Peninsula rose eightfold between 1950 and 2007 (from 8 to 58 million) while that of the Levant increased fourfold; up to 75 percent of the population in North Africa is under the age of 30.64 According to the Population Reference Bureau in 2005, nearly 95 million people in the MENA were between the ages of 15 and 24 alone, but were suffering from “political, social, and economic systems [that] have not evolved in a way that effectively meets the changing needs of its rapidly growing young population.”65 These place great strain on struggling economies to generate sufficient jobs to absorb the generation of young people entering regional labor markets. Indeed, World Bank estimates that 5 million jobs will need to be created each year for the next two decades emphasize the scale of the challenge ahead.66 Together, these factors place authoritarian regimes in a difficult position as they seek to balance globalizing forces with the maintenance of their domestic bases of support and power. The awkward paradox facing regional policymakers is that discontent at faltering political economies will likely be worsened by attempts to hold back or dilute the processes of greater global engagement.
Yet, it is these same global pressures that have given the civil uprisings their sharpness by bringing into clearer focus the possibility of alternatives to the status quo. Their empowering effect on youth groups and activists will not be settled by regime attempts to minimize their influence through greater levels of surveillance or control. They also
64 C. Spencer, “Introduction: North Africa and Britain,”
International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, September 2009, p. 924; A.
Drysdale, “Population Dynamics and Birth Spacing in Oman,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1, February 2010, p. 124.
65 R. Assaad and F. Roudi-Fahimi, “Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or Challenge?,” Popula-tion Reference Bureau Policy Brief, Washington, April 2007, p. 1.
66 Tunis Declaration adopted at the conference on “Building 21st Century Knowledge Economies for Job Growth and Competi-tiveness in the Middle East,” Tunis, November 3, 2009, http://
go.worldbank.org/0R2V9YA0I0.
reflect officials’ misplaced belief that they can separate technological advances from societal changes.
Several major themes represent the crux of the issue for regional policymakers. Is the Arab Spring shaping up to be a true revolutionary moment or merely a change of elites that simply reproduces the inherited structures of power? Beyond the removal of the person of the dictator and his immediately family (most notably his sons), can the broader regime of “crony capitalists” and networks of patronage be removed? Is the military a part of the “old regime” or can it be trusted to oversee the move toward democracy, as, for example, in Egypt? Can a counter-elite emerge to challenge the existing elite, as has happened (democratically and without a revolution) in Turkey after 2002? How will the successor regimes cope with the massive socio-economic challenges, such as unemployment and economic exclusion, and with the inevitable disillusionment when people’s material situation fails to improve overnight?
It is still far from clear, and also too early to tell, if the Arab revolution will transition toward democratization and the consolidation of its institutions and values. Significant obstacles remain unresolved in states weakened by the legacies of authoritarian rule, lacking autonomous civil society organizations and freely independent political parties, and unsure of the relationship between the citizen and the state inherent in concepts of citizenship. Although the elections in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and 2012 provided a legitimate test of the strength of participatory mechanisms and direction of public opinion in the post-revolutionary moment, democratic transition is about much more than the mere conduct of elections, important though they are. It is about internalizing and embedding concepts of social justice, inclusion, and cohesion as a starting-point for reformulating the relationship between the state
and its citizens. The development of a substantive democratic political system will inevitably be a long process, as it has been elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Multiple transitions need to occur on political, economic, and social levels.67 European and GCC States in the Mediterranean For the European Union (EU) states, the political upheaval in North Africa posed a multifaceted challenge to their southern flank. In particular, migration dynamics dominated and largely overshadowed EU policymakers’ thinking in their dealings with their counterparts in North Africa.
Ex-Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi’s maverick attempt in 2010 to obtain payments of up to €5 billion each year in return for stopping illegal migration from Africa to Europe was symptomatic of this approach.68 The securitization of migration contributed in part to the marginalization of the lofty cooperative ideals expressed at the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995.69 It also hindered attempts in the 2000s to respond to local calls for political change and democratic participation. During that period, state responses to migration became increasingly militarized as the policy discussion of international flows of people was transformed from a social or labor issue into a security matter, particularly after September 11, 2001. This reflected multiple concerns or perceptions that migrants might become a social or economic burden, a threat to cultural or national identity or, after 9/11, even a potential agent or supporter of terrorism. The shock of the attacks on the United States prompted many developed countries, including the member states of the European Union, to suspend plans to liberalize
67 K. Coates Ulrichsen and D. Held, “The Arab 1989 Revisited,”
Open Democracy, September 27, 2011.
