An analysis of our findings from the case studies, with both case-specific and general insights into how
1.2 KEY FINDING II: THE DECARBONISATION CHALLENGE CAN INTERSECT WITH VARIOUS OTHER FRAGILITY AND SECURITY RISKS
The decarbonisation challenge in fossil fuel-exporting countries frequently intersects with other fragility and security risks. Such risks and their severity vary across countries. They include conflicts at national and regional level, weak and fragile governance arrangements, and the impacts of climate change. These risks can exacerbate the difficulty of moving away from fossil fuels and decarbonisation could in turn enhance these risks if not addressed adequately. While such risks are negligible in Canada, they are particularly grave in countries whose political settlement to a large extent depends on income from fossil fuel exports (Azerbaijan, Qatar, Nigeria).
1.2.1 National and regional security risks
Our case studies illustrate that fossil fuel-exporting countries frequently face significant national and/or regional security risks. Indeed, all our case study countries except Canada face significant or even serious security challenges; these take different forms and are highly specific to the respective contexts.
For Colombia and Indonesia, the main security challenges are domestic. Indonesia has a long history of separatist movements and clashes between divergent ethnic and religious groups (as well as discontent over unequal treatment of indigenous groups). In addition, terrorism remains a palpable threat to security.
Colombia has faced long-standing internal conflicts with insurgent groups, in particular the FARC.
Although the conflict with the latter was in principle settled with the 2016 peace agreement, the situation remains fragile and the country is in the midst of complex peacebuilding and post-conflict development processes. In addition, the Venezuelan political crisis that escalated in 2018-9 has affected Colombia, which hosts more than 1 million Venezuelan refugees.
In the cases of Qatar and Azerbaijan, security risks relate in particular to the regional context. Being located in the Middle East and the Gulf region, Qatar is part of a sensitive and challenging security environment, including the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional dominance and the involvement of various external actors (the US, Russia, and Turkey in particular). In this context, deteriorating relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in the 2010s culminated in them launching an embargo against Qatar in 2017 – which has also left the Gulf Cooperation Council in paralysis. With regard to Azerbaijan, the country is in a “frozen” conflict with Armenia over the exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is entirely situated in Azerbaijan but has an Armenian ethnic majority. After the outbreak of war over the issue in 1988, a precarious ceasefire has remained in place since 1994.
Nigeria faces both serious internal and regional security threats, which pose a risk to political and economic stability. The security challenges include long-standing secessionist sentiments and movements in the South East (in the wake of the secessionist Biafran War from 1967-1970) and militant groups in the Niger Delta seeking control and revenues from the oil industry. Further to the North, the insurgency of the Islamist sect Boko Haram has constituted a serious security risk since 2012. It also connects to the broader and growing security threat posed by Islamist extremists across several countries in the Sahel region (including Mali, Niger and others). Many of the security challenges have their roots in acute socio-economic inequality and conflicts, for example intensifying competition for fertile land and control over oil resources.
Under these circumstances, decarbonisation can particularly hamper efforts to alleviate domestic conflict, while also creating opportunities. In particular, declining fossil fuel exports could threaten economic stability and government spending commitments essential for conflict management and post-conflict development. In Colombia, for example, the long-term success of the peace agreement with the FARC will rely on the government honouring its commitments under the agreement to major investments and reform in rural areas. The resulting significant budgetary pressures Colombia has faced in recent years have already been aggravated by fluctuations in its key commodity markets – and demonstrate the challenge arising from decarbonisation. As another example, volatility in oil markets may place further strain on Nigeria’s economy and exacerbate other interrelated fragility risks, such as major gaps in public infrastructure, high inequality, rapid population growth and urbanisation, and growing insecurity of rural livelihoods in its Middle Belt and Northern states. Having said that, advancing decarbonisation policies can also create opportunities that provide leeway to counter negative effects (e.g. through the expansion of renewable energies).
