1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Turkey’s economy grew fast as it was opened up progressively since the 1980s, its financial sector was stabilized and reformed after 2000, and the structural change and urbanization have unlocked productivity gains from the reallocation of labor to higher value added activities. The AK Party government’s social policies have been supportive of inclusive growth benefiting from the fiscal space generated by conservative fiscal management after the 2001 crisis. Through the decade, macroeconomic discipline was maintained and governance improved significantly, supported by the anchor of the EU accession process. This, coupled with political stability, ensured market-‐based policies were sustained, allowing the private sector to prosper and the growing economic clout of a new generation of Anatolian entrepreneurs to emerge. As a result, the middle class expanded with the entering of prospering periphery (“Islamic population“) into the center.
The urbanization of prospering middle classes has led to radical changes in the lifestyles of the majority of citizens, creating new political demands and contributing to the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). As AK Party’s policies are expected to build of the rising İslamic middle class, understanding their evolution through this process of rapid structural change is significant in order to gauge what this would mean for a “New Turkey”?
This study attempts to identify the areas and directions of change, with a view to determining what kind of dynamics and expectations the rising level of welfare has created in Turkey, how they have impacted the perceptions of the society about democracy and whether they have resulted in any views and attitudes similar to those in western societies. In order to do so, this study compiles and analyzes the studies conducted by research institutions like KONDA, TESEV and Pew during the last 20 years regarding perceptions of the society in Turkey. It also includes a closer look into the issues where surveys seemed to fall short, through observations from focus group discussions.
The first and foremost observation that field studies and focus group discussions commonly support is that the perception and understanding of religiosity among the middle classes are changing rapidly although the “Islamic” nature is very strong. We are facing a dynamic that demands material welfare, that understands freedom increasingly on a individualistic level and that is motivated to adapt to the global environment in line with these goals.
We believe that the observations put forward by this report are crucial in understanding the political and sociological evolution of Turkey, as perceptions, expectations and demands of the rising middle classes will be most important in determining the policies of today’s governments. Through this report, TESEV hopes to contribute to studies on Turkey’s middle classes and to policymaking based on sociological research.
Introduction
Theoretically, the most prominent and accentuated dynamic of the modernization mechanism is the relationship between welfare and democracy. According to modernization theories, modernization comes along with welfare, and an increased level of welfare brings along secularization. Populations that are secularizing and having increased economic resources would demand democracy with the desire to influence the political area. This mechanism, which can function in the other way around as well, also envisages that the establishment of democracy could raise the level of welfare.
This approach also asserts, implicitly, that modernizing societies would resemble Western societies as their level of income rises over time. However, as we observe in the case of Turkey, these dynamics may function in different ways in non-‐Western societies.
During the period between the foundation of the republic in 1923 and AK Party’s rise to power in 2002, Turkey has experienced a centralization process based on a “Turkish and secularist” identity, while other identities have been deprived of both political and economic opportunities. This deficiency in the field of democracy has affected the level of welfare as well; for example, despite the global growth between 1980 and 2002, Turkey’s per capita income has practically stayed the same.
With AK Party coming to power in 2002, the Islamic section has managed to create its own bourgeoisie and middle class, backed also by globalization and the post-‐modern criticism. However, rather than creating a secularization that diminishes the religious congregation, this modernization has on the one hand expanded the congregation and on the other hand altered the meaning of religiosity. Religiosity has been adapted to the requirements of daily life and the equation of morality with religiosity has been impaired, while Islamic and secularist congregations have miscegenated and everybody has become more or less “religious”. In other words, democratic demands are expanding, level of welfare is rising and western lifestyle and values are increasingly getting a foothold in the Islamic section of the country. However, this does not represent a breakaway from religiosity as suggested by modernization theories, but rather the diversification of religiosity and developing a new identity within a pluralist structure.
What do field studies and focus group discussions tell us?
By compiling the studies conducted by institutions like KONDA, TESEV and Pew during the last 20 years regarding the perceptions of the society in Turkey, we tried to identify the areas and the directions of change, with a view to determining what kind of dynamics and expectations the rising level of welfare has created in Turkey, how they have impacted the perceptions of the society on democracy and whether they have resulted in any views and/or attitudes similar to those in western societies. Following this compilation, we wanted to have a closer look into the issues where these studies seemed to fall short of, through focus group discussions. A brief summary of our findings as a result of these studies is presented below.
a) Political institutions and rights
Studies suggest that there has been a large positive change in the society’s attitude towards political rights and freedoms, but the Islamic section still preserves its sensitivity about religious differentiation and a political tension that keeps a dichotomy of secularist/religious alive still continues.
On the other hand, for example, sharia is supported as a religious symbol of a fair and ideal society, rather than being a political demand even among the Islamic section. Likewise, greater importance is attached to political parties’ improving the economy, protecting rights and freedoms and combatting corruption, rather than safeguarding religious values. Common demands include the regulation of state-‐religion relationship by an independent and pluralist organ, provision of religious education by the state in a manner that respects the multiple-‐identity characteristics of the country, and rights of conserved; tolerance towards different sexual identities remains much lower than the tolerance to different ethnic identities. Likewise, broad sections of the society support the view that “chastity” is
There is a tendency towards individualization across the country and this process of individualization moves faster in areas that are under the control of the individuals, such as economy, but more slowly
Turkish society have risen, and that the Turkish society considers other societies from a much more egalitarian perspective, while its judgments are getting harsher.
2002/3 2006/7 2012 demands material welfare, that increasingly understands freedom from an individualistic perspective and that is motivated to adapt to the global environment in line with the asserted goals. majoritarianism and the functions of state are expressed as introducing measures, frameworks and limits on freedoms, a balance is sought in the end, affirming, “a relinquishment of freedoms is
women; that it would encourage individualization on the one hand and the demand for fundamental rights and freedoms on the other. This implies that the new middle class trends of Turkey would move the country closer to the daily life perception of the West.