2. POST-FOUNDATIONAL POLITICAL ONTOLOGY
2.2. Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemonic Conception of Politics
The concept of hegemony emerged as a response to the crisis of Marxist ideol-ogy. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, differ-ent strands of Marxism from Rosa Luxemburg to George Sorel sought to ac-count for the growing gap between the opacity of social reality and the theoreti-cal uniformity of Marxist categories, between the actual heterogeneity of the workers and the theoretical homogeneity of the proletariat (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 18). Diverse political forces, as Leninism in Russia proved, can hege-monise the revolutionary task of the proletariat. A theoretical breakthrough, however, was made by Antonio Gramsci according to whom the working class, as a leading intellectual and cultural force, needs to create a collective will from a series of different social demands (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 65–71). Later, the discursive conception of “hegemony” seeks to leave behind the remaining
remnants of essentialism and foundationalism. To achieve this objective, as we will see, Laclau uses Heidegger’s ontological difference.
Orthodox Marxists claim to have identified the objective laws of economics operative underneath the surface of social processes, institutions and practices.
The economic base determines the superstructure of social phenomena such as culture and politics (Laclau 1990a: 7–42). A legal system, for instance, reflects the historical stage in which economic production finds itself at that particular moment. No matter what type of society we are dealing with, social relations and identities are determined by the laws of economics. The structure of society and history is made transparent by the impersonal and immutable laws of dialectical materialism.
If, as Laclau and Mouffe believe, the differential chain of social signifiers lacks an unquestionable centre, then society, as a signifying system, does not appear as a self-grounding objectivity, as a fully transparent and immediate reality:
“Against the essentialist vision we tend nowadays to accept the infinitude of the social, that is, the fact that any structural system is limited, that it is always sur-rounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to master and that, conse-quently, ‘society’ as a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its own par-tial processes is an impossibility” (Laclau 1990a: 90).
Contrary to metaphysical representations, society does not precede the infinite field of interlinked identities and practices as a pre-given essence or substance.
What we are left with and what we have to start with in the age of dissolution of all certainties is the endless proliferation of social difference. Yet, according to Laclau and Mouffe, this does not mean that we end up with a bundle of pure particularistic identities. In the same way as society, particularities are not en-closed objectivities with a literal meaning (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 103–104).
How is then social formation possible when the meaning of neither particular nor society is finally fixed?
“Communitarian fullness”, conceived as a determined and immediate being, is structurally impossible (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 93–96). Yet, for Laclau and Mouffe, this impossible object is structurally necessary insofar as social relations and particularities do not exist in a perpetual state of chaos. The social necessity for an order manifests itself intensely in the state of disorder where
“’order’ is present as that which is absent” (Laclau 1996: 44). An order, if it is present in the state of privation, lacks a particular content. Having suspended its normal functioning, an order reveals itself as an empty form or as “the empty signifier” without a particular signified. Laclau and Mouffe think that the experience of this lack sets in motion the political attempts at instituting a normal state of affairs. In the concrete circumstances, there are multiple possibilities as to how the social field can be organised. An exact form that an order takes cannot be deduced form some positive rules or premises (Laclau &
Mouffe 1985: 105–114). The construction of “people” occurs on a contingent
terrain where competing political forces seek to articulate a social bond. The political act of institution (or “political articulation”) gives a particular content to an order as such and, by doing so, constitutes the objectivity of the social. In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe attribute to politics “the status of an ontology of the social” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiv; original emphasis).
In order to grasp the character of an instituted order, Laclau and Mouffe elaborate Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. A realised order, resulting from an articulatory practice, is hegemonic in the sense that “a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it […]” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiii). A missing order can be embodied by different particularities none of which are by nature suitable for the task (Laclau 1996: 42–43). For Marchart and Mouffe, universality is thus a hegemonic universality; analogously, a concrete order is always a hegemonic order. In the state of crisis, political projects compete for the hegemonisation of an absent communitarian fullness. In order to hegemonise the empty signifier and fill in the lack, a particularity needs to detach itself from a particular signified. A socialist party, for instance, does not just advance its own narrow interests. In order to articulate other identities and political forces, socialism needs to address a much wider spectrum of unsatisfied socio-political concerns and issues (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 183–183). The problems of ecology, racism, or chauvinism need to be articulated within the paradigm of Marxism. What, in the end, is at stake in the workers’ struggle is not only the emancipation of the proletariat, but rather universal emancipation.
