The Foreign Policy of China towards Iran’ s Nuclear Program (1) Geographical Scope

From the security governance perspective, the authority of the government of the People’ s Republic of China can be seen as being fragmented in mainly an upward fashion in its approach to the nuclear proliferation in Iran. China’ s political authority in this case has shifted from a central-ized state level to a global level, and the country continually stresses its willingness to cooperate with the IAEA and the United Nations, for example through the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). ⁶³ China has also emphasized its support and full compliance with the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Materials, the Nuclear Security Summit and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, later renamed the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC). ⁶⁴

More specifically and in relation to Iran, upward fragmentation is most visible in China’ s involvement in diplomatic negotiations towards Iran, where political authority is shared between all actors to engage in talks with Iran and to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapons program. Specifically, China has stated its wish to play a constructive role in these talks, collabo-rating with all other involved actors, in order to fashion a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. ⁶⁵

(2) Functional Scope

Generally, China has clearly indicated its belief that states are the main actors in international society, although it also recognizes that the problem of nuclear proliferation requires a global re-sponse. It also recognizes that changes in the structures of the international system have given rise to the need of a more comprehensive framework for managing this threat. ⁶⁶ It should be noted, however, that China has not indicated that the case of Iran represents such a threat.

This outlook stands in stark contrast to the EU policy, which views Iran as a potential threat to the NPT regime. China instead has stressed Iran’ s right as a state to pursue a civilian nuclear program while also addressing the need for a diplomatic solution to the present situation. ⁶⁷ Accord-ingly, China continues to emphasize that the true nature of Iran’ s nuclear program and its inten-tions are yet to be confirmed, and until then, China will continue to support Iran’ s right to nuclear energy. In comparison with the EU’ s attempts to use a trade and cooperation agreement to induce compliance, which can be seen as a rather pro-active approach, China has instead adopted a pas-sive stance, supporting diplomacy and negotiations without applying pressure on Iran. ⁶⁸ Therefore, it can be argued that there has been a fragmentation of political authority in terms of the func-tional scope when it comes to nuclear proliferation issues in general. This is, however, not visible in China’ s policy in the specific case of the Iranian nuclear program, as Iran’ s right to a civilian nuclear program is constantly emphasized.

(3) Distribution of Resources

From China’ s perspective, the mobilization of resources to influence the process of policy decision-making and implementation has been somewhat fragmented, as China has cooperated with all other actors involved in the process when attempting to influence Iran. China has, for ex-ample, taken part in the package solution offered to Iran in 2006, as mentioned above. Again, it should be highlighted that the package solution mentions that restrictions on Iran will be lifted if Iran meets the demands of all involved parties; yet, the incentives offered are a result of policies pursued by the EU and the United States, and as such, China has not offered any specific incen-tives. This indicates that China has adopted a somewhat unclear yet flexible “middle way” policy toward the Iranian nuclear crisis, supporting the efforts of the EU-3 and the US to induce Iranian compliance without proactively contributing Chinese resources to resolve the problem. Thus, there has been an element of fragmentation in terms of resources.

(4) Interests

In addition to preventing spiraling nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, China is also con-cerned about its energy security, and the import of oil has become an important part of its policy. ⁶⁹ As observed above, there has been a clear shift in EU policy vis-à-vis the Iranian case away from promoting strong states or state interests toward a more comprehensive regional and international approach. In contrast, Chinese foreign policy is more heavily influenced by national goals or inter-ests, although China also stresses the importance of cooperation in managing Iran’ s nuclear ambi-tions. China is keen on promoting further domestic growth by maintaining a stable and cooperative

international environment. ⁷⁰ Consequently, China has adopted a flexible stance on the Iranian issue on the basis of national interests rather than trans-regional or international interests. Moreover, China seems to be sympathetic toward Iran in terms of sovereign rights to pursue a civilian nucle-ar program. In contrast, the EU places greater emphasis on Iran’ s obligations for transpnucle-arency and cooperation, in line with the NPT, rather than its sovereign rights. Beijing’ s approach can therefore be seen as a balancing act of maintaining sound economic relations with Iran while not alienating Washington.

