As signalized in the previous chapter “Empirical Data” (III), the collected inquiries arise from the historical domain, in the widest sense understood as the histories of the human past. Even though the information about the inquiring users is scarce, the historical domain and its methods can provide guidance and a basic framework for the interpretative and ontological analysis of the questions. The following section delineates essential characteristics of the historical domain in terms of common and principal research interests and methods. The account is based on a selection of texts on history as a scientific discipline, and is also inevitably influenced by the background knowledge of the author as a qualified historian.
History The termhistorycarries three discernible senses: the term may denote (1) what has happened and transpired in the past, (2) the study, presentation, and narration of that past, and (3) a particular form of knowledge about said past created based on particular methodological regulations (Boshof et al.,1997, 2). These three senses are, however, intrinsically intertwined and their essence has been subject to extensive debate in the field of philosophy of history ever since historians have thought and written about the past (Boshof et al.,1997, 2).
Thedomain of discourseof history comprises all that has happened in space and time and which is tangent to human life. In the words of Bloch and Le Goff(2008), the good historian resembles the man-eater from fairy tales who finds his prey where he senses human flesh.31 The principle and naturalsubject matterof historical inquiry is therefore essentially ananthropological one since humans “make” history; that is form the characteristics of landscapes, create tools and machines, compose documents, or establish and run institutions (Bloch and Le Goff,2008, 30). Historians seek to describe and understand the history pertaining to human activity(Tun orHandeln)– what humans have done – and human suffering(Leiden)– what has happened to
31“[Der] gute Historiker [gleicht] dem Menschenfresser im Märchen. Seine Beute weiß er dort, wo er Menschfleisch wittert”
(Bloch and Le Goff,2008, 30).
humans – in the past, either as individuals or in the context of social groups (Faber,1982, 35). The term “suffering”, in this context, not only refers to concrete physical and psychological afflictions but also comprises all external influences of “historical forces” and imprints experienced by humans and which they cannot directly or consciously control or influence, such as climate, vegetation, economy, society, or religion, all of which have rendered humans “suffering” objects throughout history (Boshof et al.,1997, 3). History is “for” the self-knowledge (Collingwood, 1970) of humankind, its self-certitude32, and the attempt to provide accountability for its own past.
Boshof et al. have stated that this principle domain of discourse constitutes aregulatory idea for historians undertaking historical inquiry. Naturally, historical inquiry can always only focus on particular fragments of the past. The historian attempts to render selected fragments of the past current by studying, presenting, and narrating them to contemporaries. This endeavour is necessarily subjective, determined by the interests, questions, and intentions of the inquirer, the historian, and of what the current era, the contemporaries, find interesting about the past epoch (Boshof et al.,1997, 3). The resulting historical knowledge, the “history”, represents neither
“’the past’, nor yet the surviving past” but “a reconstruction of certain parts of the past (from surviving evidence) which in some way have had relevance for the present circumstances of the historian who reconstructed them” (cit. Tosh,1996, 145-146).
According to Boshof et al., the natural sciences(Naturwissenschaft)seek to describe and explain the workings of the world based on general laws established based on (repeatable) exper-iments and expressed as generally valid propositions, history as a science focuses on the singular and unique, and aims at the accurate temporal fixation of their causes, courses, and ramifications.
This focus on the singular and unique, causation, historico-genetic perspective, understanding (Verstehen), and temporal anchorage are key criteria of the historical method (Boshof et al.,1997, 9). The termsidiographic(describing the singular) andnomothetic(establishing laws), which have been coined by Windelband (1904), express well the fundamental difference in these two approaches to (scientific) knowledge.
To put it another way, the past cannot be recreated in experiments and the historian cannot deal directly with past events but only with a “statement about the event (...) which affirms the fact that the event occurred” (Becker,1955, 330). Historical research is permeated by a fundamental “distinction between the ephemeral event which disappears, and the affirmation about the event which persists” (Becker,1955, 330). The historian may find such affirmations substantially within the archive in symbolic and mostly written form as “histories” about past events. The empirical foundation for historical inquiry into the human past essentially constitutes the surviving remains of past human activity within an archive. Dealing with affirmations carried by these remains, connecting and making sense of them, ascertaining whether they are true or not, accurate or not, is the business of historians. Their scientific treatment is regulated by the historical method.
