This chapter takes us back to the waving line at the border between slavery and freedom, and to the emergence of universal freedom as the opposite of slavery as the slaves in Haiti materialised as subjects who could transform the world. Ideas about freedom in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries developed in the contexts of slavery existing inside the forwardness of modernity, and of shifting relations of domination and subordination between Europeans and the rest of the world. This is a complicated space where the revolutionary events in Haiti swim in and out of focus, sometimes thinkable and sometimes unthinkable, and the slaves themselves appear as liminal beings in Hegel’s master/slave dialectic (Hegel 1976) until Frederick Douglass brings them forcefully to life. As Paul Gilroy has shown, it is important to consider the relationship between master and slave as characteristi-cally modern, and to explore the ways in which ‘the universality and rationality of enlightened Europe and America were used to sustain and relocate rather than eradicate an order of racial difference inherited from the premodern era’ (Gilroy 1993, 49). This association of modernity and slavery is, for Gilroy, a fundamental conceptual issue that deeply unsettles the idea of history as progress and shows us how plantation slavery ‘provided the foundations for a distinctive network of economic, social, and political relations’ (Gilroy 1993, 55). The conditions of this modern social life were understood to deform and dehumanise indi-viduals, and in the process, the humanity of the human came to be understood as an achievement, rather than a species-specifi c character-istic (Scott 2004, 91). This entailed new understandings of freedom and history which, as David Scott argues, introduced new ways of thinking about the failings of social institutions and suggested that the sources
of those failings could be historical and, therefore, changeable (Scott 2004, 92). In the revolutionary moment at the end of the eighteenth century, the clash of the zones of freedom and unfreedom created shift-ing and unstable ground for slavery and for modernity, and the new sense of humanity that was forged by Kant, Hegel and Douglass did not always light a clear path to freedom.
THE DOCTRINE OF BLACK INFERIORITY
The starting point for Enlightenment theories of rationality and uni-versality that focused on the person is Kant’s assertion that you can-not sell yourself into slavery because your person is your entitlement to set your own purposes, and slavery is an annihilation of legal per-sonality, turning people into objects, rendering them incapable of undertaking obligations and taking away their rightful power to bind themselves (Ripstein 2009, 135). For Kant, wrongly convicted prison-ers must choose execution over becoming slaves so that they do not become merely the tools of others. People who choose to become slaves alienate their freedom and conceive of themselves as things. In Kant’s view, as human beings we cannot relinquish our capacity to consent because that would undermine our status as rights-bearers. We can-not will ourselves to stop being. People cancan-not consent to be enslaved because by giving up their personhood they would not be bound by the commitment they made as people. The contract to be a slave would be void because it would constitute a complete renunciation of rights, undermining our inherent dignity and incomparable worth. A man can never treat himself as a thing, and he cannot ‘rob himself of his free-dom, which would happen if he were willing to hand over the total-ity of his forces for the arbitrary, absolute, unpermitted use of another’
(Kant [1920] 1997, 348). At its core, on this interpretation, enslavement is a matter of dishonour and the denial of autonomy (Altman 2011). As individuals, we have duties to ourselves that relate to ‘the correspond-ing right of humanity in our own person’. Any transgression of these duties means that we ‘make ourselves unworthy of the possession of our person that is entrusted to us, and become worthless, since the preservation of our worth consists solely in observing the rights of our humanity’. In losing our inner worth, we can ‘at most be regarded as an instrument for others, whose chattel we have become’ (Kant [1920]
1997, 350). It is, as Kant says in relation to begging, ‘a man’s obligation
to exert himself to the utmost to remain a free and independent being in relation to others’ (Kant [1920] 1997, 351). In this account of worth and humanity the signifi cance of personhood is linked to the triumph of moral egalitarianism, and equality of moral status is taken as the norm and as the basis for legal and political equality. As Charles Mills argues, that means that who counts as a person becomes the central question (Mills 2002, 1997).
