“Practical, results-oriented partnerships can improve the performance of the OSCE by optimizing its com-parative advantages. These include strengthening the role of the OSCE as a regional organization of the UN in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Char-ter; reviving the platform for cooperative security;
opening liaison offices; strengthening partnerships with other regional and international organizations;
supporting the strategies of our cooperation partners [in the Mediterranean and in Asia]; and intensifying our efforts to work with actors in development coop-eration and the private sector.”23
Fortunately, the organization has succeeded in signifi-cantly strengthening its partnership with the UN on both a political and a practical level. By virtue of a political dec-laration signed by me, the Slovakian chairperson Miroslav Lajcak, and UN Secretary-General Guterres in December 2019, we were able to update the Framework for Cooper-ation and CoordinCooper-ation between the UN and the OSCE, first established in 1993, to reflect present-day realities.
At the same time, we forged or renewed agreements with several important UN organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UN Wom-en, and the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS). These agreements paved the way for practical co-operation in many areas, allowing the concept of regional organization according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to take concrete form.24 For instance, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that I concluded with DFS head Atul Khare at the UN General Assembly in September 2018 gave the OSCE access to UN contracts with major suppliers such as Microsoft, saving the organization mil-lions on its Windows updates. It also opened the doors to UN further training and development modules, including a program aimed at combating sexual harassment. Al-though the large majority of participating states support-ed these efforts, there were some critics. Questions were asked, for instance, about the necessity of the MoU with UN Women or the renewal of the work plan with the UNODC.
Another reform proposal for strengthening the partnership with international organizations was the idea to establish liaison offices in important multilateral hubs, similar to those operated by the Council of Europe. The stated aim of these offices was to increase awareness of and access to the OSCE’s expertise in the international community, to improve coordination, and to intensify
co-23 See footnote 7.
24 See also Greminger, Oxford Handbook, pp. 1061/1062.
operation. A conceptual memorandum presented in Au-gust 2018 set out a vision for the gradual purchasing of five offices in New York, Geneva, Brussels, Minsk, and Moscow. Although the plan was to fund this initiative ex-clusively through extra-budgetary resources and physical contributions such as office space and secondments, it was still met with considerable resistance – some politi-cally motivated and some based on budget concerns.
Much of the opposition was focused on individual loca-tions (Minsk, Moscow) and the alleged lack of focus on the organization’s core tasks. However, in view of the pos-itive experiences that the Council of Europe has gained from its liaison offices, including in the mobilization of ad-ditional budget resources, the decision was made to pur-sue this project in spite of the dissent. Another argument in favor of this initiative can be found in the benefits of the liaison infrastructure recently obtained in Vienna by the Council of Europe, NATO, and the UN with the OSCE.
Great strides have also been made in improving cooperation between the OSCE and the EU. One impor-tant step occurred on 22 June 2018 with the signing of an exchange of letters between then-secretary general of the European Commission Martin Selmayr, former secre-tary general of the European External Action Service Hel-ga Schmid, and the OSCE. This came as no surprise, being as it was the culmination of the efforts made by three successive OSCE chairing countries in the EU (Germany in 2016, Austria in 2017, and Italy in 2018) and the Secretar-iat. Above all, however, closer cooperation between the EU and the OSCE is a logical outcome of the overlap in the scope of the two organizations. The foreign policy objec-tives of the EU in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia are strongly aligned with the OSCE’s obligations toward the countries in these regions. When it comes to strengthening demo-cratic and rule of law structures or fighting violent ex-tremism and dealing with foreign terrorist fighters, there is a great deal of harmony between the interests of the EU and those of the OSCE. While the OSCE offers the ben-efits of impartiality, presence on the ground, many years of strong relationships with local authorities and popula-tions, and specialist expertise, the EU brings political weight and resources to the table. The exchange of let-ters between the EU and the OSCE laid the foundation for a more structured partnership with regular meetings at the working and leadership level. The effects of this are already being felt, with an increase in larger-scale coop-eration projects spanning longer periods of time. This in-cludes the training program for the Turkmen authorities at the border with Afghanistan, an initiative funded by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). Another example is the ambitious monitoring project that follows legal proceedings against the perpetrators of organized crime in the Western Balkans.