What Laclau does not get tired of emphasising is the fact that a hegemonic incarnation of communitarian fullness never sutures the gap between the universal and the particular: “[O]n the one hand, the ruler imposes a particular order; on the other, and as the alternative to this particular order is chaos (nothingness), it has also to incarnate order as such, whose indifference to the particularity of its contents likens it to pure Being” (Laclau & Zac 1994: 30; my emphasis). Here, Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings is reformulated as the difference between an order as such and a particular order. As such, an order does not have a fixed content. That is why the onto-logical and the ontic never coincide for Laclau: “[T]here is no ontic content that, by itself, has a precise ontological signification. But, conversely, there is no ontological signification constructed other than through an investment of an ontic content” (Laclau 2014: 115). Thus, putting it in Heidegger’s terms, being never gives itself immediately as a transparent being with an objective referent;
being is not one being among beings. In Laclau’s terms, being discloses itself always and only through the “ontic investment” (e.g., Laclau 2000: 79; Laclau 2005: 83–93). This means that communitarian fullness appears only through the investment in an ontic content, in one particularity. By untying itself from its differential signified, the Green party, for example, can totalise itself and represent absent communitarian fullness (i.e., pure being).
To recapitulate Laclau’s main point, hegemonic incarnations never reconcile society with itself. A particularity, embodying an absent society, is unable to
erase its partial nature completely. A hegemonic body, although it has acquired the status of the universal, cannot abolish its own particularity (Laclau &
Mouffe 1985: xiii). In the end, universalisation always fails. The political ordering of the social is only an ontic “substitute” that necessarily fails to realise communitarian fullness. A hegemonic order “lives in [the] unresolvable tension between universality and particularity” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiii). This inherent tension comes forth in the state of disorder where the universality of a hegemonic order is challenged and called into question. What exactly is per-ceivable in these extreme situations is “the contingent nature of so-called
‘objectivity’” (Laclau 1990a: 35; my emphasis). That, how the line between the universal and the particular, the identical and the different is fixed in a particular order, is always contingent. From Laclau and Mouffe’s point of view, social relations and identities can be rearticulated through the displacement of dichotomous categories. A hegemonic order never coincides with itself as long as it is cut across by the dichotomous tensions.
On Laclau and Mouffe’s account, it is possible to experience the un-resolvable tensions at the antagonistic frontiers of social objectivity. The tensional relations between binary opposites manifest themselves through the antagonistic opposition that is neither the objective relation like “the real opposition” (Realrepugnanz) between real objects nor “the logical contra-diction” between conceptual objects (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 122–124). The antagonistic frontier rather prevents social identities from being fully deter-mined objectivities:
“Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevent its being fixed as full positivity” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 125).
The antagonising force, due to which “I” cannot be “I”, blocks identity as pure presence. Social antagonism signals thus the necessary failure or lack in the constitution of identity. An identity as an enclosed and immediate reality is impossible. Yet, on the other side, the antagonistic limits function as the condi-tion of possibility for any type of identity (including social formacondi-tion as a whole). A partially fixed positivity of the social rests on the relation with the negative or with the non-relational element that is heterogeneous with respect to a symbolic order (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 127–129). Neither positivity nor negativity is a fully constituted reality, that is, pure positivity or pure negativity.
The boundary between dichotomous opposites, as Laclau says, emerges through the “interplay of mutual subversions between the contingent and the necessary”, between the positive and the negative (Laclau 1990a: 27). This mutual subver-sion takes place in the zone of undecidability where political articulation, or the political act of institution, decides on the limit relation between dichotomous concepts and, by doing so, brings into existence the social as a political totality.
Political articulation, as a performative act, produces the constellation of di-chotomies by determining for example the relation between inside and outside.
The chain of social differences, with which Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemonic politics begins, is a discursive field without a fixed centre. This social field, divided into a series of struggles, lacks a natural representation. If there is not any self-grounding and immediate totality, then the only way how political arti-culation can construct the social bond is through the act of subversion (Laclau
& Mouffe 1985: 128). To achieve this, political articulation must produce a
“subversive outside” (or a radical negativity) in opposition to which differential signifiers, or social fragments, are subverted and linked together into “the chain of equivalences” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 127–134). The social bond is not based on a positive identity. From Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective, the social field constructs itself as a signifying totality only by maintaining the equi-valential relation with that what it is not, with that what negates or antagonises all its being. In this way, the equivalential chain manages to signify commu-nitarian fullness in its absence. This lack or deprived presence, however, cannot be represented directly: “A simple absence does not require any type of representation, but if the absence as such is present within the structure, it requires access to the field of representation. This representation, however, cannot be a direct one, because what is represented is an absence” (Laclau 2014:
118). A signifier that incarnates an absent society creates a discursive-hegemonic order whose positivity is subversively mediated or reflexively determined by negativity. So, for Laclau and Mouffe, the positivity of the social depends on its relation with an antagonistic outside. Political articulation constructs discursively the boundary, or the antagonistic frontier, between binary opposites such as the universal and the particular.
All in all, for Laclau and Mouffe, social formation remains a precarious space that cannot be literally fixed once and for all as long as the antagonistic relation can be contested and displaced. That what is inside of an order and that what is outside of an order is precariously determined by political struggle.