1.2.2 Fragile governance contexts
Most of the fossil fuel-exporting countries also face governance challenges at the national level, although their significance varies (see also Figure 1). These seriously curtail the respective governments’ capacities to effectively address dependence on fossil fuel export and, more generally, to implement targeted policies to foster low-carbon development. The main exception is Canada, which is a developed and mature parliamentary democracy (with long-standing tensions between its French-speaking and English-speaking regions having been successfully managed in the 21st century).
Nigeria stands out as being particularly debilitated in this respect. While characterised by increasing inequality and significant demographic pressures, Nigeria also suffers from high levels of corruption and weak governance. The ability of the state to collect taxes and control its external borders (and internal territory) is therefore seriously curtailed. Key indexes point to low levels of human development and poor governance, while the Fragile State Index places Nigeria in the “alert” category (see Figure 1).
Indonesia and Azerbaijan also face significant challenges. As well as grappling with high levels of inequality, Indonesia faces issues regarding discrimination and state capacity. While strength of governance is rated as medium, with state legitimacy and public services in particular seeing strong improvements, the Fragile State Index remains at “warning” level. Azerbaijan is characterised by serious issues of corruption and political freedom. The 2018 Freedom House Index categorises Azerbaijan as “not free” and state legitimacy, the repression of civil liberties and press freedom are identified as shortcomings.
Qatar and Colombia face far fewer governance challenges. Qatar has low levels of corruption or repression, but faces challenges with respect to democracy and political rights (general freedom, civil liberties, political participation). A particular issue is the problematic situation concerning around two million expatriate workers, mainly low-skilled Asian construction workers. Qatar has been criticised for their exploitation and for a lack of integration. In reverse, Colombia has developed relatively strong democratic institutions and has improved on the rule of law, although corruption continues to constitute a central challenge (along with high levels of inequality). Overall, governance challenges present less of an impediment to addressing fossil fuel dependency.
1.2.3 Climate change impacts
Climate change is predicted to have a medium to high impact on the countries studied. These impacts could strengthen support for engaging in climate policy and related cooperation. However, the concrete impacts might also restrict the capacity to act on fossil fuel dependency, as priority might be given to urgent adaptation measures.
Climate change vulnerability is assessed as medium in Canada, Azerbaijan and Qatar (Figure 1).
Temperatures in Canada have already increased more than 1.5°C, approximately double the global average and significant impacts are particularly being felt in coastal and northern parts of the country. At the same time, Canada may also see some positive impacts, such as growth in agricultural food production in northern regions. The country also scores relatively favourably on indexes measuring vulnerability and readiness. Qatar is affected by sea-level rise (with 96 percent of its population living in coastal towns and cities and much of its infrastructure in peril) and the associated risk of groundwater salinisation. Further increases to already high temperatures and aggravated water scarcity also constitute significant challenges, while the country scores relatively high on readiness. In Azerbaijan, rising temperatures constitute a threat for the agricultural sector due to resulting increased evaporation, droughts and water shortages – while the sea-level of the Caspian Sea may in fact fall as a result of increased evaporation.
The country scores medium on vulnerability and readiness.
Climate change vulnerability is considered high in Colombia, Indonesia and Nigeria. Colombia is subject to a variety of climate change impacts, including sea-level rise, more frequent and more intense La Nina and El Nino phenomena and decreased rainfall. Higher temperatures and increased water scarcity (due to decreasing run-off from the mountains) are of particular concern in the Andean region, home to 75 percent of the population. With the second longest coastline in the world, Indonesia is particularly impacted by changing rainfall patterns, temperature and sea-level rise, and extreme weather events and natural disasters. Jakarta is already the world’s fastest-sinking city, with around 40 percent of the city already below sea-level. Nigeria is already struggling with increasing temperatures, erratic rainfall, desertification, rising sea-levels and drought. This puts further pressure on an agricultural sector that is already struggling to maintain or enhance productivity, as well as urban centres, not least Lagos.
Addressing these challenges is also much more difficult in contexts where economic, social and governance readiness are lacking.