The core assumption in this analysis is that the opposite of slav-ery is the capacity for self-legislation. The slave becomes someone who lacks autonomy and rational freedom, whose person is the property of another person. The enslaved individual is somebody who cannot exercise sovereignty, virtue or free will and is subject to an owner’s authority. Under this kind of defi nition, the risk is that slavery comes to be understood as a fi xed status, one that attaches to servile minds, to people lacking in morally good dispositions or unable to exercise vigi-lant government over themselves. It feeds into a binary between slave-holder and slave that allows for the possibility that one can extinguish the other and reduce them to the status of an object or a commodity, entirely under their command. Those who choose to become slaves and alienate their freedom emerge from this narrative as lacking in dignity and honour, as worthless and degraded from rational freedom. This has particular implications for understanding slavery in terms of social death, but also for thinking about slavery in the context of the slaves’
social subordination and capacity for resistance and violence. This then raises the question of what happens when this capacity for autonomy, self-legislation and freedom is not universal, but is instead racialised.
The debates over how to interpret Kant’s thoughts on race reveal the impossibility of fi xing race or social death as static conceptions of the world. Vivaldi Jean-Marie argues that Kant’s exclusion of non-Europeans from his discourse constituted an indirect justifi cation of the slave trade and of dehumanisation. It is not just that Kant himself failed to condemn the Atlantic slave trade, but that the paradigm of humanity in Kant and the wider Enlightenment is based on the under-lying premise of European citizenship and masculinity, and freedom from forced labour. Only European men were fully equipped to be able to overcome self-incurred tutelage and deploy their rational, public freedom. The Haitian revolution then appears as a moment of reas-sessment, ‘a defi ning process for both the European Enlightenment and the African Diaspora’ (Jean-Marie 2013, 243) that was successful
‘because it took place within the blind spot of the Enlightenment con-ceptual apparatus’ (Jean-Marie 2013, 247). The ideal subject of enlight-enment was the propertied European man, and Kant constructed a racial hierarchy with European men at the apex, and black people at the bottom. In Jean-Marie’s assessment, Kant constructed one of the most ‘systematic accounts of race prior to the fl ood tide of racial think-ing accompanythink-ing late nineteenth century imperialism’ (Jean-Marie 2013, 244–5). He talked about Native Americans as lacking in culture and the ‘drive to activity’ to make themselves work, and as having a half-extinguished vital energy. Negroes, he added, were capable of being trained to be slaves, but incapable of any other form of education (Kleingeld 2007). The Negro could be disciplined and cultivated, but never genuinely civilised. Drawing on proslavery tracts by James Tobin, Kant constructed a racial hierarchy in which Native Americans were too weak for hard labour and unfi t for any culture (Bernasconi 2002, 148). Humanity as a whole could make progress even if many humans could not, and some races did not contribute to or benefi t from his-torical progress, but were left behind. Kant’s thinking was central to a European enlightenment that ‘defi ned European humanity in contra-distinction to the inhumanity of slaves in the European colonies’ (Jean-Marie 2013, 246). For Robert Bernasconi, the question is ‘Why were so many Enlightenment thinkers apparently unable to articulate the new sense of humanity without at the same time drawing the boundaries within humanity more rigidly and explicitly than before?’ (Bernasconi 2002, 146). How can the endorsement of racial hierarchy fi t within a theory of universal human equality?
For Charles Mills, the answer is that Kant intended the categorical imperative and the principle of right to apply to whites only, so that ‘his so-called universalism is in reality no more than white egalitarianism’
(Kleingeld 2007, 583). Mills argues for a symbiotic relation between lib-eralism and racism, where racism is the dominant tradition and liberal egalitarianism is racially infl ected from the start: ‘race is not in contradic-tion to but in symbiosis with Kant’s moral-political-teleological discourse’
(Mills 2014, 150). The idea of the person that emerges so triumphantly from Kant’s theory ‘is linked with a subperson as fi gure and ground, sym-biotically related’ (Mills 2002, 6). In Mills’s analysis, personhood needs to be understood primarily as a status, and its attainment requires more than simple humanity. Not all adult humans are persons by virtue of being humans, and while, for Kant, all rational human beings are worthy
of respect, it is ‘not a priori that all humans are rational beings (in the requisite full sense)’ (Mills 2002, 24). Kant, in other words, makes internal differentiations in the category of human beings, and partitions human-ity by creating an intermediate status, and a much fuzzier categorisation between person and thing. This mobile border is full of contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes and ambiguities, but, for Mills, the process through which humans transformed themselves into moral beings was racialised from the start. Natural slaves must be subpersons in a theory that is based on autonomy, and that autonomy is taken to be already accomplished for those whose personhood was never in question, who were never close to the borderline with thinghood.