68 “Gaddafi Wants EU Cash to Stop African Migrants,” BBC News, August 31, 2010.
69 K. Kausch and R. Youngs, “The End of the Euro-Mediterra-nean Vision,” International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, September 2009, p. 239.
immigration policies, and adopt more vigorous measures to ensure border (and “homeland”) security instead.70
All of these pathologies were on display in European policy reactions to the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The initial unrest in Tunisia and the subsequent violence in Libya resulted in thousands of Tunisians and Libyans fleeing their homeland and making their way to the small Italian island of Lampedusa. Their arrival was received with hostility by the Berlusconi government amid a febrile domestic political debate on immigration and asylum. Public and political discourse alike equated the arrivals with heightened fears for crime and insecurity, playing on already-existent local and national concerns for economic security in the middle of the European debt crisis. The fact that the countries that are most affected by the economic turmoil are those on the southern rim of Europe is also a significant factor in guiding policy toward migration.71 A similar tension became evident in the startling success of the extreme far-right and anti-immigrant Golden Dawn party in the two Greek elections in May and June 2012, revealing the rise of a virulent nationalism aimed at protecting citizens from the new arrivals.72
The Arab Spring thus intersected with Europe’s alarming economic slowdown, creating diverging push and pull dimensions to the inter-regional relationship. Both North Africa and southern Europe experienced simultaneous bouts of sustained political upheaval and economic dislocation during 2011 that look set to last for prolonged periods of time. While granting that their very different causes were rooted
70 P.J. Smith, “Climate Change, Mass Migration, and the Military Response,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 628-29.
71 S. McMahon, “Italy is Failing North Africa’s Refugees,” The Guardian, April 6, 2011.
72 J. Henley and L. Davies, “Greece’s Far-right Golden Dawn Party Maintains Share of Vote,” The Guardian, June 18, 2012.
in fundamentally distinct socio-political and economic systems, they nevertheless represented systemic shocks to the system in each region. Yet their synchronicity has increased the incentives for emigration from MENA countries just as it has reduced public and political support for immigration into Europe. This has had, and will continue to have, political implications throughout Europe, as politicians fear being outflanked by the resurgence of populist, largely right-wing political groups, and consequently adopt tougher lines on immigration.
By contrast, the GCC states have been able and willing to utilize their comparatively greater financial leverage to shape the direction of transition in North Africa. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser extent, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have used their political, economic, and cultural influence to play a markedly greater role in the region since early 2011. Qatar and the UAE provided essential support to the anti-Gaddafi rebellion and played a pivotal role in engineering the United Nations Security Council resolution and subsequent multi-national intervention. They then recognized the Transitional National Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people and supplied it with a wide range of military and non-military equipment that proved essential to its eventual success in toppling the Gaddafi regime.73 In Egypt, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network was heavily involved in covering the initial uprising that toppled Mubarak in 2011, and subsequently in reporting the 2012 presidential elections that resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power. The tone of its coverage, particularly by its newly-formed Egyptian subsidiary channel, Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr, came in for strong criticism, with the accusation that the channel “has been dedicating its coverage in favour of the Muslim
73 K. Coates Ulrichsen, “Libya and the Gulf: Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” Hurst Publishers’ Blog, December 16, 2011.
Brotherhood around the clock.” Prominent UAE commentator Sultan al-Qassemi argued that “Al Jazeera’s love affair with the Muslim Brotherhood was evident from the channel’s beginning” in 1996, noting the high profile of one of the Brotherhood’s intellectual leaders, the Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, at the network.74 Indeed, while al-Qaradawi had long been noted for his voluminous writings on Islamic jurisprudence, theology, education, and Islamic finance, the establishment of Al Jazeera provided him with a platform to reach a global audience through his regular religious program, Sharia and Law.75
Yet it would be wrong to view the GCC states as a monolithic entity in their political involvement in North Africa. It is precisely in the transition states that significant fault-lines have developed between Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other. Qatar has provided refuge to al-Qaradawi since 1961, and also took in political dissidents from many other Arab countries. They included prominent Libyan Islamists such as Ali and Ismail al-Sallabi. Both played a prominent role in the uprising against Gaddafi, and channeled the majority of Qatari assistance through their own militias and networks.76 Blessed with a fortuitous combination of a very small national population and massive hydrocarbon reserves, Qatar — uniquely in the MENA — views the Arab Spring as an opportunity, rather than a challenge, and can afford to be sanguine about the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood without undue concern for any domestic blowback within Qatar itself.
