There are indigenous systems of governance in Ethiopia. Many of the ethnic groups of Ethiopia practice some elements of customary practice of ‘democracy’. The Seera of the Sidamo, the Gurage, the Kambata (Zewde & Pausewang 2002) the Gada system of Oromo, Garrimero people, Anuak and Madda system of Afar (Aredo &
Adal 1999), Council of elders (Pausewang et al.2002:3) all constitute some component of good governance incorporating elements of accountability, transparency, participation, legal and judicial framework and coordination and
control in their system of governance. The most well-known and researched traditional system of governance in Ethiopia is the Gada system of the Oromo.(Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 51) The Gada System is a system of classes (luba) according to which every male Oromo goes through age cycles that succeed each other every eight years in assuming military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities. Each Gada class remains in power during a specific term (Gada) which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony. The Gada system exists predominantly in pastoral areas of Oromo society notably Borana (Legesse 1973: 8). Each age group has its distinct tasks and responsibilities: where the younger male members of the community take care of the cattle, a second group has the responsibility to protect the community, and the leadership is in the hands of a fifth group. Every eight years, in a luo ceremony, men are collectively promoted to the next age cycle, while the boys born during the previous eight years are ceremonially promoted to the first age cycle. Each age group chooses its leaders by election. Those who must hand over leadership to the incoming luo group of new leaders are retired into the status of respected elders (Legesse 2006:104).
In these indigenous institutions, leadership is based on certain clearly defined criteria. For the Afar people, leadership is based on characteristics like respect, wisdom and ability. The Gada, which has age and maturity as its foundation, requires that a leader be wise, honest, patient and fair. The Garrimero people elect to their assemblies persons who are brave in war, able, and convincing. Before somebody is elected to a permanent position of leadership the person will be given six months to demonstrate his ability and prove his fortitude in governance (Aredo
& Adal 1999). In the Kambata community, leadership is highly competitive and offices are rotated ever few years among the people. The leader should be articulate in presenting his community’s case. Although he will belong to one tribe, he is expected to be impartial to his jurisdiction (Arsano 2002:51).
In these indigenous institutions leaders are accountable to the community. Afar people can recall and dismiss an incompetent leader. The Garrimero people can punish a misbehaving leader and force him into resignation when necessary. The Anuak people elect their king similar to the way the Garrimero people send their elected representatives to their assemblies (Aredo & Adal 1999). In Kamabta the activities of the administrator are horizontally checked by the community elders
including their own tribes and vertically by existing traditional system of administrative units. (Arsano 2002:51)
Participation is at the core of the institutions mentioned above. For example, the Garrimero case provides an ideal type of participation in which the adult population directly elects their representative to the assembly. The Gada system allows each member of a given age group to directly participate in community affairs (Aredo and Adal 1999). In Kemabata, Sidamo and Gurage traditional systems allow the community to participate in decision making processes on the basis of commonality and consent, rather than individualism. Decisions are arrived at through consensus after exhaustive discussion. It obliges the individual to accommodate harmony and consensus (Arsano 2002:50, Zewede 2002:22, Aadland 2002:41).
Cultural norms and moral codes are more or less fair and enforced impartially. For example, the Madaa system of the Afar people allows both the offender and the victim to suggest mediators. There is also an appeal mechanism to the party dissatisfied with the decisions of the mediators. The Sidama have a written law.
(Aadland 2002:41) The Gurage assemblies seem to combine legislative and judiciary functions. Periodic meetings are held to revise the law when such revisions are deemed necessary. They have developed standard procedures for the conduct of assembly meetings. Individuals who wanted to express an opinion present their cases. They have laws, which combine civil and criminal codes as well as traditional law enforcement mechanism. Witnesses can be introduced if necessary and give their testimony on oath and there are legal experts who may advise individuals whether their case has a chance or may not (Zewede 2002:22).
Transparency characterizes all the systems and there is free flow of information between the traditional leadership and the community. Information deliberations are undertaken in an open place (usually under the shade of a ceremonial tree).
Responsiveness is another characteristic of those indigenous institutions reviewed by Aredo and Adal, the concern of the leadership, the speed, simplicity, and flexibility of those systems shows a great deal of their responsiveness. No leadership can ignore any serious issue that affects the community members.
Effectiveness and efficiency also characterize the indigenous judicial and administrative institutions. Cultural norms and moral codes are effective instruments
of enforcement. In some cases, as in the Afar Madaa system, (Aredo & Adal 1999) the case of Kambata (Arsano 2002:51-52) and Gada system of Oromo, there is even a body of young people who are established to enforce decisions made by chiefs and mediators if the need arises. Decisions are binding as per the traditional constitutions of those systems and their resilience emanates from such effectiveness.
These systems are efficient given the speed at which the cases are handled, the simplicity of the systems, and availability of the concerned leaders within the community. The system of election of leaders, the possibility of calling them back, and a limited tenure system like that practiced in the Gada system, are all features which enhance the leadership's accountability to the community (Aredo & Adal 1999).
Legitimacy of such indigenous systems emanates from people's beliefs and participation in the systems. Authority is legitimized through precedent, custom, and usage. There are binding codes of behavior both for the leaders and members of the community. Moreover, the election and representation systems are important sources of legitimacy in such institutions. The traditional political systems described above, which are mixtures of legal force and moral/religious sanctions, seem to have operated for centuries with remarkable efficiency. They apply equally to the rich and poor. Despite this fact these indigenous system of governance are somehow far from ideal democratic systems for they exclude or limit women and minority groups' access to making positions. Though women are not able to attain decision-making positions, they play different roles in the governance structures of the community. Women of the Garrimero people can vote but cannot hold top administrative positions. Afar women play a crucial role in conflict management. In times of fighting among community members, they collect guns from the trouble makers and keep them in a safe place. When conflict arises between the Afar and the Isa people, they act as mediators (Aredo and Adal 1999). In Kambata system of governance women’s judgment is believed to be impartial. The Kambata has a tradition of fact finding and opinion gathering about the case at hand. Women’s opinions in this case have a special value and it is often solicited through family connections and neighborhood networks. In this respect, women are consulted in the house by husbands, sons, relatives or neighbors who are entrusted with the handling of the administration (Arsano 2002:49).
