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Gender Norms Between Revelation und Human Reason

The reformist­oriented thought stream is often defined as a response to moderniza­

tion and globalization. Though, it should be noted that several of the core issues men­

tioned by reformists have a longer history. For instance, “the debate on the relation­

ship of revelation and reason did not begin in the Muslim world with the rise of modern science and the impact of Enlightenment thinking from the West” (Clarke 2006: 165). The thought pattern of reformist discourse can be traced back to Islam’s early history and the Mu’tazili. They were influenced by classical Greek philosophy that recognized reason as the capacity to understand the goodness of justice and the evil of injustice independent from revelation. They also recognized that justice is de­

fined by sources outside of religion based on rational thought. Hence, whatever rea­

son finds just should also be religiously obligatory, and whatever reason finds unjust should be religiously prohibited. Therefore, whatever reason rules, the Sharia will also uphold. Mu’tazili did not gain the same support as the Ash’ari school, which was based on the fallibility of reason in assessing a human being’s true rights as well as the incapability of reason to define justice (Robinson 1998). According to this school, the notion of justice must be shaped based on what the Lawgiver, i.e. God, identifies as just and unjust as found in the religious texts and this is not open to ques­

tion. This rational approach is not reflected in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) because in defining fiqh, human reason is considered incompetent in comprehending all hid­

den harms and benefits of matters; therefore, human reason is a futile and unreliable source in discovering true human rights (Kadivar 2011b: 50).

This discourse found special importance in the mid­nineteenth century with Muslims’ encounters with modernity, which often began through external threats such as European military expansion into Muslim lands. These encounters re­

sulted in moral and spiritual decline, as well as a downturn in science and tech­

nology and military strength in Muslim societies. Sayyid Jamal al­Din Asadaba­

di (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) are known as the ‘fathers of reformism’ in Islam. Asadabadi considered reform as the only way for Mus­

lims to counter European domination. Abduh also recognized how changes were necessary to preserve ‘society’s moral fabric’; therefore changes “were not only permitted by Islam, but were, indeed, its necessary implications” (Hunter 2009:

15), in order to bridge the modern world and the traditional world of classical Islam. As such, the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) belongs to the traditional worl­

dview which must be revised. Fiqh is not only based on revealed message, but

consists of a commingling of revelation and the customs and conventions of the society during the Prophet’s time. Therefore, reformists recognize that an incon­

sistency between religion and modernity is derived from the customary aspect of Islam, rather than the sacred message of religion. Hence, as Kadivar47 says, the main duty of religious experts and scholars is “to extract the sacred message again and to push aside the sediment of time­bound customs” (Kadivar 2011b:

65). For instance, Abduh emphasized the responsibility of fiqh for downgrading women’s status from the high level it has in the Quran (Abu Zayd 2013: 154).

In their efforts to find the causes and solutions for their issues, the reform­

ists emphasized the restoration of Islam’s rationalist and scientific spirit and re­

interpretation of the religious teachings to suit current conditions and needs of Muslim societies. In reference to their location on the spectrum, the reformist perspective recognizes reason as capable of understanding justice and a human being’s true rights as independent of revelation. Therefore, reformist schools of thought diverge in terms of philosophical outlook, concepts of the authenticity of human reason, methodology of analyzing Islamic scripture and legal sources as well as their view of the allowable scope for interpretation (Hunter 2009: 3).

7 1 Individual Agency and Rationality in the Reformist View

Human reason

In contrast with Sunni Islam, where Ash’ari traditionalism gained more promi­

nence over Mu’tazili rationalism, Shi’a Islam adapted Mu’tazili rationalism and thus maintained the important role of reason in Shi’a jurisprudence. Therefore,

47 Mohsen Kadivar (born 1959) is a philosopher and theologian. After abandoning his studies in electrical engineering at Shiraz University in 1978 he graduated with the equivalent of a bach­

elor‘s degree in Theology and Islamic Studies from Qom University in 1989. He earned the certificate of Ijtihad – the highest degree in Islamic religious tradition – from the theological seminary of Qom in 1997 under the supervision of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri Na­

jaf Abadi. He finished his Ph.D. in Islamic Philosophy and Theology from Tarbiyat Modarres University in Tehran in 1999. During 1992–1998 he taught as a visiting instructor for graduate students on Islamic philosophy and theology at Imam Sadegh, Mofid, Shahid Beheshti, and Tarbiat Modarres Universities. He also acted as Chair of the Islamic Thought office at the Stra­

tegic Research Center in Tehran for seven years until 1998.

