In seeking solutions to nuclear non-proliferation it is tempting to depict it as a global problem with global solutions. The Economist is not alone in seeing linkages bet-ween the UNSC failure to respond harshly enough to North Korean and Iraqi violati-ons with sanctiviolati-ons (rather than inducements) and other cases: “The lesson to other nuclear wannabes: rogue behaviour pays.”31 Others see a failure by the NWS in set-ting an example under A.VI and in disarming. But this is not feasible in the fore-seeable future and hence hardly a prescription for dealing with the most pressing proliferation challenges.32 It could even be argued that such disarmament might inc-rease the incentives for proliferation both because of the advantages in such a situa-tion and because of the increased need for self reliance for some newly-exposed states. Inducements may or may not work. They appear to have been partially re-sponsible for keeping Israel from crossing the threshold. They were not really tried in the case of India where they might have changed the calculus somewhat if offered to prevent a move in India’s status and to stabilise its programme.33
30 However North Korea’s test on 31 August 1998, of what is claimed to be a satellite, but what others saw as a missile over the Sea of Japan, raised new considerations. Foremost among these were the security implications for Tokyo of North Korea’s ability to reach and target all of Ja-pan’s major cities. One possibility is cooperation with the USA in the development of anti-missile defences. This, however, raises a controversy with China which sees such systems as li-kely to devalue its own missile force. For some of the background, see inter alia, Kristof, Nico-las. North Korea becoming increasingly bellicose. In: IHT, 4 January 1999; Shenon, Philip. US pact with North Korea is nearing collapse. In: IHT, 7 December 1998; Pons, Phillipe. Le Japon s’inquiète d’une proliferation nucleaire après les essais indo-pakistanais. In: Le Monde, 3 June 1998; Richardson, Michael. East Asians Fear Rivalry for Nuclear Arms might drift their way.
In: IHT, 3 June 1998.
31 A bomb in every backyard. In: The Economist. 6 June 1998: pp. 15-16.
32 See Glaser, Charles. The flawed case for Nuclear Disarmament. In: Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998): pp. 112-128.
33 As Virginia Foran argued India had crossed the threshold in the summer. The Case for Indo-US High Technology Cooperation. In: Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998): pp. 71-95.
Non-proliferation policy often appears to lack focus. If the problem is not general, but limited to a few states, it is worth focusing on those, while enlisting the support of the large majority. In concentrating on the ‘dabblers’, and “creating incentives for the contingent proliferator to abandon programs lacking an over-riding strategic pur-pose” the problem would be narrowed. The harder cases would still need even more attention, but their problems are specific rather than generalizable. Related to this is a problem identified by Brad Roberts: the tendency to treat nonproliferation as a po-licy in itself unrelated to general foreign popo-licy as a whole, of which it is “an integral component”. Without a strategic perspective “there is no way to decide where proli-feration fits in US priorities at any given time.”34 Compartmentalised under arms control, nuclear non-proliferation is periodically brought out of the cupboard as the holy grail or waved about in the shape of a stick rather than integrated into overall security policy.
The nuclear tests in India and Pakistan are a stark reminder that nuclear weapons, however obsolescent in the minds of some, remain a potent instrument of security for others. Arms control approaches based on assumed universal “norms” that slight se-curity interests and regional realities are unlikely to meet with great success. Securi-ty is not evenly distributed globally. The end of the Cold War did not enhance the security of all states. For some states regional issues were and remain the driving force behind their security problems. Only a Cold War mind-set and neglect of regi-onal realities, i.e., a Western/Northern parochialism, could fail to see that regiregi-onal balances and conflicts might be aggravated by the end of the conflict in the “central”
front. Seen from the perspective of particular regional states, deprived of the strate-gic leverage gained in the Cold War, of access to arms supplies on a concessionary basis, and of allies and guarantees, the world may look a more menacing place, espe-cially to states not allied to the world’s remaining superpower.
Nuclear proliferation is not global problem but a problem of particular states. States that look to nuclear weapons do so for reasons tied to their security. There are not many such states and their conditions are very specific. The motives underlying these states’ drive for nuclear weapons capability vary and are mixed but they are rarely frivolous. It is doubtful that any of the new or aspiring proliferators are primarily impelled by considerations of prestige, which largely drove the British and French programmes. Security considerations are uppermost for states moving in this directi-on. And it is there that answers must be sought.