In the debates over slavery in the late eighteenth century, the pro-cess of partitioning and drawing internal distinctions within the cat-egory of human beings was highly contested, and the complications of ‘universalizing and particularizing at the same time’ are clear (Mills 2002, 28). Britons and others had, as Roxann Wheeler points out, ‘mul-tifaceted ways to adjudicate the boundaries of human similarity, and these changed over time’ (Wheeler 2000, 240–1). In particular, it is pos-sible to trace some of the processes of ‘epidermalisation’ coming out of multiple and coexisting defi nitions and meanings of complexion. Skin colour, as Wheeler points out, was not the only ‘register of difference’ for much of the eighteenth century (Wheeler 2000, 5). Differences of civic status, of Christianity, virtue and rank, persisted as visible distinctions in dress, manners and language. Human characteristics were under-stood to be formed over time by external forces working on the body.
Cultural, educational and environmental change were understood to affect both appearance and behaviour. Wheeler identifi es confusion in contemporary usage after the 1770s as ‘color was shifting out of an elas-tic climate/humoral sensibility and onto a more rigid anatomical model’
(Wheeler 2000, 26). New discoveries about anatomy and the nervous system connected the body to the mind in different ways, and created an anatomical body that was ‘more solid than its porous counterpart, the humoral body’ (Wheeler 2000, 27). Wheeler detects a gradual shift at the end of eighteenth century, so that human differences began to be understood as less superfi cial, less changeable and more of a refl ection of inferiority than they had been before. At the same time, in the 1770s, minds as well as bodies came to be regarded as affected by climate, so that black Africans were understood to be incapable of strong exertions and relaxed in their mental powers. In the 1770s and 1780s, there was
a growing sense that bodily, intellectual and cultural differences might be connected and racialised to justify political and economic subordina-tion. In this time of fl ux at the end of the eighteenth century, slavery was not inextricably linked to skin colour, but was primarily understood as a political and economic condition, caught up in ideas and debates about civil society, property ownership, education, Christianity, improvement and commerce. ‘Over the century, Europeans’ self-perception broadly shifted from defi ning themselves in relation to each other, Muslims and the naked, pagan savage to distinguishing themselves from black Africans’ (Wheeler 2000, 48). Gradually, the colour of the skin became
‘a surface indicator of the presence of deeper physico-biological causal mechanisms’ (Mills 2002, 23). In Kant’s view, humans had the capacity to adapt to different environments, and the racially signifi cant adapta-tions were the ones which ‘once triggered by different environments, [were] unfailingly heritable’. There was, for Kant, some inner structure that explained racial characteristics, rather than their being the tem-porary effects of interaction with the environment, and skin colour is the most signifi cant of these hereditable traits (Allais 2016, 13). In Kant’s account of germs and seeds as the source of differentiation and hierarchy between the races, ‘it is the mechanisms of the body that are responsible’ for the defi cient culture of the inferior races, and he insists that they permanently fi x the character of the races (Mills 2014, 132).
In 1792, the author of Observations on Slavery asserted that much ingenuity of argument had been used to prove the idea that Negroes and whites had sprung from one common stock, but that nothing con-vincing had been offered to make the case. Agreeing with Kant, he argued that such a ‘degeneracy’ could not have been the result of exter-nal causes, and while he admitted that the effects of climate on the complexion of the skin were very considerable, the difference between the Negro and the white remained remarkably striking (Anon 1792, 33). The form of the whole head, he went on, and particularly the face,
‘is in the negroe very peculiar; totally unlike the rest of the human spe-cies, but which gives to the negroes an amazing general likeness’. The short black hair ‘or rather wool, of the negro’ was another striking dif-ference (Anon 1792, 34). Having set out these physical difdif-ferences, the author turned to the question of mental faculties. Still with a focus on the environment, he pointed out that every circumstance had tended to depress the powers of black Africans and prevented their abilities from
coming into action. Their spirit, he said, had been worn down by tyran-nical governments and by indolence, which was the constant effect of a hot climate. However, he went on, all other nations had at one time or another surmounted these obstacles, pressing forward to the degree of perfection of which they were capable. ‘Negroes’, by contrast, ‘have always submitted to their chains’ (Anon 1792, 35). They had lost their capacity for self-legislation and with it their inherent dignity. The impli-cations of such loss were clear. ‘Does not all this argue for some natural inferiority of mental endowments?’ he asked, and if so, ‘where is the hardship of destining them to servile employments, provided we treat them with kindness and attention’ (Anon 1792, 36).
