts of the founding fathers, especially the fi rst few presidents shaped the form and tone of the civil religion as it has been maintained ever since.”7
It is important to note that these documents essentially equated Ameri-cans with white people and whiteness and also marked black people as less than human and justifi ably chattel property. Bellah illustrates this point in what he chooses to highlight as central themes in American civil religion—
of which there are three.8 The fi rst theme involved the American Revolu-tion and the issue of independence. God’s will was the focus. The second theme was associated with the Civil War and involved death, sacrifi ce, and rebirth. The issue was slavery and the institutionalization of democracy. The third theme occurred as Bellah published his classic work. He described the problem of a responsible revolutionary world. The three themes—indepen-dence, the Civil War, and responsibility—all speak to the normativity of a white historical narrative, one in which the protagonists are white men fi ghting for what are read as valorous aims. As such, Bellah intentionally or unwittingly avoids talking about race, even though each of the themes was centered on critical epochs in American history where contestations over race were at their highest points. Therefore, although Bellah does not devote much attention to discussions about race, it is clear that American civil religion and whiteness are inseparable.
To Bellah’s three themes, I would add a fourth and a fi fth theme. The fourth theme would include the issues of patriotism renewed with the back-drop of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Jermaine McDonald made a similar observation in his article “A Fourth Time of Trial.”9 The fi fth theme would address the problem of what I call “white religious shock” and is shaped by the effects of the Great Recession, the two-term tenure of a black president who many working-class white people believe was not born in the U.S., and the campaign to “Make America Great Again.”
Charles Long defi nes religion as an “orientation in the ultimate sense, that is, how one comes to terms with the ultimate signifi cance of one’s place in the world.”10 Long went on to write, “The religion of any people is more than a structure of thought; it is experience, expression, motivation, inten-tions, behaviors, styles, and rhythms.”11 Long’s defi nition goes far beyond other defi nitions, which view religion as merely a social institution, or from the perspective of popularly accepted denominations. Based on Long’s defi ni-tion, we can understand whiteness as a type of religion, as Stephen C. Finley and I argued in “The Complexity of Color and the Religion of Whiteness,” in a book I coedited, Color Struck.12 It is also apparent how white people could experience shock or a sense of disorientation when they perceive challenges to the image and determination of themselves and of the nation.
September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the way Americans viewed themselves and the nation. Any sense of personal safety and national security was shattered on that day. Many Americans, white Americans in
particular, literally wrapped themselves in national symbols, such as the American fl ag. They embraced and hero-worshiped fi rst responders and the military, and participated in a host of rituals and ceremonies that not only honored those killed but also embraced American civil religion. A renewal of American patriotism, or allegiance to the nation, was on full display fol-lowing the attacks.13
Economic losses resulting from the Great Recession contributed to the sense among many white workers, in particular, that their self-image and determination were being challenged and the image and self-determination of the nation too. Although black people, and other people of color, fared far worse than white workers, white workers lost homes and jobs, and saw their modest portfolios shrink. They also expressed concern about the nation’s place in the world economy given the downturn and how such a change might impact how the rest of the world sees America.
The election of a black president also created a sense of white religious shock. The mere fact that one of the eligibility requirements to become president is that one is born in the United States is telling. Most thought they would never live to see the day when someone who identifi ed racially as black would sit in the Oval Offi ce. Throughout Barack Obama’s presiden-tial campaign and through much of his presidency, questions surrounding his place of birth—dubbed the “birther movement”—were led by people like Donald Trump. Trump’s challenge of Obama’s birthplace endeared him in the hearts of many white workers who appreciated Trump’s affl u-ence, power, and willingness to outwardly challenge Obama after a post-civil rights period where overt expressions of racially laden comments were frowned upon. Not only did Trump challenge Obama about his birthplace but he was also successful in compelling Obama to produce “papers” to prove his birthplace or right to be called an American, which he and others dismissed anyway. Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” appealed to white workers. It appealed to white workers despite the fact he offered no indication as to when America had been great before, what led to America’s decline, and how anyone would know when greatness was restored. Nev-ertheless, calls to construct walls to keep out presumably brown migrants into the United States, who Trump also sought to broadly criminalize, and to ban travel from certain predominately Muslim countries, presumably as a preemptive attempt at thwarting another terrorist attack on American soil, resonated with white workers and contributed to Trump’s defeat of Hill-ary Rodham Clinton. The idea that a black president might represent black racial progress, despite the fact that black people experienced signifi cant losses during the Obama administration, and the popularity of the “Make America Great Again” campaign were brilliantly summarized by Long. Long
wrote, “The inordinate fear that they have of minorities is an expression of the fear they have when they contemplate the possibility of seeing them-selves as they really are.”14
Four Functions of Football in American Civil Religion American civil religion is important as a framework for understanding whiteness. It should be noted that some scholars have steered away from discussions about American civil religion, apparently including even Rob-ert Bellah at some point, because of criticisms.15 Hortense Spillers outlined some of the reasons for the rejection, which, she says,
vary across a range of misgivings, from what [the scholars] would consider the distastefulness of the very idea, to defi nitional objections, others maintain that aspects of American Christianity express a greater number of anthropocentric notions than theocratic ones and that they manifest greater compatibility with secular morality than with biblical.16
Nevertheless, American civil religion is worth saving as much as Bellah’s arguments hold true today.
Grace Kao and Jerome Copulsky are among the more recent scholars to fi nd value in studying American civil religion. Kao and Copulsky ana-lyzed the pledge of allegiance and American civil religion.17 They also identifi ed four perspectives through which the pledge of allegiance and civil religion can be understood to function. I draw from their work in demonstrating how professional American football can also be under-stood to function.
