In perpetrating the 12 April coup, the leaders of the military coup sought to justify their actions on the unwanted presence of the Angolan Technical and Military Assistance Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG). Similar to the military coup in Mali, the timing of the coup in Guinea-Bissau coincided with an ongoing elec-toral process. In fact, one might be tempted to suggest that the event in Guinea-Bissau was deeply inspired by the coup and the regional response to the crisis in Mali. This is because the military command pre-emptively established an NTC with the collaboration of some minority political parties. This step mirrored the ECOWAS response to the Mali crisis and was most likely intended to legitimise the latest coup. Yet, the history of Guinea-Bissau suggests that the country has not experienced a successful democratic transition since its independence in 1974. Besides, the cycle of violence, instability and failed ‘multiple actors driven’
post-confl ict reconstruction, especially in relation to security sector reform (SSR), has gained Guinea-Bissau a reputation as one of the most unstable states in the world. Moreover, the perception of the country as a notorious transit route for drug traffi cking from Latin America to Europe and North America explains why Guinea-Bissau is sometimes referred to as Africa’s fi rst narco-state.
The AU and ECOWAS also responded very strongly to the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. They, together with other partners (namely, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the UN), condemned the coup and called for the restoration of constitutional order in the country. The AU and ECOWAS further underscored that the so-called agreement establishing the NTC ‘does not meet the exigencies of the AU instruments relating the restoration of constitutional order’169 Similarly, ECOWAS decided that it would never recognise an uncon-stitutional transitional arrangement (referring to the NTC). It also authorised the immediate deployment of the ESF in Guinea-Bissau with immediate effect
to facilitate the withdrawal of the MISSANG, assist in securing the transitional process and undertake preparatory work for the immediate implementation of the roadmap for the Defence and Security Sector Reform Programme (DSSRP).170 The ECOWAS mediation team in Guinea-Bissau is being led by Alpha Condé, President of Guinea. His team successfully negotiated the release of Carlos Gomes Junior and Raimundo Pereira, prime minster and interim president respectively, at the time of the military coup. Unfortunately, there seems to be a repeat of the compromised approach of ECOWAS that parallels its regional response to the crisis in Mali. The following paragraphs describe some of the preliminary out-comes of the ECOWAS mediation process in Guinea-Bissau.
First, ECOWAS agreed to the establishment of a one-year transitional period to allow for an effective SSR and revisions of electoral legislation and processes.171 This 12-month transitional period differed from the two-year period proposed by the military junta. Yet, it seems to have legitimised the military coup through the untimely termination of the transitional process prior to the coup and disrupting the electoral process.
Second, the ECOWAS mediation outcome led to the appointment of a new prime minister and president for Guinea-Bissau. Accordingly, Rui Duarte Barros and Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo were appointed as prime minister and interim transitional president respectively.172 Again, this was clearly a setback for the zero tolerance policy on unconstitutional changes of government. The ECOWAS decision was justifi ed by Nurudeen Muhammad, Nigeria’s foreign minister, who was also part of the regional mediation team, as being on the basis of consensus following prolonged engagement and discussions with the military junta, civil society and political parties.
Finally, ECOWAS and the AU failed to adopt an irreversible position on the restoration of the constitutional order. Only a few days before the military coup, there was a tripartite ECOWAS-AU-UN mission that met with the military au-thorities, emphasising the importance of not disrupting the electoral process.
Importantly, ECOWAS had recommended the deployment of an ECOWAS-led peace support mission in Guinea-Bissau to replace the MISSANG. It is therefore regrettable that ECOWAS refused to use its prior engagement with the military as a basis for the total rejection of the coup. At the time of writing, the ESF has de-ployed some troops to Guinea-Bissau to ensure ‘the security of the transition, and help in the implementation of the DSSRP’. Despite the fact that the AU expressed support for ECOWAS’ efforts in Guinea-Bissau,173 there is a continuing difference
between the two on how they enforce the norm against unconstitutional changes of government. While ECOWAS has lifted the sanction on Guinea-Bissau, the sanction that the PSC imposed remains in effect. Apart from raising issues of consistency in the application of the norm against unconstitutional changes of government, this clearly illustrates the inadequacy of existing frameworks on the AU-REC relationship for ensuring policy coherence between the AU and RECs.
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
In 2013 the term of fi ve of the PSC members will come to an end. The election of the fi ve PSC members for three-year term will take place during the 21st ordinary Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of AU member states.
Table 4 PSC members ending their three-year term in 2013
Region States whose Term Ends in 2013
Central Africa Equatorial Guinea
East Africa Kenya
North Africa Libya
Southern Africa Zimbabwe
West Africa Nigeria
It is anticipated that Nigeria’s de facto permanent membership in the PSC will come to an end, unless ECOWAS member states decide otherwise. If ECOWAS