The ideal advisor account as the best idealizing approach

There are two ways to respond to Rosati’s argument. The naturalist can either claim to have found a way to incorporate an ideal of the person in his theory, or argue that he can do without such an ideal. Start with the first response. From the previous chapter we know that there are two main formulations of the Model: one that relies in some way on the agent’s actual desires, the other invokes hypothetical desires. Rosati’s argument only targets a particular version of the second approach, thus it is sensible to think that other versions can do better than the one she examines. However, it is not without reason that among the several hypothetical desire accounts, she picks exactly the ideal advisor theory. She does so because the consensus in the literature seems to be that the theory offers us the best account of condition C. Here is why.

Take the two main alternatives: Brandt on value and Williams on reason. Brandt’s account of condition C is based on his notion of cognitive psychotherapy, which he defines as “a process of confronting relevant information, by repeatedly representing it, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time.” (Brandt 1979, 113) Under ‘relevant information’ he means the

“beliefs which are a part of the ‘scientific knowledge’ of the day, or which are justified on the basis of publicly available evidence in accordance with the canons of inductive and deductive logic, or justified on the basis of evidence which could be obtained by procedures known to science.” (Ibid. 111-2) And under ‘therapy’ he means an entirely cognitive process, exhausted by facing facts and logic. No alternative methods such as “influence by prestige of someone, use of evaluative language, extrinsic reward or punishment, or use of artificially induced feeling-states like relaxation” are allowed. (Ibid. 113)

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However, both conditions are mistaken. It has been pointed out that restricting information in the way Brandt does, unjustifiably compromises the intuition behind his theory:

that being better informed one is better suited to find what is good for him (or, to apply this to our case, what gives him reason to act). (Loeb 1995, 9-11) Nor is the ban on non-cognitive methods of therapy more defensible. Brandt admits that there are desires and aversions that his theory cannot exclude because they were inhabited in early childhood and are not completely insensitive to relevant facts. (Brandt ibid. 113) To take Allan Gibbard’s example, the boy who neurotically wants to keep his hands germ-free would not give up his desire to wash his hands many times every hour, no matter how vividly he represents the facts as well as the costs of his desire to himself. (Gibbard 1990, 20) It might also be the case that cognitive psychotherapy would produce desires the agent finds alien, arbitrary or crazy. Turning to Gibbard again, we might develop an aversion to dine with others provided we vividly imagine what people’s innards are like. (Ibid.) At the same time, alternative therapies might succeed helping the agent to get rid of the desire or might avoid producing it in the first place. (Velleman 1988, 357-64; for further examples in the same vein see Hubin 1996, 36-43)

An even more serious problem is that Brandt’s exclusion of non-cognitive methods makes us unable to decide in certain cases. (Velleman 1988, 357-9) Some of the desires would, once acquired by non-cognitive means, withstand confrontation with facts and logic alone. So we would like to ask whether we should have those desires. Conversely, some of our desires that would not be removed by information and logic alone might not be restored by it either. These desires are not incompatible with cognitive psychotherapy but neither would their absence be. So we would like to ask whether we should have these desires. But Brandt’s theory would prevent us from asking either question and this is a clear failure of his theory. At the same time, the ideal advisor theory has no trouble with correcting these failures. Since it distinguishes between the

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agent’s ideal self from his actual self, it need not limit the advisor’s information to what is available in Brandt’s sense, nor need it restrict forms of therapy the advisor can employ to confrontation of facts and logic alone. The advisor can choose among several types of methods, including non-cognitive ones, with the exception of those - think of the first section - that would be alienating or arbitrary from the agent’s perspective. The ideal advisor model is thus clearly superior to the construction of cognitive psychotherapy.

Turn now to Williams’ account of reasons. Williams characterizes condition C as one of ideal deliberation: he claims that whether an agent would have a desire is a matter of his having the desire after sound deliberation on the basis of his subjective motivational set. (Williams 1981a, 101; 1995a, 35; 2001, 91) Although Williams’ formulation is rather ambiguous, there is good reason to think that he would not restrict information and deliberation in the way Brandt does. As to the first, he is concerned with ruling out all false beliefs as possible grounds of reasons (think of his famous gin and tonic example) and it is arguable that this requirement often comes with the requirement to have all possible true beliefs. (Williams 1981, 102-4; Sobel 2001a, 469-472; though cf. Williams 1981, 103) As to the second, though Williams, in his Owen Wingrave example, rules out moving rhetoric (by Owen’s family) as a form of correct deliberation, later he admits that “practical reasoning is a heuristic process and an imaginative one, and there are no fixed boundaries on the continuum from rational though to inspiration and conversion.” (Williams ibid. 108-9, 110) This way of depicting correct deliberation does not seem to rule out certain non-cognitive methods such as daily meditation, influence of literature or of our own self-censure and self-praise. (Velleman ibid. 357-8)

Nevertheless, there are problems with this theory too. To understand, we have to introduce a distinction between two understandings of the ideal advisor account. (Smith 1997, 304) On the example reading, the ideal advisor is seen as giving advice to himself, which then

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serves as an example for the actual agent in the non-ideal world. On the advisor reading, the advisor advises not himself but the actual agent in his non-ideal circumstances. In my description I followed the latter reading, whereas Williams seems to endorse the first version. However, the advisor version is clearly superior. First, the idealization process through which the actual agent becomes an ideal advisor can change the agent: the desires, hence the reasons of the advisor may be different from that of the actual agent. For example, whereas the advisor may not want more information for himself, this is not true of the actual agent. (Railton 1997, 160 15n) Second, the authority of the advisor on the example reading is questionable. Since he is an ideal person in an ideal world, it is unclear what relevance his choice would have for the actual agent facing the problems of the non-ideal world. (Smith ibid.) He is not concerned with those problems; so why should the agent care about his ‘example’?