74 S.S. Al-Qassemi, “Morsi’s Win is Al Jazeera’s Loss,” Al-Monitor, July 1, 2012.
75 B. Graf and J. Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global Mufti The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, London, Hurst, 2009, pp.
4-5.
76 S. Dagher, C. Levinson, and M. Coker, “Tiny Kingdom’s Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern,” Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2011.
The same cannot be said of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both countries have attempted to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood and its local affiliates, and escalated their surveillance and repression of domestic Islamist activists since 2011. The chief of the Dubai Police, Lieutenant-General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, went so far as to inform a Kuwaiti newspaper in March 2012 of a Brotherhood plot to take over the GCC states by 2016, beginning with Kuwait in 2013.77 In late July, in the wake of the arrest of more than 50 activists in the UAE, Khalfan spoke again of an “international plot” to overthrow Gulf governments, warning that they must be on guard against the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood as much as from Iran. He added, provocatively and seemingly without any evidence, that “[t]he bigger our sovereign wealth funds and the more money we put in the banks of Western countries, the bigger the plot to take over our countries.”78 Consequently, officials in Saudi Arabia and the UAE viewed the empowerment of political Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia with deep suspicion.
During the protracted Egyptian parliamentary election process in 2011, rumors persisted of Saudi funding for the Salafist Nur party in Egypt.79 Aside from political channels, Gulf States’
assistance to North Africa has taken a number of other forms. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been major investors in Egypt while Qatari investments in Libya and Tunisia have also increased
significantly. Much of these flows has gone into funding major infrastructural development or as budgetary transfers. The UAE, for instance, pledged
$3 billion in aid and investments following the fall of Mubarak, while it also hosts some 300,000 Egyptians whose remittances constitute important
77 “Islamists Plot Against Gulf: Dubai Police Chief,” Gulf News, March 27, 2012.
78 “Dubai Police Chief Warns of Muslim Brotherhood, Iran Threat,” Business Intelligence Middle East, July 26, 2012.
79 Y. Trofimov, “As Islamists Flex Muscles, Egypt’s Christians Despair,” The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2011.
inflows into an ailing Egyptian economy.80 In 2011, the volume of Saudi investments in Egypt totalled some $110 billion with bilateral trade in excess of
$3.5 billion annually. Moreover, in June 2012 alone, Saudi Arabia approved $430 million in project aid to Egypt as well as a $750 million line of credit to import petroleum products, in addition to a separate transfer of $1.5 billion in direct budget support.81 Qatari investment in Libya surged after the fall of Gaddafi, while it has signed agreements with the new leadership in Tunisia relating to infrastructural development and assistance in the oil and gas sectors.82
In addition, the GCC states are home to some of the largest and most region-focused aid-giving agencies. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development, as well as multilateral institutions such as the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Bank for Development, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa are all hosted or closely linked to the GCC states. Individually and collectively, these organizations have long records of giving aid to conflict-affected countries or those undergoing transition in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Significantly, political and humanitarian motivations appear to be greater drivers of aid policy than purely economic motives, while they often lack the conditions-based element associated with multilateral organizations. While problematic in terms of a relative lack of transparency and commitment to entrenching certain normative values, such as good governance, human rights, and women’s empowerment, these modalities offer the potential for “quick-fix” solutions, albeit lacking
80 S.S. Al-Qassemi, “Will Egypt’s New President Rebuild Ties with the UAE?,” Gulf News, June 27, 2012.
81 S.S. Al-Qassemi, “Nayef’s Demise: Relief for the Brothers?,”
Egypt Independent, June 25, 2012.
