Regional international societies - Regional Organizations in International Society: Decolonizat

What are the implications of studying international society on a regional scale?

Again, the answer depends on whether one adopts an individualist or an intersubjectivist ontology. An individualist reading of the English School focusing on actors and interaction would define a regional international society as a physical space where patterns of interaction are particularly dense and where individuals’ values and norms

37 converge. By contrast, an intersubjectivist perspective will contend that shared meanings form the essence of regional international societies. From this view, an international regional society is a geographically coherent entity that is characterized by distinctive patterns of intersubjective meanings that differentiate it from the rest of the world. Such an approach to regional international societies can add to Comparative Regionalism by drawing attention to the mechanisms by which these meanings are institutionalized or changed over time, and therefore to the political and social dynamics underlying the stability and change of regions.

Note that this does not necessarily mean that such regional international societies are more solidarist than the global level, as the simplistic thick-thin distinction suggests (Stivachtis and Webber 2011: 110). The half-hearted incorporation of human rights norms and the idea of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in fact suggest that Southeast Asia is a more pluralist regional international society than the global one, where these human rights and the R2P have, one could argue, acquired the status of primary institutions. Instead, the regional-global nexus should be thought of as one of mutual constitution: regional international societies share certain primary institutions with the global level but they might reject certain others. Global primary institutions can influence developments on the regional level by determining a certain framework for the range of forms that regional societies can take, while at the same time, such global dynamics are likely to be driven by changes on the regional level.

The example of the EU as a global actor can illustrate this mutual constitution.

In its aspiration to assert its position as a global power, the EU has struggled to be accepted as a unitary actor in global fora such as the G8, the G20 or the Bretton Woods organizations (Jørgensen 2009). However, the structures of these fora and organizations were created based on the primary institution of national sovereignty. As they accommodate the hybrid ‘beast’ that is the EU, conventional notions of sovereignty are undermined, which is in line with the EU’s ambition to transcend the Westphalian, pluralist international society (Ahrens and Diez 2015). However, at the same time, the EU pursues efforts to increase its actorness in global governance (Murau and Spandler 2015), which can result in it adopting more state-like features. This, in turn, impinges on its internal project of creating a post-Westphalian international society (Borg and Diez 2016). The relation between the regional and the global level of international society is thus complex and interdependent.

If the main features of regional international societies are substantial difference in shared meanings from the global level and a spatially circumscribed extension, as argued above, an intersubjectivist English School perspective on regionalism must focus on how different regions construct this difference by reproducing specific primary and secondary institutions. By consequence, this study will pay particular attention on two aspects in the study of regional primary and secondary institutions. The first is the question of how specific regional institutions contribute to the drawing of boundaries. It has been widely acknowledged in constructivist literature that social structures depend to a certain extent on the exclusionary and inclusionary effects of shared meanings. For example, the EU has developed an identity as a community of democracies. If we take liberal democracy to be a primary institution of the European international society, this institution draws a boundary – though not necessarily material – between EU member states and illiberal states.

The second analytical focal point is: in what way does the building of regional primary and secondary institutions imply changing ideas about political authority in the region? Hettne and Söderbaum (2002: 461) have argued that the ‘regionness’ of an international social space depends on the degree to which “a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region.” This ties in with basic tenets of the English School theorizing of regions: since one of the defining features of the global international society is its largely anarchical structure, where states are by and large the only legitimate actors, constructing a regionally distinct level of international society can take the form of shifting authority to a central locus, thus shaping “a new collective set of priorities, norms and interests at regional level” (Warleigh-Lack 2006: 758).

Using Watsonʼs (1992) terms, higher levels of regionness imply a move from independent constituent units to a more hierarchical international society.¹⁰ While an individualist ontological position would allow an English School researcher to acknowledge this, an intersubjective ontology also allows him or her to ask about the politics of this process: who promoted such changing ideas on basis of which authority, and using which kinds of legitimizing arguments? Who opposed regionalization and why was their resistance overcome?