34 Roberts, Rethinking N+1, p. 79.
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It is indicative that the so-called ‘repentant’ proliferators, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and three former USSR states, had no strong security motivation to persist with an option; their considerations had always been political rather than urgently strategic. (In the case of Ukraine its security concerns were met by assurances and guarantees by the nuclear weapons states.) Consider by contrast the proliferators in the Gulf and Middle East, the subcontinent and the Korean peninsula. In all three regions major interstate wars have occurred, in two regions repeatedly, with major territorial consequences. The use of force has achieved results. The possibility of a recurrence of war exists and casts its shadow on these regions. In two regions, states (Israel and Pakistan) have felt existentially threatened. In none of the regions has there been a settlement of the issue underlying the conflict. It was regional dynamics and not the Cold War that fueled conflicts in the Middle East. The demise of the So-viet Union created problems not only for its favoured arms recipients but for all sta-tes concerned about balancing the US. This factor plus the US’ wooing of China could hardly fail to have its influence on security considerations on the subcont i-nent.35 Similarly, the withdrawal of the USSR and Sino-US overtures affected the security calculations of a beleaguered and failing North Korea. Yet instead of greater consideration of the key areas of proliferation concern, attention was focused on glo-bal approaches. Pressures on India regarding the CTBT appear to have encouraged that state to declare its position unambiguously.
The United States has shown a distinct ambivalence in its policies. It has moved from attempts to “rollback” India’s nuclear capabilities to seeking after 1995 to
“cap” them, i.e., to freeze the situation of non-weaponization. Consideration was gi-ven (and many analysts) proposed to offer India technological inducements in a stra-tegy of engagement to strengthen the ambiguous status quo. This was not adopted before the May 1998 tests. The question now is whether the sanctions adopted are appropriate.36 Perhaps the US should move to a policy of “managing” the fact of pro-liferation and seeking to stabilise it, technically and politically. However, it is preci-sely in the political area that the US remains most reluctant and deficient.
35 Friedman, Tom. India asks why America ignores it and courts China. In: IHT, 22 June 1998.
For an earlier appreciation of the sense of slight and quest for status note, see Pfluger, Fried-bert. To avoid a nuclear test by Delhi, treat India as a world power. In: IHT, 2 December 1997.
36 See Nye, Joe. Sanctions won’t curb pr oliferation. In: IHT, 28-29 November 1998; also Hoagland, Jim. Punishing India doesn’t look like smart policy. In: IHT, 23 February, 1999.
Unwillingness to get involved has characterised policy – hence the emphasis on sanc-tions and the bias toward technical constraints and solusanc-tions.37
Nevertheless, US policies in addressing the security concerns of states may be deci-sive. Consider the cases where the dog has not barked. In the mid-1970’s President Carter’s intimations that the US would reduce its forces in Asia saw a rapid move by South Korea and Taiwan towards a nuclear weapons option. This was reversed when the US reconsidered folding its security umbrella. Japan’s nuclear calculations too take into account the US security umbrella. The question of what sort of security guarantees or assurances and by whom, remains central to any realistic non-proliferation policy. The demand is clear but the supply is less so. Given the risks to NWS that a breach of the nuclear taboo elsewhere may have on their own ideas of deterrence, and the impact of the use anywhere of nuclear weapons may have on the policies of other states regarding proliferation, the NWS should consider the question of security guarantees altogether more carefully.38 However tempting, it may not be possible to decouple from the nuclearisation of other regions. This also requires dea-ling with the underlying security issues that fuel nuclear proliferation. Ultimately, this involves an emphasis on regional dialogue which may be facilitated by third par-ties. Dialogue that increases contacts and fosters awareness of each others posit ions at least may reduce the risks of misunderstanding. With luck it will create interest groups favouring its institutionalisation. This, in its own way, may in turn make a strategic dialogue a reality. Outside powers, to the extent that they act as facilit ators and help in establishing procedures, make compromise possible and mechanisms that stabilise the region can play a useful role. When they take sides and tilt in one direc-tion they become part of the problem. Sanctimonious moralising only encourages mutual finger-pointing.39 When emphasis is put on counter-proliferation and threats over consensual diplomacy, the outside power only encourages proliferation. Unila-teralism has costs.