32“Die Geschichte ist das Wissen der Menschheit von sich, ihre Selbstgewissheit”(Droysen,1868, 38).
Historical Method According to Rüsen et al., thehistorical methodis understood as the embod-iment of those regulations which determine historical thinking as a cognitive process and which substantiate the claim of truth in historical writing. Traditionally, these regulations of historical thinking have been found and expressed in two different kinds of operation beginning with the dominance of the literary form of historical knowledge and then, since the 19th century, the scientific production of historical knowledge through research (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 13).
This study restricts its scope to the scientific form of historical knowledge production. As Rüsen et al. continue, the historical cognitive process consists of the three basic operations heuristics,critique, andsynthesis– also called interpretation – which are determined by common and authoritative regulations underpinning and guiding their application. These three basic operations are evident in the various historical research processes. The reconstruction of the human past from empirical evidence is thus organized into a coherent principal methodological structure. The historical method as a systematic unity of heuristic, critique, and synthesis has been first theoretically described and practically employed during theHistorismusera, and is primarily connected to Droysen (1868) who established and propagated this tripartite working mode as historical method. The latter provides a principal methodological framework for the scientific conduct of historical inquiry (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 13-18).
In the historical sciences,heuristics– the “art of finding” – constitutes the first principle step which denotes the process offindinga relevant historical research question and, at the same time and most importantly for this study, offindingadequate sources of evidence and factual information pertaining to the research question (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 13-15).
Thehistorical sources (Quellen)constitute the empirical basis for historical inquiry. As a diverse and vast body, historical sources may comprise any kind of “human remains and such products of man’s activity as either were meant by their authors to communicate knowledge of historical facts or conditions, or by their nature are calculated to do so” (Shafer and Bennett, 1980, 103). This idea of intentional and unintentional sources had been distinctively formulated by Bernheim (1903) who distinguished the principle character of historical sources intotraces (Überreste)andtraditions (Traditionen). Historical sources have the character of traces if they have been created without the intention or purpose of future remembrance of the past such as orders or crew lists, but also oral, abstract and material entities such as facts pertaining to buildings or society. Sources have the character of tradition if they have been intentionally created with the purpose of being a testimonial and to serve remembrance of the past such as biographies or autobiographies, memoirs, accounts of journeys or chronicles (Bernheim,1903, 230-234).
The distinction of Bernheim (1903) is not absolute but functional, as are other categorizations of historical sources such as according to primary and secondary nature. Any historical source may be interpreted either as a trace or tradition, often depending on the particular historical inquiry. Historiographical traditions may include recent “secondary” scientific literature such as journal articles or monographs, especially if these works are the object of inquiry; however, mostly the term refers to contemporary “primary” narratives characterized by personal and
subjective accounts of experiences, events or activities. In the end, any source has factual and evidential potential and, at the same time, carries a sense determined by those historical subjects who created them for particular reasons. The facts and propositions found in either traces or traditions constitute empirical facts and are historically relevant: Why does someone claim or state a fact, regardless of whether the fact is true or not? And is the fact indeed true?
Regarding the substance(Überlieferungssubstanz)of historical sources, written documentary traces constitute the quantitatively largest and for most kinds of inquiries qualitatively funda-mental type of historical sources, in particular various kinds of documents(Geschäftsschriftgut) of corporate bodies such asofficial documents (Urkunden)andfiles (Akten)(Boshof et al.,1997, 216-226).