Those who were opposed to the African slave trade needed to coun-ter the idea that bodily, intellectual and cultural differences could be racialised by arguing against the proposition that slaves had submit-ted to their chains, and against the existence of natural inferiority in mental endowments. For its detractors, the African slave trade was a fl agrant violation of the most sacred and fundamental laws of justice and humanity. First, its advocates were falsely alleging that the Negroes were an inferior and subordinate race of men. William Belsham bor-rowed ‘from the language of Shylock’ to contest this argument, asking whether a Negro has not eyes, hands, organs, affections and passions.
Are they not fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons and subject to the same diseases? (Belsham 1790, 6). His emphasis was on the theory of shared origins within which the diversity amongst humankind was ‘technically insignifi cant’ (Wheeler 2000, 15), and on the fundamentally important ways in which all human beings are the same. In a similar vein, John Beatson declared that the idea that there are distinct races of men ‘can never be admitted even for a moment, by those who believe in Divine revelation’ (Beatson 1789, 11). Humans, he insisted, derive their origin from the same source, ‘partake of the same common nature’, are equally possessed of immortal souls and endued with the same faculties for pleasure and pain (Beatson 1789, 12). Differ-ences between them are explained by climate, habits of life, diet, edu-cation and other accidental circumstances, and not by any unfailingly hereditable internal characteristics. He condemned the use of the term
‘Negro’ as degrading, an ‘invidious appellation’ designed to cut the link of brotherhood, ‘and have it thought that the blood of such men is not congenial with your own, but that they are marked for slavery’ (Beatson
1789, 26). He went on to assert the personhood and moral equality of the black Africans by asking his readers to consider their fungibility with Europeans (at least in theory) once it was clear that accidental cir-cumstances and injustice could have worked the other way:
But, supposing that some opprobrious appellation were fi xed on us, taken from our colour or exterior appearance, and for this reason we were treated as an inferior species in the rank of beings, and, like the beasts we use, were on that account doomed to be the mere instruments of severe labour, having no will of our own, and wholly under the lawless discretion of a stranger: Should we not feel an essential injury was done to us?
Should we not be conscious that our just and native rights were violently encroached on? (Beatson 1789, 26)
William Dickson argued that from his observations he had never seen any mark of inferiority in the Negroes, or any mark of superiority in the whites. There was, he insisted, no connection between intellect and colour: ‘A man may associate his idea of blackness with his idea of the devil, or with his idea of stupidity, or with any other of his ideas that he thinks proper; but he ought not to reason from any such arbitrary associations’ (Dickson 1789, 62). There was, for Dickson, no connection between the colour of the human skin and the faculties of the human mind. Apologists for slavery who inferred natural inferiority from the colour and features of the Africans were making vulgar arguments and basic errors. The climate, he conceded, had an effect on human hair,
William Dickson argued that from his observations he had never seen any mark of inferiority in the Negroes, or any mark of superiority in the whites. There was, he insisted, no connection between intellect and colour: ‘A man may associate his idea of blackness with his idea of the devil, or with his idea of stupidity, or with any other of his ideas that he thinks proper; but he ought not to reason from any such arbitrary associations’ (Dickson 1789, 62). There was, for Dickson, no connection between the colour of the human skin and the faculties of the human mind. Apologists for slavery who inferred natural inferiority from the colour and features of the Africans were making vulgar arguments and basic errors. The climate, he conceded, had an effect on human hair,