Kao and Copulsky offer a brief history of the pledge of allegiance. They focus on the pledge because they see it as the most popular and most rec-ognizable American civil religion ceremony. They observe that millions of schoolchildren recite the pledge every day. U.S. senators begin each session with the reciting of the pledge. Civil organizations across the country also include the pledge as part of their meetings and events. The scholars also address changes to the pledge, which was written in 1892 by Baptist min-ister Frances Bellamy, over time. For example, they note changes in 1923, 1924, 1942, and 1954, when “under God” was added to the statement.
What they don’t say is that these changes also occurred as important social and demographic changes were taking place in the U.S., which many white workers may have perceived as racial progress for black people and thus a threat to their self-image and self-determination, and the image and deter-mination of the nation.
The original pledge did not include the words “United States of America,”
but merely referenced allegiance to the fl ag and the Republic. The identity of the Republic was included in the change made in 1923. It is important to note that at the time the pledge was fi rst written white immigrants from countries considered undesirable to whites who were already in the U.S.
were beginning to arrive in great numbers. These white ethnic groups hailed from southern, central, and eastern Europe. The 1923 change to the pledge follows the passage of a discriminatory immigration act, which was intended to curtail immigration from countries in those parts of Europe. The act estab-lished a quota system limiting the number of people who could arrive from those countries, based in part upon how many people had arrived in the decades preceding the act. While communism is sometimes cited as the driv-ing force for the inclusion of the words “under God” in 1954, the fact that the nation was dealing with a host of challenges to long-standing Jim Crow laws cannot be overlooked. The addition of the phrase followed a historic bus boycott in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and took place in the same year as the U.S. Supreme Court decided the landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, which represented years of efforts on the part of black people to ensure that they and their children had access to a quality education.
An examination of the sermon delivered by Presbyterian minister George Docherty, who along with the Knights of Columbus is credited with success-fully amending the pledge, shows how narrowly defi ned American life was in the minds of many whites and how little consideration was given to the expe-rience of black people in America.18 Docherty said the spirit of America lies in the people and the military. Speaking on the birthday of Abraham Lincoln, seen by some as the Messiah of American civil religion for having saved the union, Docherty made it clear that the American way of life involves sports, capitalism, consumerism, entertainment, leisure, ethnocentrism, and white privilege and the benefi ts thereof. Specifi cally, he made mention of going to the ball game, shopping at Sears, going to amusement parks, driving on the
“right” side of the road, staying in hotels, and being bored by television com-mercials. Docherty added that throughout American history “the providence of God was being fulfi lled.”19 While the pledge refers specifi cally to the United States of America, Docherty made the claim in his sermon that the statement could really apply to any republic and that the phrase once uttered by Lincoln,
“Under God,” is the “defi nitive character of the American way of life.”20 By the way, Docherty saw no problem with using “under God” as opposed to “under Jesus Christ” or some other religious fi gure as a way to consolidate largely white Christians from a variety of belief systems. He also addressed the fact that not all Americans, white Americans specifi cally, were Christian or believed in the existence of God. Docherty described the term
“atheist American” as essentially oxymoronic and called atheists “spiritual parasites.”21 He said, “If he denies the Christian ethic, he falls short of the American ideal of life.”22
Kao and Copulsky understand the importance of the pledge in Ameri-can civil religion and discuss preservationist, pluralist, priestly, and pro-phetic functions. American civil religion for Kao and Copulsky refers to
“a symbolic system that binds members of a political community to one another through shared historical narratives, myths, rituals, and some notion of transcendence.”23 The preservationist function claims that the system is necessary to maintain cultural coherence, national identity, sta-bility, and central institutions, while the pluralist perspective functions to promote change and greater inclusion, for example, to move beyond assumptions of Christianity as normative.24 The priestly perspective func-tions to affi rm, celebrate, and endorse the national image and identity.
Finally, the prophetic perspective function explores what the character of the nation ought to be.
While Kao and Copulsky make a compelling argument for the signifi -cance of the pledge of allegiance in American life and American civil reli-gion, it could also be argued that sports, particularly football, also serve similar functions and may reach an even broader audience than those recit-ing the pledge in schools, in the U.S. Senate, and in civic organizations.25 Based upon Nielsen ratings, 60 percent of the television programs that adults between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine watched in 2017 were sports programs.26 Although viewing of NFL games declined by 9 percent from the previous year, shows like Super Bowl LI, AFC Championship, NFL Divisional Playoffs, and Sunday Night Football made up the top fi ve most-watched television programs for 2017. Nearly fi fty million people alone watched the Super Bowl on television. Football also surpassed baseball sev-eral decades ago as “America’s favorite game.”27
Michael Butterworth has published a number of scholarly works on the importance of sports in American life, including football.28 He describes the marriage of commercial sports and the American culture of militarism.
Ceremonies at professional football leagues, which are now commonplace, normalized war and endorsed the “war on terror,” argues Butterworth.
Moreover, he contends, “sport rhetoric is an especially persuasive vehicle for sustaining and extending the culture of militarism.”29 Butterworth describes
“the rhetorical production of citizenship through sport.”30 He also outlines ways in which events like the Super Bowl connect sports, politics, and com-monly held myths about America, including American exceptionalism.
Football with all its pageantry could be read under a preservationist understanding of civil religion to function for the purpose of continuing
traditions, rituals, tropes, and a sense of national identity and cultural coher-ence. The playing of the national anthem, performances by military offi cials, days devoted to fi rst responders, current military personnel, and veterans, and special tributes to the armed forces during time-outs, halftime, and
traditions, rituals, tropes, and a sense of national identity and cultural coher-ence. The playing of the national anthem, performances by military offi cials, days devoted to fi rst responders, current military personnel, and veterans, and special tributes to the armed forces during time-outs, halftime, and