10 Increasing regionness therefore goes beyond a mere ‘solidarizationʼ in that it implies a relocation of legitimate actorness at the aggregate regional level, whereas in a solidarist international society states remain the primary actors.

39 3.3 Primary and secondary institutions

Having clarified the implications of regional analysis for English School theorizing, I now turn to the concept of international institutions, which has for a long time been a key element of the English School. This is not surprising, considering the fact that institutions embody the School’s core claims that international relations are socially constituted and that order is possible even in a context of anarchy (Bull 1977).

From the outset, however, clear definitions or profound theorization of the exact nature of those institutions have been largely absent from the writings of the English School.

Catalogues of supposedly existing institutions have been far more abundant¹¹ than inquiries into the conditions and mechanisms of their emergence, persistence, and change.

3.3.1 Different concepts of institutional hierarchy

In particular, as I have mentioned above, while the idea that there is some sort of hierarchy between different kinds of institutions is a recurring theme in English School theorizing, scholars have not clarified the relation between different levels of international society (Knudsen 2015b). Bull (1977: xiv) was keen to demarcate his understanding of international institutions from formal organizations. The balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management are deep structural components of international society because they are the very conditions for international order: they arise out of a functional demand, which is to render effective the rules that allow international society to follow its fundamental goals (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 58; Neumann 2003: 9).

Other English School scholars, especially of the younger generation, replace this functional idea with the notion that the fundamental institutions Bull was talking about are constitutive of international society, its actors and their goals in the first place (Knudsen 2015b). Instead of using the degree of formality as a criterion, like Bull, they contrast these constitutive from regulative institutions, such as international organizations. While the first define the basic rules of the game and the actors involved, the latter constrain the range of possible forms of interaction. In this vein, Reus-Smit (1997) differentiates fundamental institutions and issue-specific regimes, Holsti (2004)

11 For an overview, see Buzan (2004: 167–176).

distinguishes between foundational and procedural institutions and Dunne (2001: 78) separates constitutive norms from more specific rules.¹²

However, applying a constitutive logic to the level of general principles and norms while leaving the level of the more specific rules and procedures within the realm of regulative, and therefore rationalist, causality leads to an often overlooked problem:

the constitutive-regulative distinction is, in essence, not merely about ontology (Dunne 2001: 78; Keohane 1988; Searle 1995: 27–29) but also about epistemology – while regulative rules have causal effects, constitutive rules affect structure by defining situations and are therefore subject to constitutive explanation. Thus, the explanatory logic differs depending on what kinds of rules are in question (Dessler 1989; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1998). As a consequence, the concept curtails any attempts to coherently theorize the connection between the two types of institutions, especially in a dynamic context.

The task is thus to find a conception of institutional levels within a singular ontology. Buzan’s (2004) distinction between primary/evolved and secondary/designed institutions is promising because it focuses on how the respective types of institutions come into being, rather than looking for profoundly ontological differences. However, his reflections on the relation between the two institutional levels and the question of institutional change remain underdeveloped and inconsistent. At one point, he depicts secondary institutions as derivative of actors’ self-interest and, consequently, as the object of regime theory (Buzan 2004: 163–167). When he does take on the matter, he sometimes falls back into the habit of ascribing them to different ontologies, namely when he suggests that secondary institutions can serve as a kind of empirical indicator, reflecting as a positive materialization or manifestation the existence of specific primary institutions or specific types of international society (Buzan 2009: 44, 180, 2014: 30).

This is an idea derived from the individualist understanding of international society, where patterns of interaction can provide evidence for the existence of an international society. In this logic, secondary institutions are situated in a more ‘material’ ontology, which is epiphenomenal to the dynamics on the ‘ideational’ level of primary

12 In fact, while Bull does not classify his institutions into different types, his distinction of three kinds of rules contains a similar argument: These rules, which embody the institutions and render them effective, come in the form of fundamental or constitutional rules, rules of coexistence and rules concerned to regulate cooperation (Bull 1977: 67–71). With the rules of coexistence as a kind of intermediate layer, this tripartite taxonomy mirrors the constitutive-regulative distinction of the newer English School writings.

