fight the Shia Houthis that
were based in the Saadah
province.”
Volume 7, Issue 1 | January/ February 2015 Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Yemen — Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff
For the central government however, Al Hirak is a violent separatist move-ment and a grave threat to national security, especially as the country’s larg-est oil reserves are in the south.
Looking Ahead
The threat from extremism and terrorism has almost led the country to the brink – a failing or a failed state with the sectarian battle between the Sunni Salafists – including the AQAP and its affiliates – and the Shia Houthis which is also worsening by the day. At the same time, implementation of NDC’s pro-posals that hold prospects of peace and stability is incumbent on the involve-ment of all the parties, factions, tribes and groups in the country. Cooperation, compromises, and trust between them is an imperative that cannot be overes-timated. Yemen also needs the support of the international community to de-grade the threat from AQAP. Eventually, everything depends on how inclu-sive the government can be with policies aiming at social cohesion, economy progress and ultimately political stability in the country.
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Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Ra-jaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU.
Since the shift in leadership in 2013, with Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani succeeding his father Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Qatar has adopted a more interventionist approach to regional politics. The moves become significant in light of the current political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite its shortage of human resources, Qatar’s wealth and its desire for influence has led it to adopt a proxy war politics strategy, with the aim of furthering its influence as a leader of Sunni Islam. To a considerable extent, its past involvement, albeit indirect, in Libyan, Egyptian and Tunisian politics made Qatar a regional peace broker. However, in 2014 Qatar seemed to be moving away from this posture and, instead, has indirectly contributed to the political destabilization of the region.
Countries that benefitted from Qatari aid have been experiencing deteriorating political milieus, the most prominent being Libya, currently in a state of war with militias. Also, Egypt is severely affected by an uncertain transition from authoritarianism and Syria has become home to one of the most complex conflicts in the region. In 2014 Qatar continued to get involved in these ongoing conflicts. Most notably, its unconditional support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its strong support for Salafi extremists in Syria were Qatar’s pivots of its 2014 foreign policy.
Qatar
Aida Arosoaie
Middle East
Volume 7, Issue 1 | January/ February 2015 Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Qatar, the Muslim Brothers and the GCC While the Saudis and its close allies perceive the Muslim Brotherhood as a direct threat to their domestic security, Qatar has generously supported it in conflicts occurring from Libya to Egypt, and from Tunisia to Syria. Considering Doha’s longstanding relation between the Muslim Brothers, Qatar sees the organization as an Kuwait strongly supporting the Egypt’s military-backed interim regime led by al-Sissi, the Egyptian conflict became the flashpoint of a rift in relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council, of which Qatar is a member state. The three Gulf States demanded Doha to cease its support for Islamists, considerably curb the biased coverage Al Jazeera gave the Brotherhood and stop the network from referring to the events in July 2013 as a coup d’etat. Moreover, on 5 March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates recalled their ambassadors from Doha in a sign of protest over Qatar’s patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although representatives of the Qatari government publicly expressed their revolt at the Saudi and UAE demands regarding the emirate’s conduct of foreign policy, Doha tacitly understood that the situation could escalate into a severe crisis within the GCC.
Despite its struggle to overtake Saudi Arabia as the leader of Sunni Muslims in the region, Doha recognizes that its position in the GCC is crucial for expanding its influence in the region. On 13 September 2014 Qatar requested seven senior members of the Brotherhood to leave Doha, giving in to several months of increasing pressures from its neighbours to stop supporting extremist Islamists. Furthermore, on 25 September the Qatari government instituted a new law to regulate domestic charities in order to prevent them from engaging in financing militant groups.
On October 2014, Emir Shiekh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani flew to Jeddah. Although Qatar seems to have met all of the demands put forward by King Abdullah, the latter remains skeptical regarding Doha’s claim that it has completely stopped financing terrorist groups.
This is an especially critical aspect in view of claims that Qatar continues to support Jabhat
al-Nusra, Syria’s Al-Qaeda affiliate. As of now, it remains unclear whether Qatar’s increasingly interventionist approach to regional politics will prove detrimental to its overall advance as a regional political power. However, judging by the reactions of its Gulf neighbours vis-a-vis its support for Salafist activities, it is likely that Qatar’s wealth and multiple, sometimes conflicting affiliations, might in fact become a factor for undermining peace rather than brokering it.
Qatar and the Salafists
Over the last 15 years, Doha has established itself as an operating hub for the greatly interconnected Salafist community whose members live in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and other states in the region. Such old ties became extremely useful for Qatar in 2013 when it decided to start infusing huge amounts of financial support into extremist Salafi movements in Syria, with notable examples being Jabhat an-Nusra and Ahrar al Sham.
Qatar’s intervention in Syria was closely modelled after its Libyan strategy to support Islamist factions against the reigning leader, thereby increasing its influence. While the Libyan dictator Gaddafi was successfully removed from power, however, this was not the case in Syria.
The unanticipated turn of events regarding the presidency of the Arab League offered Qatar the opportunity to play an organizing role over the conflict.
Qatar — Aida Arosoaie