Because of his critical analyses on the theory of “absolute rule of the appointed jurisconsult”

(wila¯yat-i intisa¯bı¯-yi mutlaqah-yi faqı¯h) by Ayatolloh Khomeini, he served a prison term of eighteen months until 2000. Since 2009 Mohsen Kadivar has been a visiting research profes­

sor of Islamic studies at the Department of Religion at Duke University (Durham, North Car­

olina, United States). He has published numerous works on: human rights and democracy in Islam, classical and modern Shi’a theology and legal theories, Shi’a political thought, classi­

cal Islamic philosophy, and modern Quran studies [Kadivar, Mohsen. Biography.Official Web­

site of Mohsen Kadivar.Available at: http://en.kadivar.com/sample­page­2/ (29 June 2015)].

reformists following the Mu’tazili school do not believe that human reason is only for understanding the revelation and that it exists in the shadow of divine law, as fundamentalists do. Instead they consider human reason as God’s gift, which should be applied to manage the political, economic, and social affairs of society.

However, they do not believe in ‘the self­sufficiency of reason’ but rather still ac­

knowledge the need of human reason for revelation. This fallibility of human rea­

son, as Yousefi Eshkevari48 explains, does not prevent human beings from rely­

ing on it (Yousefi Eshkevari 2010b: 20). In fact, from a reformist point of view, reason and revelation are never in conflict, but rather they complement each oth­

er (Kadivar cited in Hunter 2009: 65–66). However, the perspective closer to sec­

ularism considers a more critical role for human reason, as Soroush49 points out:

48 Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari (born 1950) is a cleric and researcher in Islamic theology and histo­

ry. He is also a journalist, and a former member of parliament. He studied for 13 years in the theological seminary of Qom. After the revolution he was elected as representative in the first Iranian parliament, though only serving one term, deciding to focus on cultural and research activities after the end of his term. He was a lecturer on the history of Islam at the Allameh Ta­

batabaii University for four years, before being barred from teaching at the University when he spoke for Dr. Kazem Sami, an Iranian dissident, during his funeral.

Eshkevari wrote for different journals and magazines which were banned by the government.

He founded the Ali Shariati Research Centre in cooperation with other researchers in 1997 and has since served as its director. He was also contributor to the Great Encyclopedia of Islam, and an editor of the Encyclopedia of the Shi’a.

In December 2000, he was condemned to death for ‘apostasy’ and ‘war against Islam’ by the Special Court for the Clergy because of his speeches at the Conference on ‘Iran After the Elec­

tions’ held in Berlin on April 7–9, 2000, sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation. The sen­

tence was later commuted to five years in prison.

In the course of the protests over the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, Eshkevari came to Ger­

many and has continued his research on Islam and Quran there [Yousefi Eshkevari, Hasan. Bi­

ography.Official Website of Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari.Available at: http://yousefieshkevari.

com/?page_id=2 (29 June 2015)].

49 Abdolkarim Soroush (born 1945) earned his degree in Pharmacology from Tehran University.

He later moved to London to pursue further studies in analytical chemistry, and after graduat­

ing in this subject from graduate school at London he studied the history and philosophy of sci­

ence for five and a half years at Chelsea College.

Soroush returned to Iran after the Revolution and was appointed as the Director of the newly established Islamic Culture Group. He was also a member of the Cultural Revolution Council which was responsible for reopening the universities and restructuring the syllabi of universi­

ties, which were shut down after the revolution.