82 “Qatar, Tunisia Sign Investment Accords,” Gulf Times, January 14, 2012.
the potential for generating longer-term sustainable development.83
Thus the GCC states are better positioned than their European partners to make targeted and quick interventions in North Africa. Gulf States lack the historical-political “baggage” and human rights-related conditions to aid and development policies and, as such, may be more palatable for states and societal stakeholders in North Africa.
“Soft” forms of assistance, such as remittances, will remain important to struggling regional economies, as will the more dubious forms of direct budgetary assistance. Against this, questions about the coherence and structure of GCC states’ approaches to North Africa (as elsewhere), and about their ability to sustain and implement them, remain unresolved. Recent analysis of Qatar’s widely hailed diplomatic mediation, for example, has emphasized the lack of monitoring and implementation capacity, the small size of Qatar’s professional expertise, and the apparent absence of long-term visions or plans.84
Future Challenges
In addition to doubts about the viability of GCC states’ regional engagement, which, in the case of Qatar’s policy in Libya became viewed by members of the Transitional National Council as controversial owing to its scale and alleged intrusion into Libyan sovereignty, there are a number of other factors that suggest there are difficulties ahead. First and foremost is the fact that the Arab Spring is still very much underway, and while it may appear to have largely bypassed the GCC states, Bahrain apart, there are worrying signs that this may not be the case. Nervous rulers reacted to the unfolding upheaval by announcing
83 S. Barakat and S. Zyck, “Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments,” LSE Kuwait Programme Research Papers, No. 10, July 2009, pp. 29-34.
84 M. Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4, Autumn 2011, p. 556.
massive packages of welfare spending and direct and indirect economic “handouts” in 2011. Their scale was enormous, with the $130 billion package of welfare measures unveiled by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia exceeding the cost of every national budget prior to 2007. Other measures included hand-outs of cash (Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE), creating jobs in already saturated public sectors (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman), and raising workers’ wages and benefits (Saudi Arabia, Oman).85
The challenge now facing Gulf policymakers is two-fold. One is that the measures are fiscally unsustainable over the medium and longer term.
Over the past decade, the break-even price of oil that Gulf economies require to balance their budgets has risen inexorably. In Saudi Arabia, the increase has been from $20 to nearly $90 per barrel, with the Institute for International Finance forecasting a break-even price of $115 by 2015.
Bahrain already faces a break-even price exceeding
$100 per barrel while even the oil-rich UAE has seen its benchmark soar from $23 in 2008 to $92 in 2011. In Kuwait, the International Monetary Fund warned that the escalating rise in government spending meant that “government expenditure will exhaust all oil revenues by 2017, which means the government will not be able to save any portion of these revenues for future generations.”86 Budgeted spending in Kuwait trebled between 2004 and 2011 by which time it already accounted for up to 85 percent of annual oil income. The practical consequences of this profligacy became clear in a startling admission by the acting finance minister in March 2012 that Kuwait would require an oil
85 S. Hertog, “The Costs of Counter-Revolution in the GCC,”
Foreign Policy, May 31, 2011.
86 T. Arnold, “IMF Tells Kuwait to Cut Spending or Risk Running Out of Oil Money,” The National, May 17, 2012.
price of $109.50 to balance the budget in 2012-13, and an astronomical $213.50 by 2029-30.87 The second difficulty is that the decision to intensify the politics of patronage by increasing the flow of unproductive payoffs to key sectors of society delivers damaging blows to the attempts in recent years to scale back the role of the state in the economy and boost the role of the private sector. Instead of strengthening the private sector and weaning citizens off public sector employment, the new packages expand government spending and widen an already large discrepancy between the public and private sectors. In addition, they create hostages to fortune by locking in government spending at very high levels that depend on the
price of $109.50 to balance the budget in 2012-13, and an astronomical $213.50 by 2029-30.87 The second difficulty is that the decision to intensify the politics of patronage by increasing the flow of unproductive payoffs to key sectors of society delivers damaging blows to the attempts in recent years to scale back the role of the state in the economy and boost the role of the private sector. Instead of strengthening the private sector and weaning citizens off public sector employment, the new packages expand government spending and widen an already large discrepancy between the public and private sectors. In addition, they create hostages to fortune by locking in government spending at very high levels that depend on the