At a less high-profile level, it has been possible to build on and expand relationships with regional orga-nizations whose members hail from the eastern zones of the OSCE and beyond. Among these are the Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Securi-ty TreaSecuri-ty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-tion (SCO). Regular criticism in the form of both formal and informal statements has been made about the con-tact with these organizations by some participating states, since they are seen to represent values that differ from those embodied by the OSCE. However, for reasons of politico-geographical balance, I believe that maintain-ing relationships with these regional organizations is worthwhile. In terms of the issues addressed by the dif-ferent organizations, there is at least some convergence of interests. With the EAEU, for instance, there is a shared interest in connectivity in the economic area. With the SCO, there is common ground in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. As for the relationships with the CIS and the CSTO, commonalities can primarily be found in political and politico-military issues. Coopera-tion with all four of these organizaCoopera-tions is mainly pursued through regular meetings at the Secretariat leadership level, as well as through participation in relevant confer-ences and seminars. More ambitious plans, such as shared program-related activities along the lines of joint capaci-ty-building projects, have not yet been realized. This is partly due to complex approval procedures, for instance in the SCO; a lack of funding (the Russian Federation makes very few extra-budgetary contributions); and, at a broader level, inadequate capacity within the Secretariats of the partner organizations.
The OSCE has maintained relationships for many years with two groups of partner countries: the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Egypt, Algeria,
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia) and Asian Partners for Co-operation (Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, South Ko-rea, and Thailand). Both of these are very interesting groupings, albeit ones characterized by high heterogene-ity and diverging interests in and capacheterogene-ity for coopera-tion. Something very similar could be said from the per-spective of the OSCE’s participating states: There is a lack of continuity due to the sharply differing interests of the various chairing countries.25 The level of motivation shown toward the cooperation partners by the 57 partici-pating states also varies considerably. While the Mediter-ranean partnership traditionally enjoys a great deal of at-tention in the OSCE’s southern realm, it is barely acknowledged in other places. Interest also fluctuates over time. For instance, enthusiasm within the OSCE for cooperation with Afghanistan has waned significantly in recent years. The lack of continuity is further cemented by a lack of resources. The External Cooperation Section of the Secretariat is underfunded, while the regular budget permits the funding of precisely two regional conferenc-es. Nonetheless, the relevance of both partnerships has grown over the years. This is thanks in part to the success-ful endeavors of individual chairing countries. Germany and Italy must be mentioned here, since they succeeded in elevating the OSCE Mediterranean Conference to the ministerial level. The issue of migration has loomed large in recent years, which doubtless played a part. However, the partners themselves have also done their bit to boost relevance. Some of them – Australia, South Korea, and es-pecially Japan – are now some of the OSCE’s major do-nors. I endeavored to reinforce this positive trend through a number of targeted measures:
25 The newest member of the Troika chairs the Mediterranean Contact Group, while the oldest member leads the Asia Contact Group.
Thomas Greminger with UN Secretary General António Guterres, New York, 26 April 2018 / OSCE
• To use medium-term strategies to give partnerships a longer-term outlook and thus create greater continuity;
• To make the financing of program-related activities more sustainable by mobilizing extra-budgetary resources more systematically;
• To eliminate the “out of area” restriction for program-related activities;
• To build partnerships with selected regional organiza-tions.
With the League of Arab States (LAS), we succeeded in or-ganizing meetings at the Secretary General level, as well as establishing frameworks for cooperating on issues such as human trafficking, mediation support, and pre-venting violent extremism. It was a similar story with the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), with which I was able to sign a MoU on behalf of the OSCE Secretariat for the first time. Here, interests were centered on operational cooperation in the areas of climate change and security.
Elsewhere, however, the plan of using the Thai Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to consolidate cooperation with the regional organization did not come to fruition. At the crucial moment, there was insufficient awareness and means on both sides.