In 1983, Soroush abandoned his governmental post and dedicated himself to teaching and re­

search. He gradually became more critical of the political role played by the Iranian clergy, pub­

lished his controversial articles on religious pluralism, hermeneutics, tolerance, clericalism etc.

in the monthly magazine Kiyan, which was clamped down on in 1998 by the Islamic Republic government. Soon after, he lost his job and his security in Iran. Since 2000, Soroush has been a Visiting Professor at Harvard, Princeton, Colombia, Chicago and Yale Universities, the Wissen­

schaftskolleg in Berlin, and the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. His ar­

eas of expertise include the writings and philosophy of Rumi, Islamic and Democracy, Quranic Studies and Philosophy of Islamic Law, Islamic Political Philosophy, Intellectual and Religious History of Modern Iran [Soroush, Abdolkarim. Biography.Official Website of Abdolkarim So­

roush.Available at: http://www.drsoroush.com/Biography­E.htm (29 June 2015)].

The role of rationality in the arena of religion has, thus far, been that of a timid and dis­

creet servant of understanding and defense of religion. However, defense and affirmation cannot be complete without a critique and analysis. The enterprise of rationality is an all­

or­nothing project. One may not employ reason to attest to the truth of one’s opinion, without leaving the doors open to its fault­finding critique. The attempt to enjoy the sweet affirmation of reason without tasting its bitter approach is pure self­delusion (Soroush 2002: 154).

In the reformist perspective, the Islamic legal system is divided into non­world­

ly and worldly aspects (Naraghi 2005). The sacred aspect of the Islamic legal system refers to the non­worldly and eternal factor, which is congruent with the worldly aspect rather than parallel to it. This aspect refers to essential precepts concerning matters of faith, ethics and devotion such as praying, fasting, belief in the afterworld and prophecy, which are immutable and fixed. In the reform­

ist view, these are beyond the perception of human reason and reasoning in the realm of rationality. The second group of precepts – non­essential – deals with the worldly aspects presented in human interactions and sociopolitical affairs which are time­ and space­bounded. This realm is allocated for the appraisal of reason; thus, the collective reason of humanity is the yardstick of such precepts in Islam (Yousefi Eshkevari 2013). As Naraghi (2005) explains, Muslims should follow collective reasoning to identify the social and worldly benefits of socio­

political affairs in their worldly lives. Only if these worldly benefits of society are met, their non­worldly and eternal benefits will be satisfied. In other words, reasonable and worldly benefits in sociopolitical life precede eternal and non­worldly benefits. One must first recognize and identify the reasonable and worldly benefits of a legal and social system, and only then identify its eternal aspects (Naraghi 2005: 2). Accordingly, religion in this perspective should be reasonably demand­responsive for the exigencies of the time.

All reformists believe in the authority of human reason and profess that ev­

ery reasonable action in modern times are verifiable by religion. This is justifi­

cation for accepting the new concepts and events brought about by modernity under the condition that there is no evident rejection of those new concepts found in clear and strong wording, or are explicitly against ethical rules in the Quran – i.e. essential law. Depending on the extent of deviation, essential law can pre­

cede human reason in some reformist views, depending on their location on the spectrum. To decide which verses contain essential laws and which verses refer to rules that were only relevant in certain situations, they emphasize the impor­

tance of analyzing the historical context of revelation and religious sources (Abu Zayd, cited in Amirpour 2013: 69). Therefore, they accept the authority of hu­

man reason conditionally but the range of acceptance is related to their position on the spectrum.

Reformists, like the other two groups, recognize the main aim of religion to be the fulfillment of justice. They believe that in the Quran and the Tradition, Muslims are ordered to seek and serve justice. Yet determining the meaning of

justice and the sociopolitical system providing the circumstances to fulfill jus­

tice has been left to humans and human reason. Thus, fulfilling justice in the present society is the duty of humans and human reason of the present time.

They allocate an essential role to justice in the interpretation of Islamic rules, and their application to contemporary conditions (Hunter 2009: 66). Therefore, human reasoning is of crucial importance because of its role in defining justice as the main aim of religion.

The role of human reason in the relationship of the human being with God and society

Reformists distinguish two realms of cognition. One is cognition of God and some metaphysical concepts like the afterworld, which they believe is beyond human reason. Though human reason is necessary to conceive this realm, in fact, the decision to accept religion is a choice undertaken by human reason; without the guidance of revelation, and reason has no access to this realm. The second realm consists of all worldly affairs, which deals with human interactions and social transaction and is the scope of authority of reason. However, there is not any consensus among reformists as to what extent reason in this area has author­

ity or is independent from revelation.

