Sweden's population will decrease continually unless immigration continues to be greater than emigration, as is shown by Figure 6, which gives total population according to the six scenarios. In both national scenarios, population increases until about 2030, which is therefore attributable to net immigration.
Figure 6. Population size 1950-1985 and forecasts until 2050 according to the different scenarios; in thousands.
9000 --
The gap between the scenario giving the lowest population, i.e. the West European, and the two national ones is very wide. Population in the year 2050 will be only 5.2 million if fertility declines to the same level as prevails today in West Germany and many other countries, including Denmark, and if net immigration is nil. According to the national scenarios the population will be just over 8.6 million in that year.
The difference will therefore become large in time, but even before the year 2010 it will be more than a million. Then how extreme are these scenarios? Neither of them is especially extreme. Many countries today show the same fertility as the scenarios are based on. Therefore the conclusion must be that there is considerable uncertainty as to whether Sweden's population will increase or decrease in future but that any increase presupposes an immigration surplus.
All scenarios show a pronounced rise in the proportion of older people after the turn of the century whether the population increases or decreases (Appendix Table Al). Only on the assumption that fertility is high does the proportion diminish somewhat, and even then not until after the year 2030. The increase will apparently be greatest in the West European scenario, according to which 38 percent of the
-<
- - -population will be over 60 years of age in the year 2050, but the low mortality alternative gives similar figures also. The major part of the increase takes place as early as the beginning of the century.
However, the number of pensioners in proportion to the gainfully employed population is of greater interest than the mere proportion of pensioners bearing in mind the way in which their pensions, medical care, etc., are financed today. Figure 7 shows the proportion of pensioners in proportion to the population aged 15-64 years (see also Appendix Table A2). Between the years 2000 and 2015 the number of pensioners per persons aged 15-64 years will rise from 0.21-0.22 to 0.27-0.33.
Thereafter it continues to rise in all scenarios until about the year 2030. The nation's total dependency burden is also expected to increase sharply during this period, as is revealed by Figure 8, which shows the proportion under 15 years and over 65 years in relation to the population aged 15-64 years (see also Appendix Table A2). Further into the next century only about 55 percent of the population will be of working age.
40
Figure 7. Number of persons age 65 years and above in relation to population aged 15-59; 1985-2050; in percent.
- .
- - - - 35
Low mortality Western Europe
Figure 8. Number of persons aged 0-14 and 65 years and above in relation to population aged 15-59; 1985-2050; in percent.
30 -- Benchmark
--
--- ,,
I
National 2
Low mortality
Given the mamage and divorce frequencies which we have today, the proportion of persons aged 60 years and over living alone will increase sharply regardless of future fertility and mortality (Appendix Table A3). In all scenarios the proportion single, i.e. persons who have never been mamed, rises from about 10 percent to about 30 percent in the year 2050. The proportion of mamed persons may decline from today's 45 percent to about 20-25 percent while at the same time the proportion of widows and widowers also declines. The low mamage and high divorce rates are totally dominant--different fertilities and mortalities lead to only minor modifications. Therefore the conclusion must be that the proportion of elderly persons living alone can be expected to rise sharply unless our social patterns change completely. A rise in the number of unmarried persons increases the load not only on the pension system but even more so on the medical and care services, as they often live alone.
In all scenarios death risks are assumed to be equally high regardless of civil status.
As an alternative to the benchmark scenario this assumption has been dropped and actual death risks for the period 1980-84 have been employed instead. Since the death risks for single persons are higher than for married persons this ought to moderate the rise in the proportion of single persons.
The proportion of married persons becomes distinctly higher if account is taken of differences in death risks between different categories of civil status, as shown in Table 5. The number of married women increases by 3-4 percentage points compared with the benchmark. The equivalent figures for men are 4-6 percentage points. The rise in the proportion of single persons is therefore distinctly less when the assumption of equal death risks is dropped, but it will still be very large. The processes of family formation and dissolution are paramount.
Table 5. Proportions mamed according to the benchmark scenario and according to an alternative calculation in which mortality by civil status is considered, 1985-2050.
Women Men
Year Benchmark Alternative Difference Benchmark Alternative Difference
As has already been pointed out, many people today live together without being married. However, this is true of pensioners to only a limited extent. Only about two percent of this category were cohabiting outside matrimony in 1985. What is the
future pattern likely to be in this respect? Is cohabitation generation-related, so that the proportion of older people cohabiting will increase in future? There is much to indicate that this is so. Taking the 1985 transition intensities between unmarried, cohabiting and married persons of different ages as a starting point, certain calculations can be made. Interplay effects between singlelcohabiting categories and mortality have not been taken into account in this. The figures show that the
Figure 9. Number of single women aged 60 years and above in relation to the total number of women aged 60 years and above; 1985-2050; in percent.
Figure 10. Number of single men aged 60 years and above in relation to the total number of men aged 60 years and above; 1985-2050; in percent.
65
According to these alternative calculations to the benchmark scenario a considerable part of the decline in the proportion of married people will be offset by the rise in the proportion cohabiting. Since changes in patterns of marriage and
Low mortality
cohabitation can take place swiftly, as the rise in marriage frequency in 1989 has shown, and because our model is not quite complete, we refrain from presenting any figures. A separate study will be made instead. The conclusion i's unambiguous, however. With present patterns of family formation, part of the decline in the proportion of married people over 60 years of age will be offset by increased cohabitation. The proportion of single persons will increase, however, but the negative effects of an increased proportion of single persons on the pension system and especially on medical care will be moderated somewhat.