Livestock keeping in tribal areas

By 2010, most smallholder farmers in South Africa are black people who have inherited traditions from their forbears. The great majority of these smallholders reside in former

‘reserves’ or ‘homelands’, where traditional land tenure systems still prevail and where traditional chiefs have power to influence farming practices and decisions. Reports of this power are possibly overstatements or exaggerations. For example, in a survey with a random sample of 350 small farmers in the erstwhile ‘homeland’ Lebowa – now part of Limpopo Province – the farmers were asked questions about decision-making concerning livestock. The decision about which livestock would be kept was in 72.6% of cases made by the husband, in 4.9% by the wife, in 1.8% by husband and wife and in 2.2% of cases by the chief or headman. Extension officers and stock inspectors were involved in the remaining 18.5% of cases. Decisions regarding selling livestock were in 80.9% of cases taken by the husband, 4.8% by the wife, 12.6% by husband and wife and only in 1.7% of cases by the chief or headman (Fenyes and Groenewald, 1985).

The literature, especially South African literature until the late 1980’s, abounds with statements that in traditional African societies, livestock was of little economic significance and also statements that the livestock was mainly utilised for their hides, horns, meat, etc.

and for ritualistic purposes (Monnig, 1969). Such statements are gross oversimplifications and indeed constitute misleading statements that indicate rather limited insight in economic logic.

Hughes (1972) distinguished between economic value and purely commercial value: cattle had historically been the only available source of readily transportable and convertible wealth for traditional farmers; there were absolutely no dependable banking and similar institutions in which assets could be safely deposited and withdrawn when the depositor desired to do so. This situation still preponderates, particularly in outlying parts of the former ‘homelands’.

It has frequently been pointed out that livestock farming in Sub-Saharan African smallholder societies is very often characterised by overstocking, perverse supply response and low take-off from herds (Carlisle and Randag, 1970; Doran et al., 1979; Lele, 1975). Explanations of this phenomenon often focus on cultural factors such as ignorance, traditional attitudes and traditional value standards.

Much has been written about the perverse supply response often encountered in smallholders’

livestock marketing in different parts of Sub-Saharan Africa: increases in prices initially cause smallholders to increase their sales, but if prices rise above a certain level, they cut back on the quantity supplied – a case of the classical backward-bending supply curve. Some regression analyses (Doran et al., 1979; Low, 1978; Low et al. 1980) tended to support this observation. However, observations done by Fenyes (1982) cast doubt on whether Lebowa smallholders reacted in this way.

This reaction has often been explained in cultural terms. It may however be more correct or realistic to explain it in terms of the distinction made by Hughes (1972) between economic and purely commercial criteria. In a more commercial environment with a plethora of

financial institutions, a commercial producer will utilise rising prices to sell livestock. This will satisfy his cash needs and thereafter the money will be deposited in deposit-taking institutions (e.g. banks) and invested for further monetary gain. But what is the situation of a smallholder in a far away area without sound deposit-taking financial institutions? He will sell enough to satisfy his cash needs, and stop thereafter, as the livestock is his only available way to accumulate capital. He will be eager to sell with rising prices, but rising prices will sooner get him to the point of hoarding. He may even decide to expand his herd. One has to take into account that historically, he could not invest in land either.

Another reason why livestock farmers will sometimes sell more livestock in years characterised by lower prices than in years with higher prices, relates to weather variability. Drought years are characterised by deterioration of grazing and hence a short supply of feeding stuff for grazing animals. The condition of these animals deteriorates. Many farmers do then sell cattle to save them from starving and also to have more food per head available for the remaining animals. In such a year, the increased supply is also accompanied by falling prices.

When more rain is experienced in ensuing years, livestock is held back, partially in order to replenish the breeding stock, and prices increase. This marketing behaviour is certainly not restricted to subsistence or smallholder farmers; it has also for long been a characteristic of commercial stock farmers (Louw et al., 1979; Lubbe, 1992).

There are reasons to believe that stock owners in the areas under discussion have changed their motives for the keeping of livestock; commercial motives have become more important in Ciskei, presently part of the Eastern Cape Province (Fraser, 1992) and developments thereafter have certainly borne this out; popular farming magazines often have reports of smallholders entering the commercial livestock scene. It was also found that cattle owners in Bophuthatswana – now part of the North-West province – sold livestock because of money requirements (Groenewald and Du Toit, 1985). One factor that probably reduces the attractiveness of using livestock, particularly cattle, as a stock of wealth and hence encourages commercial selling is increasing levels of livestock theft as reported in the press.

The dearth of livestock and meat marketing opportunities and institutions in traditional areas such as the erstwhile South African ‘homelands’ has certainly contributed to meager marketing responses in such areas. Jooste and Van Rooyen (1996) argued that market access plays a pivotal role in the transition of the small-scale sector towards commercial production. Increasing market price variability (Jooste and Alemu, 2004), as well as a lack of infrastructure to support asset and income diversification (Bailey et al., 1999), were identified as major causes of limited market participation. This will be illustrated by some examples in the next section of this chapter.

The number of animals in a person’s possession also determines whether he/she will potentially become a commercial owner who wants to use marketing opportunities. Someone with less than 10 cattle, sheep or goats is unable to exploit these animals commercially as a meat

producer. Reporting on a survey among cattle owners in four districts of Bophuthatswana, Groenewald and Du Toit (1982, 1985) reported that among owners with 10 or fewer cattle, 33.4% had sold cattle in the year of the survey. Of those with 11 to 20 cattle, the percentage sellers amounted to 52.9%, while 85.8% of those who owned more than 20 cattle also sold cattle. Fraser (1992) reported that in Ciskei, 80% of the small farmers who did not sell livestock gave insufficient numbers as the reason. The number of animals that would constitute an adequate quantity to participate in the market differed among the respondents.

5.4 Case studies