International Integration

Shared sovereignty, which has become commonplace to experienced mem-bers of the EU, is not a popular concept in the U.S., who relies on its own political wisdom and strength, and whose citizens visit foreign countries not nearly as often as Europeans. National pride is highly developed. Re-cently, in the U.S., I saw a frequent TV spot in which about a dozen per-sons of different racial origin tell the spectator one after the other, proudly:

“I am an American.” To imagine such an “ich bin ein Deutscher”-campaign on German television borders the ludicrous, and even in France, which has

Geert Ahrens

a more relaxed attitude towards its own history than Germany, I could not imagine a corresponding „je suis Français“-exercise.

This concept of its own national role has an influence on all international or global enterprises that might affect American sovereignty, although the U.S. is, as a rule, not principally opposed to them. To mention a few well-covered issues: The International Criminal Court (ICC), established with lukewarm U.S.-support in 1998 by the Rome Statute, has, after the Statute entered into force four years later, led to an open transatlantic row under a new U.S. administration, in which both sides sought the support of the baf-fled post-communist states of Eastern Europe, and pressured them unfairly.

Similar issues concerned the World Trade Organization and its rights, in-terventions in third countries without a UN mandate, the global environ-ment and the Kyoto protocol, or common policies on immigration and asy-lum. On all these issues, Europeans are readier to forego certain aspects of their sovereignty than Americans, but also often lack understanding for specific American interests. This transatlantic difference (with Canada on this side of the Atlantic) is exacerbated, when the American practice shows disregard for the underlying concerns.

I hesitate to name these focuses of European anti-Americanism even in my role as the Devil’s Advocate, but they belong in this context. Let me make three examples.

(One) To begin with the judiciary, I can understand American concerns that U.S. personnel, who often are necessary to resolve international crises in the interest of the international community, may be tried by a panel of, as Washington fears, biased foreign judges. However, this understanding suf-fers if the U.S. itself does not consistently observe the highest standards of human rights (Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo) expected by Europeans.

(Two) Leaving out the complicated WTO issues, I feel that an intervention without UN authorization is a serious matter because it could undermine the great progress that the 1945 Charter has created with regard to the le-gitimacy or not of warfare, an achievement that has a considerable signifi-cance for Europe and its bloody 20^th Century history. In this regard, great-est caution is necessary, and poor assessment and intelligence must not

oc-Diverging Systems of Governance

41 cur. Unfortunately, this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the im-portant initiative by the UN Secretary-General and others that goes under the name of The Responsibility to Protect.

(Three) As to the global environment, Europeans resent the non-acceptance of the Kyoto protocol by the country with the highest per capita energy consumption and, in comparison, very low energy prices. In my rented house in Maryland, I was surprised that windows could hardly be opened, and when I wanted to heat or air-condition one room, I could not but do this in ten rooms, i.e., the entire house. It is difficult to change such estab-lished behaviour, but some beginning and some more good will would cer-tainly be welcome on this side of the Atlantic.

However, none of the aforementioned three points of divergence explains a real crisis in transatlantic relations. The one real change in the political en-vironment, the end of the Cold War, has, in my view, not ended the transat-lantic community of interests. Both sides would be well advised to take each other’s interests into careful consideration, and continue their tradi-tional cooperation. These common interests are the fight against terrorism (or “war on terror”), good governance and the rule of law wherever possi-ble, free trade and world-wide economic health, and meaningful cultural exchange. Against this background, conflicts will not be lacking and ill feelings may crop up here and there, but we continue to have much in common. In any case, everything should be done to avoid primitive anti-Americanism on this side of the Atlantic, and lack of consideration for the interests or feelings of “Old Europe,” or arrogance, on the other. I am, after all, optimistic.

Robert Wade

US and European Relations with Developing Countries: Aid, Trade, and Investment

“I’m a bit of a protectionist myself in the sense, if our jobs are going to India, we’ve got to get some kind of compensatory adjustment from them” (Ray Pagett, Walton County [Florida] Democratic Party chairman, retired Coca-Cola executive who spent three years in Vienna, quoted in John Vinocur, “The Redneck Riviera, where Bush can’t lose”, Interna-tional Herald Tribune, August 31, 2004)

“The US has yet to comply with a growing list of other WTO judgements against its trade policies and some Congress members say the ratio be-tween its ‘wins’ and ‘losses’ in the organization is becoming unbalanced”

(“Trade: Fresh road map to help find the exit”, Special Survey, Financial Times, October 1, 2004.

The aid programs of the US and of European states have changed sub-stantially over time, and are now quite similar in the sorts of activities they support.¹ This is not the result of active cooperation, however, but of the growing centrality of the World Bank in defining notions of “appro-priate” activities for aid. Aid, though, is a minor part of the economic re-lations between the US and Europe, on the one hand, and developing countries on the other. Trade and investment are much more important.

Here the US and European states, especially the Group of Seven (G7), have indeed been cooperating to establish global rules of trade and in-vestment. But I shall argue that their cooperation is not necessarily a good thing in terms of a “world interest”. The rules tip the playing field of the world economy even more against developing countries than in the past, 1 For comments I thank without implicating Paul Isenman, of the OECD

Develop-ment Center, and Michael Lipton.

Robert Wade

even as much publicized disputes erupt in US-Europe trade. The US and Europe are cooperating, in other words, to lock-in their oligopolistic ad-vantages at the top of the world income hierarchy.