41 institutions. This view is shared by other authors who are sympathetic to an individualist understanding of international society (Murden 2009; Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014; Schouenborg 2013: 32).¹³

In yet another interpretation, Buzan (Buzan 1993: 250; see also 2014: 30) indicates that regimes are somehow nested in the larger structure of international society, which makes the latter “a regime of regimes”. He thus seems to see the more fundamental institutions of international society, such as international law, as being constitutive of secondary institutions: they form “the political foundation that is necessary before regimes can come into play” (Buzan 1993: 350). This resonates not only with Manning’s (1962: 160) description of the League of Nations and the UN as

‘games within the game’ of international law, but also with the embeddedness argument of Comparative Regionalism, according to which the shape of regional organizations reflects the underlying regional norms.

Buzan does not elaborate, however, on how this constitution works, and what role secondary institutions play in this framework: do they merely adapt to changes on the level of primary institutions or do they have genuine effects that are irreducible to the primary structures? While the terminology seems to suggest a hierarchy between the two layers of international society, I think it should not be theoretically prejudiced towards a uni-directional logic of institutional change in which secondary institutions always adapt to developments on the primary level. In this, I agree with Knudsen (2015b: 3), who argues that “international organizations are important as means and drivers of fundamental institutional change.” Therefore, the direction of causal influence between the layers should be seen as an empirical question.

3.3.2 Engaging the primary-secondary distinction with constructivism

Despite Buzan’s advances, thus, the relation between primary and secondary institutions remains an open question in English School theorizing. I contend that a more thorough engagement with constructivist and institutionalist ideas offers the key to remedying this shortcoming. Several constructivist authors have called to acknowledge the constitutive effects of more specific rules, which are often only seen as regulative or functional (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Onuf 1989). In a contribution to a volume on

13 The methodological implications of this understanding are criticized by Navari (2009c: 45–46).

regime theory, Hurrell (1993: 59) writes: “The functional benefits of specific rules are, therefore, only one part of the picture. An essential element is the legitimacy of rules which derives from the common sense of being part of a legal community [...].” The constitutive character of specific rules – or secondary institutions – is rooted in the acknowledgement by the actors that their identity as a member of the international community is dependent on their acceptance of the rules, and visible in their efforts to justify their actions. Similarly, Adler (1997: 345) notices that “international organizations can be a site of interest and identity formation”, granting or denying recognition as a member of the global ‘community of nations’, as in the case of the United Nations (UN), or of a region, as in the case of regional organizations such as the EU.

In a response to two critical reactions to ‘From International to World Society’, Buzan (2005: 190–191) is quite accommodating towards such arguments about the constitutive effects of secondary institutions and admits: “one of the unresolved questions left hanging in the book is where, if anywhere, the constitutive power of institutions of any sort stops.” However, his individualist approach and his conception of institutions seem to distract him from a potential solution. Locating structure in unit properties, he defines institutions as “durable and recognized patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, [and]

embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles” (Buzan 2004: 181, emphasis added).¹⁴ This definition, which conflates norms, rules and practice, ties in with Bull’s (1977: 74) definition of institutions in ‘The Anarchical Society’ as “a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals”. Both conceptions are rooted in a behaviouralist understanding of institutions, represented among others by March and Olsen (March and Olsen 1998: 948; Raymond 1997), who see institutions as “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations”. The most striking characteristic of this definition is the identification of behaviour or practice as an element of institutions. As Duffield (2007: 4) notes, “the primary emphasis is on the actions and activities of the

14 To be exact, this definition refers to primary institutions, but there is nothing to indicate that the centrality of practice should not pertain to his definition of secondary institutions as well. More on the primary-secondary distinction below.

43 actors concerned rather than other institutional features.” If interactions are permanent and rule-bound, then they are institutional.