From the broader perspective of China’ s concern with its own global image as a responsible and active actor in trans-regional and international security areas, it becomes apparent that China’ s involvement in diplomatic negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear program is guided and influ-enced by the interests of the state. This implies less fragmentation of political authority along the interest dimension. Although China states that its interests are in line with the interests of interna-tional society and those of other countries, including France, the UK, Germany, Russia and the EU, Beijing’ s behavior shows a clear emphasis on national interests. ⁷¹ This is ultimately displayed in China’ s foreign policy statements concerning the position on policies pursued by the EU-3. For instance, China did not endorse sanctions as a means to control nuclear proliferation, declaring that

“Sanctions and pressure can hardly offer fundamental solutions to the issues.” ⁷² Similarly, a state-ment made by the Chinese delegation at the occasion of the 2011 IAEA Board of Governors meet-ing showed that China does not necessarily share the views of the other involved actors: “Though there are gaps among the positions of all parties, there will be chances for bridging the differences and enlarging common grounds as long as the negotiation is started.” ⁷³

(5) Norms

Norms underpin Chinese involvement in the diplomatic negotiations with Iran in a crucial manner. China’ s concern with its global image as a responsible and credible actor is evident in its statements about its compliance with the NPT regime and global norms on nuclear non-prolifera-tion. This shows that there has been a fragmentation of the normative stance of China in terms of nuclear non-proliferation.

It should be noted, however, that China’ s emphasis on Iran’ s sovereign right to pursue a civil-ian nuclear program again indicates less fragmentation than the normative approach adopted by Europe. Chinese foreign policy places significantly less emphasis on the international responsibil-ity of Iran to account for its past clandestine actions in nuclear development. Moreover, China is believed to have played a crucial role in slowing down a UNSC referral of the Iranian case against the wishes of other parties. ⁷⁴ It is likely that China’ s action is linked to its determination to protect its national interests.

(6) Decision-making

It is in the decision-making process that the fragmentation of political authority is more clear-ly visible where China is concerned. Through its foreign policy China has continued to emphasize collaboration between international organizations, individual states and regional security institu-tions. Decisions on how to proceed in diplomatic negotiations with Iran have been the result of consultation and joint effort by all actors, of which China has been an integral part.

This participation is closely tied to the dimension of interests. As mentioned above, China must carefully balance its interests when involving itself in the difficult international negotiations with Iran. From China’ s perspective, the most ideal situation would be one in which the EU-3, Russia and the United States were not pitted against an unyielding Iran, as this would likely lead to demands for further UNSC resolutions and pressure on China to adopt a more active and defined stance, which might anger one or more of the actors involved. Accordingly, it is in China’ s interest to prevent such a situation from occurring in the first place, and this explains its desire for

negotia-tions to continue and for all parties to be involved in the decision-making process. This implies a shift from centralization to fragmentation. ⁷⁵

(7) Policy Implementation

Similar to the decision-making process, political authority in policy implementation can be seen to have been fragmented as China continues to cooperate with Russia, the EU-3, the IAEA and the UN in policy implementation, first to verify Iran’ s intentions and the current stage of nu-clear development, and secondly, to prevent nunu-clear proliferation. ⁷⁶ It is likely that China’ s desire to maintain a stable environment for its development has influenced the way Chinese policy imple-mentation regarding nuclear proliferation challenges in Iran has developed. ⁷⁷ Implementing policy in a multilateral manner rather than bilaterally can also be seen as having enabled China to main-tain a flexible “middle way” foreign policy by not siding with either the US or the EU-3, while stressing the importance of diplomacy and negotiations. This stance arguably increases its legiti-macy as a responsible international actor, now emerging to engage with the international commu-nity.