In this respect also Legesse 1973 asserts that in the traditional Oromo society, men are functionally dependent on women in many ways (Legesse1973: 22). Hussein (2004) gives a detailed account of Ateetee rituals, practiced only by women.
Whenever natural disasters occur, women gather and perform the ritual. Oromo women used to practice Ateetee as a way of strengthening their solidarity and as a tool to counter atrocities staged against them by men. The Ateetee practiced by women is one part of a belief system that women are intermediary figures between Waaqa (God) that represents nature and the physical world or humans. The myth is that Waaq (God) listens to women’s desire and instantly responds to it (Hussein 2004: 111, Edossa et al 2005:7).
Despite the fact that it had been misused in the conquest of southern Ethiopia, and is therefore hated among the Oromo and other groups, even the rist/risti system of the Amhara and Tigrayan societies has “intrinsically democratic roots”. (Vaughan &
Tronvoll 2003: 52, Pausewang 1994: 226) The right to life can be achieved through supporting oneself through own work. In this respect the only job available for Ethiopian peasants is cultivation and that is the only means to feed oneself. For example for the Amhara, who have been dependent on agricultural sector, the right to life is assured through having the right to share the community’s land.
(Pausewang 1994: 226) In this respect the rist system, in its original spirit is designed to protect the solidarity and continuity of the basic unit of social organization of the decent group. (Markakis1974:78) The most important ways in which men acquire rist land are by inheritance, gift, claiming it from wife’s kin’s, claiming after the death of the landlord, clearing forest land, plaguing up pasture land and taking over land abandoned by someone who has left the area. (Hoben 19973:144). Similarly, in Eritrea and parts of Tigray province there is a system of owning land communally which is called Shehena and diessa that allow each family residing in the village to have a share of land (Markakis 1974:78).
As population increased and the demands of the nobility on the peasantry grew, land became scarce, and rist turned increasingly into a fight for access to land. During the
"scramble for Africa", these cultural practices were undermined for vast resources needed to carry out Menelik’s policy of consolidating the Ethiopian empire (Pausewang 1994: 227). As a result rist became a mechanism for the exploitation of southern peasants. (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003: 52)
Political culture in Ethiopia is characterized by strict hierarchical understanding of society where each member’s socio-political position and status is clearly defined and understood according to kinship, age, sex, social/material resources and religion. Social and political interaction and behavior are guided by an elaborate set of norms and rules, which establish socio-political order on the basis of a rigid system of deference and sanction (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003: 11).
The social, cultural and economic norms and institutions can be better understood in the context within which political life is pursued and develops. The norms of political culture and behavior are transmitted to future generations through socialization. Political and social behavior will be acquired first during childhood through observation, experience, teaching and sanction at home, through interaction among the family members and between the family members and the outside world (Vaughan et al. 2003: 11). In Ethiopia political culture the pattern of interaction confirm that there exists superiority on the basis of gender and age. Members of certain groups for example (craftsmen, potters, tanners) are inferior. This system of social classification along these lines suggests that people are not equal and some people have greater ‘value’ than others. The pattern of social interaction in Ethiopia hence sustains a strictly hierarchical stratification of society, where one has to obey the ‘orders from above’ (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003: 11). There is a pattern of expressing a willingness to comply readily with the demands of any superior and withholding any direct criticism of his ideas for action. (Levine 1974:124) It has been difficult to criticize any individual in a position of authority without appearing to challenge that authority. Therefore these social relations are reflected in the political culture of Ethiopian society creating the attitudes towards authority which are difficult to mediate with the exercise of open criticism and legitimate opposition that characterize multi-party democracy. The fundamental sociopolitical dynamics and norms in Ethiopia, favor not democratization, but the perpetuation of hierarchy and authoritarianism at every level of interaction (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003: 12).
The people seldom publicly question the authority of different local units of administration. Similarly, administrators themselves seldom question the orders they receive ‘from above’ to implement in their localities. The people do not conceive that they should debate and select from alternative means on issue that affect their own lives nor do they consider it appropriate that their fellows should do so. In this kind of sociopolitical context there is little possibility or alternative to the
communication of political programs from the top-down and from the center to periphery. The hierarchical expression of political culture creates various mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. As a result the sociopolitical agenda for discourse will be within the household/family/clan or within the village/local community. As a result, attempts from opposition parties or other civil society actors to define an agenda for discourse are actively counteracted by the organs of state and government, and vice versa. The result and perpetuating cause of this exclusionary culture create limitation of public political debate. Lack of communication and dialogue perpetuates polarization and encourage political opponents to pursue actions other than peaceful statements and rallies. As a result, according to Vaughan and Tronvoll, “Since our opinions are not heard or considered through political debate, let us talk with the barrel of the gun” has been a political tradition in Ethiopia (ibid).
The potential for violent political conflict in Ethiopia is not only caused by an exclusionary political culture, but also aggravated by the monopolistic predominance of the Ethiopian state in the control of material resources of all kinds.
(Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003: 12) The combination of a hierarchical political structure within the history of Ethiopian state, and its imposition from the nineteenth century on the peripheral peoples of an enlarged Ethiopian empire, also led to a level of social and economic inequality. This mostly took place in the course of Ethiopian state consolidation during late- nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries (Clapham1995:119).