The habit of conflating practice and norms has been criticized by a range of authors. The reasons for this critique include that practice must not necessarily be informed by underlying norms or rules, that norms and rules can exist despite their disregard in practice (Onuf 1989: 71, 78; Raymond 1997: 217), different practices can uphold the same norms (Knudsen 2015b: 17) and that, from a methodological standpoint, the conceptual integration of norms and behaviour precludes the use of the former to explain the latter (Duffield 2007: 4; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). From the point of view of this thesis, the main disadvantage of merging institutions and practice is that it obscures the ways by which the former emerge out of the latter and the latter are constitutive of the former (Wendt 1999: 26–27). The approach is also inept to account for cases when different institutions formulate contradictory expectations – a likely scenario, as I have pointed out above. Without an account of these mechanisms, it is hard to clarify the relation between regional organizations and regional normative deep structures.

By contrast, if one adopts an intersubjective ontology, institutions are seen as sets of intersubjectively held meanings, which are analytically separated from the practice of international actors. Behaviour which is inconsistent with prevailing norms does not invalidate those norms, as long as it is perceived as a transgression of the boundaries of acceptable behaviour by the perpetrator or by others. It thus opposes approaches which ascribe an inherent normative quality to practices as such (Bull 1977;

Navari 2011) and sees practice instead as guided by norms – an idea that is also prominent in sociological institutionalism (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). While institutions are analytically separate from practice, they are intricately linked to it in a structurationist process: they emerge from interaction and at the same time inform interaction by defining who can count as a legitimate actor and what is perceived as legitimate practice (Giddens 1984; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Onuf 1989; Reus-Smit 1999).¹⁵ In the English School, such a structurationist interpretation of international institutions is also suggested by Knudsen (2015b). The intersubjectivist approach draws

15 The social-theoretical concept of structuration was famously introduced into IR theory by Wendt (1987; see also 1999: 139–190; Wendt and Duvall 1989). Other appropriations include Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), and Onuf (1989).

attention to two kinds of mechanisms that link institutions and practice: on the one hand, the processes of institutionalization by which collectively held meanings emerge, and on the other, the processes of constitution by which these meanings are informative of practice. In this sense, I take international institutions to be sets of discursively formulated expectations about legitimate actorness and rightful conduct in international relations.

To sum these thoughts up, Buzan’s distinction between primary and secondary institutions promises to clarify the relation between different institutional levels, but so far this promise remains unfulfilled. I propose that adopting an intersubjectivist conception of international society offers a way of answering open questions because it draws attention to the mechanisms by which different kinds of institutions emerge from the practice of regional actors and in turn shape this very practice. Applying this idea not only, as Knudsen (2015b) does, to primary but also to secondary institutions opens up ways of including the latter more firmly as elements of English School theory and analysis in their own right, because it allows us to distinguish between primary and secondary institutions within a single ontology. In the following section, I expand on this point by developing a model of change and continuity in primary and secondary institutions.

3.4 Institutional stability and change – towards a structurationist model

If, as asserted above, both primary and secondary institutions have some kind of constitutive effect on actors and their practice, a central criterion for distinguishing between the institutional levels collapses (Onuf 1994: 9). However, to renounce any differentiation between types of institutions is not helpful either. To assume that an international organization is effectively the same as a normative principle such as sovereignty is not only counterintuitive, it would also mean to forego possibilities for explaining the dynamics of the relations between them.

So how can we meaningfully distinguish between the two layers of international society within a single ontology? Having made the case for an intersubjectivist reading of the English School and an analytical separation of institutions and practice, I propose that the best way to recover the primary-secondary distinction is by adopting a structurationist perspective that revolves around an understanding of primary and secondary institutions as being entangled in specific processes of constitution and

45 institutionalization. I argue that primary institutions and secondary institutions both are informative of international practice, but they are so in different ways, as there are different mechanisms of constitution and institutionalization at play (Wendt and Duvall 1989: 63–66). In the remainder of this chapter, I will present a model of primary and

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