According to Boshof et al.,official documentsare attested and created according to certain formal requirements pertaining to acts of a legal nature. Examples of official documents include edicts, notatia, charta, laws or decrees as well as orders. An important task and research inquiry for historians pertains to the investigation of the extent and form of the actual execution of legal acts, and the discovery of proof of its factual execution (Boshof et al.,1997, 228-230). The largest group of traces form the writtenfiles (Akten)which particularly pertain to phases of preparatory deliberation and expression of will in the form of memoranda and drafts as the result of the work of corporate bodies. Furthermore, many additional pre-forms of official documents and working papers are found in files which may also have legal status. Files are complemented by many other kinds of documents pertaining to the course of business(Geschäftsgang)of corporate bodies; for example, plans for office organization(Büroorganisationspläne)or file distribution (Aktenverteilungspläne), papers and documents which have moved between organizational units of corporate bodies(Schriftstücke der Überordnung, Unterordnung, Gleichordnung), as well as notes, minutes, memoranda, or other kinds of written records(Aktennotiz, Protokoll, Aufzeichnung, und Denkschrift als neutrales Schriftgut)(Boshof et al.,1997, 230-246).
Other kinds of written traces, according to Boshof et al., are journalistic sources about the transmission of news and opinions in the widest sense, letters, diaries, or other kinds of records of conversation, as well as literary traces such as fiction writing and poetry, unpublished personal estates, or specialized literature. Non-written traces may include institutional, linguistic, or social facts of the present such as particular forms of marriage, languages, or professions, physical things such as commodities, works of art, buildings, or even human corpses, visual remnants such as paintings, photographs, or films, and, lastly, audio documents (Boshof et al., 1997, 12-13).
In the context of heuristics, the archive provides the means to discover and obtain potentially relevant historical sources which may contribute factual or evidential pieces towards responding to a historical research question.33 As Tosh (1996, 65-66) has pointed out, “(...) historical
33Editions of historical primary sources are, in the end, always products of their time and constitute only particular selections, often displaced from the original archival holding. Archives and their holdings are therefore not merely auxiliary infrastructure but indispensable prerequisites for historical research.
research is not a matter of identifyingthe authoritative source and then exploiting it for all it is worth, for the majority of sources are in some way inaccurate, incomplete or tainted by prejudice and self-interest. The procedure is rather to amass as many pieces of evidence as possible from a wide range of sources – preferably fromallthe sources which have a bearing on the problem in hand”. The heuristic process may further consult other kinds materials such as recent scientific secondary literature from libraries, or primary and secondary accounts of contemporary witnesses.
The second step, thesource criticism (Quellenkritik), denotes the process of applying several principle questions to the inner and outer form of the collected historical sources (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 15-16). The purpose of this step is to determine and establish the reliability, credibility and authenticity of the traces and traditions as evidence or sources of information.
Garraghan (1957, 168) delineates several principal questions which target the outer and inner form of the source by asking when, where, and by whom the source has been created, which pre-existing material the source utilizes, and in which original form the source has been produced, and, with respect to the inner form, assess the evidential value of the contents of the source, in other words its credibility.
The third step, synthesis, also called interpretation, denotes the application of historical reasoning to the facts, which have been established by inner and outer source criticism, and puts these facts into chronology and context, thus composing a history (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 17-18).
According to Rüsen et al., every historical question entails the conception of an evolving timeline comprised of single facts. This conception is based on conjecture and assumption and thus constitutes the idea of apossiblehistory. Historical science transforms this idea of a possible history into a “real” history. Source criticism provides the building blocks for this historical reality, and synthesis assembles and layers them according to particular construction plans for this historical reality. Such construction plans are conceptions of comprehensive timelines into which the facts can be inserted or fit according to their actuality. The connections and coherence created by interpretation sprout in a state of narration; that is, through the execution of historical narration as the constitutive condition of historical knowledge (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 17).
There has been discussion within the field of philosophy of history as to whether or not there is such a thing as patterns of interpretation (Christianson,1991). Indeed, the key focus of this study rests on the first step of the delineated historical method: the finding and discovering of relevant historical sources. Their interpretation and, in consequence, the assessment of their actual value and use to a particular research endeavour, remains the responsibility of the historian.
This principal three-step approach of the historical method reflects the will to be as objective and accurate as possible, in the words of Leopold von Ranke: “[zu] zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen”(Ranke,1824, V-VI).