In order to enable precise control and monitor-ing of OSCE activities in Afghanistan, a new restriction was brought in whereby program-related activities out-side of the OSCE space were only permitted with special approval from the Permanent Council. However, the im-pacts of this new rule hampered operational cooperation with all partner countries. This was especially notable during the Arab Spring, during which time there was ma-jor interest in cooperating with the OSCE in areas such as the rule of law, democratic institutions, small arms, and security sector reform. An attempt by the Italian Chair to eliminate this obstacle to cooperation failed in 2018, ow-ing to resistance from a large participatow-ing state. None-theless, I remain convinced that passing such a measure is within the realms of possibility, so long as assurances are given that there will be clear guarantees of transparency with regard to projects funded from extra-budgetary re-sources outside the OSCE space.
As far as longer-term planning of activities with both partnership groups is concerned, there is still a lack of medium-term strategies. These would have to be drawn up by the Troika in close cooperation with the re-spective partner countries. However, particularly in the Asian partner group, a continuous thematic focus is be-coming ever clearer. This is helping to give the partner-ship a clear profile. For several years now, the fixed the-matic pillars of the partnership have been cybersecurity, the prevention of violent extremism, and the topic of women, peace, and security. Unfortunately, when it comes to sustainable funding for the activities of both partner groups, there is not much positive to say about it.
The partnership fund is gradually being eaten away, while specific project funding is usually only aimed at the short term.
The ambition to build more effective partner-ships had to come from actors who had, up until that point, played a somewhat marginal role in the OSCE de-spite proclamations to the contrary: the private sector, development and international financial institutions, as well as academia and think tanks. Over the last few years, I have observed a growing interest among representa-tives of the private sector in supporting or specifically working with the OSCE. This could be attributed to an in-creasing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR), but it may also have something to do with shared interests. The OSCE makes important contributions to the production of public goods, such as stability and solid rule of law institutions, which are relevant to the economy.
This explains, for instance, the current interest in the OSCE expressed by the companies of the Southeast Euro-pean Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which operate in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. Experiences with public-private partnerships (PPPs) in recent years have shown that this highly promising form of cooperation – which tracks perfectly with SDG 17 – can yield positive results for both sides as long as mutual expectations are clarified and clearly defined.
The OSCE has a clear interest in deepening its cooperation with actors in the private sector. However, it must adjust its working processes and its corporate cul-ture if it is to do this. The first steps of this process are al-ready under way. It is also necessary to reflect critically on the OSCE’s perception of itself as a “political organiza-tion.” In the 21st century, does “political” really mean re-maining only within the circle of government officials?
Only taking a short-term view? Ignoring structural as-pects? I believe it would be worthwhile to return to the
“comprehensive” view of security, of which the OSCE is rightly proud.
There are also preconceptions about the conse-quences of running a “political” organization. This goes some way to explaining the reticence in the OSCE’s deal-ing with development and international financial organi-zations, even though there is a great deal of overlap in the operational fields of activity in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia. It is pos-sible to name some isolated examples of cooperation with bilateral development organizations, such as the partnership with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in fighting corruption in Georgia and the effort to establish a framework for cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which has potential for further development. For the OSCE’s part, the processes in the extra-budgetary realm must be steered more decisively away from small projects and toward longer-term programs.
Conversely, the organization has a long tradi-tion of cooperating with think tanks. On the more concep-tual side of politics, notable partnerships include those with the Wilson Center in Washington and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Mean-while, the partnership with the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) covers the en-tire spectrum of the OSCE’s activities. So far, the idea of using the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic In-stitutions, established in 2013, to expand OSCE-related research activities and spread them across all regions of the OSCE space has only been partly successful. Although the network now has more than 100 members, it is more or less always the same institutions that are actively in-volved in research projects due to financial reasons. Core funding that is not tied to any specific project and is sup-ported by a wider group of countries would help here. This kind of structure is commonplace among major interna-tional research programs. It is undeniable that the net-work produces studies that are highly relevant to the OSCE’s agenda. For instance, research has been published on the road that led to the Paris Charter and related his-torical narratives (2017), the reduction in the risk of con-ventional deterrence in NATO-Russia contact zones (2018), and the creation of an informal platform of local peace-builders (2019). However, there is no established frame-work that would make it possible to present the research results to Track 1 actors and thereby open the door to real dialogue between research and diplomacy.