The absolute role for human reason in relationships between human beings and God and nature is not definable (Interview D March 2011). Instead, human rea­

son should be accompanied by revelation, for reason alone is not sufficient to comprehend all of God’s characteristics and features as mentioned in the Qu­

ran. Human reason is limited and it must be guided by revelation to be able to understand such features. In debating reason, three distinct concepts should be noticed. The first concept is rationality, which is being able to differentiate right from wrong. The second idea is irrationality, which is contrary to reason. The third is non­rationality, which is not contrary to reason but is beyond it. Through rationalizing religion, some essential parts of religion which are beyond reason will be lost. Therefore, in the relationship between God and human beings, hu­

man reason plays a minimal role, even though in relationships between human beings it has a prominent role, as it does in the conduct of all human affairs, though still accompanied by revelation (Interview D March 2011).

The idea that science can guide human affairs and religion only has a second­

ary role is rejected (Interview D March 2011). As an example, the first inter­

viewed representative of reformism refers to sexual relationships among human beings, saying that as a believer, he cannot accept homosexuality, even if his rea­

son would not be able to reject it rationally, because revelation has a clear per­

spective on this subject and defines it as a ‘perverted’ relationship (Interview D March 2011).

In this regard, the second representative (Interview E February 2011) points out that in the history of human beings, reason has always played an important role, albeit the domain of authority of human reason is changeable. He believes in self­justifying critical reason as a proper means for managing today’s human

issues. He considers no other sources which could limit autonomous reason – autonomous reason can recognize its own limitations. He refers to reason as a precedent criterion for believing in a religion. In his opinion the prophets were sent in one respect to arouse and apply human reason. While he emphasizes the important role of reason, he also stresses that sometimes it alone is not able to perceive all truths in the world. For example, in the relationship between God and human beings, though reason is of crucial importance, he believes that know­

ing God requires faith in the first stage. It means that believing in God’s exis­

tence needs faith more than rational arguments. Even in relations between hu­

man beings, human reason cannot explain everything, such as love or hate.

In this regard, the third reformist representative who stands closer to secular­

ism (Interview F May 2011) explains that rationality has a determining role in the relationship between human beings and God. Sometimes human beings ar­

bitrarily make reason follow revelation. This means following revelation is also a choice undertaken by human reason. Sometimes, reason decides not to follow revelation, since it recognizes that it alone is adequate to regulate the relation­

ship between human beings and God, and there is no need for the prophets and revelation. Similar to this is the relationship between human beings and society.

He distinguishes various rationalities such as scientific, religious, artistic and philosophical rationalism, but considers a stable and essential concept of ratio­

nality leads to a dictatorship of rationality. He also explains that rationality is an outcome of collective reasoning instead of individual. He also speaks of a ‘col­

lective’ rationalism rather than an individual rationalism. It is also rationality’s task to figure out its limitations, and to determine if there is another source for cognition outside rationality (Interview F May 2011).

Equality of man and woman in religious doctrine

Similar to fundamentalists, reformists believe that men and women are created equal in humanity and human dignity, though reformists also recognize the dif­

ferent physical and psychological features between men and women, which in no way privilege either one of them and do not influence human dignity. “In the Islamic view the criterion for closeness to God is virtue and God­consciousness regardless of gender” (Interview D March 2011). The values mentioned in the Quran for closeness to God are not distinguished between genders. Also, human dignity in this view is based on the essence of humanity, which is not dependent on gender. Women and men are, of course, different in physiological, psycho­

logical and biological aspects, although these differences are complementary to each other and they do not influence human dignity. Therefore, in the Islamic perspective, men and women are equal in creation and neither one is superior over another because of gender (Interview D March 2011).

Similarly, representative E (Interview February 2011) explains that based on the Quran, all creatures are created in pairs, including human beings. They are

Similarly, representative E (Interview February 2011) explains that based on the Quran, all creatures are created in pairs, including human beings. They are