Historical Research The scientific investigation of the principle domain of discourse follows the historical method and is further based on general methodological principals guiding which and how aspects should be collected from sources in order to reconstruct a history of the human past. It can be differentiated, according to Rüsen and Jaeger (1990, 18), into the two principal categorieshermeneutics (Hermeneutik), andanalytics(Analytik). The differentiation is neither exclusive nor selective; however, it provides further indications towards basic and essential interests of historical inquiry.
Rüsen et al. characterize the hermeneutic research strategies as focusing on the sources themselves as potential carriers of the reasons and intentions guiding past human activity and of the self-conception of the actors. In other words: Sources are selected based on preceding heuristic suppositions which give preference to traditions allowing for a reconstruction of past activities(Handeln) and suffering(Leiden) by understanding(Verstehen) the intentions and reasons seen as inherent in these sources. Preferred sources are, for example, documents of political acts such as administrative files or official documents, contemporary historical accounts, or personal testimonials of actors such as autobiographies. History is primarily to be understood and reconstructed from the sources which, of course, do not speak for themselves but contain a kind of pre-narrative(Vor-Erzählung)providing an account of changes and activities from one perspective of historical experience. Historical knowledge then is generated fromunderstanding (Verstehen)of the traditions imprinted in the sources. Hermeneutic research strategies have been formative for the era of Historismus and remain defining for historical method to date (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 18-20).
According to Droysen, the essence of the historical method is to understand through research;
that is, by interpretation.34 Still today, as Rüsen et al. state, historical processes and past events are reconstructed from activities and explained by the intentions, motives and reasons – the inner psychological conditions of actors conveyed indirectly by the sources – that have determined these activities within the interaction of actors. The focus rests on facts(Tatsachen)that are understandable; that is, expressions, manifestations, symptoms, or indicators of “meaningful intentionality”(sinnhafter Intentionalität)of human life and interaction. Interpretation connects these facts to temporal processes which make sense or have an “understandable” sense (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 18-21).
Historical phenomena and processes should not only be described and understood, according to Boshof et al., but also analyzed and explained. Theories and models are thus introduced, applied to the sources from an external perspective. They introduce measurements which are not generated from the sources themselves. For example, theIdealtypusby Max Weber seeks to describe typical attributes of a phenomenon not simply based on empirical evidence but as an illustrative abstraction, provoking tension between empirical essence and conceptual cumulation and abstraction (Boshof et al.,1997, 10-11).
Suchanalyticalresearch strategies, according to Rüsen et al., do not primarily rely on the
34“Das Wesen der historischen Methode ist forschend zu verstehn”(Droysen,1868, 9).
potential sense imprinted in sources, the intentions and reasons guiding human activities and self-understanding of actors, but on the external conditions and abstract factors which influence and determine human life and activity; for example, climate, geology, food production, price development, classes and their possibilities, abstract systems which determine what happens and less the actors themselves. Analysis asks first and foremost for facts(Tatsachen), which can be subsumed under abstract regularities such as birth numbers, increased numbers of production, and may even take on a statistical, quantifying form. Analysis renders facts fit for theory or uses theory and models for interpretation such modernization theory, fascism or imperialism theory.
It is only within such constructs that facts gain historical relevance and meaning (Rüsen and Jaeger,1990, 20-21).
Historical inquiry conducted within the boundaries of the aforementioned regulative idea of an essentially anthropological domain of discourse and subject matter needs to account for both the structural and intentional determinants of human life, and to consult the historical sources for information and evidence. Tosh (1996, 142) has summarized the essence of historical inquiry as “selection– of ’relevant’ sources, of ’historical’ facts and of ’significant’ interpretations”. For theselectionprimarily of ’relevant’ sources, and to a lesser degree of facts and interpretations understood as secondary interpretative accounts, either contemporary of the past or recent of the present, the archive remains primary and indispensable for the historian.
The presented instruments do not form a definite set; rather, historical inquiry is an evolving process which utilizes theories and methods as set pieces. Their applicants shape and form them while scientifically engaging in historical inquiry and striving for historical knowledge (Boshof et al., 1997, 1-2). However, history as an empirical science necessarily turns to the archive in order to find and discover surviving traces and traditions as the remains of past human activity, which may contain pieces of information or evidence potentially key to a wider research question.