Related to this is the place and role of arms control. The Arab states and Iran want Israel to renounce nuclear weapons and join the NPT before engaging in further
dis-37 Hoagland, Jim. The lone superpower is falling behind the curve. In: IHT, 4 June 1998.
38 On this see Goldblat, Jozef. How secure are states without nuclear weapons? In: Security Dia-logue, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1996): pp. 257-263.
39 On these lines see the comment of the Director of the IISS after these words were written at the 40t h Annual Conference, Oxford, 3-6 September 1998. Director’s Summing Up. The focus nee-ded to be on understanding and managing specific regional incentives and predicaments. In this context, anti-nuclear sermonising seemed especially promising.
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cussions about arms control and regional security. Israel seeks a comprehensive pea-ce settlement as a precondition to moving in this direction. The circularity of the im-passe is clear. Without reduced tensions, successful peace negotiations are improbable, and without some arms control, reduced tensions are unlikely. In the Middle East as in South Asia, regional tensions are the prime motivation for arms competit ion whose regulation needs some regional accommodation. This in turn pre-supposes regional dialogue. To facilitate this requires a degree of neutrality and commitment by outside powers to enable the local parties to initiate the dialogue which they would be unable to undertake left to themselves. This in turn implies that while outside powers cannot dictate terms, they cannot afford not to have positions and to leave local parties to solve the issues based on the existing (often unequal) power balance. In brief, arms control cannot progress without security assurances and the sustained rather than sporadic political commitment of outside powers. (The-se conditions do not exist in either the Middle East or subcontinent.) Good and enga-ged diplomacy is thus good arms control.
I have argued for an emphasis on regional nuclear arms control (and non-proliferation policy). This is essential for the future of arms control. Global regimes and norms set standards, but not for the hard cases. They reflect the decisions of sta-tes that do not feel threatened. They do not reflect the world as others experience it.
Regional arms control that deals with concrete security problems in their context are essential. Whether through a bilateral dialogue (e.g., India-Pakistan, North-South Korea), or through regional mechanisms, dialogue can be started. The criteria to be applied are much easier to identify where some standards already exist, e.g., UNS-COM standards to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Differences of approach are inevitable. The Arab states and Iran insist that Israel join the NPT, while Israel pre-fers a stronger regional arrangement with stringent mutual verification, itself a con-fidence building measure, after a peace agreement.40 There are also differences on timing or sequence and of tradeoffs, with links being made explicitly by some Arab states between chemical and biological on one side and nuclear weapons on the other.
In the wider Middle East, after at least six major interstate wars and with the prolife-ration of WMD, the risks and costs of war need little elaboprolife-ration. Getting from there to peace with equal security still remains problematic. Building on current regional
40 For a useful summary of the position, see Cohen, Avner; Joseph F. Pilat. Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals. In: Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998): pp. 135-167 and fn. 4.
approaches, including the near-moribund Oslo process, ACRS, UNSCOM, the GCC, engagement of major regional states and the promotion of regional dialogue, requires external assistance. The application of arms control techniques and approaches from other areas (CFE) might be helpful. Arms control may make peace treaties possible or be embedded in peace treaties e.g. between Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Kuwait, and the Arab states and Israel, and thus can contribute to the stabilisation of the region. In that sense the best arms control and non-proliferation policy is diplomacy that inc-reases security all around.
Arms control research should focus on options and tradeoffs in their specific regional contexts. This implies better knowledge of the politics and culture of areas and less reliance on technical panacea or global formulae.
6 S
UMMARYNuclear weapons proliferation is a regional and local phenomenon stemming from intense concerns about security. It can only be treated in the context of that security environment and not by global remedies, admonitions or threats. Arms control divor-ced from regional realities has proven bankrupt. Measures taken to reassure states and build confidence will reduce the incentives for nuclear weapons. But for the handful of states that seriously consider these weapons threats, sanctions and isolati-on are counterproductive. They may reinforce the incentives. Imaginative and em-pathetic diplomacy will be more constructive and conducive to diminished reliance on nuclear weapons.
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7 B
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