Our argument runs along the following sequence. Section 2.2 will present the concept of identity in greater detail. In a nutshell, we argue that counterterrorism does not only affect the targeted terrorists but, as an external effect, the identity of the population of those regions in which terrorists hide. “Collateral damage”, for instance, is most likely perceived as illegitimate. Illegitimacy, in our terms, is reflected in a (partial) loss of identity, which may be restored by retaliation, or a seeking of “in-group friends”
as support against “out-group foes.” Hence, sympathy with terrorist groups, or active and/or passive support for them will grow, possibly leading counterterrorism to provoke perverse effects. In section 2.3, we formalize our argument. Section 2.4 will then present some evidence for the central claims made. Concluding remarks and policy implications are offered in section 2.5.
others’ actions. An insult, for instance, may impugn a man’s masculinity if left unan-swered in some regions of the world. The way in which this “answer” ought to be made is also culturally, i.e. norm-dependent.10
Which categories turn to be relevant for one’s identity is not entirely clear. But self-selection, such as occupational choices,11 and exclusion by others according to this category appear to be the most prominent reasons.
The exclusion mechanism is crucial for the economics of identity. Akerlof and Kran-ton (2000: 739) even state that “dominant groups define themselves by the exclusion of others.”12 Individuals and groups who cannot access a dominant group might react by developing oppositional identities, which include prescribed behaviors opposing those of the dominant group (Akerlof and Kranton 2000: Section V). Terrorists, per defini-tion, oppose the established society. Terrorist groups are outgroups. Thus, they cannot seek protection in the governmental structure of a nation state but have to hide from the main group. Wherever their hideout, they depend on the local population around them.13 Equally, however, counterterrorism depends highly on information from the lo-cal population about the terrorist groups to fight them effectively. It is thus crucial for both parties to pull the local population on their side (Cooter and Ulen 2011).
Counterterrorist means, we argue, often ignore to pay sufficient attention to the local population which is excluded or even under general suspicion.14 When counterterrorism requires invading or occupying large territories or whole countries, like in the Afghanistan-or Iraq-War, the local population is certainly affected. Especially an invasion Afghanistan-or
occupa-10Cultures in this sense can well be defined on a lower than national level. Nisbett and Cohen (1996), for instance, analyze differences in such reactions between the northern and southern states of the USA.
11Note that the choice need not be made out of concerns for this specific category, and still affect one’s identity accordingly. One may choose to become a soldier simply because of a lack of alternatives, and then begin to develop a concern for the prescriptions attached to the job. In fact, as Akerlof and Kranton (2010) describe, large parts of the army training are dedicated to “personal reengineering” (p.39), i.e.
change in identity.
12In this regard, we should not forget to mention theTheory of the Leisure Classby Thorstein Veblen (1899). Veblen holds that especially wealthier people aim to stand out from others by what he coins
“conspicuous consumption.”
13This holds for any unlawful organization, see Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) or Cooter and Ulen (2011:
chapter 12).
14Besides the exclusion of certain groups, legitimacy of means plays a crucial role in matters of identity (see on this also D’Amico and Block 2007). Analyzing legal and illegal political protest, Opp and Roehl (1990) for example find that increases in sanctions may have an encouraging effect on the political opposition, at least if these sanctions are regarded as illegitimate. Opp (1994: 103) argues that, besides the perceived illegitimacy of government action, the deterrent or encouraging effect of legal enforcement depends on the individual’s embeddedness in his social group. The closer delinquents are socially bound together,ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that they will stand up against legislation they regard as illegitimate.
in total and at the same time incapable of dealing with problems such as terrorism. It also communicates that the current government is not respected. Harsher counterter-rorist means claim more collateral and spill over to the people in the environment of terrorist groups. Even though the local population might not sympathize with radical terrorists, the feeling of exclusion can drive the people to oppose the dominant group and perceive itself as an outgroup. This outgroup as a new social category becomes the source of identity. In such a case, however, people might likely sympathize with the terrorists, who are also a defined outgroup against the dominant group and with whom some norms or even categories might well be shared. Not only does this social support strengthen the spirit of the already active terrorists, the new social category for the local people might radicalize them in a way increase their “identity utility” by becoming active terrorist themselves.
This logic finds support from survey data provided by Liberman (2012) in that “ordi-nary people favor punishing badly behaved foreign actors to make them ‘pay’ for their crimes rather than purely to protect national security interests.” Further, concerns regard the local people:
“The use of massive military power against terrorist groups also runs a sig-nificant risk of turning the population against the government. This terrorist strategy is often referred to as provocation: Terrorist groups seek to goad the target government into a military response that harms civilians within the terrorist organization’s home territory. The aim is to convince the population that the military is so evil that the terrorists’ radical goals are justified. Al Qa’ida figures, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, adopted the strategy in such countries as Egypt ‘to force the Egyptian regime to become even more re-pressive, to make the people hate it’ ” (Jones and Libicki 2008: 108f.).
Even worse, such a provocation might not be limited to the local people but might spread to otherwise completely unaffected people. Again with special regard to Al-Qaeda, the impression might emerge that the real target of the military offensive is not a rather isolated radical group, but the whole Islamic religion: “Such images as the Abu Ghraib prisoners were sent around the globe via Internet, satellite television, and cell phone.
The war in Iraq also created a perception that Islam was under threat. Many Muslims accepted al Qa’ida’s argument that jihad was justified precisely because Islam was under attack by the United States. Consequently, fighting ground wars in the Muslim world appeared to inflame, not quell, Islamic terrorism” (Jones and Libicki 2008: 110).
Figure 2.1: The Basic Game
Despite this evidence suggesting that military intervention may rather enflame opposi-tion than alleviate it, terrorist attacks have to be prevented. Obviously, deterrence in the form of physical risks associated with terrorist activity may prove useful in this respect, and it has been shown that it can indeed be effective (Lyall (2009)). We therefore believe it helpful to formally analyze the working of both deterrence and identity in a coherent model. We in the following section offer such a model.